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ABSTRACT
The development of the oil and gas resources discovered on the
U.K. Continental Shelf has had a significant impact on employment
in Scotland. It is estimated that in Scotland 60,000 - 70,000
people are currently in oil-related employment. Approximately
20,000 of these are employed in (over 300) units manufacturing
offshore-related equipment.
However, it is argued in this thesis that domestic demand for many
items of offshore-related equipment will fall from around 1982 onwards
as the number and size of new field developments being undertaken
declines. It is further argued that if offshore-related employment
is to be maintained in Scotland it is to be hoped that manufacturers
of offshore-related equipment can identify and exploit opportunities
in offshore markets overseas by means of exporting.
It has frequently been suggested that involvement in the development
of North Sea oil fields has given indigenous firms a comparative
advantage over their international competitors. However, very little
is known about the nature and scale of offshore-related exporting
activity being undertaken and virtually nothing about the factors
which influence the aims and attainment of these firms with respect
to exporting. Thus, this thesis represents the first major study of
the practice of exporting in the Scottish manufacturing sector of the
offshore supplies industry.
The main objective of the thesis was to undertake a detailed examination
of the major factors influencing the export performance of this sector
of Scottish industry. This was achieved by means of a series of
in-depth, qualitative interviews with the senior executives responsible
for exporting strategy in a number of offshore-related manufacturers.
In addition, further research was undertaken to investigate possible
future trends in the exporting activity of the surveyed firms. In
order to do this it was first necessary to develop, with the aid of a
survey of expert opinion, a hypothetical scenario of the global
offshore market in the period to 1985. The third and final phase of
the fieldwork then consisted of returning to the original sample of
offshore-related manufacturers to discuss their expected strategy
(particularly with respect to exporting) in the period to 1985,
given the market situation presented in the scenario.
Thus, this thesis provides not only the first in-depth study of the
major factors influencing the offshore-related export performance of
Scottish manufacturers, but also investigates the implications of
these findings for the future of the Scottish manufacturing sector
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1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The development of the U.K.'s oil and gas resources has had a sub¬
stantial impact on the U.K. economy. Firstly, oil and gas production
has exerted a considerable influence on the U.K.'s balance of payments
by increasing exports and replacing oil imports. During the course of
1980 a rate of production roughly equivalent to net self-sufficiency
in oil was attained. Secondly, North Sea oil and gas is becoming an
increasingly important source of central government revenue. In the
financial year 1980/81 government revenue accruing from the U.K.
Continental Shelf - in the form of royalties, petroleum revenue tax and
corporation tax - totalled £3.8 billion (Department of Energy, 1981).
Finally, the development of the U.K.'s oil and gas resources has had an
important direct impact in terms of income and employment creation,
roughly in proportion to the level of capital and operating expenditure
incurred on North Sea oil and gas activity.
The latter effect has been particularly important in Scotland where
unemployment is traditionally well above the national average. By mid-
1978 offshore-related employment - that is, the overall impact of the
offshore oil industry on employment - in Scotland was estimated at
60,000-70,000. Ignoring consumption multiplier effects and those
employed in construction activity, in mid-1978 around 46,450 people were
employed in Scotland in just over 1000 units either partly or wholly-
involved in supplying goods and/or services to the offshore oil industry
(Scottish Office, 1979b). These 1000 units constitute Scotland's
"offshore supplies industry", a term which is used to describe all the
firms which supply equipment and/or services for use in the exploitation
of offshore oil and gas fields. These firms fall into one of three
categories. Firstly, a limited number of established companies had
supplied offshore-related equipment and/or services (either to the
southern North Sea gas fields developed in the 1960's or to the oil
industry in the Middle East and elsewhere) prior to the development in
the 1970's of the oil fields discovered in the U.K. sector of the
2
North Sea. Secondly, a significant number of established engineering
companies diversified into the supply of offshore-related equipment
and/or services following the discovery of North Sea oil. Finally,
many new units were established by both indigenous and foreign
firms (sometimes in the form of joint-ventures) attracted by the
opportunities provided by the expanding North Sea market.
However, much of the employment created by North Sea oil developments,
particularly that in the manufacturing sector, is dependent upon the
development of new fields and as the North Sea gradually matures as
an oil province development activity must be expected to decline.
Consequently, employment in offshore-related manufacturing in Scotland
must be expected to fall unless the offshore-related equipment manufacturers
located in Scotland can identify and exploit other offshore markets
overseas. The Department of Energy's Offshore Supplies Office is clearly
of the opinion that this sector does have export potential, having gone
as far as to state :
"British companies have established performance records
in meeting the difficult and demanding conditions of
the North Sea. They have won the reputation for skill,
reliability and experience to compete strongly for
offshore-related orders anywhere in the world."
(Department of Energy, 1977a)
However, there is very little information available concerning the
exporting activities of this sector of industry. Although the Scottish
Economic Planning Department does periodically collect, analyse and
publish aggregate statistics concerning exports of offshore-related
equipment by manufacturing firms located in Scotland, the data is not
detailed and the method of its collection - structured questionnaire -
prohibits any explanation of the data pattern. Hence very little is
known about the nature and scale of the exporting being undertaken by
these firms and virtually nothing about the factors which influence their
aims and attainment with respect to exporting.
1.2 AIMS AMD METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
This research seeks to satisfy the need for a thorough study of the
practice of exporting in the firms located in Scotland which manufacture
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equipment for use by the offshore oil industry, that is, the Scottish
manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry. A limited
amount of original statistical evidence concerning the exporting
performance of these firms is presented. However, the main objective
of the thesis is to provide the first detailed study of the major
factors which influence the export performance of these firms. The
main data base of the study therefore results from a series of in-depth,
qualitative interviews with the senior executives responsible for
determining exporting strategy in a number of offshore-related
manufacturers.
Indeed, the qualitative research methodology adopted provides this thesis
with an additional element of originality. Studies of export
performance in other industries have tended to use a very rigid approach
utilising a structured questionnaire (be it postal or interviewer-
administered) which results in interviews following predetermined lines
and respondents' answers being categorised into preconceived 'slots'.
However, in the course of his desk research, the researcher identified
the attitude of senior management towards exporting as a potentially
vital element among the complex factors influencing export performance.
Therefore, it was decided that the nature of the research problem
required a more flexible approach than those offered by heavily structured
interviewing techniques. Indeed, the qualitative approach allowed more
freedom to probe responses and hence resulted in greater depth of
information and a better understanding of the real motives for behaviour
than would normally have been possible with the utilisation of more
structured techniques. Thus, the adoption of this novel approach
provided valuable insights into management thinking with respect to
exporting in the context of the Scottish manufacturing sector of the
offshore supplies industry.
Having analysed the major factors influencing the export performance
and export potential of this group of firms, further research was
undertaken to investigate possible future trends in their exporting
activity in the period to 1985. This was achieved by requesting the
surveyed firms to outline their expected strategic response to a
reasonable, hypothetical scenario of the global offshore market in the
period 1980-85. This scenario was developed by the researcher based
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on a survey of expert opinion supported, where appropriate, by
information from published sources.
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The first major section of the thesis examines the nature of the
offshore oil and gas supplies industry, which represents the environment
in which the study was carried out. This section commences with a
chapter devoted to the detailed appraisal of the operations and technol¬
ogical requirements associated with the three main stages of offshore
oil activity - namely exploration, development and production/operation.
In particular, it is emphasised that the demand for many items of
offshore-related equipment is closely associated with the level of
development expenditure. The following chapter - chapter 3 -
commences with a general outline of the market for goods and services
created by North Sea oil developments and the response which British
industry has made to these opportunities. It is stressed that although
in the exploitation of any major oil basin there is considerable over¬
lapping of the exploration, development and production phases of
activity, as an area matures as an oil province both the relative and
absolute importance of operating expenditure will rise and the level of
exploration and development expenditure will fall. Moreover, as the
demand for offshore-related equipment is closely associated with the
level of development expenditure, offshore-related manufacturing employ¬
ment in the U.K. can be expected to decline as the North Sea matures as
an oil province, ceteris paribus. Chapter 3 also presents a detailed
analysis of the major factors influencing the pattern of British
industry's success and failure in its attempts to break into the domestic
offshore market. (An appreciation of British industry's performance
in the U.K. sector of the North Sea was necessary in order, for example,
to identify problems which might be replicated in overseas markets).
Finally, after commencing with a general discussion of the participation
of Scottish industry in the offshore supplies market, chapter 4
concentrates on presenting a detailed profile of the Scottish manufacturing
sector of the offshore supplies industry, which constitutes the population
from which the sample of respondent firms was drawn.
The second section of the thesis discusses the theoretical and method-
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ological issues upon which the study is based. Chapter 5 begins
with an analysis of the strategic alternatives available to offshore-
related equipment manufacturers facing a declining domestic market
and stresses that if offshore-related manufacturing employment is to
be maintained in Scotland, it is vital that attention is focussed on
exporting offshore-related technology to offshore markets overseas.
The remainder of Chapter 5 and the whole of Chapter 6 are devoted to
a review of literature concerning export performance in other
industries, undertaken in order to identify the major factors which
may influence the export performance and export potential of the
Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry. In
particular, Chapter 5 examines the factors likely to influence manage¬
ment's attitude to exporting (which in turn will help to determine
whether the resources necessary for successful exporting are committed),
while Chapter 6 analyses the association between alternative export
marketing methods and exporting success.
Chapter 7 outlines the survey aims and methodology. There were, in
fact, three distinct phases of interviewing. The first (and major)
phase consisted of in-depth, qualitative interviews in a sample of
40 firms located in Scotland involved in manufacturing offshore-related
equipment. The primary aim of these interviews was the identification
of the major factors influencing the aims and performance of these firms
with respect to exporting. The second phase of interviewing comprised
a survey of expert opinion, which formed the basis of a reasonable,
hypothetical scenario of the global offshore market in the period
1980-85. The final phase of the fieldwork consisted of a further round
of in-depth interviews in the original group of 40 companies, undertaken
with the objective of appraising likely future trends in the offshore-
related exporting involvement of these firms in the period to 1985. The
surveyed firms were asked to base their final phase responses on the
scenario presented to them by the researcher.
The final section presents the fieldwork findings and conclusions.
Chapter 8 contains an analysis of the limited amount of quantitative
information which resulted from a short statistical questionnaire
completed during the course of the first major phase of interviewing.
However, the analysis and discussion of the main body of qualitative
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data concerning the major factors influencing the export performance
of the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry
is contained in Chapters 9 and 10. While the former examines the
findings concerning the nature of the factors influencing managerial
attitutde to exporting and its effect on export performance, the
latter investigates the relationship between the use of certain export
marketing methods and exporting success. The scenario of the global
offshore market situation (1980-85) derived by the researcher is
included as Chapter 11, with the analysis of the expected strategic
response of the sample to this scenario being undertaken in the
following chapter, which also provides a rough assessment of expected
future trends in the employment, turnover and exports of the Scottish
manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry. Finally,
Chapter 13 draws together the results of the three major phases of
the fieldwork and derives general conclusions. In particular, the
final chapter synthesises the findings with respect to the major factors
influencing the export performance of the surveyed firms and examines
the implications of these findings for the future of the offshore-related
manufacturers located in Scotland.
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CHAPTER TWO
OFFSHORE OIL & GAS OPERATIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The following three chapters provide the background to the offshore
oil and gas supplies industry in which the study was undertaken. While
Chapter 3. examines the performance of British industry in supplying
the market for offshore-related equipment and services created by North
Sea developments and Chapter 4 focusses attention on the particip¬
ation of Scottish companies in the offshore supplies market, the pur¬
pose of the present chapter is to provide an introduction to offshore
oil and gas activity, particularly the nature and costs of offshore-
related technology.
Following the brief summary of the historical development of offshore
oil and gas activity provided in section 2.2, sections 2.3 - 2.5
present an examination of the operations and technological requirements
associated with each of the three main stages in the exploitation of
an oil province - namely exploration, development and production - with
particular reference to the North Sea. A glossary of technical terms
used but not fully explained in the main body of this chapter is
provided as Appendix 2.1.
2.2 THE HISTORY OF OFFSHORE OIL & GAS ACTIVITY
It was not until 1946 that large-scale drilling operations began from
fixed platforms erected in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico
off Lousiana and Texas. During the 1950's discoveries were made in
the Gulf of Mexico, the Persian Gulf and Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela,
while in the 1960' s West Africa, South-East Asia and the southern North
Sea also became important offshore provinces. Nevertheless, throughout
the 1960's and the 1970's offshore activity has continued at a high
level in the Persian Gulf, while offshore-related investment in the
Gulf of Mexico was unrivalled until the emergence of the northern North
Sea as a major oil-bearing province in the early 1970's.
Interest in the southern North Sea was stimulated by the discovery of
the giant onshore Groningen gas field in Holland in 1959. Exploration
resulted in the discovery, from 1965 onwards, of a number of gas fields,
s
principally off Eastern England.
Following the first major oil discovery - the Ekofisk field in the
Norwegian sector - in December 1969, attention was increasingly focussed
on the central and northern waters of the North Sea, leading to further
discoveries in the Ekofisk Basin and to the discovery of the Forties
and Auk fields in the U.K. sector. Finally, the existence of a rich
oil basin north-east of the Shetland Islands was established in 1972,
and a number of major oil discoveries were subsequently made in this
area, including the Brent and Ninian fields in the U.K. sector and the
Statfjord field, which lies mainly in Norwegian waters. These discoveries
have been actively developed and by April 1981,15 U.K. oil fields were already
on stream, while a further 11 were being developed. In addition, in the
U.K. sector of the North Sea, 7 gas fields were in production.
The environmental conditions - that is, the combination of water depth,
distance from shore and weather conditions - encountered in areas of
offshore activity throughout the world vary considerably. Although the
extremely cold operating environment of the Cook Inlet, where oil has
been produced since the mid 1960's, did present significant technical
problems, it can be seen from Table 2.1 (below) that the North Sea
TABLE 2.1








Gulf of Mexico 100 - 150 20 - 40 Generally calm sea & wind
conditions; potential
hurricanes
Persian Gulf 60 - 150 20 - 65 Generally calm sea & wind
conditions
Lake Maracaibo 50 10 Generally calm sea & wind
conditions
West Africa 40 - 200 10 - 20 Moderate conditions
S.E. Asia 100 - 200 15 - 20 Moderate conditions; potential
hurricanes
Cook Inlet, Alaska 50 - 150 5 - 10 Moderate conditions; potential
sheet ice & iceberg hazards.
Southern North Sea 65 - 140 20 - 85 Severe conditions
Central North Sea 250 - 420 115 - 170 Severe conditions
Northern North Sea up to 600+ up to 180 Severe conditions
SOURCE : International Management & Engineering Group (1973) , pp.104-110.
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environment is far more severe than that of any other offshore oil/gas
province which had been exploited up to that time. In fact, the North
Sea provided the oil industry with an immense technological challenge,
as the demanding environmental conditions produced new, highly complex
operating problems to which the industry had to develop new, sophisticated
technological solutions. North Sea operations have indeed stimulated
technological innovation, extending the frontiers of offshore technology,
but the experience of the oil industry in the North Sea has been that
every saving achieved through a new technological development has been
more than offset by extra cost incurred from unexpected problems.
Indeed, Table 2.2 (below) shows clearly that the capital investment
necessary to bring new North Sea reserves on stream is several times
greater than for oil fields in, for example, the Persian Gulf. Although
differing geological characteristics, statutory regulations and other
factors are of some importance, environmental conditions are the major
factors contributing to the variance in investment costs in offshore
areas throughout the world.
TABLE 2.2
Comparative Offshore Investment Costs
Area




Persian Gulf 40 - 100
Offshore Nigeria 400
Gulf of Mexico 1000
Southern North Sea 1500
Northern North Sea 2000 - 2700
SOURCE : Schleibach, W. (1976), p.35.
2.3 OFFSHORE EXPLORATION
The exploration phase covers all activities up to and including the
drilling of appraisal wells to establish the commercial viability of
a field.
The vast majority of the expenditure incurred at the exploration stage
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is associated with the drilling of exploration and appraisal wells,
most of which is undertaken by specialist drilling contractors.
The cost of drilling a well is a function of the hire and running
costs of the rig employed, which itself depends upon such factors as
the location of the well and the length of time required to complete
the well (which in turn is dependent upon the depth of well, the
particular formations that have to be penetrated and the prevailing
weather conditions). Wells in the northern North Sea have taken any¬
thing from 30 days to 8 months to complete, although the average is
around 90 days (Scottish Development Department, 1978). These factors
also radically affect the relative importance of the various elements
which comprise total exploration costs. Consequently, the absolute
cost of drilling wells varies considerably, even within a particular
offshore province such as the North Sea, while detailed cost breakdowns
of 'typical' North Sea exploration wells can prove misleading."'' For
this reason cost breakdowns included in the main text are general in
nature and are intended to provide no more than a rough indication
of the way in which expenditure is incurred.
It can be seen from Table 2.3, which provides an approximate breakdown
of North Sea exploration expenditure, that drilling services - principally
rig hire - account for around 50% of total exploration costs in the
North Sea.
TABLE 2.3




Site Preparation : Survey & interpretation 10
Drilling Services : Hire, mobilisation and
running cost of rig 50
Drilling Materials : Casing, chemicals, mud,
bits, etc. 15
Transport : Sea and air 15
Specialised : Divers, mud engineers
Services etc. 5
Evaluation : Logging, testing, etc. 5
TOTAL loo
SOURCE : Synthesis of estimates from a variety of published sources.
1- Tiro such breakdowns are included as Appendices 2.2 and 2.3.
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Other important cost items include surveying services; base, supply
boat and helicopter services; and specialised services such as diving.
Indeed, it is obvious from Table 2.3 that expenditure incurred during
the exploration phase is heavily concentrated on services, with the
direct demand for manufactured goods being restricted to that for
drilling materials 'consumed' in the drilling process.
2.3.1 Surveying
The first step in the exploration of a new offshore province is
usually the employment of a specialist contractor to undertake a pre-
2
liminary seismic survey, the cost of which may be shared by several
oil companies. Additional seismic work will later be carried out in
the more promising areas in order to outline specific structures as
potential drilling sites.
2.3.2 Exploration Drilling
There are three main types of rig used in exploratory drilling offshore.
A jack-up rig, which currently costs in the region of £15 million to
build, requires to rest its legs on the sea bed and can only be used
in water of up to 300 feet in depth. Hence the rigs most commonly
used in the North Sea are semi-submersibles, which are more suitable for
deeper water and more severe climatic conditions, although they do
cost around £45 million to construct. Semi-submersibles use pontoons
submerged beneath the surface of the water to provide stability while
floating, and, while anchored by chains to the seabed, can drill in
water of up to 600 feet in depth. The development of dynamically-
positioned semi-submersibles (which do not require to be anchored to
the seabed) will, however, allow drilling to take place in water too
deep for anchoring. Finally, drill ships are ship-shaped vessels
capable of faster movement between drilling sites. Although some still
depend upon anchors, most drill ships are dynamically-positioned,
allowing them to drill in up to 6,000 feet of water. Drill ships have,
however, proved insufficiently stable for all year round use in areas
such as the North Sea where severe sea states are experienced.
The most conspicuous component of drilling equipment on a rig is the
derrick, which is the steel framework from which the drilling string
2. See Appendix 2.1 which provides a glossary of technical terms
used but not fully explained in the main body of this chapter.
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is suspended. At the top of the derrick is the crown block to which
is secured the hoisting equipment used for raising, lowering and
controlling the weight exerted on the drilling string. The motive
power is supplied by engines driving a hoisting winch known as the
draw-works.
Drilling fluid/mud is forced at high pressure down through the centre
of the drilling string to the bottom of the bore-hole to cool and
lubricate the bit and to wash rock-cuttings back to the surface through
the space between the drilling string and the bore-hole. The marine
riser, which is a tube running from the seabed to the rig, excludes
the sea from drilling operations and enables the drilling fluid to be
returned to the rig, whereupon the rock-cuttings are removed before the
fluid is re-circulated.
When the well is a few hundred feet in depth the drilling string is
removed, lengths of casing - very strong, thick-walled pipe -are lowered
into the well and cement forced into the space between the casing and
the walls of the bore-hole and allowed to harden. This operation prevents
the walls of the bore-hole caving in, prevents unwanted water seepages
flooding the hole and facilitates the control of well pressures and
oil/gas production. Drilling is then resumed using a bit of smaller
diameter. As the hole is deepened, successively narrower strings of
casing are added, each new string passing through the string previously
introduced. In order to reduce the chance of a 'blow-out', that is,
a sudden escape of oil/gas from a well during drilling, a blow-out
preventer stack (BOP) is fitted to the top of the casing as soon as the
first string of casing has been run.
While drilling is in progress the geologist can learn about the nature
of the rocks being penetrated by checking the drill-cuttings brought
to the surface and by taking readings or 'logs' by means of
instruments introduced into the bore-hole. If necessary a hollow bit
will be used to obtain a 'core' of rock for laboratory testing. When
a potentially oil-bearing formation is reached it is tested under
conditions simulating as closely as possible those that would exist
if the well were put on commercial production. Assuming the test
proves favourable the well will be completed with the insertion of
the final string of casing which must, however, be 'perforated' (by
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means of a 'gun' lowered into the bore-hole) to allow the oil/gas
to flow into the well. At this point the BOP is closed and the well
shut in as a producer awaiting development. A well which proves
uncommercial must also be sealed off - generally by inserting a plug
of cement - to ensure that no escape of any kind can occur.
2.3.3 Appraisal and Evaluation
Should oil/gas be discovered in what appears might be commercial
quantities, further drilling by a mobile rig will be required to
delineate the field. The number of appraisal wells required will
largely depend upon the geological complexity of the hydrocarbon
bearing structure found.
Appraisal drilling will be followed by a feasibility study, which is a
technical and economic evaluation of the commercial viability of a
proposed field development, ' involving the selection of the major elements
of a field development plan and a decision as to whether the expenditure
necessary to develop the field is justified on economic grounds.
2.4 OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT
The development of an offshore oil/gas field generally requires
(a) construction and installation of a production facility
(b) manufacture and installation of production equipment
(c) drilling of production and water/gas injection wells
(d) installation of facilities enabling the transportation of the
oil/gas to an onshore terminal
(e) construction of an onshore terminal.
Table 2.4 indicates the areas in which money has been and will be
spent in bringing North Sea fields into production. It summarises
the estimated capital expenditure on both U.K. and Norwegian projects
in the central and northern North Sea on which development commenced
between 1971 and December 1979 and includes all expenditure on the
development of these fields from the time at which they were
declared commercial."^
3. Hence exploration and appraisal drilling costs and platform
operating and maintenance costs are not included.
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TABLE 2.4
Estimated Breakdown of Capital Expenditure on Oil/Gas Fields






















SOURCE : Wood, Mackenzie & Co. (December 1979)
It can be seen that roughly 50% of estimated total capital expenditure
is accounted for by the installation cost of the production platforms
and their equipment. Development drilling is the next most important
item, accounting for 19% of capital expenditure, while oil transportation
facilities - namely pipelines (12%) and loading buoys (1%) - together
account for a further 13%. The miscellaneous factor includes such
items as land purchases and consultancy fees. It should, however,
be noted that this pattern of expenditure may change over time. For
example, while virtually all North Sea fields to be developed in the
forseeable future will require platforms and associated equipment,
the demand for major new pipelines may diminish as future developments
are linked to the existing trunk lines.
2.4.1 Production Facilities
A production platform consists of two main components : the 'jacket'
which rests on the seabed and the steel deck which it supports (and
upon which the production equipment is installed).
15
The majority of the platforms installed in the North Sea are
conventional steel jackets of the type originally developed over
twenty years ago for use in the Gulf of Mexico. However, the deeper
water and severe climate of the North Sea presented new design problems
which were resolved basically by increasing the size and weight of the
jackets installed. Consequently North Sea platforms are immense
structures, far larger (and hence far more expensive) than those used
previously in the Gulf of Mexico and the southern North Sea.
The first concrete gravity structure was ordered in 1973 at a time when
this new approach appeared to offer the opportunity of reducing platform
construction costs. This type of platform will rest on the seabed by
virtue of its own weight and thus requires no piling, that is, fixing to
the seabed by means of large stakes driven into the ocean floor. In
addition, concrete platforms are delivered to the field virtually
complete, with the deck and most of their equipment already installed,
whereas only the 'jacket' of the steel platform is initially delivered
to the field, leaving the deck and equipment to be lifted and
installed offshore in the difficult environment of the North Sea.
Finally, the base of the concrete platform can be used to store oil
production.
However, apart from a brief period (1973-74) when several concrete
structures were ordered for the U.K. sector of the North Sea, steel
structures have remained more popular. Steel platforms currently appear
to have several important advantages, not least of which is their relative
cheapness compared with concrete structures. Welding techniques have
also improved considerably, while steel is more suitable for analysis than
reinforced concrete, an important consideration when platforms are
being installed in increasingly demanding offshore environments. Moreover,
oil companies claim that concrete structures have taken too long to build.
Finally, improved offshore heavy lifting equipment and developments
in piling techniques have reduced the installation period offshore, a
vital factor in an area with a limited 'weather window'.
The concrete platform builders reacted by developing new designs of
lighter concrete gravity platforms with comparatively slim gravity
towers - the so-called 'telescopic column1 - but these have so far
failed to win orders. The oil companies are, however, currently eval-
uating a variety of designs of steel-concrete hybrids, which consist
basically of a steel substructure on a concrete base resting on the
seabed.
The cost of a fixed platform (whether steel or concrete) increases
exponentially with increases in the depth of water and thus there is a
strong economic incentive to find alternative ways to develop fields
situated in deep water. Many new design concepts based largely on the
tethered buoyant principle - the 'floating platform' - have been
developed, and these seem to offer considerable advantages over the more
conventional types of structure, not only in cost (since the cost of
fabricating a floating platform is much less dependent on water depth)
but also in construction time and availability of construction sites.
Also, unlike a fixed production platform, the floating platform is
mobile and could be floated from a depleted field to a new one,
greatly extending the life of the platform.
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As yet, for a variety of reasons, oil companies have been unwilling to
risk using one of these new platform designs. However, it seems that a
major breakthrough will be achieved in 1981/82 when Conoco are expected
to place the first order for a tension-leg platform (TLP) for use on
their Hutton field. The floating structure will be fixed to the
seabed by vertical tubular steel mooring lines attached to massive
anchors. Large buoyancy columns on the platform provide an excess of
buoyancy which is greater than the platform weight and thus keep the
mooring lines in tension for all weather. Tensioned like this
virtually all vertical motion is eliminated, although lateral motions
will occur.
However, floating systems also provide a competitive alternative to
conventional fixed platforms in smaller developments in shallower
waters. Indeed, the first floating production system used in the North
Sea was a converted semi-submersible drilling rig installed on the
small Argyll field (which would probably have been uneconomical to
develop using a conventional platform) and a similar development has
been used on the Buchan field. BP have developed a single well oil
production system (SWOPS) which will employ a converted tanker to both
produce and transport offshore oil from a single subsea well. This
4. See Lewis et al, 1978a, pp. 18-19.
system, which would produce oil at up to 20,000 b/d, would cost
around £25-50 million for tanker conversion and subsea well installation.
In addition, off the east coast of Spain Shell have installed a single
anchor leg production system (SALS) in combination with sub sea
completions. The leg is connected to a universal joint on the sea
bed and a swivel system (incorporating a mooring frame and floatation
tank) on the surface, to which is permanently moored a tanker which
is equipped with oil and gas separation equipment and storage facilities.
Oil is then loaded into 'shuttle' tankers which fill up alongside and
carry the oil ashore.
In the North Sea (and other high cost areas) larger fields may also be
initially developed using a system incorporating subsea completions
and a floating unit, usually a semi-submersible drilling rig. That is,
subsea completions may be used to produce oil from appraisal wells before
the exact plan for the development of a field has been finalised. This
approach permits the acquisition of more detailed information about
the reservoir's characteristics, as well as providing an early positive
cash flow while awaiting the construction of a conventional platform.
Undertaking offshore drilling concurrently with onshore construction is
now becoming the norm, with a growing number of operators drilling
development wells through templates - steel frames placed on the seabed
- before the platform is installed in order to advance production,
although as yet these wells have been closed on completion of drilling
and production held back until after the installation of the production
platform.
Subsea completions may also allow the commercial development of those
parts of a field which cannot be reached from a central fixed platform
but which are not large enough to justify the installation of a second
platform. Small accumulations may call for a single well completion
linked to the platform by an individual flowline, while more complex
accumulations requiring several satellite wells some distance from the
platform will involve the use of an underwater manifold serving as
a collection point for the oil from the individual wells which is then
fed into a single line linking the manifold to the platform. Subsea
completion is, however, an expensive technique and the costs of
drilling and connecting each underwater completion to a production
platform can be up to ten times the cost of a conventional well
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(Shell Briefing Service, 1979d).
There are two basic types of subsea installations, the 'wet' completion
and the 'dry' completion. In the case of the 'dry' or one atmosphere
subsea completion the vital components are encapsulated in a thick-
walled, pressurised compartment which allows maintenance to be carried
out in a one atmosphere 'shirt-sleeve' environment by operators lowered
to the seabed in one atmosphere chambers which lock onto the wellhead
compartment. Problems have been experienced with a system of this type
(developed by Lockheed) which has been installed in the Garoupa field,
offshore Brazil. The 'wet' completion has its components exposed to
the water under ambient pressure. Maintenance by divers is possible in
shallow water but in deeper water this system would be remote-controlled.
At the moment only the basic production unit - the wellhead 'Christmas
Tree' - is placed on the seabed, but the next step will be to locate
the processing equipment on the ocean floor and hence eliminate the
need for a surface installation.
2.4.2 Installation
Concrete platforms are towed out vertically with their steel deck and
much of their equipment in their completed form. When on location,
the base is ballasted and the platform sunk into position on the seabed.
In contrast, conventional steel jackets travel horizontally supported
by special tanks which make them self-floating. On arrival, controlled
flooding of these tanks lowers the structure to its predetermined
position on the seabed. A temporary deck can then be installed to
allow the steel piles, which fix the structure to the ocean floor, to
be driven home. Thereafter the steel deck, living quarters and deck
modules are installed with the aid of at least one large derrick barge
before finally the mechanical and electrical hook-up can take place.
The whole installation operation may take 4-6 months to complete.
Derrick barges have evolved into large, complex and costly semi-
submersible units, consisting basically of a pontoon upon which is
mounted several cranes of varying capabilities of up to 3,000 tons.
The hire of the derrick barge is by far the largest single
installation cost item, accounting for approximately 45-50% of total
installation cost."' Transportation - tug and supply boat services -
5. See Appendix 2.4
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accounts for a further 20% of total installation costs, with
mechanical and electrical hook-up another 15-20% and diving services
5-10% of total installation cost. Thus, although there is a demand
for steel piling and other consumables, services account for the vast
majority of expenditure on installation activities.
2.4.3 Platform Equipment
Costs will be minimised by locating onshore as much of the equipment
as possible. Thus, on a field close to shore the platform may
consist of a single deck, drilling equipment and production/process
plant, with accommodation, power plant and other facilities being
located onshore. However, the discovery of oil in deep water some
distance from shore - as in the North Sea - created a demand for more
complex, self-supporting structures (since they might be cut off for
several days due to adverse weather conditions). Nevertheless,
even on platforms in the North Sea the equipment installed will vary
considerably depending upon, for example, the number of producing wells,
the quantities of gas being produced and whether the gas is being flared,
transmitted by pipeline or reinjected for pressure maintenance purposes.
Detailed lists or cost breakdowns of equipment for a 'typical North
Sea platform' should therefore be treated with some caution.
Table 2.5 presents a breakdown of the estimated demand for platform
equipment associated with field developments under way in the U.K. and
Norwegian sectors of the central and northern North Sea as at December
1979.^ Being based on cost data provided by the oil companies it
is not surprising that drilling equipment is totally excluded from the
analysis, as development drilling is normally carried out by a drilling
contractor who usually supplies his own drilling equipment.
A platform's power, process and other equipment is housed in 6-8
modules - essentially large steel boxes - which are prefabricated
onshore and loaded onto the platform as complete self-contained
equipment packages (weighing up to 2,600 tons each), thereby minimising
the amount of fabrication which must be undertaken offshore.
6. This cost breakdown is virtually identical to that put forward
by Lovegrove (1975, p.52), while a very similar cost breakdown
can be produced by appropriate re-organisation and aggregation
of cost data provided by Shell and reproduced by Crook (1975)
- See Appendix 2.5.
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TABLE 2.5
Estimated Breakdown of the Demand for Platform Equipment





Deck module shells 10
Living quarters and helideck 19
Boilers, heating, ventilating and
burner equipment 1
Water & sewage treatment plant, tanks
& mixing equipment 3
Miscellaneous fittings 7
Separators 4
Pumps Si compressors 6




fighting Si safety equipment 6
Hoisting equipment (including cranes) 3
TOTAL 100
SOURCE : Wood, Mackenzie & Co. (December, 1979).
The living quarters, which will provide accommodation for up to 20O
men and will include recreation and catering areas, may also be in
modular form. Together with the helideck, these fairly basic structural
steel items may account for around 30% of total platform equipment
costs.
Approximately 5% of total platform equipment cost is incurred on wellhead
and hydraulic shutdown equipment - essentially the wellhead 'Christmas
Tree', which is an assembly of valves and fittings which is located at
the head of a well to control the flow of oil/gas. All oil contains
a certain amount of gas which expands when it gets to surface atmospheric
pressure. Therefore, if the oil is to be off-loaded into tankers the
oil must be 'stabilised', that is, the gas removed. If there is a
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considerable volume of gas to be processed a large, expensive treatment
plant will be required on the platform. However, even if the oil is
to be transported by pipeline, gas/oil separators will be installed
on the platform to remove some of the gas for use with gas turbines
which act as prime movers for power generation. The 'process plant'
(which may account for around 5% of total equipment costs and will
consist of separators, scrubbers, filters, valves, pipework, etc) is
usually designed and assembled as a package which is installed in
modular form.
Once treated, the oil will be pumped to an offshore loading buoy or
along a pipeline. In fact, a multitude of different types of pumps
are used offshore, ranging from the mainline oil pumps '(which pump the
oil ashore) to small pumping sets for lubricating oil, fuel oil etc.
Others include the somewhat specialised mud and cementing pumps used
in the drilling process and those used in the fire-fighting, sewage
treatment, production processing and injection systems. Water and/or
gas may be pumped into the reservoir to artificially bolster the pressure
and improve recovery. In the case of water injection, water is pumped
from the sea, through processing and (at high pressure) into the well,
while gas will be compressed before injection into the well. Table
2.5 suggests that, on average, pumps and compressors may account for
around 6% of platform equipment costs.
The majority of the expenditure incurred on electrical equipment (which
altogether represents over one-third of total equipment costs) is
accounted for by the power plant - expenditure on cable, instrumentation,
meters and guages totals only about 3% of equipment costs (Crook, 1975) .
The power plant, which is normally housed in a single module, usually
comprises of gas turbine driven generators, switchgear, distribution
transformers, motor control gear and other ancillary equipment. The
design of the power plant will depend upon the total power requirements
of the platform in the production phase. The largest power requirements
will normally be associated with the pumping of oil ashore via a pipeline.
However, if the oil is to be off-loaded into tankers the largest drives
will be motors driving water or gas injection pumps, with smaller drives
for process plant (compressors etc.) and some assessment also made for
the domestic loads for heating and lighting the living quarters, offices,
and so on. Power is also required to drive the fire-fighting equipment.
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Due to the extreme importance of this plant a separate generator set
(usually diesel) and switchboard will be provided away from the power
module. A diesel generator may also be installed as a back-up power
generation unit.
The major communications links required for offshore operations
typically include open-voice communication between platforms/rigs,
supply ships and shore; radio beam navigational aids; and transmission
of data from the computer installed on the platform to monitor oil/gas
production to the terminal onshore. On the platform itself an internal
telephone system, public address system and portable radio equipment
are also required, along with TV and other entertainment systems.
All maritime communications are based on radio and for communication between
ships and platforms the traditional methods are employed. However,
the amount of information which must be transmitted between platform and
shore threatened problems of radio frequency congestion. Consequently,
the Post Office, in conjunction with Marconi Communications Systems,
have spent several years and £7 million developing a system known as
trans-horizon microwave radio. Microwaves have extremely high frequency
and so can carry very large amounts of information - by telex or telemetry
(a means of transmitting information in digital packages) - as well as
many individual telephone channels linked directly into the public
telephone network. Microwave signals only travel in straight lines and
hence under normal conditions their range is restricted by the earth's
curviture. However, the Marconi system solves this problem by
utilising the principle of tropospheric scatter, whereby high frequency
signals are 'bounced' off the troposphere and down to receivers
perhaps 200 miles away.
Finally, approximately 3% of platform equipment costs is expended upon
the pedestal cranes, hoists, winches and other handling equipment
employed on a platform, while included in the 7% of total equipment cost
shown in Table 2.5 to be incurred on 'miscellaneous fittings' is fairly
significant expenditure on valves (3%) and pipe/tubing (2%).
2.4.4 Development Drilling
Modern drilling techniques, which allow deviations of up to 60% to be
reached, may make it possible for a large reservoir to be drained in an
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optimal way from a single structure, thereby minimising platform
fabrication costs. Hence, as many as thirty development wells may be
drilled from a single platform on a large field such as Forties or Brent,
normally by a specialist drilling contractor.
It can be seen from Table 2.4 (above) that development drilling accounts
for approximately 19% of total capital expenditure in the northern North
Sea. The IMEG report (1973, p.28) estimated that roughly 40% of develop¬
ment drilling expenditure is spent on drilling services, 20% on supply
boat and helicopter services and 25% on specialised services such as
cementing, well logging and mud control, with insurance and other items
accounting for the remainder.
2.4.5 Transportation Facilities
Oil can be brought ashore by a pipeline laid from the field to an --onshore
receiving terminal or by tankers which fill up at sea from an offshore
loading facility. The choice of method depends largely on economics -
field size, production rate, distance to shore etc. - although other
criteria, such as pollution risk, are also considered. An offshore
loading system usually has a lower capital investment but higher operating
costs than a pipeline and in general is more suitable for small or
isolated fields, where the expense of a pipeline is not justified.
In the North Sea offshore loading systems of the single buoy mooring
(SBM) type have been installed not only on some of the smaller fields -
such as Auk, Argyll and Montrose - but also on larger fields, such as
Brent, in order to allow production prior to the completion of a pipeline.
In the case of the single point mooring (SPM) employed on the Argyll field,
the tanker is moored by bow hawsers to a single rotatable mooring point
around which it is allowed to swing in order to present the least
resistance to the prevailing weather conditions. For the Auk field
Shell developed the exposed location SBM (or ELSBM), which is a large
SBM especially designed for exposed locations, incorporating a helideck
and temporary quarters to facilitate access and repair work. However,
all SBM's are sensitive to bad weather conditions, resulting in
considerable downtime, and unlike the Auk field the Brent field's
reservoir characteristics are such than an interruption of production was
impossible. For this reason the SPAR semi-submersible oil storage
and loading terminal was developed. By combining a storage unit (for
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300,000 barrels of oil) with a mooring buoy production does not have
to cease when weather conditions prevent loading.
However, in 1978 over 80% of the oil production from the U.K. sector
was transported by the 700 miles of submarine pipeline in use at that
time (Department of Energy, 1979). Four major oil pipelines - ranging
from 93-120 miles in length and 30-36" in diameter - have been laid for
U.K. oil fields, while the Norwegian Ekofisk field is also connected
to Teeside by a major 220 mile pipeline. In addition, several shorter
pipelines, often of smaller diameter, have been constructed to feed
the output of adjacent fields into these trunk lines.
As natural gas liquefaction is neither commercially nor technically
feasible in the North Sea, large gas accumulations will be served by a
pipeline to shore. By the end of 1978 over 850 miles of submarine
gas pipeline was in operation in the North Sea, including 3 major lines
to the St. Fergus terminal - from the Frigg(2) and Brent fields - and
several feeder lines in the northern sector, and the complex of shorter
pipelines linking the southern North Sea gas fields with the mainland.
The total cost of a pipeline can be subdivided into material costs and
installation costs, with the latter being the dominant factor. For
example, 85% of the cost of the Forties pipeline was spent on construction
effort (Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1974). Material costs
will depend upon the pipe's diameter, the grade of steel used and the
coating applied - submarine pipeline is usually provided with a concrete
coating to give it additional weight and prevent corrosion and damage from
ships' anchors etc. Pipe-laying is a very complex, precision operation
which is therefore particularly expensive in the deep, stormy North Sea,
for which a new generation of very expensive, sophisticated pipe-laying
and pipe-burying vessels has been designed. The sections of coated pipe
are welded onboard the lay barge and then conducted over the stern of the
vessel via the 'stinger', or ramp, which keeps it at the correct angle
and tension and so prevents buckling as the now continuous length of
pipe enters the sea. Once laid, the pipeline is inspected before
being buried by a special trenching machine operated by remote-control
from a bury barge on the surface.
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2.4.6 Terminals
Expenditure on onshore terminals represents approximately 10% of
total capital expenditure to date on development in the northern North
Sea. Oil and gas terminals vary considerably in size and function
depending, for example, upon the fields to which they are linked and
the nature of the hydrocarbons received.
The terminals receiving North Sea oil are at Sullom Voe in the Shetland
Islands; Flotta in the Orkney Islands; Seal Sands, Teeside; and
Grangemouth, which is linked by overland pipeline to Cruden Bay. North
Sea terminals are invariably involved in carrying out the stabilising
process, that is, the removal of the more volatile gases present in the
crude in order to enable it to be shipped by tankers to refineries.
Facilities at an oil terminal may therefore include oil and gas storage,
water and gas separation, gas liquefaction, loading jetty or SBM,
ballast water treatment and power station.
The only gas terminal serving the northern North Sea, situated at St.
Fergus, has facilities for the receipt and metering of the gas and the
separation of natural gas liquids (or condensate) from the dry gas prior
to the latter being transferred into the national grid.
2.5 OFFSHORE PRODUCTION
A particular field's operating/production costs will depend largely upon
its size and reservoir characteristics, the length of time it has been
producing, the operating procedures and standards of its operator and its
distance from the nearest supply base.
Table 2.6 (below) provides a detailed breakdown of the estimated
operating costs of the 26 oil and gas fields situated in the U.K. and
Norwegian sectors of the central and northern North Sea either in
production (14) or under development (12) as at December 1979. However,
it should be noted that this table provides only a 'snapshot' picture
of the nature of North Sea operating costs, which may change significantly
over time. Indeed, it is only 6 years since the first U.K. North Sea oil
field came onstream and operators are only now beginning to amass sufficient
experience of operating platforms in the harsh environment of the North Sea
to allow estimates of operating expenditures to be made.
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TABLE 2.6
Estimated Breakdown of Annual Operating Costs for the
Oil/Gas Fields in the Central/Northern North Sea (1979)
Cost Items % of Total






Platform Maintenance Costs ;
Remedial operations on equipment 5
Structural inspection & maintenance 6
Servicing the wells 6
Transport Costs : 20













SOURCE : Wood, Mackenzie & Co. (December, 1979)
Virtually all operating expenditure is incurred on services, with the
major cost items being transport; insurance; and inspection, maintenance
and repair (IMR). The Department of Energy has estimated that in the
early 1980's around 50% of the expenditure on IMR will be associated
with well workovers, that is, the periodic cleaning of wells and the
replacement of downhole valves and other equipment (which,incidentally,
requires the continuing presence of drilling equipment on the platform
to enable re-entry into the wells).
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2.6 CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above discussion of the nature of offshore oil/
gas operations that the technological demands associated with the
three main phases of activity - namely exploration, development and
production - are quite different. Although platform installation and
development drilling services represent major cost items, the majority
of development expenditure is associated with the purchase of hardware
such as platforms and their electrical, process, wellhead and other
equipment; pipelines; offshore loading systems etc. In contrast,
expenditure at the exploration and production phases of activity is
very heavily concentrated on services. In fact, although there is
a derived demand for drilling rigs, supply boats, helicopters etc.,
direct demand for manufactured goods is restricted to 'consumables',
such as drilling tools and supplies. The principle consumable cost
item used in the drilling process is steel casing, several hundred tons of
which can be built into a well whether it is successful or not, although
expenditure on cement, drilling mud, chemicals, components of the
drilling string etc. is also significant. (Normally the oil companies
purchase and supply drilling contractors with the major value items
such as casing and other down-hole equipment, leaving the drilling con¬
tractors to obtain the other operating and maintenance supplies for the
rig itself). Thus, most manufacturers of offshore-related equipment
are heavily dependent upon development activity continuing at a high
level.
Having provided an introduction to the form of offshore oil/gas activity
and, in particular, outlined the nature and costs of offshore-related
technology, the following chapter investigates the performance of
British industry in meeting the demands for equipment and services
created by North Sea oil/gas developments.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE U.K. OFFSHORE SUPPLIES INDUSTRY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter outlined the nature of offshore oil/gas
operations. Rough cost breakdowns were used to examine the differing
technological demands created at successive phases of offshore activity
and, in particular, to emphasise the fact that the demand for most items
of offshore-related equipment is associated with the level of develop¬
ment activity being undertaken.
The following two sections of this chapter discuss, in general terms,
the market for goods and services which offshore activity in the U.K.
sector of the North Sea has created and the response which U.K.
companies have made to these opportunities. In these sections copious
use is made of data collected by the Department of Energy concerning
the level of orders and expenditure incurred on oil/gas activities in
the U.K. sector of the North Sea. While section 3.2 analyses the trend
in U.K. offshore expenditure (stressing the fact that development
expenditure will eventually decline in real terms as the North Sea
matures as an oil province), section 3.3 examines the performance of
U.K. industry in general in supplying the needs of the offshore oil/
gas industry. There then follows, in section 3.4, a more detailed
discussion of the major technological, marketing and financial factors
which have influenced the pattern of U.K. involvement in the U.K.
offshore market, this analysis of the experience of U.K. companies
attempting to break into their domestic market being necessary in order
to gain an impression of the problems that might be faced in world
markets.
3.2 U.K. OFFSHORE EXPENDITURE
In 1980 total oil production from the U.K. sector of the North Sea
was 80.5 million tonnes (1.6 million barrels per day), while gas
production amounted to 37.3 billion cubic metres (102 million cubic
metres per day). The cost of winning these resources has been immense.
Total expenditure incurred by operators and other production licensees



























































































































































risen dramatically from around £360 million in 1973 to approximately
£830 million in 1974 and roughly £1500 million in 1975 (Department of
Energy, 1977c). Table 3.1 (above) indicates that this upward trend has
continued in the period 1976-80, with total expenditure on the U.K.
Continental Shelf approaching £3,500 million in 1980.
Table 3.1 shows that over two-thirds of total expenditure on the U.K.
Continental Shelf in each of these five years was associated with the
development phase of activity. However this table provides only a 'snap
shot' picture of the situation over a relatively short time and significant
changes may take place in future years. For example, although many
factors influence the pace of offshore exploration in an offshore province,
it is to be expected, ceteris paribus, that as an offshore province
matures exploration and appraisal drilling will decline. Indeed, although
there was a slight upturn in the number of exploration and appraisal wells
drilled in 1980, drilling activity was still considerably below the level
3
achieved in the period 1973-78. As drilling activity falls it is to
be expected that exploration expenditure will also fall in both absolute
and relative terms (although total exploration expenditure will also be
4
influenced by changes in drilling hire rates). Similarly, a fall in
exploration drilling must be expected to be reflected in a reduction in
the number of significant finds available for development, and thus, in
time, development expenditure will also fall as an offshore province
matures. Finally, the increase in operating costs identified in Table 3.1
will continue, in both absolute and relative terms, as the number of fields
developed and brought onstream increases.
Thus, although in the exploitation of North Sea oil and gas resources there
will be considerable overlapping of the exploration, development and
production phases of activity, the balance of activities will change over
time with the relative importance of operating expenditures rising as the
level of exploration and development activity falls.
3.3 THE U.K. OFFSHORE MARKET : OPPORTUNITY AND RESPONSE
The firms which constitute the U.K. offshore supplies industry are not
always easily identifiable. In fact, it could be argued that there is
no such thing as the offshore supplies industry as such, so diverse are
3. See Appendix 3.3.
4. It should be noted that the pattern of exploration expenditure in the
period 1976-80, shown in Table 3.1, closely reflects the trend in
drilling activity identified in Appendix 3.3.
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the demands of the offshore oil industry. This was highlighted in 1974
when the Department of Energy's Offshore Supplies Office (0S0), in the
course of trying to minimise the effect of the three-day week on offshore
activity, identified around 2,000 firms involved in the offshore market,
many of which had no idea their products were being used offshore. SimflaTiy,
in 1978 a study by Baker et al found that the U.K. offshore supplies indudry
consisted of over 2,000 firms supplying over 150 main products and services.
According to Baker et al (1978), when activity began in the southern North
Sea gasfields, in the mid-1960's, U.K. engineering companies secured no
more than 10% of the market. However, a study carried out in 1972 by the
International Management and Engineering Group (IMEG) found that U.K.
owned companies were winning approximately 25-30% of the U.K. offshore
market. IMEG (1973) forecasted that as a result of the advantages of
proximity to the market and the accumulation of offshore experience, the
U.K. share would reach 35-40% by the late 1970's. Moreover, IMEG
believed that if the recommendations contained in its report were fully
implemented it was possible that the U.K. share could reach 70% by the
end of the decade.
The best source of information on the involvement of U.K. firms in the
U.K. offshore supplies market is the analysis provided by the 0S0 of the
value and U.K. content of orders placed by the operators of oil and gas
5
fields on the U.K. Continental Shelf. Although the 0S0 define 'U.K. share'
somewhat differently from IMEG,^ it is nevertheless quite clear from
Table 3.2 (below) that the market share secured by the U.K. offshore
7
supplies industry has significantly increased in the course of the 1970's.
A more detailed analysis of orders placed by industrial sector in the
period 1974-76 and 1977-80 is provided in Appendices 3.4 and 3.5
5. This analysis is based upon quarterly returns made individually by
the operators to the 0S0.
6. The 0S0 defined 'U.K. share' as the value of the contracts and main
sub-contracts placed with companies which through employment,
manufacturing or sub-contracting make a substantial contribution to
the U.K. economy. A distinction is drawn between these companies
and 'brass-plate' companies whose function is to import finished
goods or services.
7. The reduction in the U.K. share of orders placed in 1980 can be partly
explained by the changes in the composition of the orders placed that
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respectively. These show that the U.K. share of virtually every supply
sector has improved over the period 1974-80, implying that the overall
improvement in the performance of the U.K. offshore supplies industry
highlighted in Table 3.2 reflects improvements in supply capability
rather than changes in the pattern of demand. This performance has
been described in some quarters - especially the Department of Energy
itself - as a striking success. Eglin (1977) emphasised this point
by forecasting that by 1980 the U.K. would be the world's tenth largest
oil producer yet would have the second largest offshore supplies industry,
seemingly overlooking the fact that with the exception of the U.S.A. and
U.S.S.R. the other major oil producing nations are among those normally
described as "less developed". However, the more detailed analysis of the
performance of the U.K. industry in the offshore market which follows
indicates that the U.K. share of individual market sectors varies
enormously, with U.K. capability in certain sectors, such as exploration
drilling, still almost totally lacking.
8. This data is not directly comparable with the expenditure statistics
provided in the previous section for the following reasons:-
a. the expenditure that results from an order is often spread over
a number of years.
b. offshore operators' expenditure on their own personnel and
administration is included in expenditure but not in the value
of orders placed.
c. actual expenditure resulting from orders is subject to inflation and
variations, but the value of orders recorded is not always adjusted.
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3.4 MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PATTERN OF U.K. INVOLVEMENT IN THE
U.K. OFFSHORE MARKET
3.4.1 Technological Barriers to Entry
It is a popular misconception that offshore activities are 'high
technology'. In fact, only a few offshore activities (mainly in the
service sector) are 'high technology', and the 'average' technological
content of offshore activities as a whole is not especially high (Lewis
& McNicoll, 1978). On the contrary, many of the demands created by
offshore operations are well within the capability of the U.K. engineering
industry (Scottish Development Department, 1978; Lewis & McNicoll, 1978).
For example, in 1974 Gibson estimated that around 60% of the total
development costs of a field (whether in the North Sea or elsewhere) could
be expected to be spent on equipment purchased from traditional civil and
mechanical engineering industries.
Furthermore, in some areas where U.K. companies did lack offshore
expertise they have been able to acquire it through joint-ventures or
licensing agreements, often with the encouragement and advice of the
0S0. In 1975, 20% of the Scottish manufacturing firms involved in oil
(and 40% of the service firms) were in partnership with foreign companies
(Pounce et al, 1976).
Nevertheless, especially in the early 1970"s, many U.K. companies thought
that the supply of oil equipment and services was high technology and
that therefore, unlike U.S. companies, they did not possess the skills
and knowhow to meet offshore demands. (Confusion may have arisen
because the additions to offshore technology resulting from North Sea
experience have tended to be of an advanced nature and it is these high
technology developments which have attracted most attention in the press
etc.) Furthermore, although requiring fairly standard skills and
production techniques many items of equipment were unfamiliar in function,
and because of their lack of knowledge of the terms and the technology
9
used in this 'new' industry some companies experienced difficulty in
identifying areas where their skills could be applied (Lewis et al,
1978a; Moar, 1980).
9. It should, however, be remembered that offshore development in the
southern North Sea had been underway since the mid-1960's.
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3.4.2 Purchasing Inertia and Other Industrial Marketing Problems
The apparent inability of U.K. companies to identify the exact nature
of the oil industry's needs and appraise which of these they were best
qualified to satisfy has been a major factor in their failure to win
a larger share of the U.K. market, particularly in the early 1970's
(Gibson, 1974; Scottish Office, 1977a). Indeed, many prospective
suppliers appeared to want the oil companies to inform them of the
opportunities available and how they might go about seizing them, rather
than undertake market research themselves, despite the fact that they
could have learned much from the considerable body of literature
pertaining to the North Sea which soon became available (Daniels, 1976;
Larminie, 1976). Although the 0S0 aims to help U.K. industry identify
the needs of the offshore operators, and trade associations such as the
Association of British Oceanic Industries (ABOI) and the Council of
British Manufacturers and Contractors serving the Petroleum and Process
Industries (CBMPE) collect and disseminate marketing information to
their members, the onus must rest on the supply firms themselves to
seek out market opportunities which, on the basis of their own commercial
judgement, they feel they can profitably exploit (Scottish Office;
Lewis et al, 1978a; Daniels, 1976).
Similarly, both Baker et al (1978) and Lewis et al (1978a) found that
a number of prospective suppliers experienced difficulty in identifying
the location of purchasing authority within the oil companies. A
number of studies undertaken in other industries have shown that several
individuals or functional areas (such as purchasing, sales, production,
the board of directors etc.) are generally involved in an industrial
purchasing decision and that these influencers are not all necessarily
interested in the same characteristics of the prospective seller's product
(Weigand, 1968; Webster, 1965; Strauss, 1962; Kellogg, 1970). A supplier
will thus find itself selling to a multi-individual customer, while there
are also many possible outside influencers, such as consultant engineers,
governmental bodies, etc. (Weigand, 1968; Hill, 1973). Moreover, buying
responsibility will depend upon certain characteristics of the product,
such as its importance (either in terms of money or how critical its
purchase is to the total operation) or its technical complexity; the
personal characteristics of the decision-makers; organisational variables,
such as the size of the firm; and the novelty of the purchase (Fisk, 1967;
Desoutter, 1973; Buckner, 1967; Fisher, 1970; Webster & Wind, 1972).
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Lewis et al (1978a) found that buying in the oil industry might be
handled in any one of four ways: through the offices and authority
of a project manager (often responsible for much of the detailed design
and procurement of goods and services); through the contracts division
of the oil company at headquarters; through the oil company's purchasing
division; or through the oil company's local operations. Both Lewis
et al (1978a) and Baker et al (1978) found that local managers were
usually subject to budgetary controls and that therefore larger contracts
were allocated by tender board or committee at head office, or at least
referred to a head office committee for final approval."'"0 Thus, in
the case of U.S. oil companies, guidance and approval on major contracts
is sometimes sought from their head offices in the U.S.A. (Lewis et al,
1978a). Baker et al (1978) also discovered that the location of decision
making differed according to the technical complexity of the product,
with purchasing staff carrying most weight in the case of non-technical
purchases but engineers or technicians becoming more important with
respect to technical items.
In addition, every organisation will have its own set of buying processes
which may well vary from one purchase to another (see, for example, Lee,
1978). The decision process will consist of several stages, ranging
generally from problem recognition to evaluation of alternatives and
selection of source (Webster, 1965; Fisher, 1970). As each stage is
completed a process of creeping commitment to a certain supplier occurs
and there is diminishing likelihood of new vendors getting access to the
buying situation. The speed at which the 'buy stages' are completed
will depend, for example, upon the novelty of purchase. In the case
of a 'straight rebuy' of a standard product the stages will be passed
through rapidly, but the process will be slower in the case of a 'modified
rebuy', and slower still with respect to a 'new task'. Hence the 10%
of Baker et al's interviewees which received most of their work through
direct work orders were mainly suppliers of standard items purchased
by existing customers in low value contracts. The 71% which received
work mainly through tenders were usually responding to large orders
for goods required some time ahead from any one of several suppliers on
a tendering list. Finally, 19% got most of their business either by
direct negotiation with the customer (normally when he required a
specialist service of which there were few suppliers or had a problem
requiring negotiation leading to a novel solution); by telephone
10. This is also evident from G.A. Lee's (1978) exposition of the
purchasing organisation of BP Trading Ltd.
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(usually in cases where the item was required quickly); or through
informal channels/personal contact, usually in cases where a long¬
standing contract/relationship existed with the customer.
Thus, the industrial buying process is extremely complex and, as
discovered by Baker et al (197-8) , individual oil companies have very
different approaches to procuring offshore supplies and services.
Nevertheless, it is vital that prospective suppliers get to know the
organisation of the oil companies in order that the correct people are
contacted and proposals are put to the appropriate section of the company
so that they are given due consideration (Larminie, 1976) , a task which
is further complicated by the rapid pace of staff movement in the oil
industry. Ideally, all those influencing the purchase of the product
should be identified, but in practice it may only be possible to locate
those that exert the greatest influence (Fisher, 1970; Robertson, 1970;
Webster & Wind, 1972).
The 0S0 has attempted to advise supply companies in this area
(Department of Energy, 1977b). Indeed for many supply companies,
particularly those approaching the oil industry for the first time, the
OSO's most useful advice has taken the form of specific contacts within
a potential purchasing company's organisation (Lewis et al, 1978a;
Lewis & McNicoll, 1978). However, U.K. suppliers cannot afford to rely
on the assistance of bodies such as the 0S0. The importance of U.K.
suppliers undertaking their own market research is underlined by Baker
et al's (1978) findings that several supply and service organisations
displayed a lack of knowledge of the operators' purchasing procedures,
and that the more successful suppliers were indeed those that were more
aware of the purchasing processes in prospective customer organisations.
However, perhaps the biggest problem faced by U.K. supply companies has
been that of persuading the oil companies, project managers etc. to
abandon the close relationships that they had developed with U.S. offshore
suppliers prior to the development of the North Sea and risk inadequate
performance by a U.K. supplier in work not previously undertaken.
Several studies have established the importance of purchasing inertia
- that is, the tendency to purchase from a supplier with whom business
has been done before - a feature of which is lack of search activity
(Harding, 1966; Buckner, 1967; Cunningham & White, 1974; Webster, 1965;
Lewis et al, 1978a; Baker et al, 1978). Search activity is usually
most limited with respect to routine, repeat purchases of low value,
standard items, as found by Baker et al (1978). Although search
activity may be restricted because it is easier to place an order with
an existing supplier, most studies have found that doing business with
well-known, reputable, established suppliers is usually a way of
reducing risk (Webster & Wind, 1972; Buckner, 1967; Robertson, 1970;
James, 1972; Levitt, 1967). In the North Sea the risk undertaken in
selecting an untried supplier is magnified by the size of the investment
incurred and the extreme effect on an oil company's cash flow and
profits which can result from a comparatively slight delay in delivery
(through, perhaps, missing the 'weather window') or a shutdown due to
a failure of equipment. It is therefore not surprising that Baker et
al (1978, p.183) should describe the rationale for operators' purchasing
behaviour as "risk minimisation".
All oil companies compile their own lists of accredited suppliers
(Moar, 1980; Lewis et al, 1978a). This not only restricts the number
of firms which the company has to deal with, thereby making negotiation
easier, but also, in times of emergency, allows quick access to an
appropriate supplier. It should also be recognised that the expected
value of additional information must be evaluated, as search activity
is not costless (Lee, 1978; Webster, 1965; Cunningham & White, 1974),
while most purchase decisions have time constraints which in any case
may limit the amount of search activity which can be undertaken
(Webster, 1965).
There are other possible advantages of source loyalty. Purchasing
equipment identical to that already in use has been found to produce
standardisation benefits such as reduced costs of spares, fewer mainten¬
ance problems and greater flexibility (Cunningham & White, 1974).
Purchasing inertia is also a function of the number and depth of inter¬
faces (James, 1972). With complex contracts, such as the platform
jacket and module sub-assemblies which are especially designed for each
field, the desire to retain an existing, successful multiple inter-face
between oil company and designer/project manager/major contractors may
be very strong. Not only will a system controlling and directing the
flow of technical information have been established but also personal
links will have developed between people working together for several
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months - it would clearly be undesirable to re-establish all these
contacts every time a new contract was placed. Similarly, permanent
links may be established between, for example, manufacturers of gas
turbines, generators, pumps and compressors to provide a power plant
'package' for certain platform duties. Oil companies prefer to award
contracts to firms able to handle a complete package since this reduces
the problems of communication, project management, planning and
expediting (to check progress and working standards) (Lewis, et al, 1978a).
Where this is not possible restrictions may be written into a contract
requiring that the permission of the oil company be obtained before any
proposed sub-contracting takes place, again in order to minimise the
risk of delivery dates and/or quality of the final product failing to
meet the required specifications.
A further consequence of the adoption by the oil companies of the
'systems' or 'package' approach has been the practice of simply ignoring
tenders not based on the original contract specification (Lewis et al,
1978a). For example, platform modules must fit together as an integrated
whole and thus alternatives to the stipulated design specifications
cannot be considered, except on certain self-contained functions which
do not affect the overall balance of the package. Unfortunately, the
importance of adherence to design specifications was not always recognised
by prospective suppliers (Lewis et al, 1978a; Moar, 1980). In addition,
tendering against U.S. specifications - such as those set by the
American Petroleum Institute (API) and the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) - has made it more difficult for U.K. companies in
some cases, although the manufacturing specifications themselves are not
unduly onerous (Lennard, 1976).
The problems associated with purchasing inertia were highlighted in the
IMEG report and IMEG's recommendations in this area were fully implemented
with the establishment in January 1973 of the OSO, which was entrusted
with the task of ensuring that UK industry obtained a 'full and fair
opportunity' to compete in supplying goods and services for the U.K.
Continental Shelf (Department of Energy, 1977b) . Under the terms of
the Memorandum of Understanding the field operators have agreed to
supply the OSO with quarterly returns of orders placed, indicating the
source of various items and providing explanations, where appropriate,
for the use of overseas suppliers.
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IMEG (1973) found that several U.S. oil companies expected to be
influenced to 'buy British'. However, IMEG's feelings on the matter
- subsequently echoed by the OSO itself (Department of Energy, 1977b)
- were that undue pressure on oil operators to 'buy British' would make
operations in the U.K. sector of the North Sea less attractive and
hence diminish exploration effort, while a U.K. offshore supplies
industry developed in a highly protected domestic market would fail to
remain competitive and hence would be incapable of exploiting world
markets. Nevertheless, there have been occasions, such as the platform
order for the Tartan field - shared by RGC and UIE having originally
been awarded in total to the French company - when the field operators
may have been subjected by the OSO to undue pressure to buy British.
Similarly, BNOC has shown on a number of occasions that it is willing
to 'root' for the U.K. supplies industry, as in the case of the power
generation equipment for the Murchison platform which BNOC insisted
should be supplied by Rolls-Royce although Conoco, the U.S. field
operator, preferred a U.S. power plant. Certainly, there have been
repeated accusations from within the E.E.C. that 'full and fair opportunity'
is just a euphemism for protection (Eglin, 1977).
Purchasing '.inertia has also been countered to a certain extent by the
need to adapt equipment originally developed for use in the Gulf of
Mexico for the exceptionally harsh environmental conditions in the North
Sea which, in addition, have created some entirely new market opportunities
(Eglin, 1977; Lewis et al, 1978a). However, the oil industry has still
tended to look to established companies for the next generation of oil
equipment, partly because these companies have proven their technical
problem-solving ability in the past and partly because U.K. suppliers
initially did not take full advantage of the 'untried conditions' which
existed (Lewis et al, 1978a; Baker et al, 1978).
The marketing lessons of inertia are clear. When it has been established
in a company's favour then that company must maintain it to its
advantage by generating satisfaction and ensuring that its customer
believes the cost and effort of search will not bring adequate returns
(Cunningham & White, 1974; James, 1972). However, in the North
Sea market inertia has usually operated against U.K. companies, and
evidence suggests that breaking down inertia is usually a long process
requiring the devotion of considerable time and resources (Rowe, 1973).
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Even gaining access to an oil company's approved vendor list will involve
some or all of the following stages: investment in plant and manufacturing
capacity; production and testing of equipment prior to submission
to the oil company; arrangement of meetings with oil company personnel;
and demonstration of the equipment's operating characteristics to the
satisfaction of the oil company (Lewis et al, 1978a). Studies
in other industries have shown that salesmen play an important role in
breaking down inertia over a period of time in that they can provide
information which aids the buyer's work simplification motivation and
reduces his perception of the risk of changing supplier (Cunningham &
White, 1974; Rowe, 1973). However, there is considerable doubt about
the ability of many U.K. suppliers to effectively sell themselves in
this manner.
Often U.K. companies have failed to make their presence known to the
oil companies, apparently waiting to be approached (Baker et al, 1978;
Lewis et al, 1978a) .
The 0S0 aims to help the oil industry identify suitable U.K. suppliers
while trade associations such as ABOI provide a range of marketing
services for their members, such as group marketing schemes, sponsorship
and support of exhibitions and conferences, and publication and
distribution of catalogues. However, institutional support cannot
replace competent, aggressive marketing by the supply companies themselves,
both in the U.K. and the U.S.A. Furthermore, marketing activity must
be continued even after a relationship has been established as this may
be made redundant by staff movement (Lewis et al, 1978a; Moar, 1980).
One would expect marketing standards to improve with North Sea experience,
but a report produced in 1978 by PA International showed that problems
still remain (Dafter, 1978a). The report criticises a large number of
offshore supply companies for being slow to react to overseas business
opportunities in that 50% of firms called upon to supply sales information
for potential multi-million dollar orders took over six weeks to respond,
and concludes that :
"the cause of the sluggish response was not so much the common
in-built resistance to form-filling, but, more disturbingly ..
... an ineptitude on the part of many companies to effectively
sell themselves".
Baker et al's study, also produced in 1978, found that U.K.
companies appeared to be worse than their overseas competitors in
the important area of project presentation - that is, the ability
to put together a credible proposal when invited to tender for
work - apparently because they failed to make the necessary
'investment' (in terms of man-hours) on the preparation and present¬
ation of their proposals. Consequently, they did not always meet
the specification or the deadline on the submission of the tender,
nor did they present their proposals clearly and concisely.
3.4.3 Financial Barriers to Entry
There is very little U.K. capacity in exploration drilling, subsea
pipelaying and offshore installation work (other than mechanical
and electrical hook-up)areas.which have in general been dominated
by a few U.S. companies, although Dutch and Italian companies have
achieved noteable success in the offshore installation market. The
cost of constructing the vessels used in these activities is
considerable and few U.K. companies have been willing to undertake
the necessary investment without the certainty beforehand of a
contract that would guarantee the recovery of at least a substantial
proportion of their outlays (Scottish Development Department, 1978).
The oil companies, on the other hand, could not afford to wait for
prospective U.K. suppliers to obtain the necessary plant and felt that
they were already taking enough risks in the North Sea without adding
to them by using unproven equipment when proven equipment was
available (Larminie, 1976). Thus, U.K. companies trying to break into
these markets had to convince the oil companies not only that they had
the skills and expertise but also the reliable equipment required to
do the job, necessitating considerable investment prior to the
submission of a tender. These development costs have proved a
considerable barrier to entry (Lewis et al, 1978a).
IMEG (1973) recognised that entry into these sectors might not appear
profitable in the short-term, particularly in view of the
uncertainties of investment in an industry of rapid technological
change, but considered that in the long-term the attractions of the
offshore oil business were sufficient to justify this investment,
bearing in mind that other offshore provinces would be developed in
the years to come. Consequently IMEG recommended provision of
11. See Appendices 3.4 and 3.5
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government backed insurance against inadequate returns for U.K.
contractors investing in equipment and facilities, in order to
diminish the risk they faced in entering the offshore market.
In addition, IMEG proposed that in certain cases, such as
equipment having a range of applications- (e.g. crane-barges) and
therefore not tied to the requirements of a small number of contractors,
the government should purchase or hire contractors' equipment to be
leased to U.K. contractors. In 1977 the Scottish Office (1977a)
reached the same conclusions and recommended that public sector in¬
volvement in the creation of appropriate U.K. capability should
be considered. Successive governments have, however, failed to
implement these recommendations.
However, it is not only in drilling and offshore installation operations
that U.K. companies have either been unwilling or unable to take the
risks necessary to become involved in the offshore market (MacKay &
Mackay, 1975). In some cases, even where U.K. companies have contained
sections or subsidiaries anxious to become more heavily involved in
the offshore market their enthusiasm has not been backed by investment
by their management board (Select Committee on Science and Technology,
1974) .
3.4.4 The 'Track Record' of the U.K. Offshore Supplies Industry
It is vital that prospective suppliers determine the criteria which
their customers utilise in their evaluations of alternative product
offerings in order to ensure that the most effective appeal is made
to them (Webster & Wind, 1972; Weigand, 1968). The most important
purchasing criteria in the offshore market are quality, delivery and
price (Larminie, 1976; Lewis et al, 1978a). U.K. industry has,
in general, been able to meet the oil industry1s demands for a high
standard of service and adherence to contract specifications - indeed,
all suppliers on an approved vendors' list will be technically and
commercially qualified. Thus, the major factors in the award of a
contract have generally been firm delivery date and competitive price
(Baker, 1978). In particular, meeting promised delivery dates is
crucial because of the huge investments involved and the high premium
placed by the oil companies on production at the earliest possible
date (Larminie, 1976; Daniels, 1976; Lennard, 1976; Lewis, 1978a).
The performance of U.K. companies with respect to delivery has, however,
caused some concern. In the early 1970's some U.K. companies experienced
difficulty in competing with the ex-stock deliveries of U.S.-based
equipment suppliers (Lewis et al, 1978a), while others did not immediately
realise the emphasis placed on reliable delivery by the oil industry.
Often the oil companies themselves, due possibly to their inexperience
in working to such short weather windows, made impossible delivery
demands, while U.K. suppliers were sometimes let down by late delivery
of components from abroad. The Monitoring Section of the 0S0 has
demonstrated in some cases that the U.K. supply company has not been
responsible for the delay, while in other cases it has been able to
assist in overcoming potential delays. Nevertheless, delivery
problems have continued and all too often U.K. companies have deserved
their reputation for poor delivery. In some sectors (such as
platform and module building) there have been industrial relations
problems, while in others (such as shipbuilding) inability to compete
on delivery appears to be principally the result of poor organisation
and low productivity.
In the early stages of North Sea oil development, oil companies were
faced with a wide range of complex technological problems and consequently
price was not of prime importance. However, the oil companies are
becoming increasingly price sensitive as the number of the U.K. companies
able to quote for any given contract expands (Baker et al, 1978; Lewis
et al, 1978a) and their North Sea purchasing and programming experience
builds up.
The Interest Relief Grant Scheme, which provided grants at 3% per annum
on credit to finance contracts for providing U.K. goods and services,
was intended to restore some degree of comparability between the credit
terms available in relation to U.K. supplies of equipment to the U.K.
Continental Shelf and the preferential credit rates available in respect
of supplies from other countries under their national export credit
arrangements. However, this system soon came under attack from two
sides. Firstly, the U.K. supply industry argued that with rising
interest rates the 3% relief grant failed to bridge the gap between
normal interest rates and export credit interest rates. This argument
was supported by reports produced by the Select Committee on Science
and Technology (1974) and Scottish Office (1977a), which concluded
that the interest relief system was of only limited value against the
greater support given by other countries and recommended that the
assistance given to U.K. firms be brought more into line with the
Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) support. On the other
hand, the European Commission began an action in the European court
against the U.K. for operating a scheme favouring U.K. companies and
discriminating against companies from the E.E.C. Thus, in September
1979 the scheme was dropped, partly because of the Commission's
action and partly because it no longer represented value for money.
In contrast, some sectors of the U.K. offshore supplies industry
continue to be faced with strong price competition from foreign
suppliers benefitting from subsidies, whether overt or concealed. In
particular, suhsi3ies provided to European shipyards have allowed them
to pick up a sizeable share not only of ship orders, but also module
and fabrication work and some process plant business such as pressure
vessel manufacture.
While the industrial purchaser is a professional who will be concerned
mainly with economic criteria such as price, delivery and quality,
to view the industrial buying process as completely objective and
rational is to ignore the fact that the industrial buyer-seller
relationship involves interaction among people, subject to all the
vagaries of human nature (Webster, 1965; Chapman, 1973; Robertson,
1970; Kellogg, 1970; Cunningham & White, 1974; Kotler, 1972;
Marrian, 1973). Thus, for example, in a situation where there is
substantial similarity in what suppliers offer in the way of price,
delivery, etc. the purchaser has little basis for rational choice
and since he can satisfy his organisational obligations with any one
of a number of suppliers he may be swayed by personal motives such
as good relations/friendship with the sales representative of a supplier
or the 'image'/reputation of a supplier (Strauss, 1962; Fisher, 1970;
Harding, 1966; Levitt, 1967). Thus, 'irrational' factors such as
personal relationships can be important in industrial markets and it
is therefore not altogether surprising that Baker et al (1978) found
that some suppliers actually received most of their business through
personal contacts/informal channels with organisations with which a
long-standing relationship had been established. In addition, Levis
et al (1978a) found that in the early 1970's many suppliers trying to
gain entry to the offshore market actually received their initial




Some measure of the significance of the market for goods and
services created by North Sea oil developments is provided by the fact
that in 1980 offshore-related investment accounted for around 18% of
U.K. industrial investment and around 6% of total U.K. investment
(Department of Energy, 1981). However, it was stressed in section
3.2 that the nature of the offshore activity being undertaken in the
North Sea will change over time. In particular, the level of
development activity (and hence the volume of demand for many items of
offshore-related equipment) will gradually decline as the North Sea
matures as an oil province. Hence, offshore-related manufacturing
employment in the U.K. may also fall.
In section 3.3 it was pointed out that although U.K. industry in general
has responded reasonably well to the demands created by North Sea oil
activity, the U.K. share of individual market sectors does vary
enormously. The major factors influencing the performance of U.K.
suppliers were then analysed in section 3.4 in order to explain this
pattern of U.K. involvement in the domestic offshore market. Two
distinct sets of factors influencing the success of U.K. suppliers
were identified. Firstly, major problems have been presented by
technological, financial and particularly marketing barriers which have
restricted the freedom of U.K. companies to enter the offshore market.
Secondly, even once established in the market, U.K. companies have
sometimes found it difficult to provide their customers with the
delivery, price and quality they need.
It can be seen from Appendices 3.4 and 3.5 that the 'U.K. share' of
orders placed for capital goods has exceeded that for services through¬
out the 1974-80 period. It has already been pointed out (in section
3.4.1) that technological barriers to entry were generally more
important in the service sector, although some manufacturing sectors
such as wellhead and down-hole equipment are still dominated by
foreign companies which have set up subsidiaries in the U.K., while
in other manufacturing sectors such as platform fabrication and pipe-
coating joint-venture companies with experienced foreign offshore
suppliers have been established. The major financial barriers have
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also been faced by prospective U.K. suppliers of drilling, subsea
pipe-laying and offshore installation services, sectors where U.K.
capability is still at its weakest. Finally, the problem of purchasing
inertia was also more severe for service companies. Although some
U.K. companies with experience of shipping operations were able to get
into base and supply services, U.K. industry's oil-related experience
prior to the development of the North Sea was largely limited to the
manufacturing sector. Some U.K. manufacturers (of, for example, power
and communications equipment) were able to capitalise upon previous
offshore experience gained in the Middle East and elsewhere, while
some U.K. pump and process plant manufacturers had worked for the
oil companies on onshore refinery and petrochemical plant projects.
Consequently, the 'U.K. share' of orders for pumps, process plant,
communications and power plant has consistently exceeded 80%, a level
of achievement which has not been maintained in the service sector.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE OFFSHORE SUPPLIES INDUSTRY IN SCOTLAND
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter full advantage was taken of the published data
and research evidence available in order to provide a detailed analysis
of the performance of the U.K. offshore supplies industry in the
domestic offshore market. Unfortunately, a similar analysis from a
purely Scottish viewpoint is impossible due to the non-availability
of appropriate data for Scottish industry. Nevertheless, in the first
half of this chapter, which is devoted to an examination of the participation
of Scottish industry in both domestic and overseas offshore markets, use
is made of relevant statistical information (concerning Scottish offshore-
related output, exports and employment) published by the Scottish
Economic Planning Department (SEPD).
The latter half of this chapter presents a profile of the Scottish man¬
ufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry, which constitutes
the population from which the sample of respondent firms was selected.
A list of the companies located in Scotland which were identified by the
researcher as being involved in offshore-related manufacturing as a principal
activity is provided as Appendix 4.1. It was this list which subsequently
acted as the sampling frame.
4.2 THE PARTICIPATION OF SCOTTISH INDUSTRY IN OFFSHORE MARKETS
4.2.1 The Involvement of Scottish Industry in the U.K. Offshore Supplies
Market
It is extremely difficult to obtain accurate information on the
participation of Scottish firms in the offshore supplies business.
Nevertheless, a study carried out for the Scottish Office in the mid-
1970 ' s estimated that 60-70% of the U.K.'s share of the North Sea market
was being served by companies based in Scotland (Scottish Development
Department, 1978). However, this study stressed that the considerable
volume of subcontracting which is undertaken in the offshore industry
results in a large proportion of the materials and equipment supplied
by companies based in Scotland being imported from elsewhere. Total
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direct North Sea-related expenditure incurred in Scotland was estimated
at £110-125 million in 1974 and £150-200 million in 1975, which, when
compared to total U.K. offshore expenditure of £830 million in 1974
and £1500 million in 1975, implies that the Scottish share of the off¬
shore market was only 13-15% in 1974 and 10-13% in 1975. This report
therefore concluded that the Scottish share was "surprisingly small"
(Scottish Development Department, 1978, p.21). However, an alternative
estimate of oil-related net output in Scotland in 1975 of £304 million
has been made by the SEPD,1 suggesting a Scottish share of the U.K.
2
Continental Shelf expenditure of around 20% (Scottish Office, 1977b).
The results of a similar SEPD survey carried out in 1978 are shown in
Table 4.1 below. In 1977 oil-related net output in Scotland totalled
£518 million, of which just over £50 million was accounted "for by
exports (Scottish Office, 1979c). Oil-related net output for the U.K.
sector was therefore approximately £468 million, equivalent to 19% of
the total expenditure incurred on the U.K. Continental Shelf -
approximately £2480 million - in that year.
4.2.2 The Involvement of Scottish Industry in Offshore-related
Export Markets
The first evidence of the scale of the involvement of the Scottish
offshore supplies industry in export markets was provided by a survey
undertaken in the latter part of 1974 by the SEPD. This survey
identified over 10O offshore supply firms located in Scotland which
were supplying other offshore markets overseas, albeit on a modest
scale (Pounce et al, 1976). Involvement in export markets was found
to be greater in the manufacturing sector, where 72 exporters were
identified (30% of those responding to this section of the
questionnaire) than in the service sector, where only -about 20% of
respondents (about 35 firms) were involved in global offshore markets.
1. The definition of net output used by the SEPD was "gross output less
purchase of fuel, raw material and supplies; payments for work
given out to other establishments; payments for transport; net
amount of any duties, subsidies and levies payable" (Scottish
Office, 1977b, p.17).
2. Although the Department of Energy includes expenditure on pipe-laying
and installation work this sector was omitted from the SEPD survey
as it was at this time treated as construction. On the other hand,
the 1975 output figures include an element of exports which the
















Primary 2.1 0.6 2.7
Construction 5.4 0.7 6.1
Services, of which 207.4 24.8 232.2
- gas, electricity & water (4.9) (1.1) (5.9)
- transport & communication (53.7) (7.4) (61.1)
- distribution (22.3) (3.9) (26.1)
- other business services (89.4) (8.9) (98.3)
(including base services)
- other services (37.2) (3.6) (40.8)
Manufacturing, of which 102.4 24.0 126.3
- iron & steel (21.9) (9.5) (31.4)
- engineering, shipbuilding
& vehicles (60.2) (10.9) (71.1)
- other metal industries (6.1) (1.7) (7.7)
- other manufacturing
industries (14.2) (1.9) (16.1)
TOTAL - All Sectors 317.3 50.1 367.4
Platforms, modules, pipecoating
Oil & gas exploration & production




SOURCE : Scottish Office (1979c), p.11, Table 2.
It is interesting to note that the majority of the manufacturers
exporting oil-related equipment were established firms, that is, firms
not specifically set up to serve the North Sea oil market. Indeed,
for 40 (of the larger) manufacturers (out of 63 answering this question)
work in other offshore areas had predated their North Sea involvement.
These companies were exporting valves, iron and steel castings, steel
tubes, wire rope and oil well drilling and production equipment. Hence,
only 23 (of the smaller firms) had progressed from the North Sea to the
global market. The majority of the service firms involved in export
3. Figures have been rounded up to the nearest £0.1 million and may not
add up to the appropriate totals.
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markets were companies new to Scotland, mainly U.S. companies with
considerable oil-related experience.
A more recent estimate of the involvement of Scottish industry in off¬
shore markets overseas results from the SEPD's 1978 survey of the oil-
related industry in Scotland, the results of which are shown in Table 4.1
(above). It can be seen that the estimated value added generated by
exports in 1977 was £50.1 million, approximately 14% of the value added
generated by exports and sales to the oil industry taken together.
Although the volume of exports is divided fairly evenly between the man¬
ufacturing and service sectors, manufacturing firms exported more of their
output (19%) than firms engaged in the provision of services (11%).
The SEPD's 1978 survey also collected information concerning the
destination of offshore-related exports, as summarised in Table 4.2 below.
TABLE 4.2
















& vehicles 25 34 41 14.1 21
Other metal industries 6 22 72 2.5 10
All other manufacturing
industries 3 9 88 22.8 7
Total manufacturing 11 19 70 39.4 '38
Services :
Distribution 30 32 38* 2.2 28
Other business services 43 16 41 6.8 15
(including support bases)
All other services 32 61 7 6.1 8
Total services 26 37 37 15.1 51
By wholly and partly
involved :
Manufacturing :
wholly-involved 20 47 33 8.6 11
partly-involved 8 12 80 30.9 27
Services :
wholly-involved 27 34 39 14.3 43
partly-involved 2 96 2 0.8 8
TOTAL - All industries 15 24 61 54.54 89
SOURCE : Scottish Office (1979c), p.12, Table 3.
4. The SEPD estimate that the respondents accounted for 75% of total export
sales. This implies that total gross export sales in 1977 totalled
approximately £73 million.
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This table indicates that the proportion of oil-related exports which
went outside Europe was significantly higher for manufacturing firms
(70%) than for service firms (37%), particularly in the case of partly-
involved manufacturing companies^ which sold 80% of their oil-related
exports outside Europe.
Thus, although by 1977 there was evidence of Scottish companies exporting
oil-related products and services worldwide, established partly-
involved manufacturers continued to export more widely in global offshore
markets than did firms in other sectors.
4.2.3 Offshore-related Employment in Scotland
In mid-1978, while offshore-related employment in both wholly and
partly-involved offshore suppliers totalled 46,450, the overall impact
of the oil industry in Scotland - taking into consideration both the
employment associated with constructing fabrication yards, oil and gas
terminals, offshore installation and pipelaying and the consumption
multiplier effects - was estimated at around 60,000-70,000, as shown in
Table 4.3 below.
This table also highlights the significant change which has taken place
in the industrial distribution of North Sea oil-related employment
since 1976. The pattern is that to be expected of an increasingly mature
offshore province. With a number of fields now in production and a
growing number of people working offshore, employment in the service sector
increased by nearly 12,000 between 1976 and mid-1978, to reach approx¬
imately 26,450. The fact that 90% of service sector employment is
provided by wholly-involved units is a further indication of the
specialist nature of many services required by the offshore oil industry.
The fall of 5,700 in oil-related manufacturing employment was largely
due to the 6,650 jobs lost in platform and module building - especially
5. Wholly-involved units are establishments which are for the most part
relatively new, having been set up in Scotland specifically to supply
the North Sea oil-related markets. Although most of them are
exclusively engaged in North Sea oil work, a number also supply export
markets.
Partly-involved units are established Scottish units which have
succeeded in breaking into the North Sea oil market, but for whom
oil-related work represents only a part of their total activities.
Some established firms have, of course, set up new branches to under¬










































SOURCE : Scottish Office (1979b), p.31.
concrete platforms - as shown in Table 4.4.(below) which analyses
offshore-related employment in Scotland by industry. In fact, employment
in the engineering sectors (excluding shipbuilding, modules and platforms)
actually increased slightly during the 1976-78 period.
Generally speaking, for service firms the advantage of proximity to the
market outweighs the possible difficulties of obtaining good quality
labour in competition with other oil-related companies and consequently
most have chosen to establish bases on the east coast, particularly in
the Aberdeen and Peterhead areas of Grampian region, an area with a
limited industrial heritage. Thus, Table 4.5, which analyses offshore-
related employment in Scotland by region, shows that in mid-1978
21,000 non-manufacturing jobs out of a total of 26,450 (80%) were located
in Grampian region. On the other hand, Lewis et al (1978a) found
6. All figures are rounded to the nearest 50.
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Rest of mechanical engineering,
of which
- pumps, valves, compressors
- industrial engines
- other machinery (including
oil tools and wellhead
equipment)
- industrial plant & steelwork
other than platforms &
modules





















VIII & IX Instrument & electrical
engineering 650 450 1,100 +400
X & XI Shipbuilding & marine
engineering 1 ,100 1,100 -1,000
XII Metal goods (not elsewhere
specified) 1,300 1,050 2,350 +550
XII to
XIX
Other manufacturing industries 100 40O 450 -250
Total manufacturing 11,900 8,150 20,000 -5,700
XXII
Services :
Transport & communication 4,650 550 5,200 +1,650




banking etc. 3 ,700 900 4,550 +3,OOO
XXVI Miscellaneous (including
catering & diving) 3, 9O0 250 4,100 +2,350
Total Services 14,150 2,400 16,550 +8,lOO
TOTAL - All Industries 35,900 10,550 46,450 +6,250
SOURCE : Scottish Office (1979b), p.32.
8. All figures are rounded to the nearest 50.
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that many manufacturers and consultants preferred to stay in the West
of Scotland which has an established industrial infrastructure, a strong
engineering tradition and a pool of skilled labour. Nevertheless, the
SEPD's 1978 survey of oil-related employment found that 20% of respondent
companies reported labour recruitment problems, many of which were not
simply of a short-term nature (Scottish Office, 1979a). Both the
SEPD's Scottish survey and Hunt's (1978) study of the Grampian region
found that the greatest shortage was for skilled manual workers, particularly
welders, although there was also an increasing shortage of professional
workers such as engineers, technicians and sales personnel. Clearly,-
TABLE 4.5
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SOURCE : Scottish Office (1979b), p.33.
9. All figures are rounded to the nearest 50.
10. Total estimated oil employment in Highland region is 5,600 and in the
Island areas 1,650.
11. Total estimated oil employment in Lothian region is 1,850; in Central
Region 400; and in the Borders and Dumfries & Galloway negligible.
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continuing shortages of skilled labour and infrastructure deficiencies -
such as the poor road connections to the south, inadequate air freight
facilities and irregular international sea freight connections high¬
lighted in the Grampian study (Hunt, 1978) - constrain the ability of
Scottish companies to expand their offshore-related activities.
Table 4.5 also highlights the shift towards the production phase of
activity. The rapid expansion of the service sector is reflected in the
massive increase in the oil-related employment in the Grampian region,
which now accounts for 55% of total employment in wholly and partly-
involved firms in Scotland. On the other hand, the increase in oil
employment in the Tayside region since 1976 has been almost entirely
attributable to a few manufacturing companies. The loss of platform
and module fabrication jobs is largely responsible for the fall in oil
employment in Strathclyde, Fife and the Highlands & Islands.
4.2.4 Summary
The Scottish share of the U.K. offshore market is probably in the region
of 20%. However, as the emphasis in the North Sea moves towards the
production phase of activity so the importance of general services, such
as base and transport services, will increase. As proximity to the
market is vitally important to companies operating in these areas
companies located on the east coast of Scotland should dominate these
sectors and thus, over time, the overall Scottish share of the total U.K.
market should improve. Although platforms will also normally be
fabricated as close to the market as possible, geographical location is
less important in engineering and the Scottish share of these market
sectors is therefore likely to be less creditable. Nevertheless, in mid-
1978 there were 325 offshore-related manufacturing units in Scotland
12
employing approximately 20,000 people in oil-related work.
4.3 THE SCOTTISH MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF THE OFFSHORE SUPPLIES INDUSTRY13
4.3.1 Shipbuilding
Drilling Rigs
Although there was a shortage of drilling vessels in the period 1973-75,
12. See Table 4.3 above.
13. Appendix 4.1 provides a list of companies located in Scotland involved
in offshore-related manufacturing as a principal activity.
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new construction on a massive scale in the first half of the 1970's
produced a surplus of all three types of rigs by 1976-77. However,
thereafter rising oil prices once again stimulated exploration and in
May 1980 only 14 mobile drilling units (out of a world total of 450)
were without contracts, and most of these were undergoing repairs.
For many years U.S. jack-up yards - principally Levingston, Bethlehem,
McDermott and Marathon - dominated the market. However, the expansion
of offshore oil activities in south-east Asia forced these U.S. companies
to consider setting up yards closer to this market - there are now five
in Singapore - in competition with Japanese yards such as Hitachi Zosen,
Mitsui and Mitsubishi, while North Sea developments brought competition
from several European yards such as IHC and RSV (both of Holland),
CFEM (France), Arendal (Sweden) and Navire (Finland).
The Clydebank yard currently owned by UIE is the only U.K. yard to have
been successful in the jack-up market. This yard (which had won jack-up
orders previously in its days as John Brown and UCS) attracted several
orders following its take-over in 1972 by Marathon Shipbuilding, but by
late 1976 was facing closure. However, a speculative £13 million
order placed through BNOC and the Scottish Office provided a further
14 months employment for the yard's workforce of llOO men. This rig
was eventually sold to Penrod Drilling (U.S.) which then ordered a second
identical rig. Nevertheless, once again in Spring 1979 the yard was
only saved from closure by an order placed by BNOC. Marathon's
Clydebank yard has undoubtedly been a high cost operation, while the
yard's exclusion from the subsidies available to the nationalised ship¬
yards through the intervention fund has also made it difficult for the
yard to meet (often subsidised) overseas competition. The yard's
unhappy record was in marked contrast to that of Marathon's other yards
in the U.S.A. and Singapore and thus in April 1980 the yard was taken
over by the French group UIE which intends to undertake modernisation
and expand the yard's capabilities to include the construction of new
kinds of production platforms and associated platform fabrications such
as decks and modules. However, the first order to be won by UIE
(in June 1980) was for a £16.5 million jack-up drilling rig for a
Mexican drilling company.
Drillships present no construction problems for established shipyards
and Scott Lithgow have built two dynamically positioned drillships under
licence from IHC Gusto of Holland. However, no new drillships were
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ordered worldwide in 1978 and some existing units are even being converted
to other uses such as ocean mining vessels. Scott Lithgow's main compet¬
itors include IHC themselves, Mitsui (Japan) and several U.S. shipbuilders.
The market for semi-submersible drilling rigs was particularly badly
affected by the construction boom in the first half of the 1970's. For
example, only 5 units were ordered in 1978, compared to 60 units on
order in 1975 for delivery 1975-77. Several semi-submersible drilling
units are currently being used as production platforms, accommodation
units and construction and diving support units.
The most successful yards in this sector include Marathon, Levingston,
Bethlehem and Avondale of the U.S.A.; Mitsubishi and Mitsui of Japan;
CFEM (France); Aker (Norway); and Rauma Repola (Finland). The involve¬
ment of U.K. yards is, however, limited to Harland & Wolff's (Belfast)
construction of the Sea Quest in the mid-1960's, to a Sedco (U.S.) design.
Support Vessels
Although U.K. shipyards have the capability to build support vessels
they have been notably unsuccessful in securing orders, apparently
falling down on ordinary commercial factors such as marketing, delivery
and particularly price. For example, a survey of the support vessel
market carried out in 1976 (Schleibach, 1976) identified 390 support
vessels under construction in 82 shipyards worldwide. Despite the
fact that U.K. ownership extended to 69 of these, only 26 were being
built in the U.K., compared with 35 in Japan, 46 in Norway, 50 in
Germany, 56 in Holland and 99 in the U.S.A. The support vessel
construction boom which occurred in the mid 1970's (particularly in
Norway where very large tax incentives provided by the Norwegian
Government encouraged small investors to build boats in order-hungry
Norwegian yards) has still to fully work its way through the system, and
there is still little demand for new vessels. However, in August 1979,
7 vessels which were being built for U.K. owners were under construction
in Norwegian (4) and Japanese (3) yards.
Several Scottish shipyards failed to gain entry to the offshore market,
while Hall Russell & Co. Ltd. suffered from the escalation of wages
in Aberdeen and eventually withdrew to concentrate on specialised vessels,
leaving only Scott Lithgow and Ferguson Bros. involved in the support
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vessel market. Ferguson Bros., part of the Scott Lithgow group,
aim to satisfy the demand for smaller support vessels, leaving Scott
Lithgow to build the larger craft.
Ferguson Bros, have undertaken detailed design studies of seismic vessels
and coring vessels (used for taking cores of the seabed at platform
sites) but as yet have failed to win an order and the market for new
vessels of these types is currently depressed. The yard's offshore
construction experience is, in fact, limited to two anchor-handling
tug/supply vessels specifically designed for the North Sea and delivered
in 1974/75. However, as North Sea operations move into the production
phase the trend is towards the use of larger supply vessels with the
considerable load-carrying capacity required in the 'milk-run' phase.
The multi-purpose support vessel (MSV) was developed in response to an
apparent need in the North Sea for around ten large, semi-submersible
vessels capable of dealing with emergencies such as blow-outs and yet
at the same time able to 'earn their living' on a day-to-day basis by
assisting maintenance and construction work, utilising in the process
their extensive workshop and saturation diving facilities. However,
it now seems that only one or two MSV's may stiH have to be ordered (in
addition to the four purpose-built vessels already ordered) as the
government and oil companies now apparently consider that it may be
sufficient to have a MSV within 24 hours' steaming time of any offshore
installation, in which case five vessels could cover the U.K. sector of
the North Sea. Three of the MSV orders have gone to foreign yards (in
Finland and Japan) and the fourth was only awarded to Scott Lithgow after
the BNOC agreed to take a 25% share in the vessel and pay an equivalent
share of the bill. The two U.K. yards which tendered for the latest
MSV order, Scott Lithgow and Harland & Wolff, both submitted bids of
approximately £70 million, compared with the winning bid of £42 million
submitted by Rauma Repola of Finland. In addition, all four overseas
yards tendering guaranteed delivery in two years or less, while the
U.K. yards would not commit themselves to a firm delivery date but
admitted that construction could take three years.
U.K. shipyards have also failed to win orders for derrick and pipe-laying
vessels. The failure of U.K. contractors in this area has probably
contributed to the poor performance of U.K. shipbuilders. In addition,
IMEG (1973) argued that the absence of a suitable U.K. crane was a
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serious obstacle, pointing out that up to 1972 construction of large
derrick vessels had been confined to those countries in which crane-
makers were able to supply very large machines, namely the U.S.A.,
Japan, Holland, W. Germany and Italy. There has, in any case, been a
worldwide downturn in the construction market and in mid-1979 around 30%
of the world's fleet of 140 large construction vessels was under-utilised.
The new generation of larger, more sophisticated diving support vessels
(DSV's) which are now being employed in the North Sea (alongside the
converted supply ships and broad-beam stern trawlers which were used as
DSV's in the earlier part of the 1970's) are also being built overseas.
These modern vessels often incorporate dynamic positioning systems and
usually have a diving spread capable of holding 8-20 men under
compression. However, many of these DSV's were delivered in 1978-80
at a time when exploration and construction activity had declined and
it will be difficult for these specialised North Sea craft to secure work
in other offshore provinces in competition with cheaper vessels.
Consequently, future DSV's are likely to be dual purpose vessels which
can perform as supply boats when required but are fitted out in such a
way that a few days* conversion enables them to undertake a diving support
role.
Other Fabrication V7ork
Scott Lithgow have signed a joint-venture with CFEM (of France) to develop,
14
market and construct a steel gravity oil platform for the U.K. sector,
and also have a collaboration agreement with Deep Oil Technology Inc.
( of the U.S.A.) to market and build their design of TLP. In addition,
British Shipbuilders are a licensee for a TLP developed by BP and
Vickers Offshore which is claimed to be suitable for field developments
in up to 1800 feet of water.
Several U.K. yards undertook module building studies, because it
appeared that this might be an appropriate outlet for shipbuilding and
outfitting skills, only to discover that they could not meet the fierce
competition from smaller, private enterprise module builders. In addition,
Burntisland Fabricators' unhappy experience using a converted Fife
shipyard for module building has provided evidence that a shipyard may
not, after all, be the best site for these activities.
14. Although despite tendering for several field developments they
have as yet been unsuccessful.
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Nevertheless, Scottish shipyards have periodically undertaken offshore-
related fabrication work, a typical example being Govan Shipbuilder's
fabrication of the platform leg joints for the Maureen platform.
Summary
The performance of Scottish (and indeed U.K.) yards in the construction
of drilling rigs has been very disappointing. Undoubtedly the domination
of the world exploration drilling market by U.S. drilling contractors
has helped to steer the majority of rig orders to U.S. yards specialised
in their requirements. Nevertheless, starting from a similar position
to U.K. shipbuilders,yards in France, Holland, Finland and Norway have
enjoyed considerable success.
Similarly, U.K. yards in general have had only limited success in the
offshore support vessel market. However, the roles of the various
types of offshore support vessels are continually being reappraised,
providing new opportunities for U.K. yards proposing new, appropriate
design solutions to enter the market, assuming they can match overseas
yards on price and delivery.
The offshore-related efforts of Scottish shipyards have been
concentrated in the Clyde yards of the Scott Lithgow group and Marathon
Shipbuilding. Indeed, Scott Lithgow are stronger in the offshore
business than any other U.K..yard while Marathon were the only jack-up
rig manufacturers. Unfortunately, not even these yards have achieved
even a fair measure of success in the offshore market.
4.3.2 Platform Fabrication
Out of a total of 25 steel platform orders which have been placed for
the U.K. sector of the northern North Sea, U.K. platform fabricators
have won 18 outright and shared 3 others (with UIE of France), while
UIE and Dragados Y Contrucciones (Spain) have each won 2 outright.
Of the 5 U.K. yards which have shared these orders only Laing Offshore,
of Teeside, is not situated in Scotland. Laing Offshore constructed
3 platforms before announcing their withdrawal from platform business
in 1978 following 2 years without an order (although Laing were tempted
into tendering for the Magnus platform in 1979).
Ayrshire Marine Constructors (AMC), a joint-venture between the
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Scottish Weir Group and CBI Constructors, London subsidiary of Chicago
Bridge & Iron (of the U.S.A.), only entered the platform business in
May 1979 when they secured the Maureen contract, a steel gravity platform
designed by Technomare (Italy). AMC employ around 450 men at
Hunterston in Ayrshire - using a deep water site originally intended
for concrete platform construction - and are the only steel platform
constructor on the west coast.
Apart from the Maureen platform, the steel platforms have all been
conventional jackets which are constructed on their side in a dry dock and,
on completion, floated out. The main requirement for their construction
is flat land alongside moderately deep water and the three remaining
Scottish ste@l platform yards are all located on the east coast, as
close as possible to the North Sea oil fields. These yards are at
Nigg Bay on the Cromarty Firth, Ardersier on the Moray Firth and Methil
in Fife, and are operated by Highland Fabricators, McDermott Scotland
and Redpath de Groot Caledonian Ltd. (RGC) respectively.
Highland Fabricators, a joint-venture between Brown & Root (U.S.) and
George Wimpey (U.K.), have won six platform orders and employment at
the yard has varied from 1,000 - the yard's base or static workforce,
including a direct labour force of 400-500 - to a peak of around 2,500.
McDermott Scotland, which has a U.S. parent well-established in the
offshore business, has won four orders for the U.K. sector outright and
shared a fifth with U.I.E., but has nevertheless been forced periodically
to lay off some of its workforce as platforms neared completion. The
Methil yard, originally owned by Redpath Dorman Long (North Sea) Ltd.,
a subsidiary of BSC, was virtually closed in 1976 at a time when it
had failed to complete its first two platform contracts on time, partly
due to industrial disputes. The yard was saved initially by Department
of Energy intervention securing for the yard part of the Tartan platform
contract. More decisive, however, was the merger with de Groot (of
Holland) announced in April 1978, since which time RGC has won orders
for a small wellhead jacket for the Fulmar field, the major (£37 million)
Beryl B jacket and also shared the £32 million North Cormorant platform
with UIE.
Thus, all the yards have suffered from the uneven pattern of ordering
of platform jackets and decks and consequently all have been forced to
consider diversification alternatives. Highland Fabricators
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now have a pipe-rolling facility and have built modules for the
Ninian North platform, while in 1979 RGC built floatation tanks and pile-
guides for the North Cormorant platform and McDermott Scotland a
template for the South Montrose field.
Once the base of a concrete platform has been fabricated in a dry dock
it is floated out under its own buoyancy to a sheltered deep-water
site where it is sunk progressively as the high concrete towers are
built on top of it. Water of the required depth is found in the U.K.
only on the west coast of Scotland and it was here that the two successful
concrete yards were established, at Ardyne Point in Argyll and Loch
Kishorn in Wester Ross, by McAlpine Sea Tank (a joint-venture between
Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons of the U.K. and French designers Sea
Tank & Co.) and Howard Doris (also a U.K.-French joint-venture) respectively.
McAlpine Sea Tank (MST) have built two concrete platforms and Howard
Doris one platform. The other four concrete platforms for the U.K.
sector - three of which have been built by Norwegian contractors at
Stavanger and the other by Andoc of Rotterdam - were ordered in 1973-74
when U.K. capability was insufficient to meet demand. For this reason
the government invested around £20 million in the establishment of
concrete platform construction sites at Portavadie in Argyll and
Hunterston in Ayrshire. Unfortunately there were no further orders for
concrete platforms from 1975 onwards and the prospects for the concrete
yards are not good, especially since the delivery records of the two
experienced yards were very disappointing. Although MST (which has
three basins which have been idle since summer 1977) considered module
fabrication, it concluded that a west coast site was inappropriate.
In contrast, although Howard Doris^ has continued to tender (without
success) for platform orders, it spent over £1 million on developing its
facilities to widen the range of work that could be undertaken. Subsequently,
in May 1979 HDN won the deck contract for the Maureen platform. In
addition, both HDN and MST have developed new designs of concrete and
steel/concrete hybrid structures.
Summary
North Sea experience has allowed U.K. platform fabricators to build up
considerable offshore design expertise and a whole range of designs for
15. Howard Doris has now joined with NAPM of Holland to form HDN
Offshore Structures.
offshore structures - including steel jackets, concrete structures,
steel/concrete hybrids and floating platforms - have been developed
in recognition of the changing requirements of the oil industry in
the North Sea. U.K. platform yards have also considerable production
experience. For example, Highland Fabricators' experience led them
to abandon the traditional fabrication procedures used in the Gulf of
Mexico and to completely redesign the construction process, resulting
in platform construction time being halved (Lewis & McNicoll, 1978).
However, the projected trend towards the use of subsea completions and
floating platforms will not benefit the platform yards. For example,
it appears that the hull and deck of the first TLP (for the Hutton field)
will be built separately and mated at a deep-water site. Whereas the
deck may be built by one of the platform yards, the hull may well be
placed with a shipyard as the steel and construction are of a different
type and the hull could be launched from a normal shipyard slipway.
Furthermore, although some U.K. platform yards have in the past built
small items (such as deck and bridge sections) for the Dutch and
Norwegian sectors of the North Sea and McDermott Scotland built a
£9 million jacket for the Namorado field off Brazil,^ overall U.K.
yards have been very unsuccessful in winning platform orders for other
offshore areas.
4.3.3 Modules and other Steel Fabrications
Module fabrication yards must be adjacent to navigable waterways as the
huge steel 'boxes' can only be moved by sea once complete. Most module
fabricators will fabricate any structure up to 3,000 tons in weight
which can be floated out on a single barge, such as helidecks, flare
booms, mooring buoys, walkways etc.
The most successful module yards have been Redpath Engineering, William
Press, SLP Group and Charlton-Leslie Offshore (all of England), together
with Motherwell Bridge Offshore (MBO) of Leith and Kestrel Marine of
Dundee. However, even these yards have periodically been forced to
reduce their employment levels as contracts neared completion. John
Brown Engineering Offshore and Foster Wheeler Offshore, both on the
Clyde, were initially successful in obtaining North Sea contracts but
16. This jacket, towed out in January 1979, sank during a winter
storm off Hartlepool in N.E. England.
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eventually closed their yards altogether, while Burntisland Engineers
also experienced considerable difficulty in attracting sufficient orders
to keep their yard open. MBO and Kestrel Marine build accommodation
modules - which for 200 men cost around £5 million - of the 'sheer face'
type which are built as one massive multi-storey block and fitted
out internally as required.
An alternative form of accommodation module consists of a number of
containers, each weighing around 10 tons, built into a main structural
steel frame to form a total package three to five storeys high which
can be lifted and towed as one unit. The main Scottish supplier of
this type of modular unit is R.B. Farquhar, although other companies
such as Carronhall Engineering, Ferguson Sea Cabs and Richard Irvin
Fabricators also provide containerised units for a variety of uses.
In the face of strong competition from European fabricators and shipyards
- which have allegedly benefitted from shipbuilding subsidies in their
module building activities - such as Container Safe (Sweden), CFEM (France),
HCG (Holland), Penn & Bauduin (Holland), Cork Shipyard Offshore Ltd
(Eire), and Dragados Y Construcciones (Spain), U.K. module yards have
17
been unable to secure more than 50-60% of the U.K. module market.
Apart from the platform and module yards there are a large number of
Scottish companies fabricating a wide range of products for the offshore
market, from flare booms, walkways and ladders to buoyancy tanks, mud
silos, pipework and small pressure vessels. In addition, several of
the many Scottish companies which specialise in sub-contracted
inspection, maintenance and repair work - and therefore have welding
and machining capabilities - also have fabrication facities, although
they are usually only capable of small, basic fabrications such as
skips, tanks, skids, cargo baskets, bottle racks etc. Most of these
companies are located on the east coast, close to the major supply bases.
Also, included in Appendix 4.1 under the classification 'metal goods
not elsewhere specified' are Irvent (Metal Products) Ltd. and Fraser &
Borthwick Engineering Services which are sheet metal enclosure
fabricators specialising in instrumentation panels, wall-mounting
enclosures etc. This category also includes Channel-Aire Systems Ltd.
and Haden Offshore which specialise in the design, fabrication and
17. See Appendix 3.4
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installation of platform ventilation, pressurisation and air conditioning,
and Rollstud Ltd. and Prosper Engineering Ltd., which are major suppliers
of studbolts to the offshore industry. Finally, Bruce Anchor, Norbrit
Engineering, Seaward International, Turners of Shettleston and Baldt (U.K.)
Ltd. manufacture mooring buoys, marine fenders, anchors, chain cable and
associated equipment.
4.3.4 Steel Pipe and Pipe-Coating
In the early 1970's the British Steel Corporation (BSC) underestimated
the demand for high quality steel that would be created by North Sea
development and, as a result, BSC's performance (in terms of both price
and delivery) suffered. However, by the mid-1970's BSC were producing
most of the steel used for rig and platform construction in the U.K.
BSC's underestimation of the scale of the pipeline network that would be
required in the North Sea was a particularly expensive error. It was
not until 1978 that BSC had operational facilities for the production
of large-diameter subsea pipe (following the £10 million development of
18
their Hartlepool mill), until which time an important market had been
abandoned to imports, principally from W. Germany and Japan.
Pipe-coating for--the U.K. sector is dominated by two Scottish companies,
M.K. Shand and British Pipecoaters Ltd. (BPCL), the latter being a
joint-venture between H.C. Price Co. (U.S.), Bredero (Holland) and the
British Gas Corporation. The pipeline construction market in the
North Sea is currently healthier than it has been for some time.
Several feeder lines are currently required to link new fields into the
established oil trunk lines. In the gas sector the most important
project will be the gas gathering pipeline systems (in the U.K. and
Norwegian sectors), although pipeline work will also be generated by
further development of the gas fields in the southern North Sea and
the exploitation of the Morecambe gas field on the west coast.
The principal offshore-related products of BSC's Scottish plants are
casing, used to line the well, and tubing, through which the oil is
produced. BSC invested £44 million on developments at the Clydesdale
and Imperial Works in Lanarkshire specifically for the casing/tubing
market and by 1976 BSC's Tubes Division had secured 85% of total
casing orders for the U.K. sector, although large diameter casing -
18V and 20" - is still imported from W. Germany, Italy and the U.S.A.
18. In 1975, for example, large diameter pipe accounted for 90% of all
pipe ordered for the U.K. sector.
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4.3.5 Oil Tools and Wellhead Equipment
The six.major U.S. wellhead equipment manufacturers all have a
manufacturing base in the U.K. However, as the full range of wellhead
equipment is not manufactured in the U.K. some is still imported from
the U.S.A. Indeed, the 'U.K. share' of orders for wellhead and
completion equipment was only 56% in 1976.
The National Supply Co. has been manufacturing oil field equipment
in the U.K. since the 1920's but only recently decided to establish a
Londonderry plant to specialise in the manufacture of wellhead equipment.
Cameron Iron Works and McEvoy Oilfield Equipment manufacture wellhead
equipment in England, and the only wellhead equipment manufacturers
located in Scotland are Gray Tool Co., FMC Corporation and C.E. Vetco
Offshore. National Supply, Cameron, McEvoy and FMC have the capability
to supply equipment for wellhead completions both above and below the
surface, but Gray Tool and Vetco are part of the same group - Combustion
Engineering - and while Gray Tool concentrate on land and platform well¬
heads Vetco have specialised in subsea equipment, not only subsea
'Christmas trees' (in which they lead the field) but also templates,
marine riser systems, guideline tensioners etc. Riser tensioning systems
are also manufactured by Rucker in the U.S.A. and by Brown Bros. & Co.
Ltd., Edinburgh, which also make motion compensators.
Whereas most companies tend to specialise in particular areas of oilfield
tools, Halliburton Manufacturing & Services and Baker Oil Tools are
both U.S. companies manufacturing a similar but wide range of oilfield
equipment. For example, Halliburton and Baker manufacture oil well
cementing equipment - including pumping units, mixers and bulk handling
equipment - in competition with Carslake Ltd. of Bedford (a subsidiary
of Gemoco of the U.S.A.) and imports from B.J. Hughes (of the U.S.A.).
In addition, Baker and Halliburton manufacture fairly specialised
down-hole valves, pumps and other equipment, although the very
specialised equipment, such as formation testing; equipment, tends to
be imported from the U.S.A. Other companies in this area include
TRW Mission Ltd. (manufacturing in N. Ireland) and Drexel Engineering
Services Ltd., Montrose.
Baker and Halliburton also manufacture the more basic down-hole tools
- fishing tools, drilling bits, collars, pipe etc. - although these
represent a fairly small part of their production. These drilling
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items can be produced using 'machine-shop technology' and there are
19
a number of companies in Scotland manufacturing these items. A
large proportion of the basic down-hole tools used offshore are sold
through local supply houses which either subcontract the work to
local API machine shops or purchase from the local sales and service
outlets which have been established by several U.S. manufacturers
including Smith International (which includes Drilco, Smith Tool and
Servco) and Hughes Tool.
Finally, the U.K. has little capability in the manufacture of drilling
derricks, drawworks, rotary tables and swivels, and these items of
drilling equipment are largely imported from the U.S.A.
4.3.6 Deck Plant : Cranes, Hoists & Winches
Approximately 90% of the cranes used in offshore work are supplied by
U.S. manufacturers, principally American Hoist & Derrick, Manitowac and
the Clyde Iron Works. U.K. success has been restricted to the smaller
end of the market, such as the pedestal-mounted cranes used on
platforms, supply vessels etc. which have been developed by Priestman
Bros. Ltd., Ransome Rapier, Stothert and Pitt and Brendan Butler, all
of England. Atlas Hydraulic Loaders Ltd (of Blackwood, Strathclvde)
manufacture a range of small loaders and cranes suitable for pedestal
mounting on rigs and supply vessels although involvement in the •
offshore business is at the moment very limited. Several Scottish
companies, including Norson Power Ltd (Glasgow), have the capability
to supply the hoists, winches, and other handling equipment used
offshore, but none is heavily involved in the offshore market. Similarly,
not even the major suppliers of the portable pneumatic tools used in
rig/platform building and maintenance work - namely Ingersoll Rand (U.S.),
Atlas (W. Germany) and Consolidated Pneumatic (a U.S. company with a
manufacturing plant in Aberdeen) - are significantly involved offshore.
4.3.7 Process Plant, Valves, Pumps & Compressors
In 1979 offshore oil and gas accounted for more than half of the total
expenditure on process plant by the U.K. chemical, oil, gas and
electricity industries. Fortunately this important market is dominated
by U.K. manufacturers, several of which had considerable experience
in dealing with the oil industry prior to North Sea development,
allowing an 80-90% U.K. market share to be achieved 1974-76.
19. See Appendix 4.1.
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The process plant installed on a platform is a complicated 'package'
of pressure vessels, filters, valves, heat exchangers, tanks and
pipework. The term 'pressure vessel' covers anything from the
primary separators - into which the crude oil flows at full wellhead
pressure, requiring the vessel to be 34-4" in thickness - to boilers
and storage tanks. The separators, which separate out the oil from
the gas or oil from impurities will themselves vary in size and thickness
depending upon the oil/gas mixture, the number of separators being used,
etc, the largest separators usually being located on gas platforms.
Scottish vessel manufacturers can perhaps be classified into three
categories with respect to the North Sea market. Firstly, vessels of
considerable thickness are the province of specialist manufacturers
such as Babcock & Wilcox and Motherwell Bridge Engineering (although
the English firm Robert Jenkins is probably the leading supplier to
the North Sea market). The second group of companies, which are unable
to supply very specialised, thick-wall pressure vessels, include Henry
Balfour, Largo Lintec and A.F. Craig & Co. Ltd. Finally, storage and
floatation tanks may be fabricated by a host of companies, including
several fabricators in N.E. Scotland such as Speyside Engineering,
Elbar Engineering and Hunting Oilfield Services.
Several established Scottish engineering companies - including Babcock
& Wilcox and Motherwell Bridge - have also attempted, with varying
degrees of success, to attract orders for the fabrication of steel
tubulars, platform leg joints and piles.
Ball, plug, check and other types of valves and pipe fittings are used
in most sectors of offshore activity, although the major area is the
pipeline connecting field and terminal. Pipeline valves are usually
of the ball valve type since these provide a tighter shut^-off than
conventional gate valves and are more suitable to automatic operation.
The Scottish ball valve plants most heavily involved offshore are both
subsidiaries of U.S. companies - Cameron Iron Works manufacture
fully-welded ball valves in direct competition with the bolted ball
valves produced by T.K. Valves. Another U.S. valve company, Keystone
Valve, recently purchased Cannon Valve (which specialises in the
manufacture of small stainless steel ball valves). There are several
companies manufacturing other types of valves in Scotland but none are
heavily involved in the offshore market. With the influx to the U.K.
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of several U.S. companies specialising in oilfield valves, the U.K.
valve and pipe-fitting industry has the capability to supply most
of the requirements for the North Sea, and in 1976 captured 70% of this
market against strong competition, particularly from Japan.
Several U.K. pump manufacturers were supplying the oil industry prior
to North Sea developments and hence had little difficulty in coming
to terms with API standards. Over the period 1974-76 the 'U.K. share'
of the U.K. offshore market was upwards of 80%, reflecting the
capability of the U.K. pump industry to satisfy the offshore oil
industry's needs (although several of the U.K.'s major pump manufacturers
are subsidiaries of overseas companies).
Pump manufacturers to have achieved success in the North Sea market
include Byron Jackson (U.S.); Ingersoll-Rand (U.S.), which has a
U.K. subsidiary at Gateshead; Sulzer (Switzerland), which also has a
plant in England; the SPP Group (England); Mather & Piatt (England);
the Bingham Pump Division of David Brown Gear Industries, which are a
major supplier of U.S. pumps manufactured under licence in England;
and Weir Pumps of Glasgow, the U.K.'s largest and probably most
broadly based pump manufacturer, which supplies a range of pumps to the
oil industry, including those for water winning, water injection,
fire-fighting and pipeline duties. Scotland's other major pump
manufacturer, Hayward Tyler of East Kilbride, is not involved offshore.
The 'U.K. share' of the air and gas compressor market was 60% in 1976.
As in the pump industry, several major foreign compressor manufacturers
have established or purchased plants in the U.K. Among those
companies heavily involved offshore are Worthington, Dresser Clark,
Ingersoll-Rand, Elliott and Solar Turbines (all of the U.S.A.), and
Sulzer (of Switzerland).
4.3.8 Power Plant
Probably the most successful manufacturer of the gas turbines used on
North Sea platforms is Ruston Gas Turbines Ltd. of Lincoln, a U.K.
subsidiary of GEC, although strong international competition is provided
by Kongsburg (Norway), Sulzer (Switzerland), Hispano Suiza (France),
Solar Turbines (U.S.), and several others. Diesel engines are also
in use on North Sea platforms, on standby power generation, general
pumping and fire pump duties, as well as on supply vessels as main
propulsion and onboard generating power units. There are no Scottish
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manufacturers in this sector active in the offshore market, although
Dawson-Keith Ltd. and Paxman Diesels Ltd. are both English manufacturers
which have achieved some success in competition with imports from,
for example, the diesel engine division of Caterpillar Tractor (U.S.)
Generators manufactured by Parsons Peebles, Edinburgh, are in use in
the North Sea in association with both Ruston and Kongsburg gas
turbines, while their motors are being used to drive pumps and compressors
on around 15 fields in the North Sea. Strong competition is provided
by around a dozen main international rivals, including GEC and
Westinghouse of the U.S.A.; Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi of Japan;
and several European manufacturers. Manufacturers of motors and
generators also tend to manufacture control and switch gear and other
electrical equipment ranging from small electrical accessories through
to large transformers. In addition there are specialist manufacturers
of switch and control gear and other associated equipment, several of
which are located in Scotland. Anderson Strathclyde and Bauteil &
Baylor are probably the Scottish motor control gear manufacturers most
involved in the offshore market.
Several U.K. power plant manufacturers had many years prior experience
of dealing with the oil companies, while the excess capacity which
existed in the power industry for much of the 1970's allowed U.K.
manufacturers to meet the offshore oil industry's delivery requirements
with little difficulty. Consequently U.K. manufacturers have been able
to dominate the supply of power plant to the U.K. sector, securing
70-85% of the market in the period 1974-76.
4.3.9 Communications, Instrumentation and other Electrical/Electronic
Equipment
The 'U.K. share' of orders for communications equipment for the North
Sea exceeded 80% throughout the 1974-76 period. All the equipment for
tropospheric scatter systems has been supplied by Marconi Communications,
while GEC's Marconi Electronics group also supplies the more standard
microwave radio systems and complete onboard communications and
entertainment systems (including TV and radio) and navigational aids,
in competition with Plessey EAE and Pye (from plants located in
England) and Ferranti's Scottish group. However, competition is
increasing from U.S. companies such as Motorola Electronics and RCA.
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The offshore oil industry is now a major user of computers for the
control and monitoring of oil production, processing and transportation.
The computer-based process control, monitoring and information system
installed on a platform will consist of a computer, such as the
Ferranti Argus 700G manufactured in N.W. England, with telemetry and
telecontrol systems from, for example, Ferranti's Scottish group.
The offshore oil industry has also provided a sizeable market for
companies specialising in flow metering and electronic instrumentation,
including safety systems for gas, smoke and fire detection as well as
a number of instruments which have been designed specifically for
offshore use, such as anchor-chain footage counters, safe-load
indicators for cranes, subsea riser angle indicators and mud pump stroke
counting systems. Scottish companies designing and manufacturing
their own instrumentation include V.U. Data Ltd., Banchory Instruments
Ltd., Osprey Electronics Ltd., Moray Electronics, Glen Instruments
Ltd., East Anglian Electronics, Daniel Industries Ltd. and Ferranti's
Scottish group.
The rapid expansion of subsea activities has also provided market
opportunities for electronic equipment manufacturers. Scottish companies
involved in the specialist area of deep diving communications include
UDI and Helle Engineering Ltd., although at the moment the latter
merely assembles and services equipment in Scotland. UDI are also
the main Scottish supplier of underwater acoustic systems, sonar
equipment, seabed profilers etc. Finally, Osprey Electronics is the
main Scottish manufacturer of underwater TV and still-camera and video
systems, the supply of which is dominated by U.S. companies.
4.3.10 Underwater Engineering
In September 1979 more than 1500 divers were working in the North Sea
(very few at less than 300 feet) and more than 100 deep diving systems
were employed, including 20 sophisticated DSV's. Although U.K.
shipyards have been unsuccessful in winning DSV orders, U.K. companies
have nevertheless attempted to supply diving systems - consisting of
diving bell and handling system, decompression chambers etc - for
vessels built abroad, and Seaforth Maritime Ltd. have achieved some
success. Nevertheless, Comex Industries of France is probably the
world's leading manufacturer' of diving systems and submersibles.
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Diving bells are designed to transport divers to the working depth,
enable them to carry out observation dives and then allow their
transfer to the decompression chamber with maximum safety and comfort.
Those manufactured by Comex, for example, are designed for 2-3 divers
working at depths of 80-450 metres and are connected to the DSV by
a lifting cable and an 'umbilical'. Comex have also developed
a manipulation and observation bell for use in up to 1,000 metres
equipped with thrusters - which allow it to move around in a radius
of up to half the depth at which it is operating - and two hydraulic
manipulators which can be used for undertaking work on submarine
structures or on the seabed itself.
Vickers Oceanics - part of the Vickers Offshore Engineering divison
bought by the National Enterprise Board and now known as British
Underwater Engineering - were the first company to introduce submersibles
to the North Sea. However, it is Comex which have developed a complete
range of manned observation, lock-out and rescue submersibles, which
operate independently of the mother ship. Two or three man
observation submersibles are suitable for survey, inspection and
manipulation tasks. The diver lock-out submersible is a fairly new
species of subsea vessel which combines the advantages of the diving
bell and the submersible in that it operates with a high degree of
manoeuvrability independently from the mother ship and is capable of
transporting divers.
The increase in the number of remote-controlled subsea work, survey
and inspection vehicles (RCV's) in use in the North Sea is partly due
to improvements in photographic equipment which have meant that RCV's
are able to supplement some of the work previously done by divers.
UDI have developed a seabed orientated RCV called 'Seabug'.
Finally, Sub Sea Services Marine Ltd. are a Scottish manufacturer
and supplier of diving and underwater lighting, cutting and welding
equipment.
4.3.11 Other Manufacturing Industries
Scottish manufacturers of protective clothing supplying the offshore
market include Oilfield Safety Products Ltd., Angus Sewn-up Ltd.,
Delcoats Ltd., Field Gear Ltd., Multifabs Ltd., and Halket & Adam Ltd.,
while oilfield rubber products, such as rubber connectors and protection
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items, are manufactured in Scotland by Webco Industrial Rubber Ltd.
and Lassalle Manufacturing (U.K.) Ltd., and hose and associated
fittings by Stratoflex (U.K.) Ltd. PPS Glassfibre Ltd. and
Aberglen Seamarks both manufacture a wide range of marine products
such as buoys and floats. Finally, Carlyle Wishart & Co. Ltd.
and Offshore Interiors specialise in the design and supply of non-
combustible furniture and fabrics for use in modules etc. offshore,
while John Kelly and Son manufacture and distribute catering hardware
and galley equipment.
4.3.12 Summary
This section has presented a profile of the Scottish manufacturing
sector of the offshore supplies industry. Over 130 companies - listed
in Appendix 4.1 - have been identified as being involved in offshore-
related manufacturing activity as a principal activity, and these
companies manufacture and supply a wide range of products to the
offshore oil industry.
4.4 CONCLUSION
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have provided a detailed examination of the
industry in which the study was undertaken, namely, the offshore oil
and gas supplies industry. The first of these chapters outlined
the nature and costs of the differing technological requirements of
each of the three distinct phases of offshore operations - exploration,
development and production. In particular, it was pointed out that
the demand for most items of offshore-related equipment is associated
with the development phase of activity. However, it was pointed
out early in Chapter 3 that as an oil province matures the level of
development expenditure will fall, in both relative and real terms.
Evidence presented in Chapter 3 demonstrated that the importance of
development activity in the U.K. sector of the North Sea was already
falling in relative terms (as operating expenditure increases) although,
as yet, there is no conclusive evidence of a long-term downward trend
in development expenditure in real terms. When the real decline in
development activity does occur it follows that the demand for many
items of offshore-related equipment will fall and hence that there
might be a reduction in offshore-related manufacturing employment
which, it was explained in Chapter 4, provides approximately 20,000
jobs in Scotland alone.
One way offshore-related manufacturing employment might be maintained
would be for U.K. manufacturers to win a larger share of the
declining domestic market. However, it was pointed out in Chapters
3 and 4 (which presented a detailed analysis of the performance of
U.K. and Scottish companies respectively in meeting offshore-related
demands) that the U.K. share of the domestic market for offshore-
related equipment is already greater than that for services, and that
there are certain factors which are likely to prevent a further
major increase in the overall U.K. share of the domestic offshore-
related equipment market. An alternative method of sustaining
offshore-related manufacturing employment in this country would be to
increase the share of offshore markets overseas supplied by exports
from the U.K. Indeed, it is this alternative which provides the
major focus for this study and it is to an examination of the factors
which might influence the export performance of the Scottish
manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry that the
following two chapters are devoted.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MANAGERIAL ATTITUDE TO EXPORTING
5■1 INTRODUCTION
It has been stressed that most offshore-related manufacturing
employment is closely associated with the level of development
expenditure and that development activity will fall in both relative
and absolute terms as an offshore province matures. As far as the
U.K. sector of the North Sea is concerned, it will be shown in
Chapter 11 that development expenditure will decline in real terms
quite sharply over the period 1982-85, although the world offshore
market will continue to expand significantly throughout the period
to 1985.
In the following section various alternative corporate strategies
are considered and the conclusion reached that the most appropriate
strategic alternative available to companies faced with a declining
domestic market and expanding overseas markets is usually market
development. In this discussion the author has adopted the
traditional approach to corporate strategy, in which the firm is seen
as a rational decision-making unit which, having analysed its own
strengths and weaknesses and the opportunities provided by its
external environment, will select the course of action most likely to
concur with the achievement of corporate objectives. It is, however,
recognised that this is a simplification of the real world situation
in which established firms with established policies and organisation
structures based on previous experience may exhibit a tendency towards
inertia, that is, an unwillingness to accept the risk involved in
implementing a new strategy. Alternatively, the execution of a
sub-optimal strategy may be less the result of the operation of
bureaucratic conservatism than the consequence of the existence of
powerful individuals within the decision-making unit with interests
and objectives which conflict with those of the firm as a whole.
Having focussed on market development, alternative methods of
exploiting overseas markets are then briefly outlined and the conclusion
reached that exporting would appear to be the exploitation strategy
most likely to ensure that offshore-related manufacturing activity
is maintained in Scotland.
The factors which influenced the performance of U.K. offshore
suppliers in the domestic market were analysed in Chapter 3.
Marketing overseas will not only accentuate some of the difficulties
experienced in the domestic market - due to the separation of the
manufacturer from the customer - but will also create some entirely
new problems. Hence, the remainder of Chapter 5 and the whole of
Chapter 6 are devoted to an analysis of evidence from studies of
exporting performance in other industries, this survey of literature
being undertaken in order to identify those factors which might
affect the export performance and export potential of the Scottish man
ufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry. Special
emphasis is placed on the examination of those factors which are
under the control of the firm's management, in particular, the
attitude which management adopts with respect to exporting and the
exporting strategy it implements. While Chapter 6 analyses the
relationship between alternative export marketing methods and
exporting success, section 5.3 discusses the factors likely to
influence managerial attitude to exporting which, in section 5.4,
is itself shown to be a major determinant of whether the resources
necessary for successful exporting are committed.
5.2 EXPORTING AS A STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE
The importance of setting objectives in several areas of business,
including profitability and turnover, is now generally accepted.
A company which fails to meet these objectives due to a contraction
of the domestic market may react in several different ways. Firstly,
no action - other than the downward revision of objectives - may be
taken, in which case the company will decline in step with the market.
However, inability to achieve objectives may produce an organisational
crisis (resulting perhaps in changes in either executive staff or
ownership) and lead to the reappraisal of strategy following an up-to-
date analysis of both the enterprise and its environment.
Unwillingness to accept lower objectives may lead to disinvestment,
with the firm withdrawing from its current activities prior to the
contraction enforced by market forces. On the other hand, if
corporate objectives are seen primarily in terms of post-tax profits,
the selected course of action may be to accept lower turnover and
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attempt to maintain the profit level by redeploying resources more
efficiently and hence reducing costs. However, if the overriding
objective of the firm is growth, or perhaps even long-term survival,
then one of four main expansion strategies may be chosen.
Firstly, it is doubtful whether increased market penetration - that
is, increased sales of the same product to the same markets by means
of increased marketing effort - is the most appropriate expansion
strategy given a declining domestic market.
Although a second alternative, product development (which is the
marketing of new products to the same market) offers the advantage of
launching new products in a "familiar environment, selling through
established marketing channels etc., it suffers from the same problem
of dependence upon a declining domestic market. Thus, as far as
offshore supply firms are concerned, the marketing in the North Sea
of new products used at the development phase of oil activity would
appear to be an inappropriate strategy. However, in their product
development supply firms may take note of, and adapt to, the changing
structure of the oil industry in the North Sea by developing products t
and/or services required at the production phase of activity - for
example, a manufacturing company may evolve a maintenance capability.
In this way a supply firm may be able to maintain or even expand
offshore-related sales turnover in the North Sea market, although
with this strategy the expanding global offshore market is still ignored.
Market development - that is, the marketing of the same or similar
products to new (product or geographical) markets - stresses product
technology as the 'common thread' between the present and the new
strategy, while dependence upon the existing declining market is
reduced. Firstly, supply companies may be able to utilise their
oil-related expertise and market their offshore-related products,
(following, perhaps, a certain degree of adaptation) in other indigenous
markets. However, some specialised supply firms will be unable to
utilise their expertise and resources in non-oil sectors while the
opportunities for other supply firms to transfer their skills will
be restricted by the size of local, onshore markets, especially given
the remote location of many supply firms (Moar, 1980). On the other
hand, as the demand for their products in the North Sea declines, many
offshore suppliers may be able to take advantage of their offshore-
related expertise by exploiting the expanding global offshore market.
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The final alternative is diversification, which is the most extreme
(and most risky) strategy in that it involves a simultaneous departure
from both familiar products and markets, which suggests that the 1
company may lack both the technology and the marketing expertise
to be successful in the new business. Diversification does, however,
offer the opportunity to reduce overdependence on a single technology,
customer etc., and may provide greater opportunities than are available
with alternative strategies, as in the case where R&D has produced
diversified by-products with outstanding sales potential. Thus,
in general, the increased flexibility and enhanced opportunities
provided by diversification must be weighed against the increased risk
it entails (Ansoff, 1968).
This analysis suggests that, in general, the most appropriate strategy
for the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies
industry may be (geographical) market development, as this approach
would build upon the technological expertise which Scottish companies
have developed during their period of involvement in the North Sea,
while it also focusses attention on the expanding global market.
Having focussed on market development, the various strategies for
exploiting the global market must now be considered. For most firms,
exporting - that is, the marketing of goods and services across national
frontiers - is the first stage in the development of international
business activity (Tookey, 1975; Hood & Young, 1979; McDonald &
Parker, 1969). A firm would generally rather achieve its market
development objectives by exporting than by any other exploitation
strategy as a one-plant organisation affords the advantages of maximum
control, maximum identification and quantification of risks and
minimisation of administration and capital outlay. In time the
expansion of sales in an overseas market may warrant the establishment
of a marketing subsidiary there and eventually even a manufacturing
plant may be set up overseas, perhaps as a joint-venture with a local
partner(s) (Tookey, 1975). However, the primary motive for direct
investment overseas is often defensive rather than aggressive. Direct
investment may be undertaken partly as a response to the threat provided
by a series of visible and invisible trade barriers, as well as a
result of other export problems experienced, such as increasing
transport costs and delays, distribution difficulties, etc."*"
1. These factors are discussed in greater detail in section 5.3.3 below.
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(Caves, 1972; Vernon, 1973; Hood & Young, 1979; Brooke & Remmers,
2
1970; Dunning, 1972c). Finally, licensing of proprietary
technology provides an intermediate exploitation strategy. Licensing
takes many forms, but generally is the lease or sale of technology,
and/or know-how, and/or patents, copyrights etc. to a firm or individual
in return for a consideration which may be in the form of cash,
equity participation, products, cross-licensing (or a combination of
these), with payment being on either a once-and-for-all or a continuous
basis (Robinson, 1973).
A foreign subsidiary may manufacture and supply equipment (originally
produced by the parent company) not only to its local market but also
to other overseas markets and perhaps even to the parent company's
domestic market. By displacing the parent company's output for
domestic and/or export markets, direct investment may reduce manufacturing
employment in the home country. However, direct investment in an
overseas country need not preclude exports to that market. Indeed, in
some cases direct investment overseas may even lead to an increase in
the exports of the parent company through the generation of additional
sales of components or even finished products (Hood & Young, 1979).
In this way, direct investment overseas may lead to an increase in
employment in the home country. Also, direct investment overseas may
create additional employment in head office administration and services
as a result of the need for a larger central body to control the
expanding company (Hood & Young, 1979). Overall, whether direct
investment in a manufacturing subsidiary will increase exports from the
parent company depends very much upon the share of the market that
exports would have captured had direct investment not been undertaken.
However, although there is a shortage of hard, empirical evidence on
this subject, according to one survey over 80% of the U.S. firms with
manufacturing subsidiaries in Canada claimed that their exports had been
either raised or unaffected as a result of local production (Dunning,
1972a). This suggests that the employment provided in the U.S.A. by
these firms may also have increased as a result of direct investment
in Canada (if one assumes that this overseas investment did not result
in less investment in the U.S.A.). Thus the impact of direct
investment overseas by Scottish offshore-related manufacturers on
offshore-related manufacturing activity in Scotland is far from clear.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that overseas market development by means
2. Hood & Young (1979) and Dunning (1979) describe factors such as the
size of overseas markets and trade barriers - which strongly influence
the choice of strategy for exploiting overseas markets - as 'location
specific factors'.
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of exporting does offer the opportunity for Scottish offshore-related
manufacturers to capitalise on their technological strengths while
maintaining employment in this country.
5.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING MANAGERIAL ATTITUDE TO EXPORTING
Many of the factors which influence a firm's export performance^ are
beyond its control. For example, an individual firm - assuming
that it possesses neither monopoly power nor considerable political
influence - can do very little about exchange rates, the costs of
labour and capital and the level of government support given to
exporting firms. It is with these 'uncontrollable' factors that
international trade theory is mainly concerned. International trade
theory explains the composition of a country's exports in terms of
demand conditions and the relative scarcity of production factors and
natural resources. It gives little attention to the function of the
individual firm which is regarded as fulfilling a passive role simply
responding to changes in its environment. However, different firms
in the same industry, operating in the same market and faced with
the same exchange rates and other government-created conditions can be
seen to adopt completely different export marketing policies and
achieve different levels of exporting success. This suggests that
the factors over which firms do have control - such as organisation,-,
market selection, marketing mix and, to a certain extent, size - do
have an important influence on their export performance (Hirsch, 1971).
Indeed, Tookey (1964) believes that the effectiveness of the
decisions taken by individual managements has a far greater influence
on export performance than do the macro-economic factors mentioned
above.
in the review of literature presented below attention is focussed on
the influence of those factors over which the firm does exercise
some control, in particular :-
(1) the managerial attitude to exporting (examined below)
(2) the export strategy adopted (discussed in the following
chapter).
However, a management's attitude towards exporting will obviously depend
upon its perception of 'uncontrollable' macro-economic variables and
3. From the point of view of a firm's management the profitability of
exports would be the most obvious measure of export performance.
However, the researcher has adopted the point of view of the
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thus many of these factors will be considered from this viewpoint.
5.3.1 Future Market Trends
4
In their 5-industry study Cooper et al (1970) found little support for
the 'pressure hypothesis', which predicts a negative relationship between
the pressure of domestic demand and short-term variations in exports.
The authors suggest that this may have been partly due to the imperfect
substitutability of home and export products arid the substantial long-
term investment which may be required for overseas marketing (which may
mean that incremental exporting is only possible in the long term).
Moreover, firms heavily involved iir exporting were, i'nany case, insulated
from the effects of domestic deflation, while firms exporting only a
small proportion of their output were unwilling to enter untried markets
at a time when an adverse situation existed in the domestic market.
in the situation where entry into export markets is possible only in the
long-term, it would be a function of its management's expectations
about the future position of export markets and the length of the domestic
recession (Cooper et al, 1970). For example, at the most basic level,
management's export aims will depend upon how essential exports are seen
to be for long-term survival. Hence, it may be expected that to offshore
manufacturers (especially those wholly-involved offshore) whose products
are closely tied to the development phase of activity the exploitation
of export markets will appear more essential than it will to other
manufacturers (and service companies) whose products (and services) are
demanded during the production phase. There is indeed evidence of a
tendency for firms to be content to operate in their domestic market as
long as it offers adequate commercial reward and it is often only when
a constraint in the domestic market starts to operate, with the result
that sales and profits show signs of erosion, that firms consider 'filling
the gap' through the exploitation of export markets (Majaro, 1977; Hood
& Young, 1979).
Management's export aims may also depend upon the relative profitability
of domestic and export sales, not only how profitable they actually are
economic planner interested in whether the industry under study can
increase its volume of exports, and hence the percentage of total
turnover exported has been taken as the measure of export performance.
4. This study covered the pottery, motor cycle, pedal cycle, office
machinery and domestic appliance industries.
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but also how profitable they are expected to be by management (Cooper
et al, 1970). For example, is an equal rate of return expected or is
a contribution to fixed costs all that is required?^ As regards
actual profitability, evidence suggests that costing methods often do
not allow comparisons of the profitability of domestic and export orders
to be made (Tookey, 1964). When comparisons of relative profitability
are made, exports are usually considered to be less profitable than
domestic sales (Tookey, 1964; Cooper et al, 1970; MacKay, 1964;
Political and Economic Planning, 1965; Cranch, 1974), because exporting
involves additional marketing, administration and other costs, while
export markets are also often considered to be more competitive than
domestic markets (Hirsch, 1971; MacKay, 1964).
In his study of the hosiery and knitwear industry, Tookey (1964) found
that the assumed unprofitability of exports was mainly responsible for
the general lack of enthusiasm for exporting, while in their national
survey Political and Economic Planning (PEP, 1964) discovered that the
relatively lower profitability of exports as against domestic sales
constituted the third greatest barrier to exporting. In contrast, in
their study of the pottery and motor cycle industries, Cooper et al (1970)
found no obvious relationship between the relative profitability of
home and export sales, as perceived by management, and the desired export/
domestic sales ratios. This suggests that in these industries there
are other more important motives for exporting than profitability, as
discussed in the following section.
5.3.2 Reasons for/Benefits of Exporting
At the level of the firm exporting is not usually an objective in itself
but a means by which corporate objectives can be achieved (Tookey, 1975).
Management's attitude to exporting may therefore depend upon the benefits
which it expects to reap through exporting.
First, firms may export to achieve growth which is impossible (or at
least more difficult) in the domestic market, due perhaps to a contraction
of the market or anti-monopoly legislation (Tookey, 1964; Sweeney, 1970;
Wainwright, 1971; McMillan & Paulden, 1974). In fact, the desire to
5. Duguid & Jaques (1971) argue that although the profitability of
exporting is usually compared with that of domestic marketing, the
real question should be whether total sales are more profitable with
or without exports.
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expand when this was impossible in the domestic market was found by
PEP (1965) to be the most important export motivation, while Ceoper
et al (1970) also found this motive to be of prime importance in the
office machinery and domestic appliance industries.
Exporting, as a form of market diversification, will also spread risk
and increase flexibility (Tookey, 1964; Holton, 1969; Hirsch, 1971).
Indeed, Cooper et al (1970) found this to be the most important motive
for exporting in the-pottery, motor and pedal cycle industries. As far
as the offshore supplies industry is concerned, if risk can be spread
the effects of a downturn in demand from any one area - whether this arises
from a change in political circumstances, a fall in the exploration
success rate, a deterioration in the economics of field development (as
occurred in the North Sea where spiralling costs made marginal fields
unprofitable prior to the more recent oil price increases), or the
increasing attraction of other areas - can be minimised. For example,
Gaffney (1976) argues that the British experience in the first half of
the 1970's of a boom (lasting under three years) followed by a downturn
is typical of the oil business, and points to similar post-war booms in
Libya, Venezuela, parts of Africa, Alaska, the Middle East and south¬
east Asia. In fact, Gaffney (1976) regards protection against such
a downturn in a particular country or area to be the major justification
for expanding a domestic supply company's operations into international
markets.
Companies which have taken the step of becoming involved in international
markets should also be in a better position to identify and take advantage
of global opportunities (Gaffney, 1976). Furthermore, they should be
better able to monitor global competitors, which should allow comparisons
of efficiency and competitiveness to be made (P.E.P., 1965) and may
stimulate the introduction of new products and/or techniques (Duguid &
Jaques, 1971), as Cooper et al (1970) found had happened in the pottery
industry. Thus, offshore suppliers may wish to become involved in oil
operations in the North American Arctic, as the extreme environment may
stimulate technological developments in which they will want to participate.
Exporting may be undertaken in order to attain economies of scale via
large-scale production (PEP, 1965; Cooper et al, 1970; Deschampsneufs,
1967). Companies may also try to export surplus home production
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(National Economic Development Office, 1970; Robinson, 1973;
Deschampsneufs, 1967) although, as has already been pointed out, Cooper
et al (1970) found little evidence of this happening in the short-term.
Alternatively, firms may attempt to export a product outdated in the
domestic market. In this respect it is interesting to consider the
concept of the product life cycle which suggests that a product in a
particular market will go through a typical pattern of growth and decline
during its life, passing through introductory, growth, maturity and
decline phases (Vernon, 1972; Wells, 1972; Tookey, 1975). While a
product may have reached the maturity or decline phases in the domestic
market, in other (export) markets it may still be at the introductory
or growth phases. An exporting firm should therefore investigate
the position of its products in terms of the life-cycle in world markets
in order to identify in which markets it may hold a competitive advantage.
Thus, export opportunities are not restricted to technologically advanced
products and products outdated in an advanced country may nevertheless
be adequate, or perhaps even more suitable, for oil operations in, for
example, India, where offshore conditions are less severe and indigenous
maintenance capability lower than in the North Sea. Given that develop¬
ing countries are often worried if they can afford to become involved
themselvsin oil operations (Tanzer, 1978) 'outdated' technology may
actually be welcomed by these countries assuming that, ceteris paribus,
it would be cheaper than buying the most up-to-date alternative.
However, if exporting is undertaken in order to achieve economies of
scale or to sell off surplus or outdated equipment it may indicate that
export policy is subordinate to domestic sales policy. This could result
in a situation where, for example, the emphasis will be on selling the
domestic product range overseas (ignoring necessary adaptations to local
conditions) or exports are considered of secondary importance (resulting
in failure to meet export delivery dates) (Wainwright, 1971; Livingstone,
1976; Tookey, 1975).
Management executives may also be personally motivated to export. They
may view exporting as a prestigious activity - as Cooper et al (1970)
found was sometimes the case in the pedal cycle and office machinery
industries - or may see it as being their patriotic duty to export
since this would be in the national interest (Tookey, 1964; PEP, 1965).
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However, exports often commence by accident without any conscious
decision to export being made. A company may start exporting simply
because it is approached by an agent who thinks he can do a good job
in a certain area or because it happens to receive an order or an enquiry
from overseas (McMillan & Paulden, 1974; Kotler, 1972; Day, 1976;
Tookey, 1975). Moreover, a firm may continue to export (without a
great deal of thought being given to the wisdom of this activity)
merely because the current management has inherited a tradition of exporting
(PEP, 1965; Cooper et al, 1970).
However, according to the 'classical' theory of international trade, the
main reason for exporting is the desire to exploit a comparative advantage
held over global competitors. The Department of Energy has frequently
argued that the North Sea has provided an extremely difficult and demanding
environment with the result that developments in the North Sea have given
U.K. offshore suppliers a technological lead over their competitors.
However, there are three main points which must be made in relation to
this supposed technological advantage. First, only certain offshore
6
activities are what might be regarded as 'high technology'. Indeed,
a significant proportion of offshore expenditure comprises general industrial
equipment or services which any host nation with a strong engineering
industry will have the capability to supply. in addition, there are many
supplies (such as sand, gravel, cement, additives and other minerals)
that are certain to be purchased domestically in every country - for
example, these items were domestically purchased from the very beginning
of oil operations in Venezuela (Harris, 1971). Traditionally the back¬
ward linkage effects for the petroleum industries in the 'primitive'
economies, such as those in the Middle East, have not been strong (Mikesell,
1971b). However, as these nations gradually industrialise, opportunities
for exporting intermediary products will decrease. In Venezuela, for
example, items such as oil casing, pipe and oil-well tubing which were
originally imported were, by the early 1970's, being supplied by domestic
industry, as were chemicals, paints, fabricated metal products and cable
(Harris, 1971).
Second, there has been comparatively little indigenous development
of specailised oil-related technology, with the result that much of the
specialised oil technology used in the North Sea is still controlled by
foreign, principally U.S., companies.
6. See p. 32 .
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Finally, some of the technologically advanced oil-related products
which have been developed in U.K. companies in the past 8-10 years
have been designed with the North Sea specifically in mind and thus,
in their present form, may not represent superior products with respect
to other offshore areas. While there are areas (such as the Gulf
of Alaska) where the environmental conditions are as demanding as those
in the North Sea and which will therefore demand equipment of a similar
degree of technological sophistication, in other areas such as south-east
Asia products developed over ten years ago for the Gulf of Mexico may well
be ideal. For example, jack-up drilling rigs which once worked in the
Gulf of Mexico and the Persian Gulf are now operating in south-east Asia.
Thus, the advantage of superior technical design may disappear in some
export markets, owing to the greater suitability of other products for
the market conditions (Deschampsneufs, 1967). However, although North
Sea technology may be more advanced than is absolutely necessary for
areas such as south-east Asia, it is doubtful if the 'best' technology
will not be embodied in new equipment purchased for offshore activity
in such areas. For example, platform structures may be smaller and
simpler but may nevertheless embody the most advanced technological
developments resulting from wave motion studies etc. undertaken in the
context of the North Sea. In this way U.K. suppliers may still be
able to reap an advantage from their technological leadership.
Nevertheless, although to some companies overseas markets may be simply
an extension of the domestic market, with only minimal adjustment being
required before becoming involved in business in new markets, for many
firms product adaptation and development may be necessary and thus entry
7
may not be as costless as might be imagined. For example, overseas
operations may require alterations to the operating characteristics of
the equipment, alterations to the materials used in fabricating the
equipment and extension of the product line offered.
Thus, to summarise, the 'technological advantage' held by the U.K.
offshore supplies industry is probably less important in terms of export
markets than might at first be expected since much of the equipment used
in offshore activities is of a general nature, while even some of the
specialised or offshore-related equipment which is not already controlled
7. Adaptation of the product and other elements of the 'marketing mix'
is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, particularly
section 6.3.1.
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by foreign companies is within the capability of many countries (although
the fact that a lot of oil equipment is not 'high technology' may be less
important than the fact that it is generally thought by those outside
the oil industry to be 'high technology'). Moreover, even with respect
to technology where U.K. companies do_ hold an advantage over global
competitiors modifications may be required before the equipment is
suitable for export markets.
However, the North Sea has provided a good training ground for U.K.
industry and U.K. firms trying to break into global markets have the benefit
of their experience in dealing with the oil industry in the North Sea
(Baker et al, 1978). This experience gives them several advantages over
firms in other countries which, although they may have considerable
industrial experience, have no prior experience in dealing with the oil
industry. For example, U.K. industry has considerable production exper¬
ience which in itself could lead to a cost advantage. U.K. firms are
also now familiar with the purchasing behaviour and special requirements of
g
the oil industry. Furthermore, those U.K. firms experienced in dealing
with the oil industry in the North Sea will have established their
credibility with the oil companies and hence will not have to devote much
time or effort to establishing their competence in the eyes of the oil
companies in other offshore areas. That is, a company which is established
in the industry in one country has already paid its 'entrance fee'
(Gaffney, 1976). Indeed Larminie (1976) considers that the establishment
of a working relationship with foreign oil companies operating in the U.K.
- and in particular to get onto their bidding lists - is perhaps the best
chance of achieving exports.
Thus, the built-in inertia of the oil industry which operated against U.K.
industry in the North Sea may now start to work for established U.K. firms.
Moreover, as offshore operations in the next ten years are likely to
continue to be concentrated in areas where environmental conditions are
less severe than in the North Sea, the physical environment is unlikely
to prove a stimulant to technological change - and hence provide opportunities
for new market entrants - to the same extent as it did in the North Sea
(although the financial environment - the pressure of escalating costs, the
need for earlier oil and cash flows etc. - could replace the physical
8. Knowledge in these areas was shown to be vital in section 3.4.2 above.
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environment in this role). However, the trend for host governments to
9
demand more control over oil operations may adversely affect the export
potential of U.K. offshore suppliers. Obviously, in a country in
which the government has adopted a passive role with respect to oil
activities there may well be more scope for oil companies to specify U.S.
and U.K. equipment than where 100% state control exists. In the latter
situation the government will be able to maximise its influence over
imports of oil equipment and services, while buying will have pased into
the hands of local people who will have to develop their own contacts
with manufacturers and may, in fact, be ignorant of the ability of U.K.
suppliers to provide offshore oil-related equipment. Nevertheless,
the lessons learned in the North Sea, both technical and financial,
should give established offshore suppliers - not just U.K. but also
U.S., Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, French etc. - an advantage when it comes
to exploiting overseas markets.
The Department of Energy (1977a; 1978) have also claimed that U.K. offshore
suppliers "have won the reputation for skill, reliability and experience
to compete strongly for offshore-related orders anywhere in the world".
Unfortunately, the analysis of the U.K. offshore supplies industry's
'track record' undertaken above^"0 suggests that, on the contrary, the
almost standard U.K. industrial problems of inability to meet delivery dates
and inept marketing could check the development of exports to global
markets.
5.3.3 Problems Associated with Exporting
Management's aims with respect to exporting may depend upon its perception
of the problems associated with exporting, the most obvious of which are
visible trade barriers such as tariffs/import duties, import quotas and
domestic content regulations.
Import duties are taxes (normally paid by the importer) which are assessed
by governments on imported products to protect domestic industries (by
giving them an advantage over foreign competition), to generate government
revenue, or to discourage imports for balance of payments reasons. Many
studies have highlighted the significance of import duties as a barrier
9. As identified by Tanzer (1978).
10. See section 3.4.4 above.
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to trade, including those by Cooper et al (1970), MacKay (1964),
Industrial Market Research Ltd (1978) and PEP (1965).
An import quota, which limits the quantity of a certain product which
can be imported during a specific period of time, is also an effective
method of import control (Tookey, 1964; Robinson, 1973; Alexandrides
& Moschis, 1977; Wells, 1973). Often this form of control is implemented
through the use of an import licence which the importer must secure from
his government in order to receive a specific shipment from overseas.
Several countries (including Brazil) also have import deposit regulations
which require a certain proportion of the value of the proposed imports
to be lodged with the importing government a certain number of months in
advance. This increases the cost of the imported goods from the
importer's point of view and so discourages imports (Alexandrides &
Moschis, 1977; Heyman, 1975; Smith, 1979).
Import equalisation taxes may be added to the price of imports to
compensate for the situation where the exporting country has given the
exporter a subsidy. Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) export subsidies are illegal, but the U.K. government, for example,
provides exporters with quasi-subsidies such as export insurance
guarantees and sponsored trade missions and market research. Importing
countries may also operate anti-dumping legislation to protect domestic
industry from imports being sold at artificially low prices.^ In
addition, a country which is a member of a custom's union and is
suffering severe balance of payments difficulties may make a 'special
pleading' to the union - within which there are normally nil duties
between members and a common tariff with countries outside the union -
to increase tariffs unilaterally across the board.
Local industry may also be supported by some form of domestic content
regulations. For example, the Iranian government specified as early as
1954 that in cases where a similar product in terms of quality and price
was available locally the oil industry should meet its requirements from
Iranian rather than foreign sources (Bartsch, 1971), while Brazil operates
a 'similarity law' banning imports of capital equipment which could be
11. For an exporter with idle capacity exporting may be justified at any
price which covers variable costs and makes some contribution to
overheads.
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produced in Brazil (Smith, 1979). However, often this form of protection
is covert and as such falls into the category of 'invisible' barriers
to trade. Whereas visible trade barriers can be removed through
bi-lateral discussions, invisible barriers are more difficult to
negotiate simply because they are, to some extent, secret (Wells, 1973;
Robinson, 1973). For example, overseas governments may decide 'off
the record' to purchase only locally manufactured goods or goods which
have had a certain percentage of value added locally. Alternatively,
like Mexico they may try to ensure that local joint-ventures (with majority
local ownership) are established. However, it should be noted that this
type of restriction is not only implemented by developing countries. The
U.S. market has been closed to non-U.S. flag vessels and also largely
to non-U.S. equipment (Lennard, 1976). For this reason the OSO has been
trying to promote joint-ventures between U.K. and U.S. companies, with
U.K. companies providing the technological expertise and the U.S.A. the
manufacturing capability (Andrews, 1978).
Invisible trade barriers are numerous (see Day, 1976). For example, the
calculation of customs duties is often very complicated, time-consuming
(and hence costly) and may cause delivery delays leading perhaps to the
loss of future orders. Alternatively, imports may be discouraged by
customs officials 'going by the book' - that is, doing everything precisely
according to customs regulations, thereby slowing down import clearance
- or by increasing export documentation requirements. Another possible
problem is the wide range of technical/performance standards which exist
overseas (Tookey, 1975; Wainwright, 1971; Majaro, 1977).
The administration and documentation costs of exporting can be a major
problem (Industrial Market Research Ltd., 1978; Day, 1976; Robinson,
1973). According to the Simplification of International Trade
Procedures Board (SITPRO), the administration of correctly executed
export-import transactions on average accounts for approximately 14%
of the prime cost of exported goods. When allowance is made for those
procedures and documents which are inevitable, the net avoidable cost is
estimated at around 7-10% (Export, May, 1970).
Furthermore, exporting companies are finding it increasingly necessary
to make 'facilitating payments' to minor officials in foreign countries
with regard to documentation, dock or customs clearances. Similarly,
9o
'kick-backs' - that is, payments made by suppliers to employees of
customer organisations not legally entitled to them - are also expected
in many countries. Indeed, in several countries corruption appears to
be an accepted way of life which the national authorities appear unable
or unwilling to overcome (Schmitthoff, 1978; Kotler, 1972).
Use of these protectionist measures increased during the 1970's - due
mainly to the world recession, inflation, problems with the balance of
trade and the deceleration in world trade - and towards the end of the
decade had reached a level not experienced for twenty years (Barling,
1978). The attitude of a host government with respect to restrictions
on imported offshore-related technology will, however, depend partly upon
the speed at which they desire their indigenous oil and gas resources to
be developed. If oil revenue or reduced dependence upon imported oil is
regarded as the prime objective then the host government may opt for
rapid development, in which case it must be prepared to accept that the
demand for oil equipment which is thereby created can be satisfied only
by imports from the U.K., U.S.A. and elsewhere. On the other hand,
they may adopt the 'infant industry' approach-and try to maximise the
domestic content of oil-related purchases by deciding upon a slow rate
of development of their oil and gas resources and by giving maximum
support to the domestic supplies industry. This choice is one which
must be made by developed and developing countries alike. The Norwegian
Government, for example, has tightly controlled the pace of offshore
development and implemented protectionist policies. In fact, the U.K.
has received only about 6% of the Statfjord field orders, despite its
share (in the order of 16%) in that field.
In addition to the visible and invisible trade barriers discussed above
there are several other factors which may restrict exports, including
the inaccessibility of overseas markets in terms of distance and/or
modes of transportation or communication. Distance affects the cost
12
of transportation and also puts exporters at a disadvantage compared
with local producers with respect to the time required for physical
transportation of goods to the market, a factor which could be particularly
important to exporters of offshore-related equipment given the importance
assigned to swift delivery by the oil industry. Moreover, there are
12. Hood & Young (1979, p.377) describe transport costs as a 'natural'
trade barrier, as distinct from tariffs, import quotas etc. which
are 'artificial' trade barriers.
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still risks involved in shipping goods overseas, such as dock strikes
and congested ports (especially in the developing countries), and thus
larger stocks may have to be maintained at overseas sales and service
outlets than would otherwise be necessary. Finally, the more complex
the transport modes the greater the opportunity for damage, pilferage
and delay, and also the better the packaging required. The
accessibility of overseas markets was found to be a factor influencing
the exporting success of firms in the machine tool industry in a study
carried out by the P.E. Consulting Group (Tookey, 1975), while in their
study of 281 U.K. exporting firms Industrial Marketing Research Ltd.
(IMR) found that 'communications' and 'delivery delays' were considered
to be the two greatest problems with respect to exporting.
This evidence suggests that perhaps the first target for many U.K.
offshore suppliers should be the other sectors of the North Sea. Howevep,
with respect to Norway, for example, U.K. exporters still have to overcome
the aforementioned problem of protectionist government policies, while
even with respect to other sectors of the North Sea they will not really
have the advantage of proximity to the market which leads to orders
for general services and onshore work such as provision of warehousing.
Proximity to the market is, of course, vitally important to wholly-involved
service companies such as drilling contractors, support bases and
specialised oil services^ and thus these firms will probably have to
undertake direct investment in the main centres of oil activity overseas
if they are to exploit offshore markets worldwide.
Exporters also face currency fluctuation risks in periods of fluctuating
exchange rates (Heymann, 1975; Livingstone, 1976). In addition, they
may experience difficulty in collecting payment. This may be due to
restrictions implemented by the government of an importing country in
an attempt to conserve foreign exchange for the purchase of 'essential'
imports (Cooper et al, 1970; Tookey, 1975; Deschampsneufs, 1967;
Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977). Some countries (such as China) which are
worried about their limited foreign exchange reserves are increasing
pressure on the major exporting nations to step up their imports from the
countries to which they are exporting. However, most western governments
13. This can be seen from the fact that over 80% of the employment
created in Scotland by wholly-involved, non-manufacturing companies
is concentrated in the Grampain region - see Table 4.5.
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are against reciprocal trading agreements of any kind as they are
difficult to negotiate and implement, while there may also be a conflict
of interest between the exporter and other parties in the exporting
country who feel that their business will be adversely affected by the
counter-trade imported goods. Nevertheless, tradincj with some
countries requires reciprocal trading to be accepted as one of the
'rules of the game'.
Traditional supply links may also make some areas more promising than
others. For example, given the strong trade links between the U.S.A.
and South America, it may be difficult for U.K. firms to combat the
entrenched positions of U.S. companies in these markets. In 1969 the
Economist Intelligence Unit found a strong relationship between the
scale and direction of a country's aid and the volume of its exports to
the recipient country, with a higher proportion of the aid actually being
spent on purchases of goods and services from donor countries than was
formally tied to such purchases (Tookey, 1975). Evidence suggests
that foreign aid is becoming increasingly important in the battle for
overseas contracts, but unfortunately it appears that many U.K. companies
are unaware of the funds available to them (Hughes, 1978).
Several studies have shown a clear relationship between the nature of
the product and the percentage of total sales exported with, for example,
quality, high-priced goods having a greater export potential than bulky,
weighty or low-priced goods (Tookey, 1964; Cooper et al, 1970). Export
potential may also be associated with the nature of the market - for
example, the importance assigned to price relative to style, delivery
etc. Cooper et al (1970) found that in the pottery industry the
greater the importance assigned to price the lower is the export potential,
ceteris paribus.
Companies may also be unable to fully exploit export markets due to their
inability to increase production because of a shortage of labour, land,
14
raw materials or finance (Cooper et al, 1970; ITI Research, 1979).
In this respect larger firms may hold an advantage over small firms which
may not have the resources to be successful in export markets (Kotler,
1972). For example, in his study of the hosiery and knitwear industry
14. Finance may be required to make additions either to production
capacity or to working capital to finance export transactions.
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Tookey (1964) found that larger firms were likely to be more successful
15
in export markets and that this was probably because their greater
resources enabled them to offer the longer periods of credit required
by overseas customers, undertake market research, employ and train
specialist staff etc. (although small firms may be able to overcome
some of these problems by using the export services provided by
16
various organisations or by joining together with other manufacturers
of similar but non-competing products to share the cost of export
marketing operations). Cooper et al (1970) also found that larger
firms in the pedal cycle, motor cycle and domestic appliance industries
exported a higher proportion of their output, and although no clear
relationship was apparent in the office machinery and pottery industries,
in the latter there was evidence that the export marketing activities
of small firms were restricted by a lack of resources. In the
national study undertaken by P.E.P. (1965), 40% of the firms in the
size range 1000-2000 exported more than 25% of their turnover, compared
with only 19% of those in the 100 - 500 size range and 10% of those
under 10O. Finally, Hirsch's study (1971) of firms in Denmark,
Holland and Israel showed that in all three countries small firms
tended to export a smaller percentage of their sales than larger firms
and suggested that this might be because larger firms were better
equipped to assume the additional risks involved in operating outside
the domestic market.
Thus, the attitude which a firm's management adopts towards exporting
will depend not only upon its perception of future market trends and
the benefits of, and problems associated with exporting, but also
upon the firm's size (and hence its resources and capabilities) and
the nature of its products.
5.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MANAGERIAL ATTITUDE TO EXPORTING
In the previous section, larger firms were found to export a higher
proportion of turnover than smaller firms, apparently because they had
the resources required to be successful in export markets. In fact,
successful exporting requires commitment in terms of production
17
capacity; .marketing mix (and its adaptation to meet the needs of
15. Exporting success was measured in terms of percentage of total turn¬
over exported.
16. These services are discussed in section 5.4 below and also in Appendix
5.1.
17. This term is explained on p.10.4 below.
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overseas customers); increased administration and the employment of
specialist staff. However, these resources will not be committed
to exporting unless senior manaaement executives adopt a positive
attitude towards exporting and decide upon a systematic exporting
policy.
Tookey (1964) found that a positive, sensible attitude towards
exporting - actively seeking orders and systematically selecting those
that could be filled profitably - was the most successful and
profitable approach. However, a company's export policy may range
from a policy of actively seeking any export order to the ad hoc filling
of any export order which happens to come in. In fact, Tookey (1964)
found that few firms had an explicit strategy with respect to exporting
and even fewer adopted a positive export policy. For example, although
21 out of 32 respondents claimed to be following a policy of unqualified
expansion of exports, few were in fact using marketing methods which
would achieve this objective.
A failure to commit the necessary resources to exporting was also
discovered in the IMR study (1978, p.vii), which concluded that
"throughout the research findings there is evidence to suggest that
resources for export marketing may frequently be inadequate". For
example, in over 50% of the exporting companies surveyed only 10% or
less of the total sales staff worked on exports. Moreover, in
many exporting firms, less than 25% of the 'export sales staff' were
fully engaged on export work. Thus, only a small proportion of total
sales effort was being directed towards the export market. Indeed,
it is not uncommon for companies to deploy far less resources in
export markets than in domestic markets even though these companies
believe the export potential for their products overseas (even in
the short-term) exceeds that in the home market (Duguid & Jaques, 1971).
The U.K.'s major international competitors may, however, be more
willing to commit resources to exporting. ITI Research (Export, Jan/
Feb 1979) found that large U.K. exporting companies employed fewer
staff in their export departments than did their West German and French
counterparts (while the opposite was true in their home sales
departments and concluded that in U.K. exporting companies there were
too many people employed on the home front and too few on exportina.
Moreover, less training of export staff was undertaken in the U.K.
than in France and West Germany. Approximately 50% of the U.K.
exporters surveyed by IMR (1978) gave some kind of training to
export sales staff, with larger companies undertaking more special
training than smaller companies which felt less able to invest
resources in this area. Tookey (1964) found that only 8 out of
54 hosiery and knitwear manufacturers had sent staff to export
training courses and that the lack of trained staff was a handicap to
some firms' exporting performance. For example, staff were not
trained sufficiently to enable them to seek out and analyse marketing
intelligence. Similar findings have been made in the U.S.A.
(Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977).
IMR (1978) also found that only one-third of the U.K. companies
exporting to the E.E.C. used the language of the country to which
they were exporting during negotiations and, despite Yarker's statement
(1976, p.23) that "lack of languages has never lost me export orders",
the British Overseas Trade Board's (BOTB) Languages Study Group
(BOTB, 1979b) has emphasised the need for U.K. firms to review their
policy on language training and so become more effective in selling
overseas. The BOTB report points out that many of the U.K.'s major
competitors attach much greater importance to languacre skills than
most U.K. companies. Indeed, competitors often regard knowledge of
the language and culture of their customers as fundamental to exporting
success, in contrast to the U.K. attitude that language ability is
merely a bonus. While lack of language ability is liable to be
particularly important when direct selling is undertaken, as in
industrial markets, many firms in non-English speaking countries give
preference to firms able to deal in the local language (BOTB, 1979b).
Thus, the BOTB report stresses that success in export markets cannot
be expected without knowledge of the local language, recommends that
export staff should be able to speak and understand another major
European language and points out that U.K. companies are not even
making adequate use of the language training facilities available in
this country.
Resources must also be made available to motivate export marketing
staff to perform their tasks with maximum efficiency. However, ITI
Research (Export, Jan/Feb 1979) found that adequate incentives were
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not offered in the U.K., partly due to the levels of taxation in
this country. U.K. export managers were found to 'enjoy' a reward,
after tax, of about only one-third of the incomes of their French
and West German counterparts, a fact which has also been stressed
by Yarker (1976). Indeed, in the U.K. the status and rewards
offered for jobs on the export sales team may be less than those for
domestic sales positions, even though export work is more difficult.
Firms which do not have adequate resources to efficiently develop
export markets may be able to overcome some of the export problems
this creates by utilising the export services provided by the
government, banks, trade associations, chambers of commerce and other
similar bodies. In this respect, Tookev (1975) argues that the
services offered by the BOTB are particularly useful for- new
exporters and smaller firms and, indeed, the BOTB tends to concentrate
on supporting the exporting efforts of small and medium-sized companies,
since the larger firms are usually more experienced overseas and
hence are more able to do without the kind of services provided by
18
the BOTB (Gray, 1979a). It is therefore perhaps surprising that
IMR (1978) found that small exporters made less use of government
services than did larger companies. In fact, evidence suggests that
the BOTB's services are not fully utilised. In both the ITI study
and Tookey's study of the hosiery and knitwear industry 30% of the
firms surveyed claimed to make no use of the BOTB's export services
(Gray, 1979a; Tookey, 1964), while roughly 50% of the firms surveyed
by P.E.P. (1964) failed to use the BOTB services. It seems therefore
that there may be a 'communications gap' and that the BOTB need to
increase publicity of their services (Gray, 1979a; Tookey, 1964).
The performance of U.K. exporters will be influenced not only by the
range of export services provided, but also by their effectiveness.
Both IMR (1978) and Tookey (1964) found that the government services
were generally highly regarded by exporters, while ITI found that
the export services provided by the BOTB were considered to be more
helpful by U.K. industry than those offered in France and West Germany
(Gray, 1979a).
18. The range of services provided by the BOTB to exporters is
discussed in Appendix 5.1.
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5.5 CONCLUSION
It was argued in section 5.2 that it may be possible to maintain
offshore-related employment in Scotland at its present levels if
manufacturers react positively to the decline in the domestic market
by deciding to export their offshore-related equipment to overseas
markets. Section 5.3 was devoted to an examination of the factors
likely to influence managerial attitude to exporting. There appear
to be six major groups of factors which might influence management's
attitude to exporting and hence its export aims:
(1) management's perception of future trends in both the
domestic and export markets.
(2) management's perception of the benefits of, and reasons
for exporting (which, in turn, will partly depend upon
corporate objectives).




(6) previous export performance.
As far as future market trends are concerned, the majority of the
evidence discussed suggests that export markets are usually regarded
as being less profitable than the domestic market and that this
relative unprofitability may deter firms from exporting. A firm may
therefore often be content to operate in its domestic environment
until such time as the operation of some constraint in the domestic
market is perceived by its management as a threat to its future growth
or even long-term survival. It is often only at this point that a
firm may consider taking advantage of profitable opportunities that
exist in overseas markets.
Thus exporting may be seen as a way of achieving a greater sales volume
than would have been possible solely in the domestic market - and in
this way the benefits which a firm's management expects to derive
from exporting may be influenced by its perception of future market
trends. Apart from growth, most firms appear to regard the opportunity
to spread risk as the most important of the many benefits which they
may expect to reap from exporting. In addition to these benefits,
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manufacturers of offshore-related equipment may wish to export to
utilise a comparative advantage which they may hold as a result of
their involvement in the North Sea. In many cases, rather than a
technological advantage resulting from operating in the harsh
environment of the North Sea, the comparative advantage may simply
be based on 5 - 10 years experience of marketing products and
services to the offshore oil industry. Although management's
attitude to exporting may be influenced by its perception of the
benefits of exporting this, in turn, will depend upon corporate
objectives.
Management's attitude to exporting may also be shaped by its perception
of the range and severity of the problems associated with exporting
its products. Evidence from studies undertaken in other industries
indicates that in addition to the assumed relative unprofitability
of exporting, the most serious export problems are usually presented
by protectionist measures (particularly tariffs and domestic content
regulations) and transportation difficulties. The significance
which management attaches to the exporting problems it identifies
may in turn be influenced by its view of future market trends. For
example, a vigorous effort to surmount considerable export problems
may be made by a firm which believes that the domestic market for
its product(s) is in long-term decline. Both the size of the problems
associated with exporting and also the importance assigned to them
may depend upon the resources of the firm. For example, the
management of a firm experienced in exporting may have far less
difficulty overcoming and be far less concerned about the export-related
problems it faces than an inexperienced firm facing identical problems.
Management's attitude to exporting may also be influenced directly
19
by the capabilities and resources it knows it has at its disposal.
Indeed, management may even be aware of the research evidence which
suggests that larger firms may have an advantage over smaller firms
in that they have the resources required to achieve exporting success.
The nature of the product may also influence management's attitude to
exporting through its impact on management's perception of future
market trends, the benefits of exporting and the problems associated
with exporting. For example, manufacturers of basic offshore
fabrications may be less enthusiastic about exporting than manufacturers
19. For which size of firm is often used as a proxy measurement.
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of specialised offshore equipment because they perceive the problems
associated with exporting their range of products as being far more
severe. Certainly it would appear that exporting sophisticated,
offshore-related equipment should generally present fewest problems
- for example, specialised oil equipment may be exempted from
tariffs.
Finally, in those firms which have exporting experience, management's
attitude towards exporting is likely to be influenced by the relative
success or failure of that previous experience. This 'feedback
influence' is shown as a broken line in Figure 5.1, which is a
simplified diagrammatic representation of the determinants of managerial
attitude to exporting and the influence that this factor in turn
exerts upon export performance.
As explained in section 5.4, the attitude which a firm's management
adopts with respect to exporting will have a considerable impact on
whether resources are committed to exporting, which in turn will be
an important determinant of export performance. However, Figure
5.1 also indicates that export performance may be influenced by the
utilisation of the export services provided by the BOTB, banks, trade
associations and other external organisations. In particular,
small firms which have neither exporting experience nor substantial
resources available for export market development may nevertheless
achieve some success in export markets through utilising these services.
Thus, it must be hoped that offshore-related manufacturers will adopt
a positive attitude to exporting and therefore be willing to commit
to exporting the resources necessary for success in overseas markets
clS • • .
"... there appears to be a close association between
companies' investment in export activity and their
export performance" (IMR, 1978, p.vi).
However, it does not necessarily follow that a high level of investment
in export activity results in improved performance (and that therefore
the achievements of U.K. exporters are largely the result of their
own initiatives). In fact, the converse may be the case -
investment in export activity may have been more a reflection than a

















resulting perhaps from inherent advantages, may have generated





It was argued in Chapter 5 that it is vital that a firm's management
adopts a positive attitude to exporting as otherwise the resources
necessary for successful exporting will not be committed. This
chapter follows on naturally from the previous chapter in that it
is concerned with the utilisation of these resources in the
development of an effective export marketing programme.
The following section examines alternative methods of efficiently
organising the export function within the exporting company. Section
6.3, which constitutes the major part of this chapter, appraises
alternative export marketing methods, with individual subsections
being devoted to discussions of the need for the adaptation of
marketing methods for export markets, export market selection policy,
export marketing research, export pricing, export products, export
promotion and export distribution. It will be stressed that the
most appropriate export marketing methods will depend to a considerable
extent upon the nature of the product and since this thesis is
concerned with the export performance of offshore-related equipment
manufacturers emphasis will be placed upon the exporting of industrial
products.
6.2 ORGANISATION OF THE EXPORTING FUNCTION
The resources devoted to exporting must be efficiently utilised and
thus effective marketing organisation is very important. The way
in which the exporting function is organised will depend upon a number
of factors, one of which may be the ability of the existing marketing
organisation (Tookey, 1975). For example, if the existing marketing
department lacks staff with experience of international marketing,
the decision to enter export markets may well necessitate the hiring
of experienced staff, perhaps to form a separate department.
Hirsch (1971) argues that a unit specialising in a given task will
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be set up within a firm when the task it must perform is complex
enough to warrant the allocation of the resources required. In
this respect, the organisation of the exporting function may-
depend upon the market selection policy utilised"'" as this will partly
determine the similarities between domestic and export markets and
hence influence the need to hire new staff with experience of
business in overseas markets.
However, the major factor influencing the organisation of the
exporting function is likely to be the importance and scale of
overseas operations. That is, the importance which firms attach
to their actual or potential export markets will be reflected in
the size, degree of autonomy and relative position on the organisational
chart of the unit dealing with them (Hirsch, 1971). When export
business represents only a small percentage of total sales, exporting
will normally be accommodated within the existing marketing department.
Tookey, Lea & McDougall (1967) found that small firms appeared to
deliberately combine export and domestic marketing departments because
they felt this approach made economical use of staff and made specific
decisions on the priority of home and export customers easier,
although this approach does require all marketing staff to have a
wider range of skills. However, export business may in time become
sufficiently important to warrant organisation as a separate department
and eventually may even reach a scale where the home/export department
organisation is dropped in favour of international divisions handling
both domestic and foreign business (Tookey, 1975; Kotler, 1972).
Hirsch (1971) also found that firms with no formal unit dealing with
exports had a relatively low export performance (measured in terms
of percentage of total sales exported). However, Hirsch emphasises
that this does not mean that firms will necessarily improve their
export performance by establishing an export department as it was
unclear which of the two variables was the 'cause' and which the
'effect'. Hence it may be that firms exporting a high proportion
of turnover simply consider the establishment of an export department
justified.
1. Export market selection is discussed in section 6.3.2 below.
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6.3 EXPORT MARKETING METHODS
2
Exporting is merely a special case of marketing and basic marketing
principles are equally applicable to the exploitation of export
markets as they are to the domestic market. Differences do arise
in the exporting situation as a result of the separation - in terms
of geographical distance, economics, culture, language and politics
- of the producer and the consumer, and these necessitate considerable
adjustment of the marketing programme implemented (Kotler, 1972;
Duguid & Jaques, 1971; Deschampsneufs, 1967; Alexandrides & Moschis,
1977; PEP, 1965). Indeed, export marketing is more complex, more
costly, more uncertain and more influenced by political factors
(Tookey, 1975; Holton, 1969). Nevertheless, export marketing does
not require the formulation of new principles and techniques, merely
the ability to vary the application of these according to the local
conditions in overseas markets.
3
6.3.1 Adaptation of the Marketing Mix
A firm's willingness to adapt its marketing mix - in accordance with
differences that exist between domestic and export market conditions
- provides an indication of the attitude of its management towards
exporting, in that it is those firms which fail to adopt a positive
export policy (seeing export orders as 'extras' to be filled if and
when they come in) that are likely to attempt a standardised approach
(Majaro, 1977). A firm which adopts this approach will try to
develop a single marketing programme that will appeal to the largest
number of buyers possible, relying on mass advertising media to endow
the product with a superior image in the minds of the buyers, that is,
to differentiate its product from those of its competitors. The
objective of this strategy is cost minimisation (since adaptation
generally involves increased cost) and control maximisation (as
standardisation makes monitoring performance and decision-making easier).
2. There are many definitions of marketing. Kotler (1972, p.17) defines
the marketing concept as "a customer orientation backed by integrated
marketing aimed at generating customer satisfaction as the key to
satisfying organisational goals." However, evidence suggests that,
generally speaking, industrial goods manufacturers in the U.K. are
less customer-orientated than consumer product organisations
(Deschampsneufs, 1967; IMR, 1978; Hill & Hillier, 1977).
3. Kotler (1972, p.44) defines the 'marketing mix' as "the settings of
the firm's marketing decision variables at a particular point in
time". Kotler argues that there are four variables which must be
combined in the marketing mix - price, promotion, place and product
- to which the author would add a fifth, research.
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However, a totally standardised international marketing mix is an
elusive goal (Majaro, 1977) and, in any case, although cost effective,
standardisation leads to marketing rigidity and hence cost minimisation
4
need not necessarily result in profit maximisation.
At the other extreme is the strategy of formulating a unique marketing
mix to suit the needs of each and every export market whose sales
and profit potential warrants this approach.
Between these two extremes lie a number of intermediate strategies
requiring varying degrees of adaptation to suit local conditions
(Tookey, 1975). For example, markets may be grouped into clusters
of countries with similar 'marketing ecologies', for each of which
the exporter can then develop a relatively standard marketing mix
which may be successful in achieving the desired corporate goals
for each national market (Majaro,- 1977; Keegan 1972; Hovell &
Walters, 1972; Boyd, 1974). Companies using this approach are, in
fact, 'segmenting' the world market, that is, they are subdividing
the world market into homogenous subsets of markets/customers where
any subset can be selected as a target market to be reached with a
distinct marketing mix."* The basic advantage of market segmentation
is that it necessitates the employment of the marketing concept and
focusses attention on consumer needs, leading to a better understanding
of the customer and why he buys. Once management understands the
needs of the customer it is in a better position to direct marketing
programmes that will satisfy these needs. Since it aims at customer
satisfaction, adoption of a market segmentation approach should provide
the firm with a competitive advantage over firms using a standardised
approach and hence should lead to higher total sales. However, market
segmentation will also result in higher administration and adaptation
costs. Management must therefore relate any modification of the
marketing mix to the size and potential of the export market in order
to ensure that adaptation is profitable (Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977).
4. Nevertheless, Keegan (1970) suggests that for a firm starting to
export there may be good reasons - such as simplicity and cost
minimisation - for adopting a uniform market strategy.
5. For a full description of market segmentation, see Kotler (1972),
p. 165.
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However, it should be noted that export market involvement may not
only require adaptation of the marketing mix but also implies, or
at least should imply, changes in objectives, policies and organisation
for the entire company. For example, the design department may have
to develop new styles suitable for export markets and the production
department may be involved in the scheduling of special runs, while
it has been suggested that integrating the movement of goods into
the exporting process rather than thinking about transportation once
the order has been secured (or even manufactured) could result in
savings of up to 10% on the transportation costs of exports (Hughes,
1979b). Thus, for maximum efficiency it is vital that all company
departments are 'educated' to think about the export customer as well
as the domestic customer.
6.3.2 Export Market Selection
The extent to which adaptation of the marketing mix is necessary will
depend partly upon the market selection policy utilised. Assuming
that the chances of loss in different markets are independent, by
becoming established in a number of markets a firm can reduce the
risk it faces. However, foreign market entry requires investment
and this investment will be lost in those markets which turn out to
be unprofitable. Moreover, a given investment in marketing resources
may well yield a higher total return when it is concentrated in a
small number of markets than when the effort is spread thinly over
several markets. Thus, there is a trade-off between risk-spreading
and expected profitability, and the choice which a firm makes will
depend upon the resources it has, its risk-preferences, etc. (Hirsch,
1971) .
Evidence suggests that U.K. companies attempt to develop a greater
number of markets than is advisable given their limited resources.
For example, ITI Research (Export, Jan/Feb, 1979) found that French
and West German companies tend to concentrate on fewer markets than
U.K. exporting firms and concluded that this policy lead to a better
understanding of market conditions, reduced overheads and increased
managerial efficiency. IMR (1978) found that although the number of
export markets served clearly increased with size, 50% of the U.K.
exporters surveyed with 100 employees or less exported to more than
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ten countries, despite the fact that 85% of these companies had six
or less export staff, not all of which worked on exports full-time.
Moreover, in most companies the trend was towards further dispersal
of marketing effort with the penetration of new markets. IMR (1978)
concluded that such a wide dispersal of effort raised doubts as to the
cost-effectiveness of these firms' marketing effort. Concentration
of eiffort on a few markets is particularly important to small firms
with limited resources and firms in the initial stages of exporting,
as entering a market with inadequate resources will often lead to an
underestimation of the specialised needs of the market, which may
prejudice the exporter's long-term stake in that market (Tookey, 1975;
Yarker, 1976).
Perhaps the most obvious market selection policy is to choose those
markets which offer the greatest potential - that is, those in which
the latent demand for a suitable product is greatest given the
existing competition - and then adapt the marketing mix to meet the
requirements of these markets. However, this may lead to the selection
of a geographically dispersed group of markets with diverse requirements,
necessitating difficult and costly marketing mix adaptation for each
market (Tookey, 1975). In fact, evidence suggests that often 'matching'
is the best basis for market selection, that is, firms should select
markets which offer adequate potential but which also have similar
characteristics to the domestic market, as this will maximise the
relevance of previous experience and minimise learning and adaptation
costs (Tookey, 1975; Keegan, 1972; Sweeney, 1970). In this way
the company concentrates its marketing activity on achieving a strong
position in those markets in which its strengths lie, rather than
spreading its resources thinly in the development of many markets
0
throughout the world (Majaro, 1977).
6.3.3 Export Marketing Research
Up-to-date marketing information is a key feature of the marketing
approach (Duguid & Jaques, 1971). Evidence of the importance of
adequate information is provided by the IMR (1978) study which found
that the most important factors influencing exporters' choice of
markets were 'good knowledge of local market conditions' and 'favourable
market conditions' (which presupposes the availability of reliable
information about these markets).
6. Kotler (1972, pp.185-187) provides a more detailed discussion of
the benefits of 'concentrated marketing'.
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Although 'desk research' (of published information) may be adequate
for preliminary screening of export markets, planning of marketing
operations will require direct contact with the market and systematic
investigations (Majaro, 1977; Day, 1976). Indeed, ITI Research
(1979) , Tookey (1975) and Wainwright (1971) believe it is essential
to either undertake or commission first-hand research. This research
may, in fact, be carried out by a domestic agency which specialises
in conducting market surveys of overseas markets, an overseas research
agency (which may have first-hand knowledge of the country under
investigation), the company itself (using its own resources and having
the advantage of familiarity with the products to be exported), or
a combination of these, the choice depending upon several factors
such as the relative costs of the various approaches (Alexandrides &
Moschis, 1977; Day, 1976; Cranch, 1974). Moreover, marketing
information should be continuously up-dated as the marketing environment
will change over time and hence marketing strategy may have to be
revised (Tookey, 1975; Godley & Cracknell, 1971; Wainwright, 1971).
However, evidence suggests that U.K. industry is heavily dependent
on published information concerning export markets, particularly small
firms which find marketing research an extremely expensive activity
(MacKay, 1964). Both the IMR (1978) study and Tookey's (1964) study
of the hosiery and knitwear industry revealed very little use of
marketing research organisations, the main source of export information
7
m both surveys being the export services of the BOTB and feedback
from salesmen and agents overseas, although trade associations,
chambers of commerce and banks are also important sources of information
(IMR, 1978; Burgess, 1970; Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977; McMillan
& Paulden, 1974). Several surveys undertaken in the U.S.A. have
shown that lack of information about overseas markets is, in fact,
the main obstacle to export expansion in that it causes firms to under¬
estimate export potential (Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977).
In general, in any country the market for industrial products will
consist of a much smaller number of buyers than exists for consumer
goods. A large proportion of the demand for offshore-related equipment
in any particular market will emanate from the major international oil
companies, drilling contractors, project managers and state oil
8
company, where one exists. However, as has already been explained,
7. See Appendix 5.1 for further details.
8. See p.33.
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it may nevertheless prove extremely difficult to identify the location
of purchasing authority in industrial markets in general and in the
offshore market in particular. Given the importance of directing
marketing activity at those people which exert most influence in
the purchasing process, it is vital that Scottish offshore-related
manufacturers make direct contact with the operating companies,
drilling companies etc. active in overseas markets.
While the main responsibility for assessing offshore markets overseas
must rest with the offshore-related manufacturers themselves, the
0S0 devotes some of its resources to the identification of overseas
opportunities. The 0S0 acts as a general agency within government
for the collection and evaluation of information concerning major
offshore developments overseas - leaving the BOTB's Export Intelligence
9
Service (EIS) to handle the information flow about smaller contracts
- and also works closely with professional and trade associations
such as ABOI and CBMPE. The OSO's aim is to be able to advise on
the probable nature, scale and timing of major offshore projects
overseas; the organisations that will make the major buying decisions
and the key personnel involved; and the domestic supply of offshore-
related goods and services in the countries where the developments
are taking place. Having in this way identified opportunities for
U.K. participation the OSO works closely with the Overseas Project
Group of the BOTB (which has experience in the pursuit of contracts
for large projects and can offer financial assistance to consortia
and main contractors)"'"0 to provide assistance and advice to enable
U.K. companies to mount an effective response (Department of Energy,
1977) .
6.3.4 Export Pricing
Decisions must be taken with respect to the basic price, credit and
payment terms, margin policy and transport terms to be offered to
export customers.
Pricing a product in export markets is extremely complex due to the
large number of variables that must be taken into consideration.
Firstly, the internal cost structure of the product must be assessed.
The production costs taken into account may be full or variable costs
9. See Appendix 5.1 for further details.
10. See the section concerning Capital Goods Projects in Appendix 5.1.
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depending upon the company's strategy towards export markets.
For example, if exporting is being undertaken merely to maintain
full production capacity it would be appropriate to take variable
costs into consideration. However, if the commitment to exporting
has involved extra capital investment this must be taken into account.
A unit cost of production will be arrived at by adding any modification
costs to these production costs, while other cost elements which may
be considered include shipping costs (including transportation,
administration and insurance costs), tariffs, taxes, middlemen's
margins and a contingency element for exchange rate fluctuation and
other financial risks. Once these various cost components have
been assessed, the external factors likely to affect the product's
sales - such as competitive prices and the product's estimated demand
schedule - must be analysed before the final price is fixed
(Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977).
The practice of having one common price for all markets is more likely
to be wrong than correct in any particular market. Evidence suggests
that most firms' ex-works export prices are different from (and
usually lower than) ex-works domestic prices (P.E.P., 1965? Duguid
& Jaques, 1971; Cooper et al, 1970; MacKay, 1964; Hirsch, 1971).
Nevertheless, several studies have revealed that many U.K. companies
experience difficulty in meeting overseas competition. For example,
price competition - from both local manufacturers and imports from
other foreign countries - was identified as the second greatest
hindrance to exports in the P.E.P. (1964) study and the greatest
difficulty encountered in export markets in the Scottish survey under¬
taken by MacKay (1964). Similarly, IMR (1978) found that more U.K.
companies considered themselves to be at a competitive disadvantage
with respect to price than with any other factor. The significance
of this competitive disadvantage can be seen from the fact that the
studies by both IMR (1978) and Hirsch (1971) revealed that exporters
believed price to be the most important factor determining success
or failure in export markets.
The international competitiveness of U.K. industry depends partly
upon the rate of inflation and the rate of productivity growth, in
which areas the U.K. has fared worse than its major international
competitors in recent years. These factors should result in a fall
Ill
in the value of sterling, but instead, until the early part of 1981
the pound was strong (reflecting the U.K.'s oil resources and high
interest rates) and hence itself adversely affected the international
competitiveness of U.K. manufacturers.
Credit is an important aspect of the 'price mix', and adequate credit
accommodation is one of the major factors which an exporter's
prospective customers will take into consideration. Indeed, because
of balance of payments pressures, foreign exchange controls and high
interest rates, the importer may be more interested in the credit
terms offered - and also the currency in which payment is to be made
- than the actual price (Robinson, 1969). It is therefore vital that
the credit policy established meets the needs of the customer and
compares favourably with the terms offered by competitors (BOTB, 1978;
Robinson, 1969; Benedict, 1979; Hughes, 1979a). Often customs will
prevail in a particular market or country as to the credit terms which
customers believe they have the right to expect with, for example,
longer periods of credit being expected in industrial equipment markets
(Hirsch, 1971; Day, 1976).
The credit to be provided will be one of the terms of payment agreed
upon by the importer and exporter. Although cash in advance offers
the exporter the highest degree of security, this method of payment
places a heavy burden upon the importer and therefore is seldom used
(Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977). The export letter of credit also
offers considerable protection to the exporter. The letter of credit
will be opened by the importer through a local bank upon completion
of the sales contract. The importer's bank will then request an
associated bank in the exporter's country to inform the exporter that
a letter of credit has been opened in his favour. Usually this
arrangement will be irrevocable, which means that the exporter is
guaranteed payment (in his own currency) on presentation of the shipping
documents to the local bank which confirmed his letter of credit.
From the point of view of foreign customers letters of credit are,
however, costly (since the buyer must pay bank fees and deposit funds
in his own bank well before receipt of either documents or merchandise),
time consuming and irksome (Benedict, 1969; Deschampsneufs, 1967;
Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977). In contrast, sales on open account
offer the least protection to the exporter as this method provides
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no tangible proof of the importer's obligation to pay. However,
this method is simple in that it requires little or no documentation
and no bank fees, and is therefore often used for sales to familiar
customers in stable countries. However, many exporters quote their
terms ofrpayment as 'cash against documents', which means in effect
that the exporter will release the documents - the title to the goods
- against payment or a promise to pay on a certain date (depending
upon the credit period the exporter has agreed to extend to the
importer). This method involves the exporter, through his bank,
drawing on his overseas customer a bill of exchange for the due amount.
The Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) insures exporters,
at a reasonable cost, against any loss arising from the failure of
overseas customers to pay for goods.1"'" Insured against the risk
of non-payment, exporters should in theory be able to pursue bolder
marketing policies, taking on new buyers and breaking into new markets
without fear of heavy losses (ECGD, 1977; Brown, 1979).
Providing that the importer is credit worthy and the importing country
stable, commercial banks will normally assume the credit and political
risks involved in export financing. However, in more difficult cases
the exporter may assign his rights under an ECGD insurance policy to
his bank, or make use of the loan guarantee schemes provided by the
ECGD which enable commercial banks to undertake high risk export
12
financing (ECGD, 1977; Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977; Day, 1976).
In this way, the ECGD's guarantee support for export finance enhances
an exporter's liquidity, helping him to offer competitive terms and
win contracts he might otherwise lose (ECGD, 1977; Brown, 1979).
Given that some developing countries may be unable to achieve their
desired rate of offshore development due to a shortage of funds,11 the
ECGD's guarantees for buyer and supplier credit financing may be
particularly important with respect to U.K. oil-related exports to
these countries. For example, in September 1978 the ECGD backed
a $50 million loan to Pemex of Mexico for the purchase of U.K. plant
and equipment for the oil, gas, refining and petrochemical industries,
and in June 1978 and August 1979 guaranteed $35 million loans to
Petrobras (of Brazil) to help finance contracts awarded to U.K. suppliers
of capital goods for the oil and petrochemical industries.
11. Appendix 5.1 provides a more detailed explanation of the insurance
cover offered by the ECGD.





The determination of the product element of the export marketing
mix necessitates decisions being taken with respect to the design,
quality, branding, packaging, servicing and range of products to be
exported.
The U.K. exporters surveyed by IMR (1978) regarded product quality
and expertise to be the second most important factor for success in
export markets and considered this factor to be that in which they
held their biggest competitive advantage. However, only 30% of these
exporters claimed to design and develop products specifically for the
export market, the rest developing products initially for the home
market. Moreover, most products sold overseas are characterised
by an almost token degree of adaptation, such as slight modifications
to fit technical standards such as voltages (Duguid & Jaques, 1971).
Although product adaptation will increase both manufacturing costs
(through the loss of economies of scale) and R&D costs, the more
adaptive the company is to the foreign market's needs the more likely
it is to win a large share of the market (Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977;
Keegan, 1970; Tookey, 1964).
The extent to which adaptation is necessary will depend to a large
extent upon the nature of the product. In general, industrial products
are relatively environmentally insensitive and, in some cases, it may
even be possible to design an 'international product' which can be sold
in both export and domestic markets in more or less the same form
(Deschampsneufs, 1967). Also, industrial goods tend to be either
custom-built or produced in batches, so that the 'setting up' costs
of adaptation will not be relevant. Moreover, adaptation costs will
be minimised if the needs of both the domestic and export markets
are considered at the outset in the planning of a new product
(Deschampsneufs, 1967). Finally, export marketing costs can be reduced
by narrowing the range of products to be exported, perhaps exporting
only those products which require minimum face-to-face communication
with customers. Hirsch (1971) found that in 17 of the 18 industries
studied the product range exported was more restricted than that sold
in the domestic market and concluded that concentration on a narrow
product range if anything improved export performance as it allowed
economies of scale in both production and marketing to be achieved.
Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out, techniques and
equipment suitable for operations in one set of environmental
conditions may be inadequate when subjected to new conditions and
equipment designed for use in the North Sea may require adaptation
for use in other offshore areas. In particular, as industrial product
manufacturers Scottish exporters of offshore-related equipment require
to pay special attention to the need to design products for export
which reflect the different (often lower) maintenance standards and
practices of overseas markets (Keegan, 1970; Deschampsneufs, 1967).
The parallel development of services is a vital part of the product
element of the marketing mix of industrial products (P.E.P. 1965;
Tookey, 1975). For example, the capital goods manufacturers surveyed
by IMR (1978) considered the provision of after-sales services to be
the fourth most important factor for success in export markets. Although
arrangements may be made for services to be provided by an independent
organisation in the export market(s), if the product is custom-made
or the training of the employees of a separate organisation is
uneconomical, the services may have to be provided by the manufacturer.^"
This may involve him in considerable expenditure on the establishment
and running of a local operation, which may not be justified by the size
of the market. Indeed, inability to provide services economically may
prohibit exports altogether, or at least limit exporting to those products
which either do not require servicing or can be serviced by independent
organisations in overseas markets. Indeed, Hirsch (1971) found that
fewer firms gave their export customers pre-sales services (including
technical assistance and instructions about the use of the products
purchased) and post-sales services (including repairs and provision of
spare parts) than in the domestic market. However, the export
performance of those firms which did provide services to foreign
customers exceeded that of those that did not (Hirsch, 1971).
6.3.6 Export Promotion
According to Deschampsneufs (1967), promotion is probably the element
of overseas marketing most neglected by U.K. manufacturers. Companies
may use a combination of advertising, personal selling, sales promotion
and public relations to promote their products. The need to adapt the
14. See p.85
15. This subject is discussed further below, pp. 119-120.
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'promotional mix' in individual export markets will depend to a
large extent upon the product with, for example, a highly technical
product normally lending itself to a higher level of promotional
standardisation (Majaro, 1977) .
The most appropriate methods of promotion will also depend upon the
16
nature of the product (Tookey, 1975). Industrial equipment
manufacturers will tend to make more use of personal selling than mass
media advertising. This is partly because these manufacturers will
normally have a much smaller number of prospective customers than a
manufacturer of products for the consumer market, but also because
products sold in industrial markets tend to be of a higher value, less
standardised and more complex nature and hence are best sold directly by
a salesman (Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977). Indeed, Buckner's (1967)
study of industrial purchasing in the U.K.revealed that sales engineers
are, for industrial purchasers, probably the most important method of
obtaining information on products, and that therefore the salesman is
the industrial goods manufacturer's key marketing resource. Also, the
salesman is in the best position to identify the individuals who exert
influence over the purchasing decision and their goals (Webster & Wind,
1972) and should be able to vary his approach in accordance with the
various interests of the 'influencers' (Harding, 1966). Thus, a
salesman can provide detailed, specific information tailored exactly to
satisfy each influencer's needs, in a way which would be impossible
through mass media and impersonal sources of information (Webster & Wind,
1972). The exporter who sends representatives overseas will therefore
get to know the market and his customers at first hand and gain a better
understanding of the way in which his product can be sold there.
Moreover, the exporter who has taken the trouble of visiting the buyer's
country will be more favourably considered (Tookey, 1978).
It has already been emphasised that industrial purchasing need not be
17
completely rational. For example, an industrial purchaser may be
swayed by the image/reputation of a supplier (Harding, 1966; Levitt,
1967; Strauss, 1962). Indeed, Harding (1966) found that the 'image
factor' was a powerful influence on industrial buying decisions.
16. Although IMR (1978) did find, rather surprisingly, that there was
little significant variation in the use of the most important forms
of promotion by firms in the industrial and consumer sectors.
17. See p. 43.
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This image factor is not simply a function of previous experience
with a supplier but also the result of attitude formation strongly
influenced by the reputation a company has among its peers, advertising
and the personality and behaviour of visiting salesmen. According
to Levitt (1967), the better a company's reputation the better are its
chances of obtaining a favourable first hearing for a new product
among prospective customers and of achieving early adoption of that
product. However, Levitt (1967) found that the favourable influence of
a company's general reputation erodes over time. That is, in the
absence of repeated sales call-backs or advertisements to reinstate his
identity, the seller, over time, will tend to lose the favourable
impact of his good reputation. Thus, even in industrial markets,
advertising and sales promotion materials can perform the important
function of establishing and re-instating the good image/reputation
of the seller (Harding, 1966; Levitt, 1967).
In industrial export markets advertising may be used to create
awareness of the company and its products and hence provide an environment
in which a salesman can work more effectively (Alexandrides & Moschis,
1977; Yarker, 1976). Deschampsneufs (1967) points out that although
the technical publications in some local markets may be of limited
value, there are a growing number of both general and technical
publications of international coverage in which advertising may be
worthwhile. Certainly, there are a number of offshore-related
publications such as 'Offshore1, 'Oil and Gas Journal' and 'Petroleum
Engineer' which are internationally read. Although industrial
advertising should ideally be based on an appraisal of the characteristics
of the buying situation and the composition of the group influencing
the buying decision, industrial advertising budgets are usually too
small to allow different appeals to be made to the various people
wielding buying influence (Harding, 1966).
Deschampsneufs (1967) considers the provision of sales literature
such as brochures, leaflets, specification sheets and catalogues listing
products available for sale overseas - to be the first essential in
terms of overseas promotion, and direct mail shots (which are designed
to provide leads for salesmen and can be directed at several people in
each organisation) to be a particularly useful sales weapon provided
they are followed up quickly.
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However, the study carried out by the P.E. Consulting Group (1970)
revealed that purchasers of machine tools regarded exhibitions as
being more important than sales literature and advertising.
Exhibitions and trade fairs can be particularly useful for the intro¬
duction of new industrial goods, while they also provide the exporter
with an opportunity to observe the competition and make and/or
maintain contact with agents and buyers (Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977;
Yarker, 1976; P.E.P., 1965; BOTB, . 1978) However, the value
of participating at trade fairs is frequently questioned as any order
engendered by initial contact made at a trade fair may not materialise
for up to two years. Also, exhibiting is expensive and offshore-
related manufacturers must be selective. They must consider, for
example, whether they would be better not to take advantage of the
BOTB1s assistance at general British Industrial Exhibitions (such as
those held in Mexico in 1978 and China in 1979) in order to concentrate
on the more specialised offshore exhibitions, at which they can also
18
benefit from BOTB support. In fact, U.K. offshore-related
manufacturers are always well represented at international offshore
exhibitions, the most important of which is the annual exhibition
at Houston, at which U.K. companies form the largest overseas delegation
- at the 1980 exhibition, for example, the BOTB joint-venture group
comprised 162 companies. The OSO is itself always represented at a
number of annual international offshore exhibitions, while every year
OSO personnel visit a number of overseas countries with offshore prospects
in order to give presentations on U.K. offshore capability to senior
government officials and oilmen.
19
6.3.7 Export Distribution
Possible methods of distribution include export merchants in the U.K.;
buyers for overseas organisations resident in the U.K.; agents and/or
distributors in overseas markets; overseas sales representatives (and
other staff sent to visit overseas markets); and sales subsidiaries
overseas.
20
Export houses have considerable experience in selling overseas and
provide a wide range of marketing, finance and shipping services to
18. BOTB support for overseas trade fairs and exhibitions is discussed in
Appendix 5.1.
19. In terms of Kotler's terminology, this is the 'place' element of the
marketing mix.
20. In the interests of brevity, export finance houses, factors, confirming
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the manufacturer. However, they often■specialise in the type of
services offered, the products handled or the markets covered - in
particular, they are stronger in Commonwealth markets and better at
exporting consumer products (Tookey, 1975; BOTB, 1978; McMillan &
Paulden, 1974). In addition, export houses may be unable to handle
after sales service, while use of an export house limits the contact
of the exporter with the market and hence restricts his knowledge of
the market and his ability to develop his export organisation further.
Nevertheless, use of an export house may be appropriate for new
exporters (particularly small firms) with a product highly saleable
overseas but lacking in marketing skills and knowledge of overseas
markets and unwilling to commit substantial resources in the early
stages of overseas marketing, or for established exporters in markets
where the potential is insufficient to justify the establishment of
the firm's own sales organisation (Duguid & Jaques, 1971; Wainwright,
21
1971) .
The distinction drawn between an 'agent' and a 'distributor' may be of
a legal nature. Robinson (1973) defines an agent as a local represent¬
ative who buys nothing from his principal but merely acts on his behalf
as defined in an agency agreement, whereas a distributor actually contracts
to buy the exporter's goods for sale to third parties, thereby absolving
the principal of certain risks and liabilities from that point onwards.
However, often the distinction is more one of a functional nature, with
the term 'agent' being used to describe a representative who obtains
orders on behalf of his principal and sends them home for execution,
whereas the 'distributor' holds stock (which he may or may not purchase)
from which he delivers.
22
An agent, who will receive commission on sales, is suitable when long-
term selling is required to a large number of possible customers.
However, when there is likely to be a long period before commission can
be earned on a regular basis - as in the launching of a new product -
houses, export managers, export merchants, manufacturer's export
agents and buying/indent houses, which are all intermediaries situated
in the domestic market offering slightly different export services,
have been included under the heading 'export houses'.
21. Similar arguments apply to selling through the U.K. buying offices
of overseas governments or foreign firms (Tookey, 1978).
22. Whether defined in a legal of functional sense.
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it may be necessary to pay the agent a fee or retainer in addition
to commission on sales in order to encourage the agent to expend time
and effort on the untried product. A distributor will normally
23
receive commission or profit on sales plus profit on the sales of
spares and consumables related to the product (of which he will be
expected to keep stocks). Finally, in the case of large items of capital
equipment, the local representative may agree to provide installation,
maintenance and repair service facilities in return for a fee over and
above commission on sales (McMillan & Paulden, 1974).
The employment of a local representative limits the investment committed
by the exporting firm and provides detailed knowledge of tie -market
(Tookey, 1975; Day, 1976; Yarker, 1976). However, the interests of
the principal and the agent will not be identical, which may be a
constant potential source of conflict between the two parties (Duguid
& Jaques, 1971). It is therefore important that a precise, formal
agreement is concluded between the agent and the exporter as this should
help to avoid misunderstandings which might otherwise arise with respect
to sales territories, the division of responsibility for selling and
other activities, etc. (Wainwright, 1971; Yarker, 1976). Careful
training, motivation and management of overseas agents - including regular
visits to train personnel and stimulate enthusiasm - is also vitally
important, although these are areas often neglected by U.K. exporters
(McMillan & Paulden, 1974; Wainwright, 1971; Duguid & Jaques, 1971;
Godley & Cracknell, 1971). Finding a good agent may also prove extremely
difficult, although useful help in the selection of agents can be sought
firm banks, chambers of commerce, trade associations and the BOTB
24
(McMillan & Paulden, 1974; P.E.P., 1965; Schmitthoff, 1979; BOTB, 1978).
The use of salaried salesmen in overseas markets opens up a vitally
important direct personal link with the customer. However, the salesmen
may not know the local customs, market etc. as well as a local
agent, while the firm will also be required to provide a fuller range
of export services (Tookey, 1975; Duguid & Jaques, 1971; Alexandrides
& Moschis, 1977).
Finally, the establishment of a marketing or sales subsidiary overseas
provides a base for carrying stock and providing spares and after-sales
23. Depending upon whether the distributor purchases the goods or merely
stocks them for the principal.
24. Details of the BOTB's agency finding service are provided in Appendix
5.1.
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service, makes it easier for overseas customers to make contact
with the firm and improves control over foreign operations.
The choice of distribution channel will depend upon company, market
and product considerations. For example, ITI Research (Export,
Jan/Feb, 1979) found that no significant differences in methods of
overseas operation seemed to exist between companies in the U.K.,
France and West Germany - differences appeared to be related to size
of company, with small firms tending to rely on the use of intermediaries,
whereas large firms tend to perform more of the marketing functions
themselves. In fact, companies often go through a classical pattern
of evolution in distribution (Majaro, 1977; Tookey, 1975). Generally
speaking, it is desirable for an exporter to maintain direct control
over the product as far down the distribution line as possible as this
will put him in a better position to influence the way in which it is
marketed (Barling, 1979a). However, when entering international
markets for the first time firms normally lack the specialised skills
and know-how (and perhaps also the resources) required to control their
own channel and therefore prefer to use intermediaries (Majaro, 1977;
Robinson, 1969). Eventually, as experience increases, exporters
may wish to expand their control over the marketing of their products
in overseas markets and may even establish subsidiaries in those
markets which justify this level of commitment.
Most companies do, however, use more than one type of distribution
channel at any one time in different markets depending, for example,
on their size and growth potential - low sales turnover encourages the
use of middlemen so that marketing costs can be shared (Tookey, 1964;
Wainwright, 1971). The larger the typical order size or the greater
the geographical concentration of customers the more likely is the
use of the company's own sales representatives since it becomes more
economical to use full-time employees (Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977;
Duguid & Jaques, 1971). Also, in some countries it is politically
advisable or even essential to have a man on the spot (Yarker, 1976) .
Finally, channel selection will be influenced by traditional marketing
practices in particular overseas markets (Majaro, 1977).
Product characteristics will also influence the choice of distribution
channel. Industrial products are often custom-made and as such are
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normally sold direct by sales representatives (IMR, 1978). If the
products are technically complex or if technical consultation on
design is required the best results will be achieved if the firm's
own personnel conduct the negotiations, as agents may not be
technically competent (Majaro, 1977; McMillan & Paulden, 1974;
Alexandrides & Moschis, 1977). Also, many industrial customers prefer
to deal direct with the principal (Duguid & Jaques, 1971). However,
if installation, operative training or after-sales service is required
a local representative of some kind will probably be necessary
(Deschampsneufs, 1967). For example, P.E.P. (1965) found that in
the machine-tool and earth-moving equipment industries it was essential
that manufacturers had local representatives able to give prompt
service to overseas customers. Thus, although selling (particularly
in industrial markets) will often be undertaken by the manufacturer's
own personnel, local agents may nevertheless be employed to provide
contacts, languages in negotiations and after-sales services.
6.4 CONCLUSION
Evidence suggests that there is a strong relationship between marketing
strategy and export performance. For example, in Table 6.1 below,
which summarises some of the results of Tookey's (1964) study of export
TABLE 6.1
Proportion of Total Sales Exported, Compared with Export Methods
% of Total Sales Exported 0-4 5-14 Over 15 All Firms
Percentage of firms replying to
questions :-
Willing to adapt products or
packaging 44 63 83 61
Advertising in overseas markets 8 29 62 29
Having overseas subsidiaries or
employing export sales reps. 5 16 36 21
Staff visiting overseas markets 68 74 86 73
Using 3 or more export services 31 72 86 62
Using export training courses 10 21 14 15
SOURCE : Tookey (1964), p.63.
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performance in the hosiery and knitwear industry, there is an
association between the export methods adopted and the percentage
of turnover exported. However, it is not possible from these
results to establish whether firms export more because they use
these methods, or whether these methods are merely a necessary part
25
of large-scale exporting (Tookey, 1964).
Nevertheless, it is obviously essential that the marketing mix
formulated for export markets satisfies the needs of prospective
customers. As in the domestic market, it is vital that offshore-
related manufacturers identify the location of purchasing authority
in each of the (relatively small number of) major prospective
customer organisations in each market in order that marketing activity
can be directed at those individuals who exert most influence in the
form which is most likely to have the desired effect upon them.
Normally offshore-related manufacturers will find that the most effective
means of communication with prospective customers will be the salesman,
since he will be in the best position to distinguish the identity and
goals of the purchasing 'influencers' and should be able to adapt his
approach in response to their various interests (in a way which would
be more difficult, or perhaps even impossible, using other media).
A salesman will also be able to provide the detailed information
(concerning what may be a technologically-sophisticated product)
which an agent may not be competent to deliver. A local agent may
nevertheless be employed to provide the prompt after-sales service
considered essential by the oil industry in those offshore areas
overseas where it is not feasible for offshore-related manufacturers to
establish their own service facilities. While industrial purchasing
decisions are largely based on rational criteria such as price, credit
terms and product quality, 'irrational' factors such as a supplier's
reputation can also influence the patronage decision. In the
formulation of a company's general reputation an important role is
played by industrial advertising, exhibitions, mail shots (and other
promotion material) and particularly previous experience. In this
respect the previous North Sea experience of Scottish offshore-related
manufacturers may prove an important comparative advantage.
25. The direction of this relationship could only really be determined
by a detailed, on-going study of the exporting process in
individual firms.
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The IMR (1978) and ITI Research (1979) studies both found that
U.K. firms tend to spread their resources too thinly over a number
of export markets. This evidence suggests therefore that offshore-
related manufacturers, particularly those exporting for the first
time, should concentrate their resources on the development of a
small number of key export markets. However, even with the adoption
of this "concentrated marketing' approach, effective export marketing
requires commitment of resources, although to a certain extent it
may be possible for a firm to limit its investment in exporting by
making use of the export services provided by the BOTB and other
external organisations, as shown in Figure 6.1 (below), which is a
diagrammatic representation of the major factors influencing export
performance.
As explained in the previous chapter and as illustrated in Figure
6.1, whether resources are committed to exporting may be determined
to a large extent by the attitude which a firm's management adopts
with respect to exporting. This attitude may itself be influenced
by a number of factors including firm characteristics, product
characteristics, previous exporting experience, management's perception
of the benefits and problems associated with exporting and expected











SURVEY AIMS AND METHODOLOGY
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the aims and methodology
of each of the three phases of fieldwork. Following a brief
explanation (provided in section 7.2) of the desk research carried
out prior to the fieldwork, section 7.3 discusses the objectives
and survey methods of the first (and main) phase of interviewing.
This survey, undertaken with the objective of identifying the major
factors influencing the export performance of the Scottish manufacturing
sector of the offshore supplies industry, consisted of a series of
in-depth, qualitative interviews with the senior executives responsible
for determining export strategy in 40 offshore-related manufacturers
located in Scotland.
The second phase of interviewing, which consisted of a survey of
expert opinion, is described in section 7.4. This survey was carried
out in order to develop a scenario - an internally-consistent, plausible
account of a future situation - of the global offshore market in the
period 1980-85. Finally, the aims and methods employed during the
final phase of the fieldwork - which was undertaken with the objective
of investigating possible future trends in the exporting activities
of Scottish offshore-related manufacturers - are discussed in section
7.5. This phase consisted of a further round of interviews in each
of the original sample of offshore-related manufacturers, during the
course of which the senior executives were requested to state the
expected strategic response of their firms to the market situation
as outlined in the scenario developed by the researcher.
7.2 DESK RESEARCH
The desk research phase involved the collation and analysis of
published and in some cases unpublished information on the area of
study. It was necessary to undertake desk research in three main
areas : export marketing literature, the nature of the offshore oil
industry and the global offshore market.
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Such is the volume of literature on the topic of exporting that the
researcher had to be very selective as to the items analysed. In
fact, the desk research in this area principally involved the synthesis
of previous work on export determination in order to identify
informational gaps representing possible areas and methods of study,
in this way avoiding duplication of research.
Sound knowledge of world markets for offshore-related equipment was
necessary as expected future trends in both export and domestic markets
had been identified as significant influences on export marketing policy
in previous research studies undertaken in this area (Cooper et al,
1970; Majaro, 1977). In addition, knowledge of the global situation
would allow the interviewer to pose the appropriate questions (and
probe the resulting answers) and appear informed, encouraging respondents
to give considered, genuine responses and thus hopefully improving
the quality of the results obtained.
It was necessary to undertake desk research on the nature of the
offshore oil industry for the following reasons :
(1) Interviewers in industrial marketing research must have a sound
knowledge of the subject matter to be discussed as otherwise
respondents will tend to lose interest in the interview, with
the quality of data suffering as a consequence.
(2) As will be explained below, it was decided not to tape-record
the interview. This meant that knowledge of the industry
was particularly important since it would be essential that the
researcher was capable of assessing quickly the salient points,
as not every word spoken could be written down.
(3) It was evident from previous export marketing studies that the
nature of the product influences export performance. It
was therefore essential to become acquainted with offshore-
related equipment in order to understand how its nature might
influence fieldwork findings.
(4) It was necessary to identify the problems which Scottish manu¬
facturers had experienced in entering the North Sea market in
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order to gain an impression of the type of problems they might
encounter in export markets.
(5) It was intended that the identity of the firms constituting the
sample population - that is, firms in Scotland manufacturing
offshore-related products as a principal activity - would be
uncovered. Contact was established with the Department of Energy's
Offshore Supplies Office (0S0), the Scottish Economic Planning
Department, the Scottish Development Agency and the Manpower
Services Commission in the hope that at least one of these
organisations might have compiled a comprehensive list of companies
located in Scotland which were involved in the offshore market.
Unfortunately this did not prove to be the case and information
from these sources was supplemented with details of firms drawn
from offshore journals (such as Offshore Services, Ocean Industry
and Oilman) and offshore registers (such as those provided by the
Highlands and Islands Development Board and the North East
Scotland Development Authority). These registers offered the
additional advantage of providing the name of a contact - often
the managing director or marketing manager who was exactly the
person the researcher wished to interview.
As the offshore supplies industry is extremely heterogenous, it
was decided to limit the study to companies located in Scotland
which were involved in the manufacture of offshore-related
equipment as a principal activity, this being the sector of the
industry for which exporting was likely to appear most essential
(and also therefore most likely to be interested in, and cooperate
with, the study). However, it should be noted that it was
impossible to compile an exhaustive list of companies comprising
the sample population and thus some manufacturers heavily involved
in the offshore market may have been omitted while other companies
may have been incorrectly included.
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7.3 SURVEY OF MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF
THE SCOTTISH MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF THE OFFSHORE SUPPLIES INDUSTRY
7.3.1 Survey Aims & Hypotheses
It was explained in Chapter 2 that much of the equipment produced
by Scottish offshore-related manufacturers is only demanded in
association with the development of new offshore oil fields and
that therefore these firms are heavily dependent upon a high level
of development activity being maintained. However, it was
explained in Chapter 3 that as the North Sea matures as an oil province
development activity will fall in real terms. Indeed, it will be
argued in Chapter 11 that development expenditure in the U.K. sector
of the North Sea will decline in real terms quite sharply over the
period 1982-85. Despite this decline in the domestic market, it
was stressed in Chapter 5 that offshore-related manufacturing
employment might nevertheless be maintained in Scotland if these
companies were to vigorously develop the export markets for their
products.
However, little is known about the nature and extent of the involvement
of Scottish offshore-related manufacturers in export markets^ and
virtually nothing about the factors which influence their export
performance. The first (and main) phase of the fieldwork sought
to make a contribution to this end by carrying out a thorough
investigation of the nature of the exporting activity undertaken by
Scottish offshore-related manufacturers. Although interesting new
statistical data on the current marketing position (and, in particular,
export performance) of these firms was collected, the main objective
of this survey was to identify the major factors which influence
the aims and attainment of Scottish offshore-related manufacturers
with respect to exporting. In effect, the factors influencing export
performance were to be investigated.
It was shown in Chapters 5 and 6, which presented a synthesis of
previous work in this area, that many factors specific to the individual
1. The limited statistical evidence available concerning exports of
offshore-related equipment by manufacturing firms located in
Scotland was presented in section 4.2.2 above.
firm - such as managerial attitude to exporting and size of firm -
may influence export performance. Moreover, there is considerable
heterogeneity between firms in the so-called offshore supplies
industry with respect to factors which it appeared might influence
export attainment. For these reasons the study was undertaken
at the level of the firm.
2
Figure 6.1 (above) provided a diagrammatic representation of what
would appear - on the basis of the synthesis of the literature on
export determination - to: be'the ma jor factors likely to influence
a firm's export performance. Hence this figure outlined the major
topics requiring detailed examination in the course of the first
phase of interviewing. In particular, among the hypotheses to be
considered were the following :
(1) A firm's export performance will be influenced by the export
marketing methods it employs, specifically :
a. Those firms which possess up-to-date export marketing
intelligence (based ideally on first-hand research) will be
more successful in export markets than those firms with
inadequate marketing information.
b. Export performance will be highest in those firms which
undertake a range of promotional activities in export
markets, although individually the most important form of
export promotion for industrial products will be personal
selling (with, if possible, a permanent sales presence
being established in export markets).
c. Although agents may be employed to provide contacts and
languages in negotiations, the most effective method of
distributing industrial equipment overseas will be direct
to the customer.
d. Those firms which adapt their marketing mix in order to
satisfy the differing needs of their export customers will
be more successful exporters than firms which attempt to
utilise a standard marketing mix (developed originally for
the domestic market) worldwide.
2. See p. 124.
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(2) As those marketing methods associated with a high level
of export performance - such as the collection of adequate
marketing intelligence, the use of a range of promotional
methods and the adaptation of the marketing mix - are also those
requiring the greatest commitment of resources to exporting,
large firms will, in general, be more successful in export
markets than small firms.
(3) The devotion of adequate resources to exporting will depend
not only upon a firm's size (and other characteristics) but
also upon how its senior executives regard exporting. Hence,
in this way, managerial attitude to exporting will have an
important influence on export performance.
(4) Management's attitude to exporting will itself be influenced
by its perception of future trends in both the domestic and
export markets; its perception of the benefits of, and problemb
associated with exporting; the nature of its previous exporting
experience; firm characteristics and the nature of its product(s).
Hence these factors will all exert an indirect influence on
export performance.
(5) Those firms which do not possess the resources and capabilities
necessary for large-scale exporting may nevertheless achieve
some success in export markets by :
a. concentrating their limited resources on the effective
development of a smaller number of export markets than
large firms.
b. utilising the export services provided by several organisations
such as the BOTB and trade associations - hence small
firms will make fuller use of these export services than
larger firms.
7.3.2 Why Qualitative Research?
The major reason for selecting a qualitative approach was recognition
that quantitative techniques involving the use of a structured
questionnaire represent a very rigid approach. The respondent's
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attitudes and motivations are categorised into predetermined
1 slots1 which have been designed by the researcher based on his
own experience and thus these 'slots' may or may not reflect the real
range of categorisations held in the market place. For example,
3
when structured questionnaires are used at interviews or in
4
postal questionnaire surveys typically 6-8 alternative responses
will be provided, with space being left for 'others' to be suggested
by respondents. However, simply leaving space does not solve the
problem entirely, the result being that the findings emphasise
the criteria provided by the questionnaire and underestimate or
even fail to recognise the importance of other factors not provided
as possible answers. Moreover, respondents in industrial marketing
research often do not like to be constrained by the 'straightjacket'
imposed by structured interviewing.
In contrast, the qualitative method is relatively free and
unstructured, and is loose enough in approach to avoid the danger of
predetermining or categorising responses prior to the interview situation.
Both the interviewer and the respondent are free of the constraints
imposed by a structured questionnaire, and while the respondent is
allowed to develop lines of thought and associations which he_ believes
are relevant, the interviewer is also free to follow up on responses
by asking supplementary questions to clarify or amplify the original
response, resulting in greater depth of information being obtained.
When a structured questionnaire is used the interview follows rigid,
predetermined lines rather than natural thought channels and
deviations of this nature are impossible (Adler, 1966; Goodyear, 1971;
Stacey & Wilson, 1963; Moser & Kalton, 1971).
The researcher intended to examine managerial attitudes to exporting.
However, the factors which senior executives think influence their
own decisions and hence their firm's export performance may not
necessarily be those that are actually relevant, that is, the interview
method is always dependent upon the accuracy of the respondent.
3. As appears to have been the case in the studies undertaken by
Tookey (1964) and MacKay (1964).
4. Of the type carried out by P.E.P. (1964), Hirsch (1971), IMR (1978)
and ITI Research (1979).
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Furthermore, a manager may not wish to reveal his own real attitudes
towards exporting. For example, profitable opportunities in overseas
markets may be ignored because domestic marketing is easier or
because of a 'fear of the unknown'. While these may be the true
motives behind a firm's export policy the respondent may distort his
responses in order to place himself in a more favourable light with
respect to the interviewer or because a truthful description of his
attitudes would be damaging to his ego. Hence, while the respondent
may reveal accurately what he did, his explanation of why he did it
may reflect what he wants the interviewer to believe (and also perhaps
what he himself would like to believe). Thus, using direct
questions may result in respondents giving rationalisations of their
true motives (Elliott & Christopher, 1973; Oppenheim, 1966; Goldman,
1970). Qualitative research offers the opportunity to approach
the subject indirectly and to probe responses in the course of the
discussion in order to get below the respondent's surface reactions
and discover the more fundamental motives underlying his attitudes
and behaviour (Elliott & Christopher, 1973; Kinnear & Taylor, 1979;
MacFarlane Smith, 1978).
Thus, qualitative research was selected because the nature of the
research problem - involving, as it did, the study of managerial
attitudes to exporting - required a more flexible approach than
could be provided by the standardised interviewing techniques
offered by a structured questionnaire. It was clear that categorisation
of responses into predetermined 'slots' should be avoided and that
in order to get below the surface rationalisations of behaviour it
would be necessary to be free to probe responses to achieve greater
depth (and, hopefully, greater accuracy) of information.
7.3.3 Sampling Procedure
The list of offshore-related manufacturers provided in Appendix 4.1
represented the sampling frame, that is, the list from which the
sample was selected. As mentioned above, this list may be
incomplete or inaccurate, although all reasonable steps to ensure
accuracy were taken. Had the intention been to select a random
sample, the sampling frame would have represented an important
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source of bias in that not all firms would have had an equal chance
of selection. However, qualitative research involves small
numbers of respondents drawn from the sample population and although
the sample selected may be roughly representative of different
categories of respondents within the sample frame, they will not
usually be selected on any probabilistic basis (Sampson, 1972) .
The sampling procedure utilised involved two major departures
from random sampling. Yeomans (1968b) states that possibly the most
important reason for a modification to straightforward random
sampling is lack of homogeneity in the sample population. If each
possible sample has the same chance of occurring then there is always
the possibility of a very unrepresentative sample being drawn. When
there are well-defined categories within the population the possibility
of an unrepresentative sample can be avoided by taking a predetermined
number of units randomly from each category. This procedure, known
as stratified sampling, thus ensures that the different strata of
the population are represented in the sample in the correct proportions
(Yeomans, 1968b; Elliotts Christopher, 1973; Moser & Kalton, 1971).
It was apparent from the results of previous research studies that
the nature of the product exerted considerable influence on export
performance. It was therefore decided to subdivide the population
into different product categories - as shown in Appendix 4.1 - and
sample from each subsection rather than from the total population.
However, there was still the chance that the selection of firms
from each strata on a random basis would produce a very unrepresentative
sample - indeed, given the limited involvement of Scottish
manufacturers in offshore markets overseas it would have been possible
for random sampling to produce a sample of non-exporters, resulting
in the survey being of limited value. It is for this reason that
many industrial surveys do not use a formalised sampling technique,
but rather the '80-20' rule, which is a generalisation that in most
markets 20% of the firms produce or consume 80% of the product.
Thus by selecting and surveying the vital 20%, 80% of the market can
be covered thoroughly. It was therefore decided to maximise
coverage of offshore-related manufactured exports by initially
selecting those companies which, on the basis of the desk research,
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appeared to be the major Scottish exporters of offshore-related
manufactured goods. As these exporters tended to be large companies,
smaller companies were then selected in such a way as to make the
sample more representative of the various product categories.^ In
all 45 firms were contacted, but 5 of these were unwilling to
cooperate with the study. Vhen interviews had been carried out in
40 firms reasonable coverage of the Scottish manufacturing sector
of the offshore supplies industry was judged to have been achieved.^
However, this method of selection, together with the fact that a
few of the firms selected had been wrongly classified on the basis
of the information provided in the offshore registers etc, resulted
in the sample drawn being only roughly representative of the various
categories of respondent firm in the sample frame, although the
only category totally unrepresented is 'other manufacturing industries',
which comprises smaller firms with widely varying capabilities.
Thus, a qualitative sample of Scottish offshore-related manufacturers
was selected in such a way as to include both large and small firms
with varying manufacturing capabilities and exporting different
proportions of turnover. In addition, an effort was made to include
both new and established firms, as well as both U.K. and foreign
firms.
A profile of the 40 firms surveyed is presented in section 7.3.4 below.
The information concerning the size, nationality, offshore-related
involvement and other relevant characteristics of these firms results
from a statistical questionnaire completed during the course of the
first phase of the fieldwork.
5. The suppliers of the major items of offshore equipment - namely
the shipbuilders and platform fabricators - were, however,
identified and treated separately from the rest, as, given their
importance, the intention was to undertake interviews in each
of these firms. Unfortunately the management team of Ayrshire
Marine Constructors had not been finalised at the time at which
the fieldwork was undertaken, while two other platform constructors
refused to cooperate, with the result that only three out of
six platform constructors were included in the study.
6. The researcher took into account the trade-off between improved
coverage and increased resource cost. Although only 40 manufac¬
turers were included in the survey, it is estimated below that
these firms accounted for approximately 70-80% of total offshore-
related manufacturing in Scotland (see footnote 12 on p.137).
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7.3.4 Sample Profile : Characteristics of Respondent Companies
The survey covered 40 units manufacturing offshore oil and gas
related equipment for use in the U.K. sector of the North Sea and
other areas of offshore activity. Relevant characteristics of
these units are provided in Appendix 7.1,^ while Appendix 7.2
provides aggregate employment, turnover and exporting data for the
8
40 firms surveyed.
The 40 units consisted of 16 local Scottish companies; 10 subsidiaries
controlled by headquarters in England & Wales; 4 joint-ventures
between at least one British company and at least one foreign
company; and 10 subsidiaries of foreign companies (9 with headquarters
9
in the U.S.A. and the other Europe).
Of the units which had been established in Scotland prior to the
development of the central and northern North Sea from 1970 onwards,
only six had supplied equipment - namely casing, wellhead equipment,
ball valves, power plant and telemetry and communications equipment -
to offshore markets elsewhere in the world prior to that date."'"0
The remaining ten established units were firms only attracted into
the offshore business by the proximity of the North Sea (although some
of these had previously supplied onshore petrochemical plant which
was in some cases similar to its offshore equivalent). The units
described in Table 7.1 (below) as 'new units' were all only established
in Scotland following the discovery of North Sea oil in the early
1970s and therefore had no experience themselves of supplying other
offshore markets. In addition to completely new, independent companies,
this group of units included new subsidiaries of both traditional
British engineering companies and U.S. oil-related manufacturers.
Indeed, the new units surveyed included seven subsidiaries of U.S.
companies with plants manufacturing oil-related equipment in the U.S.A.
7. Where the terms - such as nationality, unit and offshore-related
involvement - used in this section are also defined.
8. Aggregate data only is provided in order to maintain anonymity.
9. See Table 7.1 (below)
10. See Table 7.1 (below)
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and elsewhere, three joint-ventures involving partners with
construction yards overseas and two subsidiaries of U.K. companies
which had supplied the southern North Sea gas fields during the
1960s from bases established in eastern England. Hence, in addition
to the six units with prior offshore-related experience, twelve
of the new units were part of larger organisations with previous
experience in other offshore markets.
TABLE 7.1












Scottish 9 6 1 16
U.K. 3 4 3 10
Joint-venture 4 0 0 4




SOURCE : Interview data
It can be seen from Table 7.2(B) that established firms were, in
general, larger than new units (with the exception of the platform
fabricators which are large-scale operations). However, it should
be noted that only two of the eight newly-established foreign units
employed 150 employees or less, compared with seven out of nine new
Scottish firms. Moreover, Table 7.2(A) indicates that the majority
of the Scottish firms were small while the U.K. units included in
the sample were, generally speaking, large. Indeed, Appendix 7.2
shows that the 16 Scottish firms provided only about 25% of the
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TABLE 7.2
Nationality and Offshore Experience of Unit by Size
K' Number of Employees
All
CompaniesUp to 150 151-1000 over 1000
(A) Nationality:
Scottish 10 4 2 16
U.K. 2 3 5 10
Joint-venture 0 2 2 4
Foreign 2 6 2 10
(B) Offshore Experience:
New unit 11 9 4 24
Established unit
with no experience 3 3 4 10
Established unit
with experience 0 3 3 6
All Companies 14 15 11 40
SOURCE : Interview data
sample's total employment and sales, while the 10 U.K. units were
responsible for over 40% of total turnover and over half the sample's
total employment.
Total turnover of the units surveyed was an estimated £615.5 million,
of which £273.1 million (44.4%) was offshore-related. Sales of
offshore-related equipment accounted for £247 million (40.1%) I'1
12
Together these 40 units employed 39,937 people.
11. See Appendix 7.2. These are gross output figures and therefore not
comparable with the data provided in Chapter 4 which related to net
output.
12. It proved impossible to gauge accurately the level of offshore-related
employment in units only partly involved in offshore-related activities.
If it is assumed that around 40% of employees were involved in
offshore-related manufacturing, this would suggest that oil-related
/ cont'd
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Although the units surveyed all regarded themselves as being
involved in the offshore oil business as a principal activity, the
extent to which they were involved in offshore-related manufacturing
activity varied considerably, as shown in Table 7.3 (below).
TABLE 7.3
Nationality and Offshore Experience of Unit by Involvement
in Offshore-related Manufacturing Activity
Sales of Offshore-related Manufactured
Goods as a Percentage of Total Sales
All
Companies
0-33 34 - 66 67 - 100
(A) Nationality:
Scottish 7 4 5 16
U.K. 6 1 3 10
Joint-venture 0 1 3 4
Foreign 3 3 4 10
(B) Offshore Experience:
New unit 5 6 13 24
Established unit
with no experience 8 2 0 10
Established unit
with experience 3 1 2 6
All Companies 16 9 15 40
SOURCE : Interview data
This table also illustrates that the new units which had been established
in Scotland since the discovery of North Sea oil were generally more
heavily involved in offshore-related manufacturing activity than the other
/cont 'd
manufacturing employment in these units was in the region of 16,000 people
(approximately 80% of total offshore-related manufacturing employment in
Scotland). However, given that the Scottish Office (1979c) found output
per employee to be considerably higher in oil-related industry than in
Scotland as a whole, this assumption is liable to overestimate oil-related
employment in these units.
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units, particularly the established firms which only entered the
offshore market in the 1970's. In particular, 13 out of the 24
new units derived more than two-thirds of their turnover from offshore-
related manufacturing (and, with the inclusion of offshore-related
service activity, this rises to 18 out of 24 units). Table 7.3 (A)
also shows that the joint-ventures and subsidiaries of foreign companies
included in the sample tended to be more heavily involved in offshore-
related manufacturing than the units falling into the other two
13
categories. This can also be seen from the fact that the units
with foreign participation accounted for only 31% of the sample's
14
total sales but almost 55% of its offshore-related manufactured turnover.
In contrast, the Scottish firms - which were in general smaller (see
Table 7.2(A)) and less reliant on offshore-related manufacturing (see
Table 7.3(A)) than the other units - were responsible for only 11%
of the sample's total sales of offshore-related equipment.^
In fact, further analysis revealed that sales of offshore-related
equipment were heavily concentrated in a few of the units surveyed.
Indeed, 4 units accounted for over half and 8 units for three-quarters
of the sample's offshore-related manufactured turnover, while, at the
other extreme, 20 units together were responsible for just under 6% of
the sample's total sales of offshore-related equipment.
Although 27 of the 40 units surveyed undertook some form of exporting,
Table 7.4(A) reveals that the foreign units were generally more heavily
involved in exporting than the other units, particularly the Scottish
firms (and the joint-ventures, three of which were platform yards).
Indeed, the 5 new units identified in Table 7.4(B) as exporters of over
two-thirds of their turnover were all subsidiaries of U.S. companies.
Apart from these exceptions, the established units tended to export a
higher proportion of their turnover than the newly-established units.
Table 7.4(C) shows that for the sample as a whole there was a clear
association between size of unit and proportion of total turnover exported,
with only 1 of the 14 small units (150 employees or less) exporting more
13. Moreover, none of the units with foreign participation sold equipment
outside the oil, gas and petrochemical sector, compared with over half
the Scottish firms and all but one of the U.K. units.
14. See Appendix 7.2.
15. See Appendix 7.2.
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than one-third of their output, compared to 13 of the 26 larger
units. Once again, this result ties in with the previous findings
on the association between export performance and experience/
nationality in that the established firms and the new subsidiaries
of U.S. companies were larger than the new units established by Scottish
16
and U.K. firms. Thus, to summarise, small, newly-established,
Scottish and U.K. units were found, in general, to be less involved in
export markets than the larger, more experienced U.S. subsidiaries
and those firms which had been established for some time.
TABLE 7■4
Nationality, Offshore Experience and Size of Unit by Total
Involvement in Exporting
Exports as a Percentage of Total Sales All
CompaniesNIL 1-33 34-66 67-100
(A) Nationality:
Scottish 7 7 2 0 16
U.K. 1 4 3 2 10
Joint-venture 4 0 0 0 4
Foreign 1 2 2 5 10
(B) Offshore Experience:
New unit 10 9 O 5 24
Established unit
with no experience 3 4 2 1 10
Established unit
with experience 0 0 5 1 6
(C) No. of Employees;
Up to 150 6 7 0 1 14
151 - 1000 4 4 3 4 15
over 1000 3 2 4 2 11
All Companies 13 13 7 7 40
SOURCE : Interview data
16. See Table 7.2.
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Data relating to exports of offshore-related equipment by the sample
will be analysed in the following chapter.
7.3.5 Interview Method
The first approach made to a selected firm was in the form of a
17
typed letter. This letter was followed, approximately three to
four days later, by a telephone call to arrange a specific time for
the interview.
Only five firms refused to cooperate with the study. Response was
thus excellent - almost 90% - and in most cases information was freely
given. Interviews were undertaken in 40 firms during the period
June to September 1979.
The face-to-face, in-depth interview is less structured and more
intensive than a standardised questionnaire-administered interview,
with extensive probing being used to encourage a single respondent
to talk freely and express detailed beliefs and feelings on a topic
(Sampson, 1972; Kinnear & Taylor, 1979). Although in-depth
interviews are sometimes called unstructured or non-directive inter¬
views, the interviewer must have clear objectives and will normally
have at least an outline plan of the broad areas which are to be
discussed or perhaps a list of prepared questions which will form the
framework within which the interview will be undertaken.
The topics list - of the areas to be covered in the course of the
interview - used during the fieldwork is reproduced as Appendix
7.5. As the commitment which respondents were willing to make
was assumed to be limited, the number of the topic areas was
restricted to twelve - this being the number which it was expected
could be covered adequately in 1-li hours - although within each
area there are two or three general questions listed. These questions
were either very important and therefore not to be forgotten on
any account, or important and not obvious from the topic headings on
the topics list. The intention was, however, that these questions
would arise naturally in the course of the discussion with the
17. See Appendix 7.3. This contact letter was accompanied by a covering
letter from Professor Norman Hunt, Head of Department, vouchsafing
the integrity of the study - see Appendix 7.4.
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respondent.
The specified topics represent the main area of discussion covered
in each interview, around which flexibility was allowed when it was
advantageous. The rationale for this method of interviewing was to
remain flexible but to stay in control in order to maximise the
collection of relevant data. Thus, for example, although a
specific list of points had to be covered, no formal questions to be
asked in a particular manner at a particular point in time were
devised and there was freedom to move the discussion from one subject
to another, according to the situations which arose during the
interview.
7.3.6 Analysis
The qualitative research data on each of the 40 firms consisted of
the transcription - running, on average, to around ten pages of 4,000
words - of the respondent's replies to the questions asked during
the course of the interview, which typically lasted 1 - li hours.
As pointed out by Cooper et al (1970), there is a danger when
carrying out an investigation at the level of the individual firm that
so much detail peculiar to individual firms may be uncovered that it
is difficult to identify common trends. It was therefore necessary
to condense this quantity of material in some way so as to discern
important common factors from the mass of detail. The methods of
analysis of qualitative or unstructured data vary according to the
purpose for which the results are to be used, but generally these
methods are referred to as 'content analysis', although Elliott &
Christopher (1973) and Moser & Kalton (1971) distinguish between
'content analysis', where the data is pre-existing, and 'coding'
where the data has been specially produced.
Content analysis may be undertaken by computer. This involves
transcribing the qualitative data onto punch cards and assigning 'tags'
to various messages or characteristics contained therein. The
computer then scans the punch cards and plots the number of cases in
which the tags are used, in this way providing some measure of the
intensity of feeling placed upon fie tags.However, computer analysis is
most appropriate when a large sample is selected, as only then will
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the time spent creating the common vocabulary be cost-effective. In
the case of the present study it was more economical to undertake
the analysis by hand.
The coding process used consisted of the researcher reading each
respondent's answer to a particular question and 'coding' it by
deciding that it should go into a certain category. For example,
when asked about the problems associated with exporting, one
respondent replied :
"Because of the Irani boycott as a wholly-owned U.S.
subsidiary we can't get business in Iran ... and the
same thing could happen elsewhere, in Libya, for
example, which is politically volatile."
This response was coded into the category of exporting problem entitled
'political factors'. Two points are worth noting with respect to
the coding process. Firstly, when a number of respondents are placed
into the same category the implication is that they will all be treated
as equal for the purpose of analysis and hence coding different
respondents into the same category necessarily involves losing some
of the information held about them (Elliott & Christopher, 1973;
19
Simon, 1969). Secondly, the researcher designed and employed his
own categorisation relevant for his purposes. However, the net
effect was not the same as would have resulted from redesigning the
questionnaire in the form of multiple-choice questions offering these
categories, as there were good reasons for allowing the respondent
freedom to express himself,^0 while the imposition of the researcher's
categorisation was also delayed until he had gained experience of
the true motivations held by respondents.
19. Moser & Kalton (1971) argue, however, that as one of the points of a
less formal approach is to obtain a more complete picture of the topic
area than a formal interview would allow, if this gain is not to be
sacrificed the analysis must contain a fair amount of the detail
rather than simply compressing it into statistical tables. As one
of the principal reasons for the adoption of a qualitative approach
was the acquisition of a more detailed representation of the
factors influencing a management's attitude to exporting (and hence
its aims and attainment with respect to exporting), in the analysis
of the results which follows - in Chapbers 8 to 12 - individual
responses will be quoted where doing so is useful in explaining or
illustrating a point made in the main body of the text.
20. As has already been explained in Section 7.3.2 above.
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The units of analysis in the case of qualitative data may be the
total response of one respondent to one question, a theme (of which
there may be several in a response), or 3imply a word or phrase.
Analysis by hand allows not only the computation of the frequency
of occurrence of units of analysis, but also permits insights into
motivation to be provided (by a perceptive researcher reading between
the lines) which would otherwise be overlooked by a computer analysis
which tends to rely upon weight of evidence. (Elliotts Christopher,
1973).
The variables of analysis selected were those considered to be of
importance (in terms of their influence on exporting success) in their
own right (such as size of firm) or those thought likely to be
helpful in understanding another variable - for example, management's
perception of the problems associated with exporting was investigated
in order to analyse this factor1s influence on management1s attitude
to exporting and hence exporting success.
Having selected the variables of analysis, it was necessary to choose
and define the categories for each variable. Some classification
decisions were taken at the research design stage, prior to undertaking
the fieldwork. For example, at this stage it was decided to include
offshore-related manufacturers which had not, up to that point,
become involved in export markets. However, much of the category
selection work - such as the categories of exporting problems - was
undertaken after the data had been collected, with an effort being
made to ensure that the categories were defined so as to make certain
21
that observations would fit clearly into one category or another.
7.4. SURVEY OF EXPERT OPINION ON THE GLOBAL OFFSHORE MARKET 1980-85
Desk research on world markets for offshore-related equipment had been
undertaken at an early stage. However, it was necessary for the
21. In addition to the qualitative data, a certain amount of statistical
data resulted from a short structured questionnaire (see Appendix
7.6). Apart from providing interesting new data on the level of
exporting being undertaken by Scottish offshore-related equipment
manufacturers, this statistical information also provides a check
on answers given during the in-depth study of the factors
influencing export performance.
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researcher to gain sufficient expertise to enable the development
of a scenario of the global offshore market situation (in the period
1980-85) to which respondents could react, and the information
uncovered during the desk research phase was considered to be
insufficiently detailed for this purpose. For this reason a small-
scale survey of expert opinion was undertaken.
A qualitative forecasting method was utilised because it was recognised
that quantitative forecasting techniques - which depend heavily upon the
availability, reliability and utilisation of historical data - often
fail to take into account the wide range of factors which influence
the variables forecasted. Indeed, reliance upon historical data
and statistical relationships frequently produces inaccurate forecasts
because the limited number of quantified relationships that can be
formed are often inexact explanations of the subject-matter of business
forecasts (Campbell, 1966). It is for this reason that many
business organisations adopt a multi-system approach, combining forecasts
from statistical measurements, opinions of company employees etc, with
the final forecast being determined subjectively by the individual(s)
responsible for forecasting and/or planning. However, Helmer & Rescher
(1959) point out that utilisation of non-quantifiable background opinion
involves the problem of weighting prima facie evidence in relation
to this background information, which frequently may be intuitive in
character. Given this problem Helmer & Rescher suggest that considerable
importance should be attached to experts in the field :
"for the expert has at his ready disposal a large store
of (mostly inarticulated) background knowledge and a
refined sensitivity to its relevance ..." (Helmer &
Rescher, 1959, p.38).
In fact, the employment of experts forms the basis of all qualitative
forecasting and various techniques representing alternative procedures
for helping experts to express their subjective judgement of future
22
trends have been developed. In selecting a qualitative forecasting
technique a choice had to be made between a group and an individual
approach. Evidence of the relative efficiency of the group vis-a-vis
23
the individual in problem-solving acitivites was reviewed and the
22. See Wheelwright & Makridakis (1973)
23. For more detail see, for example, Campbell (1966); Argyll (1972);
Schein, (1970).
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Delphi Technique in particular, was considered in some detail.
However, group solutions were found to be time-consuming and costly
to administer. Hence the more straightforward approach of combining
various expert judgements into a subjective 'average' was selected.
25
As far as the global market for offshore-related equipment was
concerned, the objective of the survey was the identification of the
major areas of offshore development activity during the period 1980-85
and the main factors likely to influence export potential (such as
indigenous engineering capability, government policy with respect to
imports and environmental conditions) in these areas. Detailed
studies of individual geographical and product markets were considered
both unnecessary (given the objectives of the research) and
impossible, in terms of the time and effort such a task would require.
Moreover, attention was concentrated on the development stage as
most equipment purchases are associated with this phase of activity.
It was necessary that the time period chosen for discussion be sufficient
to allow the formulation and implementation of the corporate strategy
considered most appropriate given the hypothetical market situation.
Evidence suggests that in the case of market diversification, which
might involve the establishment of facilities overseas or the recruitment,
training and support of an efficient sales force, a time period of
five years was probably the minimum required. On the other hand, it
was considered dangerous to present the respondents with a projected
market situation beyond 1985 as, given the tremendous pace of change
in the industry, the operation might be regarded as inappropriate or
even worthless by the respondents, resulting in half-hearted or even
non-cooperation. Moreover, five years is a common planning horizon for
companies supplying industrial markets (Barnsley, 1978).
With respect to the U.K. market there were two main objectives. Firstly
it was necessary to provide some indication of the anticipated level of
24. This is a method of systematically soliciting and collating expert
opinion with the objective of obtaining the most reliable consensus.
This technique replaces direct debate with a carefully designed
programme of sequential individual interrogations, usually by postal
questionnaire. For further details see, for example, Helmer (1966);
Dalkey & Helmer (1963); Gordon (1968); Gordon & Helmer (1964);
Helmer (1968); Campbell (1966); Lloyd & Rawnsley (1978); Dale (1973).
25. Excluding the U.K. sector of the North Sea.
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equipment ordering in the period 1980-85. It was decided to project
the pattern of field developments and production platform ordering during
this period since with the present state of technology nearly all field
developments require a platform of some form (while the platform is also
the single most expensive item of equipment purchased and is therefore
very important in its own right). Thus the number, size and timing of
field developments and platform orders provide an indicator of the
overall level of offshore business. The second objective was to provide
some indication of the capacity loading in the industry anticipated
in the period 1980-85. It was decided to project development expenditure
as this is incurred in either staged payments or a single payment on
completion of an order and hence provides some measure of the capacity
loading in the industry. The credibility of the projections does,
however, decline as the time horizon lengthens.
It was necessary that the discussion of the U.K. market be in greater
detail than that of the world market, as previous studies had found
that corporate strategy may depend critically upon the domestic market
situation and the capacity loading in the industry. However, detailed
study of the U.K. market for particular products was considered to be
impossible given the time constraint imposed by the nature of doctoral
research. In addition, even detailed studies have in the past proved
extremely inaccurate. For example, over-optimistic platform forecasts
were partly responsible for the excess of U.K. platform sites. Moreover,
detailed studies of this kind were unnecessary, particularly as the
market for many items of offshore-related equipment varies with the number
of field developments going ahead and the number of platforms being
ordered. It was therefore sufficient simply to identify general trends.
Where appropriate some indication of the size of the market for particular
products can be derived by using the aggregate figures projected in
association with rough equipment breakdowns (such as those shown in
Chapter 2).
The survey of expert opinion consisted of interviews with officials
of nine organisations - six banks/investment managers/stockbrokers and
2 6
three government agencies. A larger survey was considered but
seemed to add little of value to the thesis while being expensive in
terms of both time and money. In particular :-
26. The organisations which constituted the panel of experts are listed
as Appendix 7.7.
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i. A consensus on most of the scenario topics had already
emerged from the interviews undertaken with the nine panel
members.
ii. As the oil companies themselves are reluctant to disclose
up-to-date information while most other organisations -
with the exception of certain banks, stockbrokers and
government agencies - are dependent upon published information
of the kind surveyed by the researcher during the desk research
phase, further interviewing was unlikely to improve accuracy
to any great extent.
iii. Many forecasts in the area of oil and gas (and energy in general)
- prepared by organisations (including the oil companies) with
considerable resources devoted to forecasting the future trends
in this sector - already exist.
The data collected during the survey of expert opinion was subsequently
analysed and (together with material from the desk research and first
fieldwork phases) written up, as presented in Chapter 11 below. The
full report was, however, unsuitable for presentation to respondents
in the final stage of the fieldwork. In particular, its length
was such that interviewees might fail to digest it properly (causing
difficulties in the interview) or even refuse to cooperate. For this
reason it was decided that the respondents should be supplied with
27
a summary of the most relevant points drawn from the original report.
7,5 SURVEY OF POSSIBLE FUTURE TRENDS IN THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF THE
SCOTTISH MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF THE OFFSHORE SUPPLIES INDUSTRY
The objective of the final phase of fieldwork (undertaken in the
period February to April 1980) was to ascertain the expected strategic
response of the 40 selected manufacturers to a reasonable but hypothetical
scenario of the global market for offshore-related equipment in the
period 1980-85, with particular attention being paid to the strategic
alternative of market diversification.
27. See Appendix 7.8.
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The researcher re-established contact with these firms by telephone
before sending them a copy of the scenario summary, together with
28
a brief letter of explanation. None of the original sample of
40 firms refused to cooperate with the final phase of the fieldwork,
although a second interview was not carried out with one organisation
which was in the process of being taken over. The remaining 39 interviews
were undertaken in a similar fashion to that described above, using
the topics list reproduced as Appendix 7.10.
7.6 CONCLUSION
Three phases of fieldwork were undertaken. The first phase of the
research was concerned with an appraisal of the factors which influence
the export performance of the Scottish manufacturing sector of the
offshore supplies industry. However, constraints were imposed on the
range of factors which could be discussed by the length and nature of
the interviews undertaken, and it is recognised that a number of less
tangible factors (such as the quality of advertising, sales personnel
etc.) not covered will nevertheless exert considerable influence on
exporting success.
The second phase of the fieldwork consisted of a survey of expert
opinion which formed part of the basis of a scenario of the global
offshore market in the period 1980-85. Finally, a further round of
interviewing was undertaken in the original sample of 40 offshore-
related manufacturers in order to discover these firms' expected
strategic response to the scenario developed by the researcher.
It is important to bear in mind that the sample was selected on a
non-random basis and that the firms surveyed are not truly representative
of the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry
(much less other groups of firms) and therefore while the analysis reveals
certain associations as far as the firms sampled are concerned, it is
impossible to generalise from these results. Indeed,
"in qualitative research no attempt is made to draw hard
and fast conclusions. It is impressionistic rather than
definitive" (Sampson, 1972, p.7)
28. See Appendix 7.9.
That is, whereas quantitative research produces hard information and
definite conclusions, qualitative research produces 'soft' information





The following three chapters present the analysis and discussion
of the results concerning the factors influencing the export
performance of the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore
supplies industry. Chapters 9 and 10 are based on the main body
of qualitative data resulting from the in-depth interviews under¬
taken in the surveyed manufacturing firms. While the next chapter
concentrates on presenting the analysis of the results concerning
the nature of the factors influencing management's attitude towards
exporting and their effect on export performance, chapter 10
examines the findings with respect to the relationship between the
export marketing methods utilised and export performance. In effect
then these two chapters are devoted to the main qualitative findings
concerning the major factors influencing export performance, and
the reader should bear in mind the diagrammatic representation of
these influencing factors presented as Figure 6.1 and the hypotheses
outlined in section 7.3.1, against which these results should be
viewed and to which reference will periodically be made.
The present chapter is, however, essentially different from the
following two chapters in that it provides an analysis of the
limited amount of quantitative information which resulted from a short,
structured questionnaire, normally completed during the course of the
main qualitative study. It should, however, be remembered that
although roughly representative of the various categories of
respondent firm in the sample frame, the sample was not selected
randomly and, in particular, is probably biased in terms of the
major exporters of offshore-related equipment.
8.2 THE VOLUME OF EXPORTS OF OFFSHORE-RELATED EQUIPMENT
Of the 40 units surveyed only 22 had exported offshore-related
equipment in the year for which data was collected, although a
further 3 had exported offshore-related equipment in previous years.
It should be noted that the exporters included all 9 of the Scottish
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subsidiaries of the U-.S. multinationals (the tenth foreign unit
being a non-exporting subsidiary of a European company). Together
these U.S. subsidiaries accounted for 70% of the total volume of
offshore-related equipment exported by the sample, as is shown
in Table 8.1 (below).
TABLE 8.1
Exports of Offshore-related Equipment by Nationality of Unit
Volume of Offshore-related





Scottish 16 9 2.9 5.1
U.K. 10 4 14.7 25.7
Joint-venture 4 0 - -
Foreign 10 9 39.6 69.2
TOTAL 40 22 57.2 100.0
SOURCE : Interview data
Further evidence of the dominance of offshore-related equipment exporting
by the U.S. subsidiaries is provided by the fact that this group of
firms provided most of the major exporters of offshore-related equipment
(with exports worth £1 million or more per annum) surveyed, as can be
seen from Table 8.2 (A).
As explained in Chapter 7, in addition to the 6 established firms
which had sold equipment to offshore oil markets prior to the development
of North Sea oilfields, the sample also contained 12 newly-established
units which were part of larger organisations which themselves did have
previous experience in other offshore markets, either in the southern
North Sea gas fields or overseas. When both forms of offshore-related
experience were taken into consideration, a strong association emerged
between prior offshore-related experience and the volume of offshore-
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TABLE 8.2
Volume of Exports of Offshore-related Equipment by
Nationality, Offshore-related Experience and Size of Unit









Scottish 7 9 0 16
U.K. 6 2 2 lo
Joint-Venture 4 0 0 4
Foreign 1 3 6 10
(B):Offshore Experience
No experience 14 8 0 22
Prior experience 4 6 8 18
(C):Number of Employees
Up to 150 6 8 0 14
151 - lOOO 6 3 6 15
Over lOOO 6 3 2 11
All Companies 18 14 8 40
SOURCE : Interview data
-related equipment exported, with none of the 22 firms without any form
of prior offshore experience whatsoever being a major exporter of
offshore-related equipment, as shown in Table 8.2(B). Hence although
it may be an important advantage in export markets for the group to
have had previous experience in other offshore markets, it was not
necessarily essential that the particular manufacturing plant located
in Scotland had previously supplied offshore markets. Thus, the U.S.
subsidiaries (whether new or established), all of which were part of
organisations with prior offshore experience, held an advantage over
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Scottish and U.K. companies newly-established in the offshore
supplies business.
Table 8.2(C) highlights the fact that none of the small units
exported equipment worth more than £1 million in the year for which
data was collected, suggesting that, as would normally be expected,
there was an association between size of firm and the volume of
offshore-related equipment exported. Once again, it is worth
remembering that only two of the U.S. subsidiaries were small units
(and these were, of course, part of much larger organisations).
Evidence was also found of a possible relationship between the nature
of the product and offshore-related exporting, in that while relatively
few fabricators and manufacturers of major items of equipment were
involved in offshore-related exporting, most of the manufacturers
of process plant and wellhead and oilfield equipment were exporting
i l
offshore-related equipment. In terms of products, the majority
TABLE 8.3
Exports of Offshore-related Equipment by Product Sector
Product Sector
Number of Units Volume of Exports
Total Exporters £m %
Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering;
Concrete & Steel Platforms; Steel,
Pipe & Pipe-coating 8 2 23.1 40.4
Modules; Fabrications; Sub¬
contracting; Metal Goods; Under¬
water Engineering 12 5 1.9 3.3
Wellhead & Oilfield Equipment 9 8 35.95 45.3
Process Plant 5 4 5.17 9.0
Power, Electrical & Electronic
Equipment 6 3 1.12 2.0
TOTAL 40 22 57.24 100.0
SOURCE : Interview data
1. See Table 8.3. Compared with Appendix 7.1, the product sectors in
Table 8.3 have been widened and the corresponding export data
aggregated in order to preserve confidentiality.
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of offshore-related manufactured exports consisted of casing,
wellhead and oilfield equipment and a drilling rig. Significantly,
the manufacture of specialised oilfield equipment was dominated by
U.S. subsidiaries.
Detailed statistics concerning the volume of exports of offshore-
related equipment by country of destination were not collected.
However, some indication of the relative importance of various off¬
shore markets is provided by Table 8.4 below. Firstly, of the
22 units which did export offshore-related equipment, 16 exported
to at least one European market. Indeed, it is interesting to note
that despite the Norwegian Government's well-documented policy of
supporting indigenous industry and the fact that the level of demand in
Norway was not as high as it was in, for example, Mexico, more units
(15) had exported equipment to Norway than to any other single offshore
market anywhere in the world. Other important European markets were
Holland, Spain, France and West Germany, although several others were
also mentioned. The offshore-related equipment exported to France
and West Germany was sold to large engineering contractors for
offshore projects in other areas of the world, rather than for offshore
activities on the continental shelves of these two countries.
TABLE 8.4
Major Export Markets for Offshore-related Equipment
Manufactured in Scotland
Area
Number of Units Exporting Offshore-related Equipment
Scottish (9) U.K. (4) U.S.(9) Total (22)
Middle East 6 4 6 16
Europe 5 4 7 16
North America 1 3 4 8
South America 1 3 3 7
Central America 3 0 3 6
Africa 0 1 5 6
Far East 2 2 1 5
U.S.S.R. 0 2 3 5
China 0 3 0 3
Eastern Europe 1 0 0 1
SOURCE : Interview data
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Involvement in the Middle East matched that in Europe, with Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran being the major export
markets. It should be noted that more U.S. subsidiaries exported
2
to Africa than to North, South or Central America. This in part
reflects the way in which the multinationals allocate global
markets to their various manufacturing plants, with the Eastern
Hemisphere (particularly Europe, the Middle East and Africa)
usually being regarded as the U.K. plant's sphere of operations,
while the Western Hemisphere is normally reserved for the U.S.
plant (s)."^ While North America might be expected to be a difficult
market for U.K. and Scottish firms, the performance of these units
in Africa, South and Central America was disappointing. This was
especially true of Mexico and Brazil (to each of which only one U.S.
and two non-U.S. units had exported) which have in the past been
highlighted by the 0S0 as markets offering excellent prospects to
4
U.K. offshore suppliers.
Further analysis revealed that 3 units together accounted for 67%
and 7 units for 90% of the entire sample's exports of offshore-
related equipment. The data contained in Tables 8.1 - 8.4 indicate
that this small group of major exporters consisted of experienced,
large or medium-sized units (most of which were U.S. subsidiaries)
exporting casing, wellhead and oilfield equipment and drilling rigs
mainly to other European markets and the Middle East.
However, it must be expected that large firms will export a greater
volume of offshore-related equipment than smaller firms, ceteris
paribus. For this reason, the following section will present
an analysis of offshore-related export performance in terms of
the proportion of total offshore-related sales exported.
2. Moreover, the U.S. subsidiaries which were exporting to North
America were doing so only on a very limited scale.
3. The market allocation policies utilised by the U.S. multinationals
are discussed in greater detail below, pp. 209-216.
4. It will be shown below that U.S. companies have established a
very strong position in Canada, Mexico and South America -
see p.-.193.
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8.3 OFFSHORE-RELATED EXPORT PERFORMANCE
It is evident from Table 8.5(A) below that there was an apparent
association between nationality of firm and export performance, in
that the subsidiaries of the foreign companies tended to export a
greater proportion of their total offshore-related turnover than did
other firms. In particular, 6 of the 7 units most heavily involved
in offshore-related exporting activity were U.S. subsidiaries.
TABLE 8.5
Offshore-related Export Performance by Nationality,
Experience and Size of Unit






Scottish 7 9 0 16
U.K. 6 3 1 10
Joint-Venture 4 0 0 4
Foreign 1 3 6 10
(B)= Number of Employees
Up to 150 6 7 1 14
151 - 1000 6 5 4 15
Over 100O 6 3 2 11
(C): Offshore Experience
No Experience 14 8 0 22
Prior Experience 4 7 7 18
All Companies 18 15 7
40
SOURCE : Interview data
Section 7.3.4, which presented a profile of the sample, provided
evidence suggesting the existence of an associaton between size of
unit and total export performance, that is, the proportion of total
turnover exported. However, Table 8.5(B) indicates that although
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smaller units tended to export a smaller proportion of their
offshore-related turnover than did larger units, there was not a
close association between size and offshore-related export
performance. (The association may have proved stronger had the
employment statistic used as an indicator of size been offshore-
related employment rather than total employment, but unfortunately
the former proved impossible to assess).
In contrast, when offshore-related experience at both unit and
group level was taken into consideration a clear association between
offshore-related experience and export performance did emerge, as
can be seen from Table 8.5(C). For example, all the firms exporting
more than one-third of their offshore-related turnover had some
offshore-related experience prior to the development of the oilfields
in the U.K. sector of the North Sea.
The researcher had considered it possible that wholly-involved
manufacturers might behave differently from those only partly-involved
in offshore markets. In particular, it was reasoned that those
manufacturers totally reliant on offshore markets might consider the
development of offshore-related exports more essential than those
firms also selling to onshore customers in the U.K. However,
analysis of the quantitative data revealed that for the sample as
a whole there was not a significant association between the degree
of involvement in offshore-related manufacturing and either the volume
of offshore-related equipment exports or the proportion of total
offshore-related turnover exported.
Finally, there was evidence to suggest that offshore-related export
performance might be influenced by the nature of the product. For
example, it can be seen from Table 8.6 that while exports accounted
for 23% of the offshore-related manufactured turnover of the sample
as a whole, the firms in the wellhead and oilfield equipment sector




Proportion of Total Sales of Offshore-related Equipment












Engineering 40.7 95.5 1.9 4.5 42.6
Wellhead & Oilfield
Equipment 21.6 45.5 25.9 54.5- 47.5
Process Plant 10.4 66.7 5.2 33.3 15.6
Power, Electrical &
Electronic Equipment 3.8 77.6 1.1 22.4 4.9
TOTAL 189.8 76.8 57.2 23.2 247.0
SOURCE : Interview data
8.4 CONCLUSION
The discussion of the quantitative data presented in this chapter
indicates that as far as the sample was concerned there was an
association between export performance (measured in terms of the
proportion of total offshore-related turnover exported) and certain
characteristics of the firm and its products, as shown in Figure 8.1.
FIGURE 8.1
Factors Influencing Offshore-related Export Performance
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Although there was some evidence of a relationship between size
of firm and export performance, the characteristics of the firm
which appeared to exert the strongest influence on export
performance were offshore-related experience and nationality.
However, it should be remembered that the U.S. subsidiaries were
themselves part of large organisations with considerable offshore-
related experience manufacturing specialised oilfield equipment.
Thus much of the observed variation in export performance
apparently associated with nationality of firm might in fact be more
correctly attributed to the influence of these other factors
rather than to differences in nationality per se.
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CHAPTER NINE
FACTORS INFLUENCING MANAGERIAL ATTITUDE TO EXPORTING
9.1 INTRODUCTION
It was argued in Chapter 5 that it was only in those companies in
which senior executives adopted a positive attitude to exporting that
the resources necessary for successful exporting would be committed.
It was further hypothesised in Chapter 7 that there were 6 main groups
of factors which might influence managerial attitude to exporting :
(1) management's perception of future market trends
(2) management's perception of the benefits of exporting




(6) previous export performance.
This chapter presents a discussion of the qualitative findings
concerning the relationship between managerial attitude to exporting
(and the factors by which it is influenced) and export performance.
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that altogether 25 of the
40 firms surveyed had exported offshore-related equipment."'" In
section 9.2 the nature of the offshore-related exporting activity
undertaken by the sample will be discussed in greater detail. This
section also contains an examination and analysis of the attitude
towards exporting adopted by the managements of the firms constituting
the sample (as evidenced by their stated export aims and the export
policies they have implemented) and the relationship between this
attitude and exporting success. In the course of the exposition of
managerial attitudes to exporting, the influence exerted by firm
characteristics and managerial perception of future market trends will
begin to become apparent, although it is not until section 9.3 that the
association between managerial attitude to exporting and firm
characteristics, future market trends and previous exporting experience
is analysed in detail. The findings concerning the relationship between
management's attitude to exporting and its perception of the benefits
and problems associated with exporting will be discussed in sections
1. 22 firms had exported offshore-related equipment in the year for
which data was collected while a further 3 had exported offshore-
related equipment in previous years.
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9.4 and 9.6 respectively, while section 9.5 provides an analysis of
the nature of the comparative advantages which the surveyed firms
claimed to hold over their international competitors.
9.2 MANAGERIAL ATTITUDE TO EXPORTING AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE
This section provides further details of the nature of the exporting
activity undertaken by the sample and identifies the managerial
attitude to exporting - as indicated by their own description of their
aims and policies with respect to exporting - in each of the surveyed
firms. This discussion is carried out by product sector and the
nomenclature occasionally used in this section corresponds with that
provided in Appendix 7.1. The section concludes with an analysis of
the association between managerial attitude to exporting and export
performance.
Shipbuilding; Concrete & Steel Platforms; Steel, Pipe & Pipe-coating
Only two of the firms in this sector exported offshore-related
equipment in the year for which data was provided, although one of
the shipyards had previously exported an offshore-related vessel.
None of the platform fabricators surveyed were involved in export
markets. One of these yards was not even trying to export because it
considered that platforms were such basic items of equipment that they
had no export potential :
"If we could export we would be pleased to do so, but there
is no chance of exporting platforms, there's plenty of
ability to manufacture these in other countries."
In contrast, the other yards had both tried to win export contracts
and had between them tendered unsuccessfully for platform orders for
West Africa, Brazil, India and Abu Dhabi. Despite this evidence
2
suggesting that it is extremely difficult to export platforms, both
these yards believed that there was still a chance of exporting
platforms and both stated that they would step up their exporting efforts
if the domestic market were to decline, as one explained :
"We're happy with our patch, the North Sea. (Nevertheless) the
export potential is there and if the market does not pick up
we-'-ll set our sights abroad."
The pipecoating yard (R) was also forced to admit that although it
hoped to export in the future, with so many yards already in existence
2. One of the large fabricators also remarked that "the chances of an
export platform order are virtually nil."
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around the world it was unlikely that it would win a lot of export
business. On the other hand, the casing manufacturer (S) exports
its tubular products to offshore markets throughout the world and
treats export and domestic markets equally. A similar attitude was
adopted by the firms in the shipbuilding sector, with the following
being typical of the explanations provided :
"It's a world market. It doesn't matter where the order
comes from,- export and domestic markets are looked at
equally."
Unfortunately only the rig-builder (C) had been successful in export
markets in the year for which data was collected, and one of the other
shipyards admitted that there was very little chance of exporting
support vessels.
Modules; Fabrications; Sub-contrating; Metal Goods; Under-water
Engineering
Of the four module fabricators surveyed, two had exported offshore-
related equipment but only on a very minor scale. In fact, one of
these had decided to concentrate in the future on developing the
domestic market :
"Because we are new we must concentrate initially on our
backdoor market (and although) we keep an eye on the
international market we don't want the majority to be
exports, it's dangerous to rely" on export markets in
that way."
Moreover, the other exporter had decided to withdraw from exporting
altogether :
"We're a small company and we want to grow carefully and
sensibly. We've been too busy in the North Sea to follow
it up at the moment. We keep it there because things
could go quiet in the North Sea."
While one of the other (non-exporting) firms had never really tried to
export because it had "always seemed to have had plenty of work from
the domestic market", the other had been trying (unsuccessfully) to
export, despite the fact that it consirterecL that there was very
little chance of it being successful in export markets. Thus, the
firm to have launched the most serious attack on export markets was
also the least optimistic about the export potential of modular units.
There appeared to be a relationship between the degree of sophistication
of a firm's fabricated products and its exporting success, in that the
164
only exporting fabricators were a manufacturer of hydraulic
diving handling systems (N) and a highly-diversified firm (L)
exporting tubular connectors, down-hole tools, helicopter refuelling
systems and diving chambers^ but not its more basic fabrications.
Firms K, M, 0 and P, which manufacture a wide range of unsophisticated
fabrications (ranging from flare booms, helidecks and floatation
tanks to cargo baskets and bottle racks), have all failed to export
their products. Indeed, three of these were not even trying to
export, primarily because they realised that their products had very
little export potential, while even the fourth, which was actively
seeking export orders because it was "desperate" for work, admitted
that as a fabricator it was unlikely to win a lot of export business.
Finally, although the studbolt manufacturer (Q) was planning to
export eventually and was, at the time of the survey, considering
starting to export to Norway, it was ...
"only thinking of exporting to Norway because they approached
us. We're a new company gradually increasing sales, before
we can go after exports we've got to have some sort of
domestic base."
Wellhead & Oilfield Equipment
All but one of the manufacturers of specialised oilfield equipment
surveyed were supplying offshore markets overseas (while the
remaining firm had previously exported offshore-related equipment).
The wellhead equipment manufacturers surveyed were all U.S. subsidiaries
heavily involved in exporting. Two of these were trying to develop
exports in particular because, as one explained :
"We're not happy with our dependence on the North Sea
and we want to become less dependent on it because eventually
it'll go on a care and maintenance basis."
On the other hand, the third wellhead manufacturer (V), which has a
subsea capability the others, do not as yet possess ...
"don't care where the business comes from, we never consider
it as exporting, we are worldwide suppliers".
Similarly, firm Y - an established U.K. engineering company which
had achieved a certain degree of success in offshore-related markets
some years ago but had totally failed in its attempts to break into
the offshore markets for subsea equipment (dominated by V) t- saw no
3. Firm N2 had also been taken into export markets for the first time
through diving system manufacture which, it explained, was
"really just all fabrication".
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reason to distinguish between domestic and export orders. Nor, for
that matter, did W and Z, two subsidiaries of well-known U.S.
manufacturers of a wide range of oilfied equipment. For example,
one remarked :
"We'll go anywhere they drill. Our pledge is that
wherever oil is found we'll be there to offer our
capability."
The third U.S. oilfield equipment manufacturer was, however,
concentrating on the development of new export markets because "there's
not the capacity in the North Sea for us to expand". Finally, it
should be noted that the two Scottish down-hole tool manufacturers
surveyed had only supplied export markets indirectly, through local
(Aberdeen) service companies. Both of these companies were small, and,
as one explained ...
"we'd like to export directly but we haven't got a lot of
money, we can't afford to."
Process Plant
The U.S. subsidiaries manufacturing ball valves were both heavily
involved in offshore markets overseas and both displayed what one of
them described as a "worldwide attitude", an attitude shared with a
Scottish pump manufacturer (G2) which had won a small number of
very sizeable offshore-related export orders.
The remaining firms in this sector are both major process plant
manufacturers, but whereas one had supplied pressure vessels and
heat exchangers to several offshore markets, the other had proved
uncompetitive in the range of process equipment used offshore and
the only offshore-related business being undertaken consisted of
sub-contracted steelwork for the North Sea, although it was
continuing to tender for offshore-related export contracts. The
former was also very interested in exporting, having previously
neglected exporting in favour of domestic sales :
"We neglected exports while the North Sea was at its
peak, but this has diminished and it won't come back
so we take what we can".
Power, Electrical & Electronic Equipment
The established power plant manufacturers (H2 and 12) have been
exporting motors, generators and switchgear to offshore markets
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overseas for some time, and neither distinguished between export
and domestic orders. Nor, for that matter, did K2, which had
exported communications equipment for use on offshore platforms
in previous years and whose failure to do so in the period for
which data was collected was not the result of any deliberate
policy to withdraw from exporting.
Of the three electronic equipment manufacturers only one was actively
developing markets (having already achieved a limited volume of
exports of sonar and navigational equipment) :
"We're not going to get volume sales in the North Sea,
therefore we're looking for volume in world markets.
We've been looking at exporting more and more recently."
The remaining firms in this sector were both small, newly-established
Scottish manufacturers of electronic equipment regarded as possessing
considerable export potential. Despite this, neither firm was even
attempting to export, although both expected to export at some
future date after they had first exploited the domestic market for
their products.
Summary
Overall the shipbuilders and platform builders surveyed had achieved
only very limited exporting success. This, in turn, has repercussions
for suppliers of ancillary equipment, especially the fabricators of
helidecks, flare booms, floatation tanks etc. which appeared to have
little chance of breaking into export markets in their own right
(although more sophisticated fabrications such as diving systems
did seem to possess export potential). In the field of general
mechanical engineering, casing, pressure vessels, heat exchangers,
valves and pumps had all been exported, while specialised oilfield
equipment (such as wellhead equipment and down-hole tools) had been
exported in considerable volume, although this latter sector had
remained largely the preserve of U.S. subsidiaries. Finally, all the
electrical and electronic equipment manufacturers surveyed appeared
to have developed products capable of securing a share of export
markets, although several still had to prove that they could market
their products effectively overseas.
Thus, this discussion of the exporting activities being undertaken
by the sample suggests that the nature of the product may be an
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important influence on export performance (with, in general, a
positive relationship existing between the degree of product
sophistication and export performance and potential).
This section has also contained an examination of the managerial
attitude to exporting in each of the surveyed firms (as evidenced
by their stated export aims and the export policies they have
implemented). A full classification of the export policies







emphasising export markets 5
emphasising both export and home
markets equally 18
emphasising domestic market 2
Non-exporters, of which
attempting to export 8
not attempting to export 7
TOTAL 40
SOURCE : Interview data
It can be seen that of the 25 firms which had previously exported
offshore-related equipment; 23 had adopted a positive attitude to
exporting in that they were either treating export and domestic markets
equally or emphasising the development of export markets. The
only exporters which had not adopted a positive attitude to exporting
were 2 module fabricators, one of which was concentrating on the
development of the domestic market while the other had decided to
withdraw from the export market altogether. These 2 firms had,
in fact, never taken a conscious decision to export but instead had
simply filled export orders as and when they had come in, that is,
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they had become involved in exporting in the first place almost
by accident. As far as the non-exporters were concerned, 8 were
attempting to export (indicating a positive attitude to exporting)
but 7 were not even trying to break into export markets. Thus,
altogether 31 of the 40 firms surveyed had adopted a positive attitude
to exporting. The remaining 9 firms were putting little or no
effort into the development of the export market, indicating that
they had adopted what might be described as a 'passive* attitude to
exporting.
When managerial attitude to exporting in each of the surveyed firms
was compared with its export performance (measured at its most basic
level in terms of whether or not offshore-related exporting had been
undertaken), an association between these two factors clearly
emerged, as can be seen from Table 9.2 below. For example, while 23 of
TABLE 9.2






Positive 23 8 31




SOURCE : Interview data.
« of the 31 firms to have adopted a positive attitude to exporting had
achieved offshore-related equipment exports, only 2 of the other 9
4
firms had exported offshore-related equipment. This suggests that
a positive attitude to exporting is a necessary pre-requisite for a
high level of export performance.
4. And, as was pointed out above (p.163), this was only on a very
limited scale.
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9.3 MANAGERIAL ATTITUDE TO EXPORTING AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS,
PREVIOUS EXPORTING EXPERIENCE AND FUTURE MARKET TRENDS
In Chapter 5 it was suggested that managements attitude to exporting
might be influenced by the capabilities and resources it has at its
disposal. For example, management may be aware of the research
evidence that indicates that smaller firms tend to be less successful
than larger firms in export markets because they do not have the
resources required for exporting success. In fact, evidence was
found of an association between size of unit and managerial attitude
to exporting - most of the units which displayed a passive
attitude to exporting were small independent companies employing
150 employees or less.^ In addition, none of the firms which had
adopted a passive attitude to exporting had any experience whatsoever
of offshore markets prior to North Sea developments, suggesting that
managerial attitude to exporting may also be influenced by the
nature of previous offshore-related experience.^ Finally, there
appeared to be an association between nationality of firm and managerial
attitude to exporting, in that Scottish firms were less inclined to
adopt a positive attitude to exporting. Indeed, all but one of the
firms which had failed to adopt a positive approach to exporting
were Scottish.^
Thus, there did appear to be an association between managerial
attitude to exporting and certain firm characteristics, specifically
size, previous offshore-related experience and nationality. These
factors were, however, very much inter-related. For example, it was
shown in Chapter 7 that the Scottish firms tended to be smaller than
firms of other nationalities, while only one of the Scottish firms
had any form of offshore-related experience prior to the development
of North Sea oilfields, compared with 17 of the other 24 firms.
In fact, with the exception of one large joint-venture unit, the
firms which had adopted a passive attitude to exporting were all
small or medium-sized Scottish companies, none of which had supplied
offshore-related equipment prior to the development of North Sea
oilfields.
Management's attitude to exporting might also be influenced by the
relative success or failure of its previous exporting experience.
5. See Appendix 9.1 (A)
6. See Appendix 9.1 (B)
7. See Appendix 9.1 (C)
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However, there was no clear evidence that the nature of previous
exporting experience had influenced managerial attitude to
exporting in the offshore-related exporters, although it was
interesting that the only exporting experience of the module yard
which had decided to withdraw completely from exporting consisted of
an extremely difficult contract in the Middle East which had been fraught
with problems and which had never been completed.
In the course of the examination (undertaken in section 9.2) of the
attitudes towards exporting adopted by the managements of the
surveyed firms, evidence was uncovered of the influence exerted by
management's perception of present and future market trends. For
example, all the exporters emphasising the development of export
markets in particular explained that this policy was being implemented
because of the constraints which the domestic market imposed on their
ability to expand. In addition, two of the (non-exporting)
platform yards stated that they would increase their exporting efforts
should demand in the domestic market decline (threatening their
survival), while the studbolt manufacturer admitted :
"Other than Norway we haven't bothered because there's
plenty of business to conquer here first."
These examples indicate that these firms took into consideration
the current and expected levels of demand for their products in the
domestic market. It was also apparent that as far as the third
platform-builder and three of the fabricators of basic items of
equipment were concerned, their conscious decision not to attempt to
export was largely due to their recognition that it would be
extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible, to export the type of
equipment they had the capability to produce - that is, in each of
these firms, management's assessment of the effective demand for its
products in export markets influenced its aims and policy with
8
respect to exporting.
Given the evidence presented above suggesting that several firms did
take into consideration the current and expected levels of demand
8. Management's assessment of the effective demand for its products
in export markets will obviously partly depend upon the nature of
its products (which will in turn influence transportation costs etc).
Hence, in this way, managerial attitude to exporting may be
indirectly influenced by product characteristics. Indeed, it should
be noted that all the manufacturers of specialised oil technology
and process plant had adopted a positive attitude toward exporting,
and that most of the units which had not were from a single sector
- fabrication.
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for their products in the domestic market, one might expect an
inverse relationship to exist between the attitude to exporting adopted
by a firm's management and its own assessment of the likely future
trend in demand for its products in the domestic market. However,
for the sample as a whole there was not a clear association between
management's perception of the future trend in demand for its
products in the domestic market and managerial attitude to exporting.
For example, Table 9.3 shows that two of the firms which expected
the domestic market for their products to decline had nevertheless
9
adopted a passive attitude to exporting, while most of the firms
which expected domestic demand to increase were nevertheless not
content to sit back and exploit this expanding market but instead
had adopted a positive attitude towards exporting. This shows that
TABLE 9.3
Managerial Attitude to Exporting by Managerial Perception
of the Future Level of Demand in the Domestic Market










Positive 13 15 3 31
Passive 2 6 1 9
TOTAL 15 21 4 40
SOURCE : Interview data
management's perception of future trends in demand certainly is not
the sole (and probably not even the most important) factor influencing
managerial attitude to exporting.
One of the fabricators which was not trying to export argued that
there had been no need to export because it had been busy in the
domestic market :
9. This apparently inconsistent result is explained by the fact
that these two firms were basic fabricators which felt that their
products had no export potential.
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"For our limited facilities we can find work in the
U.K., we're not forced to find markets overseas."
This suggested that in this firm managerial attitude to exporting
was influenced by current capacity loading.
Altogether 34 of the 40 firms surveyed were operating below full
capacity, while a further two stated that they would expand if
they received further export orders. Hence only four firms indicated
that their ability to increase export sales of offshore-related
equipment was limited, either because they were already operating
their plants at maximum capacity and were unwilling to expand in order
to be able to accept increased export business, or because production
was being restricted by a shortage of several forms of skilled labour
(including turners, welders and sheet metal workers). However, there
was little evidence of an inverse relationship between current
capacity loading and the policy implemented with respect to exporting.
For example, the firms operating at full capacity included one of the
exporters which claimed to be emphasising the development of export
markets and only two of the firms which had adopted a passive attitude
to exporting.
Managerial attitude to exporting may, however, be influenced by
management1s perception of the relative profitability of export and
domestic sales. Hence, it may be expected that firms which
considered exporting to be more profitable than domestic marketing
would have implemented a more aggressive exporting policy than companies
which regarded exporting as less rewarding.
Several exporters remarked that it was very difficult to assess
the relative profitability of export and domestic sales, while others
argued that it was dangerous to generalise since the profitability
of individual contracts varied considerably. For example, one firm
explained :
"The levels of profit available vary depending on the
phase of activity. The high profit is in the
exploration phase - this is the side based on personal
contacts when you stick to people who won't let you
down. Construction brings in a different approach
with full tendering and billing and more competitors."
Other comments indicated that purchasing became even more professional
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(and cost conscious) with respect to contracts associated with
fields at the production phase of activity. Given that the balance
of activity in the North Sea has moved from exploration/development
to development/production, it is not surprising that most of the
9 firms which considered export orders to be more profitable than
domestic sales argued that this was because there was less competition
overseas and export markets were less price conscious. The remaining
firms which expected exports to be more profitable explained that any
export order undertaken would have to be more profitable in order
to compensate for the risk involved in exporting, with one firm
commenting :
"The mark-ups on exports would be the same as on domestic
business plus a 2% contingency factor and this would
lead to a higher profit. If exports were less profitable
it would probably be because somebody at our end botched
it up."
Most of the 7 firms which assessed exports to be less profitable than
domestic sales stated that this was because of the additional costs
involved in exporting (principally transportation, insurance and
agency commissions), although in two cases it was due to a deliberate
policy of reducing the profit margin on export sales in order to
make export prices more competitive and hence build up export business.
The latter firms had thus made a conscious decision to limit short-run
profitability in order to increase profitability in the long-run.
However, the majority of the sample estimated that there was, or
would be, very little difference in general between the profitability
of export and domestic sales. Several of these firms argued that
this was because offshore oil and gas is an international business
dominated by large multinational companies. For example, the
diving systems manufacturer explained
"On diving systems there should be no real difference
in price and profitability as we're dealing with the
same people whether it is an export or not."
Moreover, further analysis revealed that there was no obvious
relationship between the relative profitability of export and domestic
sales and export policy implemented. For example, only one of the
units which displayed a passive attitude towards exporting was among




The evidence presented in this section suggests that in many cases
managerial attitude to exporting was influenced by certain
characteristics of the firm, specifically its size, previous
offshore-related experience and nationality. However, it was
pointed out that these factors were inter-related and that, in fact,
all but one of the firms which had adopted a passive attitude to
exporting were small or medium-sized Scottish companies without any
form of previous offshore-related experience whatsoever. There was
also evidence that in some firms management's perception of the
effective level of demand for its products in both the export and
domestic markets influenced its attitude towards exporting (and hence,
in this way, both the absolute level of demand in these markets and
also the nature of the product may act as influencing factors), while
in at least one firm current capacity loading influenced export
policy. However, overall, there was not a clear association
between managerial perception of the future trend in demand in the
domestic market and managerial attitude to exporting, nor was
there any evidence that in general attitudes towards exporting
were significantly influenced by either the current level of capacity
utilisation or the perceived relative profitability of export and
domestic marketing.
9.4 BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPORTING
It was argued in Chapter 5 that management's attitude to exporting
might be influenced by its perception of the range and the importance
of the benefits associated with exporting its products.
Table 9.4, which lists the major reasons for exporting given by
the sample, highlights the different rationale for exporting provided
by both exporters and those firms not exporting offshore-related
equipment.^"0 In particular, exporters tended to stress the desire
to achieve growth through exporting, to take advantage of global
opportunities and to spead risk, motives seldom mentioned by non-
exporters. In contrast, the non-exporters stressed the need to
export in order to maintain employment (or, in some cases, survive)
10. As far as the firms which were not attempting to export offshore-
related equipment were concerned, Table 9.4 indicates the
benefits these firms would expect to obtain from exporting.
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TABLE 9.4
Major Reasons for Exporting by Offshore-related Export Involvement11
Reasons for Exporting
Offshore-related Export Involvement Total12
Exporters (25) Non-exporters (15)
To expand sales, of which 13 14 27
- to grow (8) (2) do)
- to survive/maintain
employment (5) (8) (13)
- to increase profits (0) (4) (4)
To take advantage of
global opportunities 8 0 8
To spread risk 7 1 8
Personal motivation, of
which 1 5 6
- prestige (0) (1) (1)
- patriotic reasons (1) (5) (6)
SOURCE : Interview data
and benefits - such as patriotism and the ability to increase profits
by increasing turnover through exporting - considered unimportant
by exporters.
Given that a large majority of the sample were operating at less than
full capacity, it is not surprising that by far the most common reason
for exporting was the desire to increase sales. For several firms,
most of them exporters, exporting offered the opportunity to expand
when this was impossible, or at least more difficult, in the domestic
market. However, a slightly larger number of firms, mostly non-
exporters, regarded exporting not so much as a way of achieving growth
but rather as a means of avoiding decline (and hence redundancies).
The following comment was typical of the remarks made by the exporters :
11. A full classification of all the reasons given for exporting by
the sample is provided in Appendix 9.2.
12. Although the figures shown in the 'total' column equal the sum
of each row, the columns cannot be totalled as some firms
provided multiple responses.
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"If we didn't export we couldn't exist, exports allow us
to continue to survive - we have a responsibility to
those people we employ."
The situation was even more serious for the firms which viewed
exporting as a means of survival but which had failed to win export
orders. Finally, a few firms regarded exporting as a way of
increasing profit through increased turnover, in that "if you're
13
increasing turnover you must be increasing profit."
The fact that many firms were either exporting or trying to export,
because the level of domestic demand limited growth (and in some
cases, threatened survival) provided further evidence that managerial
attitude to exporting may be influenced by management's perception
of the level of demand in the domestic market. Indeed, the extent
of this evidence is such that it appears to seriously contradict the
conclusion reached at the end of section 9.3 that in general attitudes
towards exporting did not appear to be signficantly influenced by
either the current level of capacity utilisation or management's
perception of the future trend in demand for its products in the
domestic market. However, although the majority of firms exported,
or attempted to export, in order to expand sales beyond the level
possible in the domestic market, it may be that for many firms this
was just one of several exporting motives (of which it may not
even have been the most important).
In contrast, there is no doubt that to 3 exporters the desire to take
advantage of global opportunities (that is, to satisfy the demand
for their products emanating from offshore markets overseas) was
vitally important, in that all of these units mentioned only this
14
motive for exporting. It should be noted that most of the firms
to stress this motive for exporting were U.S. subsidiaries.
Several firms stated that exporting was undertaken in order to spread
risk and increase flexibility, the following statement being typical
of the kind of reasoning used :
"The advantage of exporting is mainly in terms of the
spread of geographical risk. The North Sea is in
oilfield terms a stable zone of activity but it's highly
dangerous to be reliant on that one area."
13. This may not, of course, necessarily be the case.
14. Hence, the managerial attitude to exporting in these units was
clearly influenced by the level of effective demand for their
products in export markets.
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The only non-exporter to mention this motive explained that the risk
could stem from either a downturn in the market or a change in the
government legislation affecting the North Sea, and that it would
therefore be advantageous to export and hence broaden its customer
base. The fact that market diversification could also reduce the
variability in sales produced by the seasonal nature of North Sea
demand was also mentioned by a few firms, one commenting :
"With the weather window in the North Sea we're busy in
the summer but fairly dormant in winter, exporting more
we could even out the bumps."
It was noticeable that all the firms which mentioned risk-spreading
were either Scottish or U.K. owned and it seems likely that for the
U.S. companies (and perhaps also the joint-ventures) this motive was
less important because, with plants located throughout the world
serving a large number of offshore markets, these companies had
already spread the risks affecting their activities.
Among the motives for exporting less often mentioned was the desire
to monitor global competition (and avoid the complacency which might
result from operating purely in the domestic market), the following
comment being representative of the explanations provided:
"Exporting means contact with developments in other markets.
The North Sea has been the laboratory but won't remain so
for much longer with Australia, Newfoundland and Alaska,
where the climate is even more demanding than the North Sea."
While in this way exporting may result in the introduction of new
techniques and/or products, one firm argued that exporting could
lead to product improvement simply by increasing sales volume and
allowing movement along the 'learning curve':
"Volume sales can help you improve your products. For
example, we built 3 scanning sonars but at the time the
quality left something to be desired. Recently we've
done a batch of 10 which are superior."
In addition this firm had, through exporting, reaped the more usual
economies of scale, namely reduced cost (and hence more competitive
pricing). A few firms felt that exporting 'proved' or would
'prove' their capability and competitiveness and improve their
reputation in both domestic and export markets, the following
explanation being typical :
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"Exporting affects the view that the world market has of
your capability. Operating not just in a closed market
in which business was put your way by the government
suggests you are more capable. If you're getting export
contracts you're obviously competitive - in reputation
terms exporting provides some benefits."
While one firm was hoping to export directly because exporting was
expected to be easier (since export contracts would allow a longer
time for production than domestic orders which were usually required
at very short notice), a small number of exporters indicated that
they were exporting because exports were more profitable than domestic
sales as there was less competition in overseas markets. The
relative unimportance of the latter motive is consistent with the
evidence presented earlier that most of the sample considered that
there was, or would be, very little difference in general between
the profitability of export and domestic sales.
Typical of the comments suggesting that the personal motives of
a firm's senior personnel might influence export policy was the
following :
"The Chairman might like the Queen's Award for Industry
so he might push from the top (and) we would help the
balance of payments and get foreign currency, and I suppose
we have a moral obligation to export because Britain
survives through exporting."
However, none of the firms, which suggested this motive implied that
it would be the sole or even the most important reason for
exporting and all provided additional explanations of their policy
towards exports. Hence, it seems likely that personal motives
15
would normally be of only secondary importance.
Thus, most firms argued that they were exporting (or would export)
for sound, commercial reasons, with only the studbolt manufacturer
admitting to being drawn into exporting without giving the matter due
consideration and without having made a conscious decision to export.
15. It should be noted that most of the firms which mentioned
personal motives were non-exporters which therefore had no actual
experience of the benefits of exporting. Indeed, as far as the
firms stressing the patriotic aspect of exporting were concerned,
this may have been an example of respondents saying what they
thought they should say.
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Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out, Table 9.4 suggested
that there was an association between the nature of the reasons
given for exporting and export performance (measured in terms of
whether or not offshore-related equipment had been exported).
Moreover, it should be noted that 6 of the 8 major offshore-related
exporters (with export sales of offshore-related equipment of
£1 million or more per annum) and 4 of the 7 firms with the best
offshore-related export performance (that is, those firms exporting
over one-third of their offshore-related sales) gave as their sole
motive for exporting the desire to take advantage of global
opportunities. Thus, there appeared to be an association between
exporting being undertaken for 'aggressive' motives - such as the
desire to achieve growth and, in particular, the desire to take
advantage of global opportunities - and successful performance in
offshore-related export markets.
Evidence was also found that managerial attitude to exporting might,
in some cases, be influenced by management's perception of the
benefits associated with exporting. For example, all but one of the
firms to mention the desire to take advantage of global opportunities
had adopted a positive attitude to exporting, while personal motives
and the wish to expand sales for survival and profitability purposes
were stressed by more passive firms than would normally be expected
given the small number of firms which had adopted this type of attitude
to exporting. However, for the sample as a whole there was not a
strong relationship between the nature of the reasons given for exporting
and managerial attitude to exporting. Thus, although the reasons
given for exporting were not, in general, a particularly good
indicator of managerial attitude to exporting (perhaps because they
represent just one of several groups of influential factors), those
firms exporting for aggressive motives did tend to be the most
successful exporters.
Further analysis revealed that significant differences existed in
the motives for exporting mentioned by firms in different product
16
groups. In particular, while the manufacturers of specialised
equipment stressed the desire to take advantage of global opportunities
and to expand through exporting, and the electrical/electronic
16. Appendix 9.3 provides an analysis of the major reasons for
exporting by product sector.
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equipment manufacturers emphasised growth and the importance of
spreading risk, to the process plant manufacturers and the manufacturers
of the major items of offshore equipment the most important reason
for exporting was to continue to stay in existence.
Finally, there were also one or two important differences in the
motives for exporting suggested by firms of different nationality.
For example, it was noticeable the majority of the firms to state
that they were exporting for the sole (aggressive) reason that they
wished to take advantage of global opportunities were U.S.
subsidiaries. (However, once again it should be borne in mind
that most of these U.S. subsidiaries were manufacturers of specialised
oilfield equipment and that therefore the findings concerning
exporting motives by product group and by nationality are not
independent).
Summary
Thus, the benefits associated with exporting suggested by the sample
were found in many cases to be influenced by firm nationality and
product-mix. However, in general, there was not a strong relationship
between exporting motives and managerial attitude to exporting
(perhaps because management's perception of the benefits of exporting
was just one of several groups of factors influencing its attitude
towards exporting). In contrast, a clear association was
discovered between the nature of the motives for exporting suggested
by the surveyed firms and export performance, in that firms which
exported for aggressive motives tended to be the most successful
exporters of offshore-related equipment.
9.5 SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The desire to take advantage of global opportunities was the nearest
any firm came to explaining its motives for exporting in terms of a
desire to exploit a comparative advantage held over global competitors,
which is, according to the classical theory of international trade,
the main motive for exporting. However, it was suggested in
Chapter 5 that manufacturers with experience of supplying the North
Sea market may hold a comparative advantage over their international
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competitors. Evidence as to the nature of this supposed
comparative advantage will now be discussed.
Table 9.5 (below) provides an indication of the relative importance
of the major factors suggested as comparative advantages by the
17
sample, although this is a simplified picture given that these
will vary in different circumstances, as one firm explained :
"Sometimes it's price, sometimes it's quality, sometimes
reputation, sometimes technology ... it's getting the
correct combination of factors that's important."
In addition to one firm which considered that it held an advantage
in "technical competence" and another which believed its strength
lay in its "technical expertise", 14 firms claimed to have developed
technically superior products, although several emphasised the need
for continual product development in order to stay ahead of
competitors. Furthermore, some of these firms still have to prove
that they have the ability to market these products effectively,
while there is also a danger that technological development may
become an end in itself with the result that what appear to the
manufacturer to be technological advances may not represent better
solutions to its customers' problems. For example, a failure to
relate product development to the market's needs is evident in the
following statement by an electronics manufacturer :
"Nobody else is in our business. We have technological
products nobody else makes so we are trying to create a
market."
Not all of these superior products owed their development solely to
North Sea experience, as one U.S. subsidiary made clear :
"Our equipment has been developed over the last 40 years
for a specialised use. During this time so many 'bugs'
have appeared and been solved that our equipment must be
good, because of the technological know-how we've built
up over the years."
However, most firms emphasised the importance of North Sea experience
and indeed, detailed analysis of the respondents' replies indicated
that it is doubtful whether any of the dozen Scottish/U.K. firms
which claimed to hold a technological advantage would have developed
this without the stimulus of the North Sea market.. The same
17. A full classification of all the comparative advantages











































































































applies to firm V, a U.S. wellhead manufacturer, which only
developed its subsea capability as a result of North Sea involvement.
In fact, this firm argued that its technological advantage with
respect to all its products stemmed from its lack of previous
offshore experience :
"The equipment used offshore is twice as big and heavy
as it needs to be. Competitors developed it from onshore
equipment, nobody sat down and designed offshore equipment.
Being a young company we did, we developed systems
primarily for offshore use."
It can be seen from Table 9.5 that all the manufacturers of electrical/
electronic equipment claimed to possess an advantage with respect to
product/expertise. In contrast, none of the firms in the fabrication
18
sector claimed a product advantage with respect to fabrications,
while none of the shipbuilders or platform fabricators alleged that
they held an advantage in terms of either product or expertise.
This result is consistent with the previous evidence that certain
fabricators (including one of the platform yards) were not even
attempting to export because they realised that their products had
19
very little export potential, and also with the conclusion that
all the electrical/electronic equipment manufacturers appeared to
have developed products capable of securing a share of export markets
and that in general there was a relationship between product
sophistication and export potential.^0
Nearly half the sample stated that they held an advantage over their
competitors in terms of their 'track record' and/or reputation. The
importance of this factor is evident from the following statement
by one of the U.S. subsidiaries :
"Our customers ask for our ball valves by name and we
are usually the most accepted even if we are the most
expensive."
A few of the firms which claimed an advantage of this type had
started to build up their reputation well before the development of
the North Sea. However, for the vast majority North Sea involvement
had been vital in allowing them to establish their credibility to
the extent that they now regarded their track record in the North
Sea as providing them with a comparative advantage over international
18. Although the highly-diversified firm L claimed that some of its
non-fabricated products were technically superior and firm N
believed it held an advantage in "technical competence".
19. See p.162 and 164.
20. See pp. 166—167.
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competitors. Moreover, a number of firms stressed that the North
Sea was in fact the ideal area in which to prove one's capability
and several specifically mentioned that this advantage should lead
to success in export markets, the following explanation being
typical of the reasoning used :
"With our experience in the North Sea we,should be able
to get orders overseas. The question our customers ask
is 'where has it been used?'. We've got credibility if
it has been used in the North Sea, especially by the
majors like BP who are known throughout the world."
Several exporters claimed to possess an advantage in terms of
market knowledge or established contacts. Once again, Scottish
companies had developed these contacts through their involvement
in the North Sea, as one explained :
"The same people evaluating diving systems manufacture in
the North Sea evaluate diving systems in other areas.
Therefore we don't have any marketing problems, we know
the people."
However, two U.S. subsidiaries manufacturing down-hole tools
(which tend to be purchased on a more local level) stressed the
importance of having contacts established throughout the world :
"The trick is to get in and get specified. For example,
with the Saudis we know people who will tell us the
project is underway before the 0S0 knows about it."
Some firms commented upon the importance of purchasing inertia.
While a few considered that they held an advantage in certain markets
- Canada and the Middle East being mentioned - which traditionally
purchased from U.K. companies or were at least orientated towards
British standards, one firm also pointed out that once established
with a particular customer inertia will work on one's behalf :
"If somebody has your equipment and they go for an extension
then you're in a good position unless you've let him down.
Also, they go for your spares and come to you to service your
own equipment."
Of the firms which believed that their size gave them a comparative
advantage in export markets, half argued that being a large
organisation was advantageous. The actual benefits large size was
considered to bestow were increased flexibility (resulting from the
ability to redistribute orders among the company's various plants),
the ability to draw on the expertise of the rest of the group and
greater financial backing (allowing, for example, better credit
arrangements to be offered to customers). The fact that large
companies considered that their size and, in particular, their
greater financial resources provided them with a comparative
advantage over their competitors is consistent with other evidence
21
that size is an important advantage in export markets.
All but one of the firms to allege that small size was advantageous
were Scottish. Generally speaking, the suggested benefits of
small size were somewhat less tangible than the alleged advantages
of large size. While small size was considered to confer the
ability to respond quickly to both customer inquiries and problems and
to changes in demand, the ease of co-ordination and control in a
small company was also emphasised :
"We're small and the right hand knows what the left hand
is doing. Everybody knows what's going on. We take a
big project one at a time and we all know what's happening,
the big operators don't."
One firm argued that in a small company the identity of interest
between employees and the firm could be sustained, resulting in
fewer morale problems and providing advantages worth protecting :
"Growth into a large company or takeover by one is not in
the interests of the firm or the employees, as we would
lose our identity. In a small company when an engineer
designs a piece of equipment it's almost as if he's got
his name on it and if it goes wrong he'll drop everything
and open it up to see what's wrong with it - it's pride."
The absence of industrial relations problems was also specifically
mentioned as a benefit of small size by one firm and, in fact, small
firms accounted for the majority of the companies which mentioned
good industrial relations as a comparative advantage (although, in
effect, only one firm argued that 'good industrial relations' meant
anything more than simply the flexibility of operation allowed by
non-unionisation). Several stressed the great importance of this
flexibility, the following explanation being typical of the
reasoning used :
"Non-unionisation is the biggest advantage. What you've
got to understand about the petroleum business is that you
21. See for example, pp. 250-251.
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need the ability to react and serve quickly. We need
to be flexible. We have no rigid job classification
structure and we can work overtime when we want to and
so on."
Thus, non-unionisation and good industrial relations apparently allow
flexibility of operation, which in turn seemingly yields important
benefits in terms of speed of response and, according to one firm,
reliable delivery :
"We meet deliveries because of our labour force. We're
40 miles from Aberdeen, and we're pulling from a rural
community with no background of industrial disputes."
Several of the firms which claimed to hold an advantage in terms
of either speed or reliability of delivery stressed the vital importance
of these factors to the oil industry. Typical of the arguments used
by the firms emphasising the importance of being able to meet
promised delivery dates was the following comment by a module fabricator :
"The key to everything, the philosophy behind the whole
operation is that we must deliver on time, it doesn't
matter how we do it. Delivery has got to be the biggest
thing, late delivery of a module could throw them out 6
to 9 months, which could be very expensive."
Representative of the firms which claimed to be superior in terms of
their speed of delivery was the following :
"The oil business doesn't plan too far ahead. We got
two weeks notice of £180,000 of wellheads. They rely on
our ability to deliver and up to now it's been good, that's
why we've made inroads into our competitors, we could supply
and they couldn't."
Although one firm stressed that"you don't have to have the lowest
price, you need to be technically compliant and be able to sell once
you've got the bid in," a price advantage over competitors was
alleged by several firms, some of whom explained that this was mainly
the result of their labour costs being considerably lower than those
of, for example, their Norwegian and American competitors. In
addition, a few firms allegedly held an advantage in terms of their
ability to take part in a 'package deal' offered to countries
requiring financial aid :
"We've got to tag along with others in a package providing
know-how (usually from the operator), aid (government-
backed) and credit. Therefore we take along a bank which is
prepared to work out a deal shaded towards their ability to pay."
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U.S. subsidiaries considered that a U.K. location aided entry into
the E.E.C. and Commonwealth markets (by reducing customs and other
difficulties), allowed access to U.K. financing (directed, in
particular, at the old Commonwealth countries such as India), and
reduced transportation costs (by reducing the distance between
the manufacturing plant and, for example, the Middle East). British
companies mentioned either their location1s contribution to the
absence of industrial relations problems or the availability of
skilled labour in their area. Finally, superior facilities and
marketing orientation were factors considered by a few firms to provide
them with an edge over their international competitors (although
it is likely that many other firms took marketing orientation for
granted).
Summary
A number of factors were suggested as a source of comparative
advantage, the most important being product/expertise and track-record/
reputation. Many of the companies mentioning these two categories
of comparative advantage were Scottish or U.K. firms, for most of whom
involvement in the North Sea market had been absolutely essential to
the development of their offshore capability. The firms claiming
a product advantage included all the electrical/electronic equipment
manufacturers but none of the shipbuilders or platform builders, nor
did any of the fabricators claim a product advantage with respect
to their fabricated products. Moreover, it was noticeable that most
of the firms which admitted that they held no special comparative
advantages over their international competitors were from the fabrication
sector. Hence, this analysis has provided further evidence of a
possible association between the nature of the product and export
potential. Generally speaking, however, there was not much difference
in the nature of the supposed comparative advantages held by firms of
different nationality, although size of firm did appear to have snme
bearing on the nature of comparative advantages allegedly held.
Further analysis revealed that there was some evidence of an
association between the nature of the comparative advantages claimed
by a firm and its management's attitude to exporting. For example,
the comparative advantages most often mentioned by the firms which
had adopted a passive attitude to exporting were those of small
size (principally good industrial relations) and very few of the
passive firms mentioned the track record and product advantages which
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were easily the most frequently referred to by the firms which had
adopted a positive attitude to exporting.
Finally, exporters in general claimed to hold more comparative
22
advantages than did non-exporters. Moreover, the exporters
23
most heavily involved in export markets (in both relative and
24
absolute terms) claimed to have more comparative advantages than
did less successful exporters. These results indicate the existence
of an association between the number of alleged comparative
advantages and export performance. (They also suggest that there
was a considerable element of truth in the responses provided by
the sample concerning the comparative advantages allegedly held.)
9.6 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPORTING
There were some significant differences in the nature of the
25
exporting problems mentioned by firms in different product
26
sectors and also firms of different size. These differences will
be highlighted in the discussion of exporting problems which follows.
Almost half of the sample mentioned visible trade barriers - such
as tariffs and domestic content regulations - as an exporting problem.
For example, one of the shipbuilders pointed out that many countries
(including Canada, South Africa, Brazil, Singapore, Mexico and the
U.S.A.) provide their domestic shipbuilding industries with subsidies
of 25% or more. All but one of the process plant manufacturers
also considered visible trade barriers (primarily tariffs) to be a
problem, with India, Australia, Yugoslavia and especially South
America (where tariffs in general are high due to the LAFTA agreement)
being singled out for special mention. In addition, one of these
firms pointed out that often support for local industry was 'hidden'
and that even within the E.E.C. there was a great deal of protectionism :
22. See Appendix 9.5
23. See Appendix 9.6 (A)
24. See Appendix 9.6 (B)
25. As far as the firms not attempting to export offshore-related equip¬
ment were concerned, this section analyses the exporting problems
these firms would expect to encounter.
26. See Table 9.6 (below) which analyses the major exporting problems.
A full list of all the exporting problems suggested by the sample /
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"Where you get countries like Spain and Italy in trouble
and strife politically their governments try to keep
people employed, therefore they have hidden subsidies.
Also more happens with respect to subsidies then you
think. For example, the French shipyards are subsidised
- subsidies for shipbuilding are allowed but they are
being used for building pressure vessels in competition
with us."
It was the less obvious forms of protectionism which the platform
builders and fabricators had generally encountered, particularly
with respect to the Norwegian market. For example, one fabricator
remarked :
"We spent weeks preparing a quotation for Norway for
nothing. We don't know if they were seriously
considering us or just going through the motions of
asking us to quote."
Although three of the electrical/electronic equipment manufacturers
mentioned visible trade barriers, for two firms these were only
regarded as a problem with respect to the U.S. market, while for the
third Norway was a difficult market (but only with respect to
products already manufactured in Norway). Similarly, although all
<
the wellhead manufacturers experienced problems with respect to
domestic content regulations, this-was only in countries (such as
Mexico and Norway) where their competitors had established plants
from which the state oil companies tend to order direct. Finally,
the relatively unsuccessful firm Y was the only oilfield equipment
manufacturer to mention visible trade barriers as a problem.
Thus, while the shipbuilders, fabricators and process plant manufacturers
faced fairly widespread visible trade barriers, the electrical/
electronic equipment manufacturers apparently only experienced this
problem in the more sophisticated markets of Europe and North
America, and the manufacturers of specialised oil technology only
in markets where competitors had undertaken direct investment. Hence,
although not obvious from Table 9.6, there was an association between
the significance of visible trade barriers and the nature of the
product, with sophisticated and/or specialised items of equipment
being relatively free of the constraints imposed on export potential
by visible trade barriers. Given this association it was no surprise
/ is provided in Appendix 9.7, while Appendix 9.8 provides details
of the factors which the 25 exporters of offshore-related
equipment expected to constitute additional exporting problems










































































































































































to find that the majority of the companies to argue that the
unsophisticated nature of their product was a disadvantage in export
markets were among those to mention visible trade barriers.
Further evidence of the consistency of these qualitative results is
provided by the fact that the firms arguing that the unsophisticated
nature of their product represented an exporting problem included
all but one of the companies which had previously explained that
they had adopted a passive attitude to exporting because they
recognised that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to export the type of equipment which they had the capability to
manufacture. The firms to stress the unsophisticated nature of their
products as an exporting problem were all in the area of fabrication
and sub-contracting (including all the platform fabricators).
Typical of the reasoning used by these firms was the following
comment :
"Our products have no unique aspect, no sophistication,
there's no export potential. "
The invisible trade barriers referred to as exporting problems fall
into one of two categories - corruption and (the more frequently
mentioned) administration and customs difficulties. The firms to
express concern about the problem of corruption in export markets
singled out Africa and the Middle East for special mention. While
one firm commented that in theMiddle East "bribing is necessary or
your loads are dropped at the docks or not picked up", another stressed
that bribery of officials with responsibility for purchasing decisions
was also necessary :
"The Middle East is the land of the greasy palms. It's
a very, very difficult market for us. We are a slightly
old-fashioned, well-established company and we didn't
operate a slush fund or splash money around, the
directors were a bit naive in that respect. Anybody who
thinks they can get business on the strength of their
performance is wrong. Your agents have got to look
after the right parties."
This was indeed the way in which one of the U.S. subsidiaries dealt
with the problem :
"We use agents, you've got to have them in the Middle East
where there's a lot of baksheesh. We pay the agent
commission and what he does with it is his own business.
You can't have your own people dishing it out."
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Several firms referred to the customs and administration difficulties
associated with exporting, including excessive export documentation.
For example, one firm stated that it had to supply Turkey with 20
original copies - no photocopying was allowed - of all invoices and
test certificates. Some firms stressed in particular the problems
associated with letters of credit, highlighted in the following
remark :
"It takes us 2h months to establish a letter of credit and
when we receive it it must be word perfect in order to
receive the money. If there are any differences between
the order and the conditions on the letter of credit - for
example, differences in the shipping arrangements - then
legally the bank can't pay up."
The inaccessibility of export markets was also frequently suggested
as an exporting problem. Some firms argued that inaccessibility
resulted in communication problems which make exports more difficult
to control. However, inaccessibility can also be in terms of
distance (which affects transportation costs) and modes of transportation
(which can result in transportation difficulties and hence delivery
delays). Problems associated with market inaccessibility were
mentioned by all the platform builders and half of the fabricators,
but by only one of the electrical/electronic equipment manufacturers
and only two of the wellhead and oilfield equipment manufacturers.
This suggests that the inaccessibility of export markets is another
exporting problem of much greater significance to manufacturers of
unsophisticated products than it is to exporters of specialised,
high-value/low bulk:' items of equipment (for whom transportation
costs are relatively unimportant).
Nearly half the sample mentioned problems associated with receiving
payment on export contracts. Several firms stated that they had
completed contracts for which they had never received any payment
(with Nigeria, Mexico and Iran being the countries involved), while
others had, on occasion, not received full payment. In addition,
some firms had been involved in export contracts where a shortage
of foreign exchange in the importing country had resulted in the
exporter being pressurised to accept a counter-trade agreement, with
the following being a typical example :
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"We got a very big contract in Algeria. We had to
involve our bankers because of the problems we had.
Algeria wouldn't let the currency out of the country,
we could have payment in oranges, in camels, but not
in sterling."
Finally, several firms commented upon the period of time - often
six months - that sometimes elapsed before payment was received on
export contracts, particularly in cases where letters of credit were
used.
Political factors may also provide problems with respect to exporting.
While one U.S. subsidiary was prohibited by the U.S. government
from signing contracts with Iran, another criticised U.K. government-
imposed restraints on trade with countries such as South Africa.
Some firms believed that the political situation in general was
worsening :
"The international market available to British manufacturers
is shrinking. For example, you can't sell to China if
you've sold to Taiwan; Iran is no longer available;
Nigeria has been upset by the British; Chile is out of
order; and Israel is a no-go area if you want to export to
the Arab countries."
However, it was also pointed out that even a change of government in
an overseas country could result in a contract being withheld.
It has already been shown that some firms considered that they held
an advantage in certain markets which traditionally 'buy British',
while others argued that as they were now established in the oil
27
business inertia would start to work on their behalf. However,
a much larger number of firms regarded purchasing inertia as a
problem. Roughly half of these firms referred to the difficulty
of entering markets which were traditionally supplied by firms of
other nationalities, as one explained :
"Our competitors have their own area preferences, just
like our Commonwealth."
Among the traditional supply links mentioned were France's ties
with Abu Dhabi and her African colonies, Belgium's links with her
African colonies and the U.S.A.'s sphere of influence in Canada,
Mexico and South America. Other firms mentioned source loyalty
in export markets as a problem. For example, one firm admitted :
27. See p. 184.
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"As far as our low pressure products are concerned,
our competitors have been established longer and
therefore they have the edge."
However, this same firm went further to argue :
"The oil business as a whole is American-orientated
and a lot of American influence is incorporated into
the specifications. This means we are always putting
forward options of British specifications against
American specifications. They are compatible in some
cases but we always struggle to match American
specifications."
Several firms mentioned currency fluctuation risks and, in particular,
the impact which exchange rate fluctuation can have on the profitability
of exports, a typical comment being :
"You quote in yen, marks or dollars, and you"re worried
you haven't allowed sufficient room for changes in
exchange rates. There can be up to a 120-dav quote
period, so it gives us a lot of sleepless nights."
In addition, a few firms stated that the absolute value of sterling
was a problem in that it contributed to making them uncompetitive
28
in export markets, while several others explained that it was for
this reason they were worried about the future movement of the
29
pound. The following remark provides a clear explanation of
this problem :
"Everybody converts to dollars. We were quite happy at
$1.90 but it's now $2.30 which means our prices have
gone up a tremendous amount, 25-30% has gone on our prices
through no fault of our own."
All but one of the firms which claimed that their international
competitiveness" was being harmed by the poor performance of their
raw material suppliers singled out the British Steel Corporation
for special mention. BSC were criticised for both the price and
quality of their steel and also the unreliability of their
deliveries.
It has already been pointed out that a number of firms believed
that either their skiJLed labour force or good industrial relations
provided them with an advantage over their international competitors
(with, in several cases, these competitive advantages being
28. One U.S. subsidiary stated that for U.K. manufacturing industry to
be competitive the pound would have to be worth no more than $1.50
(at a time when it was valued at $2.30).
29. See Appendix 9.8.
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associated with the location in which these firms had established
their manufacturing plants)."^0 This evidence is consistent with
the fact that only one firm regarded its (very unreliable) labour
force as a problem which would affect its performance in export
markets, although two other firms argued that their ability to
compete in export markets was adversely affected by their high-cost
locations (in Aberdeen and a remote area of north-west Scotland) to and
from which transportation costs of raw materials and finished products
were considerable.
Several firms (including all the shipbuilders) claimed that their
ability to compete in world markets was being impaired by export
subsidies provided by overseas governments (including France, Holland,
Canada, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Spain and Japan). In addition,
a few firms also complained that the support given by the U.K. government
31
to exporters was insufficient. Finally, an inability to provide
credit at rates comparable with those offered by international
competitors was mentioned by three firms, the same number of companies
which claimed to hold an advantage in terms of credit provision.
Although a number of factors such as the value of sterling, overseas
government export subsidies and inadequate performance by suppliers
were mentioned as contributing to the uncompetitiveness of the sample
in world markets, several firms admitted that their own low
productivity was also partly responsible. Indeed, the rig-builder
described productivity as ...
"our biggest problem. We build a first-class rig but
productivity is considerably lower than in the States.
It takes almost twice as many man-hours to build a rig
over here, although the rate per hour is higher over there.
Overall, the effect is an ex-yard cost of $4h million
more out of here than the States."
Most firms stated that their inefficiency was due to a number of
factors, with the following being typical of the explanations
provided :
"The facilities are out of date. We have installed new
machines but the sophistication is not all the way
through, so we get bottlenecks. We have a £70 million
30. See p. 187. It should also be noted that a shortage of skilled
labour was responsible for restricting production in only one of
the 40 firms surveyed.
31. The utilisation of the government's export services is discussed
in more detail in the following chapter, pp. 239-243.
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capital investment plan over the next lO years
providing we get guarantees from the work force to
accept certain flexibilities. We are buying up their
'allowances', including pay awards for reduced manning
levels. We have basically a lazy workforce from
management to shop floor. Their basic attitude is
wrong, they only work 4 hours a day. We have poor
management, we're not well organised - the organisation
of the work as it goes through the shops - we might
only get 20 hours work on something in 2 weeks."
Three of the firms to mention low productivity were part
associated with, a nationalised industry. Certainly as
one of these firms was concerned, this was a major cause
productivity problem :
"Our base capability is now 520 employees, but at one
time we had 120O wrapped around our necks - we had
this 'social responsibility' drivel."
Thus, a number of factors contributed towards price uncompetitiveness
in export markets, which itself was mentioned as a problem by double
the number of firms which allegedly held a comparative advantage
in terms of price. However, the significance of price uncompetitiveness
as an exporting problem varied by product sector, as can be seen from
Table 9.6 (above). For example, none of the electrical/electronic
equipment manufacturers mentioned this problem, while the only
manufacturers of specialised oilfield equipment which did were two
Scottish/U.K. firms and a single U.S. subsidiary for which this
situation was temporary in that it had arisen only because its major
international competitors were "undercutting just to keep their
factories open". On the other hand, the situation was more serious
in the general engineering sector where one firm admitted that it was
a lot dearer than its foreign competitors and therefore only won
export orders when they couldn't meet delivery dates, while another
explained :
"In straight competition the Japs will 'take us to the
cleaners'. We don't get a lot of business in the Middle
East because they deal in cash and go for the lowest bid.
Therefore I deal with all the bankrupts, such as Egypt
and Turkey."
However, inability to meet international price competition was most
serious in the shipbuilding industry, where the full extent of the
problem was made evident by one shipyard's comment that "our cheapest





even with respect to sophisticated, multi-purpose support vessels
the position was not a great deal better :
"Even if 10 are required for the North Sea it is unlikely
that we will build any of them on a price and delivery
basis alone. It's up to the government to say if we
take the order."
Two of the shipbuilders were also among the firms to admit to
having difficulties in matching the delivery dates quoted by their
competitors (partly as a result of inefficiency). Several firms
regarded as a problem the fact that they were restricted from
exporting to certain markets under the terms of a licensing or joint-
venture agreement, or because these markets were served by another
subsidiary of the same group. One firm explained the significance
of this type of restriction in the following way :
"The first and most important thing is to renegotiate the
terms of the agreement. This is the crux of the whole
thing. We're restricted to European waters. If we get
agreement to relax that element then exports will take
off."
Although a few small firms commented on the advantages which small
size can bestow, a somewhat larger number of firms (all but one of
which were Scottish) argued that small size was a factor which
adversely affected their export potential. For example, for the
small electronics firms investment in R & D was seen as a priority,
with the result that there was little finance available for
expansion, as one explained :
"Our only problem is it's heavy finance, we refuse to
let it run away with itself. We could expand to produce
massive exports - there's a huge market for this equipment
- but this would take our resources away from more
development. It's a trade-off situation because we're
totally self-financing you see."
A few firms argued that being small companies they lacked management
depth with the result, for example, that "you don't think about the
future, you're too bothered with day-to-day problems". Finally,
one firm explained that exporting was a particularly costly exercise
for a small company :
"It's the chicken and egg situation, particularly in the
oil business where there are high costs with respect to
entertaining, hotel bills, etc. To send a chap to the
Middle East for a fortnight is costly."
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Thus, this evidence is consistent with the theory that small firms
may be at a disadvantage in export markets in that they may not
possess the resources necessary for the successful exploitation of
overseas markets.^
In fact, over half the sample mentioned as a problem the additional
costs and difficulties of overseas marketing, with several firms
commenting specifically on the cost of overseas selling, the following
comment being typical of the responses provided :
"We can't afford to export because of the cost of overseas
travel and so on. Two trips to India cost me £4,000 for
nothing. We need salesmen which we can't afford."
However, overseas selling was also considered expensive by large
companies, one of which believed that an export sales team of 5 was
as much as could be afforded given the fact that overseas salesmen
"consume money at a great rate." While the difficulty of collecting
appropriate information about overseas markets and the greater cost
of tendering for and negotiating export contracts were referred to
by a few firms, ten companies mentioned the problem of supporting
export markets. Several firms argued that the only solution to the
latter problem was the provision of service facilities overseas
(either by establishing their own service bases or by appointing
agents to undertake servicing for them) as it was too expensive
to send U.K. personnel overseas to undertake maintenance and repair.
However, one firm pointed out that there were cases where the cost
of overseas support might prove prohibitive :
"In Nigeria the business available is just not
profitable considering what we would have to do to
get it - they want a service base set up - so we're
not interested."
In addition, several firms stressed that agency relationships can
33
cause problems. For example, while one exporter remarked that
"you never know if an agent is doing a good job and it's difficult
to keep an eye on them", one non-exporter considered that :
"getting the right agent is probably the most important
problem. We'll be talking to an awful lot of people
before we decide."
32. Further evidence suggesting that small firms may not be able to
afford to utilise the most appropriate export marketing methods
will be discussed in the following chapter.
33. This subject is discussed in greater detail in the following
chapter, pp. 229-231.
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fiifficulties with respect to product adaptation were mentioned by
only two firms, each of which argued that its workforce had been
trained to the high standards required for North Sea contracts and
that therefore problems might arise when it was asked to lower its
standards on contracts for less severe environments such as the
Gulf of Mexico. A further four firms admitted that their product
ranges were unsuitable for some export markets, even after a degree
of product adaptation. Perhaps the clearest example was provided
by one of the electronic equipment manufacturers :
"The main application for our systems is the North Sea.
They were specifically designed for that sort'' of market
and are not necessary for calmer waters. It's okay in
a high-cost operation but the budgets are lower in the
Gulf so they are not looking for expensive, high-
technology items. If it's essential it's okay but a
support item which can be added to a project is not
viable."
Finally, the language barrier was mentioned by only a few firms,
although more than one firm made comments such as "fortunately most
of the people we deal with speak English".
Summary
Thus, the exporting problems most frequently mentioned by the sample
were the additional costs and difficulties associated with export
marketing; visible and invisible trade barriers; the inaccessibility
of export markets; problems with respect to receiving payment;
purchasing inertia and price uncompetitiveness. However, the
importance of these various exporting problems did vary by product
sector. For the shipbuilders, for example, the major problem was
inability to meet international competition with respect to delivery
and especially price, mainly as a result of low productivity and the
subsidies provided to rival shipbuilding industries by overseas
governments. On the other hand, two different factors limit the
export potential of the platform builders and fabricators. Firstly,
platforms and other fabrications are unsophisticated items which
overseas governments are likely to insist are manufactured locally.
Secondly, these items are heavy and bulky, and are therefore difficult
and expensive to transport relative to their value. The major
problems the process plant and wellhead manufacturers appeared to
face were the additional costs and difficulties of export"~marketing
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and, more especially, visible trade barriers (including both
tariffs and domestic content regulations) imposed by countries
developing their indigenous engineering industries. To the
manufacturers of specialised oilfield equipment, problems such as
tariff barriers and transportation costs were relatively
unimportant and instead, in addition to overseas marketing difficulties,
concern was expressed about the problems associated with payment
and invisible trade barriers (problems considered to be less pressing
by the shipbuilding, fabrication and process plant sectors).
Finally, the electrical/electronic equipment manufacturers appear
to have developed products with export potential, and therefore
their main problems seemed to be those connected with marketing
these products overseas (particularly supporting export markets),
breaking down purchasing inertia and, for the small firms, coping
with the limitations of their size.
There was, however, no evidence to suggest that management's
attitude to exporting was influenced by its perception of either
the range or severity of exporting problems, in that no association
was found between managerial attitude to exporting and either the
number or the nature of the exporting problems mentioned by the
sample.
9.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented an examination of the qualitative findings
concerning the factors influencing managerial attitude to exporting
and export performance. Apart from providing further details of
the nature of the exporting activity being undertaken by the sample,
section 9.2 outlined the export aims and policies of the surveyed
firms, which were taken as being indicative of the attitude towards
exporting adopted by the managements of these firms. Analysis
then showed that there was an association between managerial attitude
to exporting and export performance, in that a positive attitude to
exporting appeared to be a necessary pre-requisite for successful
exporting.
In sections 9.3 - 9.6 attention was focussed on certain factors which,
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it was postulated, might influence the attitude towards exporting
adopted by a firm's management. There was, however, no clear
evidence that managerial attitude to exporting was strongly
influenced by previous exporting experience. Nor did the
relative profitability of export and domestic sales appear to be
an influential factor - this finding being supported by subsequent
evidence indicating that very few firms claimed to be exporting
because exports were more profitable than domestic sales, while even
fewer mentioned lower profitability of export sales as a problem.
As regards the influence exerted on management's attitude to exporting
by its perception of future market trends, it is worthwhile reviewing
the considerable volume of evidence concerning this relationship
presented in this chapter. Firstly, in the course of the discussion
34
of the exporting policies implemented by the sample it became obvious
- especially from some of the direct quotations included in the text
- that in some firms management's perception of the effective level of
demand for its products in both the export and domestic markets
clearly did influence its policy towards exporting. Secondly, for
over half the sample a major"^ motive for exporting was the desire to
overcome the restrictions that the level of domestic demand placed on
growth, indicating that in these firms management's perception of the
level of domestic demand significantly influenced its attitude to
exporting. Moreover, the only motive for exporting provided by
eight exporters was the desire to take advantage of global opportunities,
illustrating that in these firms attitutde towards exporting was
undeniably influenced by management's perception of the level of demand
for its products in export markets. However, it was shown in
section 9.3 that for the sample as a whole there was not a clear
association between managerial attitude to exporting and either the
current level of capacity utilisation or management's perception of
the future trend in domestic demand. Thus, to summarise, in some
firms managerial attitude to exporting was clearly influenced by
management's perception of future market trends (and the resulting level
of capacity utilisation) but overall there was not a close association
34. The export policies implemented by the sample were discussed in
section 9.2 and analysed in section 9.3.
35. Although for those firms which provided more than one motive for
exporting the desire to expand sales beyond the level possible
in the domestic market may not even have been the most important
reason for exporting.
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between these two factors, perhaps because, as will be discussed
below, this is just one of several groups of factors which will in
general influence management's attitude to exporting. For example,
although a firm's management expects the domestic market for its
products to decline, it may nevertheless adopt a passive attitude
to exporting because it believes that its products have no export
potential or because it considers that it does not have the resources
to enable it to export successfully.
It was postulated that a management's attitude towards exporting
might be influenced by its perception of the range and severity of
the problems associated with exporting. However, no evidence was
found to suggest that management's perception of exporting problems
was an influential factor. In contrast, there was evidence that in
some firms management's attitude to exporting might be influenced by
its perception of the benefits associated with exporting (and hence
36
its reasons for exporting). There was also some evidence of an
association between the nature of the comparative advantages allegedly
37
held by the surveyed firms and managerial attitude to exporting.
Thus, as shown in Figure 9.1, a firm's export performance was found to
be closely associated with the attitude towards exporting adopted by
its management. This attitude was itself influenced in some cases by
managerial perception of future market trends, the benefits associated
with exporting and the nature of the comparative advantages held.
38
However, none of these relationships was individually very strong,
perhaps because there are, in fact, several groups of factors which
influence managerial attitude to exporting.
36. An association was also found between the nature of the reasons
given for exporting and export performance, with those firms
exporting for what might be described as 'aggressive' motives -
such as the desire to take advantage of global opportunities -
generally being more successful in export markets.
37. There was also an association between the number of alleged
comparative advantages and export performance.
38. For this reason the relationships concerned are shown in Figure 9.1
(and subsequent figures) as broken lines.
203
FIGURE 9.1
The Relationship between Managerial Perception of Future Market Trends,
the Benefits of Exporting and the
Nature of Comparative Advantages Held and Export Performance
However, managerial perception of future market trends, the benefits
of exporting and the comparative advantages allegedly held were, in
turn, influenced by other factors, of which one of the most important
appeared to be the nature of the product. In section 9.3 it was
pointed out that the majority of the non-exporters which had adopted
a passive attitude to exporting had done so because they had accepted
that it would be extremely difficult to export their unsophisticated
products, while the evidence presented in section 9.4 indicated that
there were significant differences in the exporting motives of firms
in different product sectors. Product characteristics also
influenced the nature of the comparative advantages allegedly held.
Indeed, the nature of the product influenced whether or not any
comparative advantages were held - most of the firms to admit that they
held no comparative advantages over their international competitors
were from the fabrication sector. Finally the significance of the
various exporting problems mentioned varied considerably by product
sector. For example, while the fabricators were primarily concerned
by the unsophisticated nature of their products and the cost and
difficulties of their transportation, the oilfield equipment
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manufacturers commented upon what were to the fabricators the less
pressing problems of invisible barriers to trade and payment
difficulties. Thus, to summarise, the nature of a firm's products
significantly influenced its management's motives for exporting and
also its perception of the problems associated with exporting,
the comparative advantages it held and future trends in the demand
for its products, and hence, in turn, influenced managerial attitude
to exporting (as shown in Figure 9.2 below). This qualitative
evidence suggesting that product characteristics influenced export
performance (through their influence on the factors influencing
managerial attitude to exporting) is consistent with the quantitative
evidence presented in chapter 8 and the discussion of the sample's
exporting activities provided in section 9.2, which together showed
that the nature of the product exerted a considerable influence over
export performance arid potential.
FIGURE 9.2
The Relationship between Product Characteristics and Export Performance
Analysis of the qualitative data also revealed that in some cases
certain characteristics of the firm - namely offshore-related
experience, nationality and size - influenced managerial attitude
to exporting (and hence export performance). First, although
many newly-established Scottish and U.K. firms argued that their
experience in the North Sea had been sufficient to provide them with
a 'track record', contacts or even a superior product which would
give them an advantage over their international competitors, it was
noticeable that all of the firms which had adopted a passive attitude
to exporting were newly-established units with no offshore experience
whatsoever prior to the development of North Sea oilfields. Second,
8 of the 9 'passive' firms were Scottish and not one a U.S.
subsidiary. (This was consistent with the finding that U.S.
subsidiaries tended to export for 'aggressive' motives). Finally,
two-thirds of the firms which had displayed a passive attitude to
exporting were small independent companies. (Again, this was
consistent with the fact that while several large companies believed
that their size was an advantage, more firms mentioned small size
as a disadvantage than as an advantage).
However, it should be noted that the results concerning the
influence exerted upon managerial attitude to exporting by firm
characteristics were inter-related in that all but one of the 'passive
firms were small or medium-sized Scottish firms, none of which had
supplied equipment to offshore markets prior to North Sea oil
developments. Similarly, it was noticeable that all but one of the
firms to mention small size as an advantage and all but one of the
firms to describe small size as a disadvantage were Scottish companies
This result can be partly attributed to the fact that Scottish firms
tended to be smaller than the units established in Scotland by firms
of other nationalities. However, the fact that the smaller U.K. and
U.S. subsidiaries tended not to comment on the significance of
their small size with respect to exporting might also suggest that for
them it was the size of the larger group of which they were only part
that was relevant as far as exporting was concerned. Thus, firm
characteristics (such as size, nationality and the nature of
offshore-related experience) influenced managerial perception of the
benefits of (and reasons for) exporting and the comparative advantages
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held over competitors and, in this way, affected managerial
attitude to exporting and hence export success. These qualitative
findings concerning the influence exerted by firm characteristics
are consistent with the quantitative evidence presented in the
previous chapter which highlighted the significance of the
relationship between offshore-related export performance and
nationality, offshore-related experience and (to a lesser extent)
size of firm.
The qualitative findings concerning the factors influencing managerial
attitude to exporting (and the relationship between this attitude
and export performance) are summarised in Figure 9.3 (below). It
can be seen that product characteristics were found to influence
management's perception of future market trends and that together
firm and product characteristics had a bearing on management's
perception of the benefits of exporting and the comparative advantages
held over competitors. in turn, these three groups of factors were
FIGURE 9.3
Factors Influencing Managerial Attitude to Exporting and Export Performance
39. Size of firm also influenced managerial perception of exporting
problems, but as there was no evidence that the latter exerted /
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found, in many cases, to influence managerial attitude to exporting.
The qualitative survey thus identified five major groups of factors
affecting managerial attitude to exporting, which itself was found
to be a vital determinant of exporting success.
/ a significant influence over managerial attitude to exporting (or





The previous chapter presented an analysis of the qualitative findings
concerning the nature of the factors influencing managerial attitude
to exporting. It was shown that the attitude towards exporting which
the managements of the surveyed firms adopted seemed to be influenced
by five main groups of factors :
(1) product characteristics
(2) firm characteristics
(3) managerial perception of future market trends
(4) managerial perception of the benefits associated
with exporting
(5) managerial perception of the comparative advantages
held over competitors.
Managerial attitude to exporting was, in turn, found to be closely
associated with export performance and, indeed, a positive attitude
to exporting appeared to be a necessary pre-requisite for exporting
success.
It was argued in Chapter 5 that the adoption of a positive attitude
to exporting was essential if the resources necessary for the
successful exploitation of overseas markets were to be committed to
exporting. That is, the development of an effective export marketing
programme was likely to suffer due to inadequate resources unless
management implemented a sensible, positive policy with respect to
exporting.
This chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the qualitative
findings concerning the relationship between the export marketing
programmes implemented by the 25 exporters of offshore-related
equipment and their export performance. In the course of this
discussion an attempt will be made to identify the part played in this
relationship by managerial attitude to exporting and the commitment
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of resources to exporting.
As the export marketing methods utilised (and hence the resource
commitment required) will depend to a large extent upon the nature
and number of the export markets exploited, this chapter commences
with an examination of the export market selection policies implemented
by the 25 exporters. This is followed (in section 10.3) by a
discussion of the actual export marketing methods utilised, with
individual sub-sections dealing with the topic areas of export
pricing, product adaptation for export markets, export promotion,
export distribution and export marketing research. Section 10.4
outlines the findings concerning the utilisation by the exporters of
the range of export services provided by a number of organisations,
including several government departments, banks, trade associations
and chambers of commerce. It was argued in Chapter 5 that these
services, particularly those provided by the BOTB, might be particularly
useful for new exporters inexperienced in the business of supplying
overseas markets and also for small firms which might not have the
resources required to efficiently develop export markets. The way
in which the surveyed exporters organised their exporting function is
examined in section 10.5 before finally, in section 10.6, the results
presented in this chapter are drawn together in the form of a
conclusion, which highlights in particular the importance of the role
played in exporting success by the commitment of resources.
10.2 EXPORT MARKET SELECTION POLICY
This section provides an analysis of the export market selection
policies adopted by the 25 firms which had exported offshore-related
equipment. It can be seen from Table 10.1 that while 7 firms had
chosen not to limit in any way the number of markets to which they
intended to export, 8 had decided to consciously select export markets
for their offshore-related equipment and the remainder had had restrictions
on the scope of their exporting activity imposed upon them.
Apart from one Scottish firm restricted under the terms of a licensing
1. The qualitative data examined in this chapter results from section C
of the topics list (see Appendix 7.5) which was answered by the 25
exporters of offshore-related equipment.
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agreement from exporting its diving systems outside European waters,
the firms having export restrictions imposed upon them were the 9
U.S. subsidiaries, which were expected to limit the scope of their
exporting activity in accordance with corporate strategy determined
by their head offices in the U.S.A.
TABLE 10.1
Market Selection Policy by Nationality of Firm
Market Selection Policy
2
Nationality of Firm Total
Scottish U.K. U.S.
No selection of export markets 3 4 0 7
Imposed restrictions on export
markets 1 0 9 10
Conscious selection of export
markets 5 3 0 8
TOTAL 9 7 9 25
SOURCE : Interview data
As shown in Table 10.2, where the Scottish subsidiary was the only
manufacturing plant outside the U.S.A.^, it was normally allocated
the Eastern Hemisphere (including Europe, Africa, the Middle and Far
East and, sometimes, Australasia);, leaving the U.S. plant (s) to serve
North, South and Central America. Singapore appeared to be the
favoured location for the second plant established outside the U.S.A.
as this allowed the Eastern Hemisphere to be neatly subdivided, with
the Singapore plant serving the Far East and Australasia (and sometimes
also the Middle East) leaving the remainder of the Eastern Hemisphere
2. The joint-venture category has been omitted from this and subsequent
tables since none of the joint-ventures had exported offshore-related
equipment.
3. The Scottish subsidiary was normally the first manufacturing plant
of its type to be established outside the U.S.A.
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for-the Scottish subsidiary. Finally, if a further plant is
required in the Eastern Hemisphere it is likely to be established
either in Norway (due to the size of that market and the degree to
which it is protected) or France (because of the advantage of having
a 'French connection' in Abu Dhabi and several African markets).
Indeed, one of the U.S. firms had already placed a manufacturing
plant in France, while most of the others had strong sales offices
or agencies in Paris.
TABLE IP.2




Territory Allocated to Scottish
Subsidiary
C USA (2); Singapore Europe; North & West Africa
T USA; Singapore; France;
Argentina; Brazil
Europe; Middle East.
U USA (2) W. Europe; North & West Africa
V USA (2); Singapore E. Hemisphere (shared with
Singapore).
W USA E. Hemisphere
Z USA E. Hemisphere
B2 USA; Singapore Europe; Africa; Middle East




SOURCE : Interview data
However, the rigidity with which these market allocations were imposed
varied considerably. For example, in contrast to the very rigid
market allocation policies imposed on four subsidiaries, the
subsidiary with the least structured policy described it as follows :
"The Eastern Hemisphere/Western Hemisphere arrangement
was rigid until the last 3-4 years but the ideal situation
is to have all the factories full and if any plant is having
problems we move business about. We'll take business
anywhere and we'll quote anywhere. Very often 2-3 plants
tender for the same order."
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Although export market allocation in the remaining four subsidiaries
was fairly rigid, some flexibility was allowed in order to spread
the group's workload whenever a particular plant was experiencing
4
difficulties. For example, one subsidiary which had been
encountering considerable difficulty in winning orders explained
that it had managed to prevent the Singapore subsidiary tendering
for an order for India, despite the fact that its own price was
considerably higher.
Within their allocated sales territories the U.S. subsidiaries had
undertaken very little selection of export markets. For example,
one of the oilfield equipment manufacturers explained that although
the Scottish plant was the centre for all operations outside the
American continent it was not necessary to select export markets:
"We have a very, very small customer base. We get a
lot of big orders from very few customers so we do not
shut anybody off or we could shut off 10% of our
business."
Most of the firms which did consciously select export markets were
large companies. These included two large process plant manufacturers
(each of which ignored markets in which it felt it did not hold a
comparative advantage of some kind) and the large power plant
manufacturer which explained that "no one can cover the whole world
completely".^ The larger, diversified fabricator carefully planned
product launches in selected markets, concentrating effort upon the
development of one market at any one time. For example, with
respect to its tubular connectors this exporter exploited first the
U.K. market and then the Norwegian market before turning its attention
to the U.S.S.R. The market selection policy of the large electronics
firm was clearly influenced by the fact that it considered itself to be
relatively inexperienced in the offshore oil business :
"The first thing we must do is consolidate on our
North Sea territory. Development must be steady,
we must not throw our interests too wide so we
can't perform adequately in any of these markets."
4. In these organisations tenders were co-ordinated by headquarters
in order to prevent the group's various plants from entering
into competition with each other.
5. This exporter emphasised the importance of concentrating on
North-west Europe where equipment can be sold to the large
contractors in Italy, West Germany, France and Holland for use
worldwide.
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Similarly, a small fabricator explained :
"We've only been in this business a few years. We
can only tackle so much effectively with given
resources."
Thus, these responses indicate that in deciding to limit the scope
of their exporting activities several of these firms took into
consideration their previous experience and their resources. However,
the fact that the group of firms which had decided to select export
markets included four large firms and only two small firms would
appear to conflict with the proposition that small firms are more
likely to consciously restrict their exporting activities due to a
shortage of resources. In fact, the qualitative evidence presented
above indicates that even firms designated for the purposes of this
study as 'large' did not have the resources to market their products
world-wide, while in particular, the launch of new (offshore-related)
products to a new (offshore) market on a global basis required a
scale of investment beyond that feasible for any firm, small or
6
large, newly established in the offshore supplies business.
Similarly, it was noticeable that the firms which were not restricting
their exporting activities included four small firms and only two
large firms (although one of the small firms was part of a larger
group). Once again, at first sight this would appear to be the
opposite trend to that which might have been expected. However, it
is obvious from the following statement by a small Scottish firm that
in at least one case there had not been a conscious decision not to
select export markets, but rather this strategy was more the result of
the total absence of a formal exporting policy :
"I wouldn't know enough to select export markets,
I would sell to anybody."
6. The best illustration of the influence of resource availability on
export market development concerned the planned establishment by a
Scottish firm of a series of offshore support bases overseas :
"We're a small company, therefore we have to identify particular
geographical areas. We survey them all and then boil them down
to one or two, we don't have the management depth for more than
that. Therefore it's a progressive planned path of development
in certain markets. There is a temptation to go 'flag-planting',
that is, to stick 'flags' in many areas without serious effort
at successful organisation. It's a question of finite resources,
we can't develop every market."
214
Thus, in addition to providing evidence that some firms took into
consideration resource availability (and also the scale of investment
required) in determining their export market selection policy, the
qualitative findings also provided partial explanations for the
absence of an obvious association between size of company and export
market selection policy and, in particular, the lack of evidence
suggesting that smaller firms were, in general, more likely to choose
to consciously limit the scope of their export marketing activity in
order to avoid spreading their resources too thinly.
It was also noticeable that the actual involvement in export marketing
of the firms which stated that they did not restrict the scope of
their export marketing activity varied considerably, from one firm
which had only exported offshore-related equipment to Norway to
another which had exported all over the world. Further analysis
revealed, in fact, that the sample's stated policy with respect to the
selection of export markets was not a good indication of the actual
7
spread of its offshore-related exporting activity. For example, the
majority of the firms which did not intend to restrict their exporting
activities in any way were exporting to no more than 6 offshore-related
markets, while another firm was exporting offshore-related equipment
to around 30 markets within the Eastern Hemisphere, to which it was
restricted.
As far as the actual scope of offshore-related exporting activity was
concerned, there was evidence that small firms tended to export to
a smaller number of markets than did larger firms. For example, not
one of the small exporters was involved in more than a dozen export
markets. This evidence was thus more consistent with expectations
concerning the relationship between size and export activity than were
the findings relating to the exporters stated export intentions. In
addition, a strong association was found to exist between prior
offshore-related experience and the scope of offshore-related exporting
activity, in that none of the firms without any form of prior offshore-
7. See Appendix 10.1. The data concerning the actual scope of
offshore-related exporting activity relates to only 22 exporters
as it stems from 0.10 of the statistical questionnaire which was
not answered by firms B, Y and K2 which had failed to export
offshore-related equipment in the period for which data was
collected.
related experience was exporting to more than a dozen offshore
markets overseas. It should be noted that once again the important
fact appeared to be that the group was established in the industry
and the fact that the Scottish-based unit was itself new to the
offshore business seemed relatively unimportant. Given these
findings and the fact that the majority of the Scottish exporters
surveyed were small firms without any form of previous offshore-
related experience, it was not surprising to find that Scottish
exporters tended to export to fewer offshore-related export
markets than did the other exporters, with none exporting to more
than a dozen offshore markets overseas. Thus, the scope of the
exporting activity undertaken was found to be associated not only with
the size of the firm, but also its offshore-related experience and
nationality (although in practice these factors were inter-related).
It was suggested in Chapter 6 that firms which supplied a limited
number of export markets might find exporting more profitable than
firms which dispersed their marketing effort over a large number of
markets. However, although the majority of the exporters which
considered export sales to be more profitable than domestic sales
were involved in a small number of export markets, overall no clear
relationship was found to exist between the actual scope of offshore-
related exporting activity and the perceived relative profitability
of export and domestic sales. Nor was there any obvious association
between the scope of export marketing activity and exporting success
(measured in terms of the proportion of offshore-related turnover
exported), as some of the firms most heavily involved in offshore-
related exporting supplied equipment to a very small number of markets
while for other firms involved in a large number of offshore markets
overseas exports represented a relatively small proportion of total
offshore-related sales. However, a positive association was found
between the volume of offshore-related exports and the number of
export markets supplied, that is, most of the high volume offshore-
related exporters marketed their equipment in a large number of
Q
offshore markets overseas.
8. See Appendix 10.2.
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Summary
The U.S. subsidiaries located in Scotland were all restricted (to
varying degrees) in the scope of their export marketing activity by
limitations imposed upon them by their head offices in the U.S.A.
As these multinationals develop their global operations, establishing
further manufacturing facilities outside the U.S.A., it appears that
the territory allocated to the Scottish subsidiary will shrink (in
geographical terms at least). On the other hand, the majority of
these multinationals have in the past been willing to maintain
some flexibility in their market allocation policies in order to
ensure that any one plant will not suffer unduly as a result of a
downturn in demand in its territory.
The export market selection policy implemented was found to be a
poor indicator of the current scope of offshore-related exporting
activity. When a second measure of the scope of exporting activity
was adopted - the number of overseas markets to which offshore-related
equipment was exported in the period for which data was collected -
associations were found to exist between this variable and the size,
offshore-related experience and nationality of the exporters surveyed.
In particular, small exporters with no previous offshore-related
experience (many of them Scottish) tended to be involved in fewer
offshore-related export markets than were other exporters.
However, no evidence was found to suggest that the number of export
markets supplied significantly influenced either offshore-related
export performance or the perceived relative profitability of export
and domestic sales.
10.3 EXPORT MARKETING METHODS
10.3.1 Export Pricing
When asked to compare export and domestic ex-works prices, many
exporters argued that it was difficult to generalise since each
contract was treated separately, with the price quoted depending
very much on the circumstances of the particular contract and, among
other things, the capacity loading in the plant. The following
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explanation provides a good example of the complicated nature of
the pricing process :
"The pricing philosophy is basically the same wherever it
is. We build up the costs and add the mark-ups necessary.
At the end of the day when in negotiations we take
whatever actions are necessary to get the job, taking into
account the loading of the factory and so on. We take
everything into account."
Most of the exporters stressing the difficulty of comparing export
and domestic prices concluded that they were roughly the same. Among
the other exporters to state that ex-works prices for export and
domestic orders were roughly comparable were those firms which argued
that export markets were just as competitive as the domestic market,
and also two exporters which pointed out that they used the same price
list throughout the world, as one explained :
"We have one price list for everybody - they are the same
customers anyway. As more and more of the big oil
companies centralise their purchasing office we find we
are dealing with the same people, the same department is
handling the Middle East, Far East and so on. BP's
central purchasing worldwide is done from Harlow. Shell
have two - New York buys for North and South America and
the Eastern Hemisphere is handled out of the Hague.
Total buys everything from Paris."
It can be seen from Table 10.3 that 20% of the exporters sold their
products in export markets at prices above those which pertained to
the domestic market. Some exporters explained that this was because
competition was less severe overseas, but others argued that higher
prices were necessary to cover the additional costs and risks involved
in exporting. Finally, only one exporter sold its products overseas
at prices below those in the domestic market (as a result of a
deliberate policy to make its exports more competitive in order to
increase sales volume).
Thus, most exporters estimated that export and domestic prices were
roughly equivalent. In most cases this was apparently due to the
competitive nature of export markets (with several exporters commenting
that they were operating in a world market in which it was very
difficult to isolate segments in which there was less competition)
and in only two cases was uniform pricing the result of the use of
standard price lists applicable throughout the world. Table 10.3
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TABLE 10.3
The Association between the Relative Pricing and Relative





Export & Domestic Sales
Exporting more Export & domestic Exporting less
profitable sales equally profitable
profitable
Tota
Export prices higher 3 1 1 5
Export & domestic
prices roughly
equivalent 3 12 4 19
Export prices lower 0 0 1 1
TOTAL 6 13 6 25
SOURCE : Interview data
indicates that apart from the single exporter which had purposely reduced
its profit margin, five other exporters which charged similar or even
higher prices in export markets nevertheless found export marketing to
be less profitable (due to the additional costs of exporting). It was
therefore interesting that three exporters which were charging similar
prices in export and domestic markets argued that exporting was more
profitable. This apparently inconsistent result might conceivably
be explained in terms of different costing methods applied to export
and domestic orders, but unfortunately no data concerning this aspect
was collected during the course of the survey. Finally, as might be
expected, the majority of the exporters which had set export prices
9
above those for domestic orders had found exporting more profitable.
10.3.2 Product Adaptation Policy"1"0
Although they undertake continual product development in response to
9. There was no obvious association between the relative pricing policy
adopted and firm size, nationality, experience, offshore-related
export performance, offshore-related export sales volume or product
characteristics.
10. The nature of the products exported by the sample has already been
discussed in section 9.2 above.
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problems created by new environments, the oilfield equipment
manufacturers agreed that basically they produced standard products
for sale worldwide, with a typical comment being :
"The tools that are exported are no different to the ones
sold for use in the North Sea, they are still to API
standards."
On the other hand, although the basic design of their equipment is
standard, for the wellhead manufacturers each major offshore contract
will be different in some way from the last, requiring the development
of an individual wellhead system. The significance of the modification
sometimes required was highlighted by one firm's comment that it
turned down orders that it couldn't handle technically.
The exporters in the process plant sector all undertake product
adaptation for export markets. For example, pumps for high pressure
fields require to be manufactured from a higher grade of steel while
there will be trim variations on valves used offshore depending upon
several factors such as the service it is to fulfil, the nature of
the fluid which will pass through it and its location.
In the fabrication sector, although diving systems will be adapted
according to the depth of water in which they are to be used,
environmental conditions are not a factor influencing the need to
modify accommodation modules and other containerised units, the
internal design of these items being determined solely by the customer's
particular requirements. Similarly, although the rig-builder produces
drilling rigs to a standard design, "the client has the chance to
jockey all the equipment around, it's all subject to negotiation."
Also, every support vessel built by shipbuilder B will be a 'one-off'
constructed either to the customer's specification or to the yard's
own design given the function the vessel is to perform for the client.
In the power plant sector there was some disagreement. While the
motor control centre manufacturer argued that very little modification
was required for overseas markets, the motor/generator manufacturer
stressed that it was very important to modify equipment :
"We can't sell something that Shell wants to Aramco if it
doesn't meet his specifications. You've got to give him
what he wants. He writes his own specification. Most
specifications we receive are very, very detailed."
It is impossible to discuss the importance of product modification
without referring to particular products, and as the survey covered
a relatively small number of firms in several different product
sectors it is extremely difficult to reach conclusions which hold
for the sample as a whole. In particular, no evidence was found
to suggest that firms manufacturing the same or similar products
adopted different policies with respect to product modification
depending upon their attitudes to exporting.^ However, it is_
clear from this discussion that most items of offshore-related
equipment exported by the sample (with the exception of certain items
of oilfield equipment, such as the more basic down-hole tools) are
either 'one-offs' or products which will require a degree of modific¬
ation in order to meet the needs of overseas customers. As one
electronic equipment manufacturer remarked :
"The product must be tailored to the market. We must
remember that the products have been developed for the
North Sea."
Thus, although only two firms mentioned product adaptation as a problem
12
affecting exports, the fact that for most firms exporting will
require product adaptation and development means that entry into export
markets will not be costless.
10.3.3 Export Promotion
It can be seen from Table 10.4 (below) that 22 of the exporters
had undertaken personal selling, making this the most popular method
of promoting exports.
11. As was suggested in Chapter 6 might be the case.
12. While a further 4 firms stated that their product ranges were
not suitable for all export markets - see p.199 in Chapter 9.
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TABLE 10.4
Methods of Export Promotion
Method "■
Number of Exporters Utilising
this method of Promotion 13
Personal Selling 22
Advertising 19
Sales Promotion, of which 18
exhibitions & trade missions (14)
sales literature ( 7)
direct mail shots ( 1)
other ( 2)
Publicity 2
SOURCE : Interview data
One reason for the popularity of personal selling was the nature of
the offshore supplies market and, in particular, the small number of
customers which exist for most offshore-related products - as one
fabricator pointed out ... "it's not like selling brushes". Where
the global offshore market does consist of a small number of very
important customers an export sales team can cover the entire market,
as a second fabricator explained :
"It's not like going into a market and having to develop
trading links and contacts, it's not like selling biscuits
into Indonesia. Our network of contacts is already
established, it's basically U.S., Houston-based. We need
to develop a relatively small but very aggressive team of
people - sales people, engineers and designers - who are
prepared to be very, very mobile."
Moreover, the drilling rig manufacturer's customers were so geographically
concentrated that its sales network consisted of a single office (in
Houston) :
13. Some firms provided multiple responses.
"It's a close knit community within which we do
business - 90% of the drilling contractors are in the
U.S.A. and 85% of them are based in Houston so selling
is concentrated there. There's no need for us to get
bogged down in a whole fleet of salesmen."
Indeed, several exporters commented on the fact that the offshore oil
business was like a 'club' based in Houston, membership of which was
essential. Typical of the explanations provided was the following :
"Everybody knows everybody else. In the oil business
it's the old pals act again and again which is important.
The last order I got in the U.S.A. was from a man I'd
worked with in Flushing 12 years ago. I hadn't heard
from him since but he called me up and asked me out to
lunch and over lunch we set up a deal."
The fact that the exporters often found themselves involved in negot¬
iating high-value contracts with a multi-individual customer also
influenced the choice of promotional methods, as is clear from the
following remark :
"We believe in direct selling. The orders we get are
E^-l million each, where it is possible to identify 3
or 4 people to get to per order. Therefore by and
large we work with technical sales experts."
For example, one wellhead manufacturer stressed the ability of
salesmen to identify and reach both the senior officials apparently
responsible for the purchasing decision and also those people that
used the product and were therefore likely to influence the final
purchasing decision. The flexibility of salesmen was perhaps even
more important to the motor/generator manufacturer which pointed out
that in most cases it was selling to a multi-client customer,
including not only the end user but also an engineering contractor,
architect/consultant and the original equipment manufacturer, that is,
the manufacturer of the pumps or compressors to be driven by its
motors. The mobility of the sales effort provided by the salesmen
was also stressed by several exporters, with the following remark
being a good example of the explanations provided :
"The sales guys should be like Bertram Mills circus -
living in a tent. If the market goes into decline
they take the tent elsewhere, as the market changes
we have to change with it."
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Finally, apart from giving sales presentations to customers while
overseas, salesmen can also perform other tasks, such as checking
on the performance of agents and gathering valuable marketing
intelligence, as one marketing manager explained :
"I go overseas and knock on doors. You discover problems
with agents once you get out there - their letter-writing
might be good but they may be sitting on their backsides.
Also I find out from the customer what their forward
plans are over the next 6-12 months."
Only two exporters mentioned that they used publicity in the press
or on radio or television as a non-personal means of stimulating
demand for their products in export markets, despite the fact that
publicity is in fact 'free advertising' not paid for by the sponsor.
Moreover, while one of these firms was quite happy providing its overseas
agents with material for press releases, the other explained that it was
reconsidering this practice :
"We've used press releases but I don't like them. It
lets your competitors know with whom you're doing
business, that is, who has business to offer."
A variety of forms of sales promotion were used by the exporters to
stimulate demand for their products overseas, including exhibitions,
trade missions, direct mail shots, sales literature (such as brochures
and catalogues) and seminars. There was some disagreement concerning
the benefits which could be expected to be derived from participation
in exhibitions and trade missions overseas. For example, one of the
smaller, less well-established electrical/electronic equipment
manufacturers sought a number of benefits from exhibiting overseas :
"It's a good way of finding agents. Also it's a good way of
backing up agents. They can't stock everything, we're very
diversified for such a small company. We take along what he
wants and he brings along the clients and with a bit of luck
we sell it, that's why we always take working equipment over
to exhibitions. Also you meet the people you want to speak
to, it's a good way of short-circuiting the information
channels."
On the other hand, one established electrical equipment exporter
participated in exhibitions only on an irregular basis and for a very
specific purpose :
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"We have used them in the past, to get into a new
market essentially. The North Sea is a good example
of this, we exhibited in Houston for 5 years around
the time the North Sea was developing."
Several firms took part occasionally in non-offshore specific British
trade missions and exhibitions overseas, although only when these
were considered 'special'. Among the trade missions regarded as
special were those to Japan, China and Eastern Europe (including
Poland, East Germany and the U.S.S.R.). While only two exporters
mentioned as a promotional tool the provision of seminars and only one
referred to its use of mail shots directed at prospective customer
organisations to provide leads for its salesmen, several exporters
did mention their use of sales literature (including catalogues and
brochures), with the following being typical of the remarks
emphasising the importance of appropriate, technical, sales literature :
"To sell our products, it's no good telling everybody how
wonderful we are, they need to know what we've done, so
a reference list is very important - plus the normal
technical literature."
Although most of the exporters undertook advertising, this was,
however, entirely restricted to the trade press. Moreover, although
a few exporters (in the process plant and electrical equipment sectors)
advertised in technical journals not specifically directed at the
14
offshore market, most of the advertisers concentrated on a number of
offshore-related (or at least oil-related) publications which are
internationally read, as one large U.S. multinational explained :
"We advertise in oil journals which go worldwide but
there's no specialised advertising in export markets.
We do quite a lot of first class advertising, in most
of the magazines we have a full page or two."
In the case of the U.S. subsidiaries, policy with respect to the
advertising undertaken in the international oil magazines (and also the
international oil exhibitions and promotional materials such as films)
was generally determined by their head offices in the U.S.A., with the
Scottish subsidiaries merely being left to organise the local marketing
effort, including the offshore exhibition held in Aberdeen.
Even among those exporters which did advertise, opinions as to the
14. Although this advertising primarily stressed these firms' general
spheres of competence, their offshore capability was also mentioned.
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usefulness of advertising varied considerably. For example,
although concerned about its cost, one newly-established U.K. firm
considered it to be essential to advertise in oil journals such as
Ocean Industry ...
"which is recognised and is in most offices throughout
the oil world. We take 6 months in every year which
is quite expensive but the response from it is excellent."
On the otter; hand, a few advertisers admitted that their advertising
budgets were limited, primarily because they felt that they were
already well-known and that therefore advertising was less essential,
a typical comment being the following :
"Advertising tends to be a public relations exercise,
we are already well-known from Alaska to New Zealand
in the things we do. It is just taking a corporate
message occasionally to people we already know."
Indeed, two of the non-advertising exporters argued that as they were
established in the offshore oil business there was no need to
advertise overseas as they could depend upon 1word-of-mouth' advertising
to work on their behalf.
Summary
Thus, despite the fact that several firms described the cost of
overseas selling as a problem influencing export performance,^" most
exporters regarded personal selling as the first essential as regards
the promotion of exports. This fact was evident not only from the
data contained in Table 10.4 (above), but also from comments such as
"advertising is all very well but you need personal contact as
early as possible" and "we spend a lot on travel and sales visits,
this is better value than money spent on advertising". A key factor
influencing this emphasis on personal selling appeared to be the small
number of customers which existed in most sectors of the offshore
market, although the preference for personal selling also appeared
to be influenced by the geographical concentration and multi-individual
nature of customer organisations and the high-value nature of offshore
contracts.
15. See p. 198.
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However, it is also clear from the discussion of the methods of
export promotion utilised by the exporters that the various promotional
tools were to a certain extent seen as performing different functions,
with advertising being used to create and maintain an awareness of the
exporter, its capability and its reputation in customer organisations,
while the main sales effort was through personal selling. It is
therefore not surprising that most exporters used more than one method
of export promotion. Indeed, 15 exporters utilised personal selling,
advertising and some form of sales promotion simultaneously.
As all but 2 of the 25 exporters had adopted a positive attitude to
exporting it was impossible to reach a general conclusion as regards
any possible relationship between managerial attitude to exporting and
the commitment undertaken in promoting offshore-related products in
export markets. Nevertheless, it was interesting that neither of
the firms which had adopted a passive attitude to exporting had undertaken
any form of export promotion whatsoever.
Evidence was found, however, of a clear, positive association between
the number of methods of export promotion utilised and export
performance. In particular, none of the exporters which had failed
to undertake any form of promotional activity aimed at offshore markets
overseas had exported more than 10% of their offshore-related turnover,
while none of those exporters employing two or less methods of export
promotion exported more than 30% of their offshore-related turnover.
Thus those exporters which employed a wide range of methods of export
promotion tended to export a higher proportion of their offshore-related
turnover.
At first sight there did not appear to be a close association between
size of firm and the extent of promotional activity undertaken, in
that half of the small exporters had utilised three or four methods
of promotion. However, most of these units were part of larger
groups and in fact four of the five small independent exporters
utilised no more than two methods of promoting exports. This suggests
that in these four small firms export promotion was restricted by a
shortage of resources. This lack of resources resulted in three of
these firms being unable to undertake personal selling overseas
(despite its recognised importance as an export sales promotional tool),
while the entire personal selling activity undertaken by the fourth
16. See Appendix 10.3.
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consisted of two unrewarding sales trips to India by its managing
director, who explicitly mentioned that although he would like to
employ salesmen he just could not afford them. In addition, it
was noticeable that the fifth small, independent Scottish exporter,
which did possess a small international sales team, commented :
"We're a bit thin on the sales side but we're having
to make do until we've got more finance. We'll
probably use marketing agents overseas."
Thus, strong evidence was found that in some small firms export
promotion was restricted by a lack of resources, (this result being
consistent with the previous finding that several firms regarded their
17
small size as a disadvantage in export markets).
In addition, in general there was an association between the number
of methods of export promotion utilised and the nationality and
previous offshore-related experience of the exporters. In particular,
the U.S. subsidiaries tended to utilise more methods of export
promotion than the other exporters (especially the native Scottish
firms). The U.S. subsidiaries were also amongst those firms with
previous offshore-related experience (at the group level if not at the
level of the Scottish subsidiary itself) which were found in general
to use a greater number of methods of export promotion than firms
18
without any form of prior offshore-related experience. The extent
of the inter-relationship between these firm characteristics is
highlighted by the fact that small, Scottish firms with no form of
prior offshore-related experience accounted for four of the six
exporters which did not advertise their offshore-related products
and for all three of the exporters which did not undertake personal
selling.
10.3.4 Export Distribution
It was shown in the previous section (10.3.3) that 21 of the 25 exporters
were selling their equipment direct to export customers on a regular
basis. Of these, eight exporters depended upon export salesmen which
were based in the U.K., a further eight had established permanent
offices overseas in addition to their export sales teams based in the
U.K. and five exporters had overseas bases but were without U.K.-based
export sales teams. Thus, as shown in Table 10.5 (below), 16 exporters
17. See p. 197-198.
18. See Appendix 10.4.
228
regularly sent salesmen and other company employees on overseas sales
trips, while 13 had established permanent bases overseas.
TABLE 10.5
Methods of Export Distribution
Methods of Distribution
Number of Exporters Utilising
this Method of Distribution
Agents 18
Overseas sales trips by salesmen
and other company employees 16
Overseas sales subsidiaries 13
Associated companies 4
U.K. supply companies 3
SOURCE : Interview data
The location of these permanent bases overseas reflected the pattern
of purchasing authority for offshore-related equipment, which is, as
19
has already been pointed out, centred on Houston. For example,
one power plant manufacturer explained that it had ...
"a strong operation in the States partly because of the
volume of domestic business there is, but in addition
because of the considerable amount of business dictated
and influenced by U.S. companies not for use in the
States - much of the equipment for the oil and petro¬
chemical industry worldwide is handled out of Houston."
Similarly, the second most important location for a sales office
appeared to be London (where several oil companies have established
purchasing offices), while other favoured sales office locations
were Paris (important for the French-speaking African markets) and
the other major cities of Europe (where direct selling activity was
aimed at the head offices of large contractors operating worldwide).
However, the pattern of purchasing authority will, of course, depend
19. See p. 222.
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upon the nature of the product. Generally speaking, purchasing
authority was found to be particularly concentrated in the case of the
major expensive items of equipment such as drilling rigs and power
plant, with purchasing decisions regarding smaller, less expensive and
more frequently purchased items such as down-hole tools being made at
a lower level in a number of locations. In this respect it was
noticeable that two U.S. exporters of oilfield equipment (for whom
down-hole tools represent a major product line) had established sales
networks which in the Eastern Hemisphere alone consisted of 52 and
31 overseas offices respectively. For example, the latter firm had
divided the Eastern Hemisphere into 31 'districts' "which are located
in every major offshore location in the world, where all the selling
is done out of the district".
However, these overseas subsidiaries were set up not only as sales
outlets but also as service bases, that is, they were established in
order to be able to fulfil the oil industry's demanding requirements
with respect to quick and efficient maintenance. It has already been
pointed out that the support of export markets was regarded as a major
exporting problem by a significant number of firms, which argued that
it was too expensive and too time-consuming to send U.K.-based personnel
20
overseas to undertake repair and maintenance. The only solution to
this problem was generally seen as being the provision of service
facilities overseas, either by establishing wholly-owned service bases
or by appointing agents to undertake the service function.
Indeed, the ability of agents to provide a local maintenance service
21
was a major reason for their employment by the majority of the exporters.
For example, the pump manufacturer emphasised :
"the need for some indigenous type of organisation to really
get off the ground for exporting. It's difficult to make a
direct sale from here of equipment produced from here. V&
have 70-80 agencies which have service facilities which we
use, established companies serving similar industries but
not pumps."
A second important reason for the use of agents was the legal requirement
which exists in many countries (including Brazil, Mexico and the Middle
20. See p. 198.
21. Altogether 18 of the 25 exporters employed overseas agents (see
Table 10.5).
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East) that a local agent, usually a national of that country,
be appointed. Thirdly, agents can, of course, carry out a number
of selling and other activities on behalf of the exporter.
On the other hand, some of the manufacturer/agency relationships
were found to be extremely complex and, as has already been pointed
22
out, involved the exporter in a number of problems, particularly
when the precise details of the arrangement were not contained in a
tight agency contract. The great majority of the agency relation¬
ships were, however, based on detailed, formal contracts, roost of
which specifically prohibited the distribution and sale of competitive
products. Nevertheless, several exporters mentioned that the very
fact that agents handled other companies' products at all created
problems, as one observed :
"Agents are not committed to your particular company, they
peddle a lot of companies' equipment, which is not the
best situation. You lose a lot of time on a contract if
the agent is not doing his job properly."
Only one exporter actually sold its (electronic) equipment to its
agents and only one further exporter used its agents as stockists of
its oilfield equipment. Thus, as far as selling activity was concerned,
in the vast majority of cases agents were employed simply to support
sales effort in the local market and forward enquiries to the
manufacturers. These firms in turn tendered for the contract and,
if successful, supplied the equipment direct from their Scottish plants.
However, the exact relationship between a manufacturer and its agent
during negotiations was often very much more complicated than this
simplified picture, with the exact manner in which salesmen and agents
combined to provide an effective sales effort during negotiations
varying by exporter, by agency (and, in particular, its precise area of
competence), and by contract, with, for example, the manufacturer's own
salesmen tending to play a greater part in the case of large or technically
complex contracts and generally becoming more involved as negotiations
moved towards the later, critical stages. Generally, however, agents
were used primarily ...
"for making contacts, not selling. They know the
language, the customs, how to get to the people in
the government and so on."
22. See p. 198.
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Several exporters distributed sales literature through their
overseas agents, partly in order to keep them interested. However,
the most common form of support given to overseas agents was a visit
by company employees. One experienced exporter summed up the
situation concerning the support, motivation and management of agents
as follows :
"At the end of the day agents are only as good as you
can make them. You must service them and respond to
them, they'll do nothing if you let them. Agents
come in 3 varieties : the unexcited variety where you
can kick their backsides and still get no effort; the
separately excited variety where you can kick their
backsides every 6 months and get effort; and the
self-excited variety where you have to hold them back
- there's not too many of them though."
Nevertheless the major factor motivating an agent is, of course, the
23
commission received on sales, and it was for this reason that one
of the process plant manufacturers argued that major items of capital
equipment were best sold direct rather than through agents :
"Agents are motivated by getting a regular percentage
frequently on regular sales. Direct selling is the
only way to sell because we are in capital goods which
come infrequently in large lumps."
Of the four small firms which had not undertaken personal selling in
export markets on a regular basis, one had chosen to export through
overseas agents which carried out all selling and maintenance
activities. The remaining three firms were exporting through
Aberdeen subsidiaries of multinational offshore supply companies, an
arrangement which apparently offered these small firms two main
advantages. Firstly, these supply companies possessed established
relationships with the major offshore customers worldwide, which the
manufacturers could only develop themselves at some expense over a
considerable period of time. Second, these multinationals had
exporting experience and could undertake all the necessary export-
related activities (which require expertise and would have involved
the manufacturers in substantial investment). Hence, to these firms
exporting was, as one remarked, "just like domestic business". Thus,
these four small firms, which did not have the resources to undertake
23. Together with the selection of agents in new markets, the
calculation of the commission due to agents was an area which,
in the absence of a precise contract, was found to create
problems for exporters.
232
effective direct selling, had chosen to export through middlemen.
Finally, a few British exporters were utilising the overseas sales
and service networks of their parent organisations, where appropriate.
For example, one exporter explained that its parent had ...
"a lot of footholds, extremely large footholds in
some areas. For example, they are doing a lot
of negotiating in China so we are doing our selling
in China through them."
Summary
Thus, although very much dependent upon the nature of the product,
purchasing authority for offshore-related equipment tended to be
heavily concentrated in Houston and, to a lesser extent, in London
and other major European cities. Despite this, many offshore-
related manufacturers considered it essential to have a comprehensive
network of local representatives (be they agents or wholly-owned
sales and service outlets) in order to be able to fulfil the oil
industry's demanding requirements with respect to quick and efficient
maintenance and also the local government's regulations as regards
'domestic content'.
Overall, the U.S. subsidiaries tended to establish their own sales
and service bases overseas (supplemented where necessary by the
appointment of agents) whereas those British companies which had
developed global sales and service networks tended to rely more
heavily on agents. For example, the 13 exporters which did have their
own sales and service outlets overseas consisted of 7 out of 9 U.S.
subsidiaries but only 6 out of 16 British exporters of offshore-
related equipment. Moreover, it was noticeable that three sizeable
British companies (in different product sectors) which claimed to
have established agencies in virtually every country in the world had
not yet taken the step of establishing a sinqle sales office overseas
(and, incredibly, one of these exporters employed only one salesman
24
for the entire export market). In these cases it appeared that an
unwillingness to risk resources in export markets may have influenced
the determination of the sales and distribution network.
24. This suggests an unequal distribution of sales effort between
the domestic and export markets, a question which will be
discussed in greater detail below.
However, undoubtedly part of the explanation for this difference
in distribution methods apparently related to company nationality
lies in the fact that the U.S. subsidiaries in Scotland to a
considerable extent inherited an existing sales network originally
established to sell and service equipment manufactured in the U.S.A.,
whereas several of the British exporters were completely new,
independent firms without any prior offshore-related experience.
That is, the establishment of an appropriately located network of
sales and service bases was something which only those firms which
had been involved in the offshore business for a substantial period
of time could be expected to achieve. This is evident from the
fact that the 13 exporters with overseas sales and service bases
consisted of six established firms, six new units with prior
experience at group level (that is, 6 subsidiaries of established
companies) and one small, new firm which had started to develop its
own sales offices overseas only with considerable financial backing
from its parent company.
It should also be re-emphasised that the U.S. subsidiaries were, of
course, part of large organisations which had the resources to
establish overseas sales and service bases, which was not the case
with all the British exporters (particularly the Scottish firms),
several of which were small companies which couldn't even afford to
25
employ an export salesman, never mind set up an overseas sales
subsidiary. For example, one firm had undertaken a detailed
costing exercise :
"We sent a man on a 90-day tour of the Middle East and
he found that to keep a man and his secretary in Abu
Dhabi would cost £100,000 a year. We are a very cautious
lot, there 1s no way we'd put up that much front money.
The firm is very conservative, outlook very narrow."
Thus, firm size and length of experience were found to significantly
influence the methods of export distribution utilised by the sample.
There was evidence that small firms begin to export through
organisations in the domestic market which relieve them of most of
the problems associated with exporting. Thereafter, these firms may
attempt to develop their own links with overseas markets, perhaps
firstly by exporting through overseas agents and then by employing
25. See pp. 226-227.
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export sales representatives to sell direct to the customer. In
time, when the company has increased in both size and exporting
experience, it may establish its own sales subsidiaries overseas.
The U.S. subsidiaries located in Scotland did, of course, have the
advantage of being part of large organisations well-established in
the offshore oil supplies business. However, there was evidence
that the difference in the export distribution methods utilised by
exporters of different nationality could not simply be explained in
terms of these two variables. In particular, certain large
established British exporters were found to rely entirely on agents
in overseas markets, having failed to commit the resources necessary
26
to establish even one permanent office overseas.
This observed difference in behaviour as regards the methods of
export distribution utilised by firms of different nationality is
not favourable from the point of view of British exporters in that
a clear association was found between exporting success and the use
of export distribution methods involving direct contact with, and the
27
investment of resources in, export markets. For example, none of
the firms selling indirectly to export customers exported more than
one-third of their offshore-related turnover, while all but one of
the exporters which had achieved this level of exporting success
possessed sales and service subsidiaries overseas.
10.3.5 Export Marketing Research
It has already been pointed out that only a few firms mentioned
the collection and analysis of export marketing research data as a
28
problem area. Moreover, while one U.S. subsidiary argued that it
was not too difficult to keep up-to-date with the global offshore
situation because "the oil world is a very small place", another
exporter (entirely dependent upon its salesmen for export marketing
intelligence) commented :
"If we cover the major oil companies that's about all
we need to know. All the oil companies tell us their
plans worldwide."
26. Nor had either of the exporters which had adopted a passive
attitude to exporting committed resources to exporting, having
both decided to export through middlemen.
27. See Appendix 10.5. A similar association was found between
methods of export distribution and volume of offshore-related
exports.
28. See p. 198.
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Thus, it appeared that in general the collection of export marketing
intelligence did not represent as big a problem for the sample as it
does for manufacturers in other industries, due to the concentration
of purchasing authority (for most offshore-related products) in a
small number of customer organisations in certain key locations (such
, 29
as Houston).
The sources of export marketing intelligence utilised by the exporters
of offshore-related equipment surveyed were classified into three
categories: the trade press; external sources (including the 0S0,
BOTB, trade associations and banks); and the exporters' own internal
information systems (based on information reported by salesmen,
agents and other personal contacts).
The exporters which mentioned that export marketing intelligence
gleaned from the trade press represented a major information input
were very much in the minority,"^0 despite the fact that these firms
claimed that the publications concerned - the major international
oil journals - provided a good deal of useful information. Moreover,
none of the firms which exported more than one-third of their offshore-
related turnover mentioned the trade press as a good source of
intelligence concerning offshore-related markets overseas, that is,
published information was heavily utilised only by less successful
exporters.
The majority of the exporters received export marketing intelligence
from at least one external organisation, of which the most heavily
utilised was the 0S0. Roughly half the exporters which used the 0S0
had no complaints about the information service it provided. However,
some firms alleged that the information supplied by the 0S0 was
usually out of date, as one U.S. subsidiary explained :
"Their latest and greatest we knew a year ago. You see what
the 0S0 fails to realise is that to have a chance to supply
you need to be in at the start, at the specification stage,
well before the tender stage. The client asks a group of
29. In-depth marketing research - for example, identifying the key
personnel within a customer organisation with respect to a
certain purchasing decision - is, of course, nevertheless a
difficult exercise.
30. See Table 10.5.
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engineers to draw up plans of the project and they pick
a group of manufacturers whose products they like and their
products go on the specification sheet. It's very difficult
for anybody not on that specification sheet to get the order.
So when the 0S0 say 'it's now coming out for tender' it's
too late. What we need to know is 'it looks like the
following project is going ahead'."
TABLE 10.6





Internal information system 19







SOURCE : Interview data
Criticism was also levelled at the competency of 0S0 personnel and
the standard of the work they produced. On the other hand, one
exporter which did use the 0S0 argued that some of the blame should
be shared by the offshore suppliers themselves for their failure to
use the service provided by the OSO properly :
"You must use the OSO properly - 70% of the offshore suppliers
have the attitude 'where can we sell it'. I think we use
them properly. When we hear about something we hit them and
we want an answer, and if you know the people you can get the
answer."
Similarly, a second exporter remarked :
"We find them very useful. Companies want the OSO to put it
to them on a plate. They are told about market opportunities
identified by the OSO but they won't take the risks. They
want the OSO to act as their marketing operation, but they
can't do that."
Although the second major external source of export marketing intel¬
ligence , the BOTB's Export Intelligence Service (EIS) received heavy
criticism from both users and non-users, particularly the U.S. subsidiaries
31. Some exporters provided multiple responses.
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(none of which utilised the SIS). U.S. subsidiaries in the wellhead
and oilfield equipment sector argued that the EIS was not sufficiently
specialised, with the result that the information it provided was
unsuitable and therefore useless. Typical of the responses provided
was. the following :
"The BOTB is not much use for oilfield equipment. Export
information is tailor-made for consumer goods like
washing-machines."
The other serious criticism levelled at the EIS by several of its
users (and also some non-users) was that the information provided
was usually out-of-date, as illustrated by the following quote :
"By the time you read there's a project in Peru the
chances are the job has been on the go for a couple
of years. You usually have to prequalify and get on
the list of accepted suppliers and by then it's too
late to do so. We have to go on the job right at the
time they're thinking about it. The effort to get the
enquiry should be equal to the effort going into the
tender, you've got to get in to have a chance."
Only a small number of exporters mentioned banks and trade associations
32
as a major source of export marketing intelligence, althouah these
firms appeared to value the information these organisations provided.
However, one firm did explain that although it received the weekly
international brief from the British Marine Equipment Council (BMEC)
it was not used because ...
"by the time the information is in there the decisions
and specifications will all have been made."
Thus, all the external sources of information were criticised to
some extent, primarily for not supplying information at an early enough
stage of an overseas contract. The EIS was, however, also heavily
criticised for its failure to provide sufficiently detailed
information for this specialised ares, of industry. The fact that
more exporters used the 0S0 as an external source of export marketing
intelligence than the EIS was surprising given that the 0S0 has
devoted only a small share of its resources to the identification of
overseas opportunities and that, as a result, it has only attempted
to provide information concerning major offshore developments overseas
(leaving the EIS to handle the flow of information concerning smaller
32. See Table 10.6 above.
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contracts). However, the 0S0 and EIS were both used as a source
of export marketing intelligence by those firms less successful in
export markets. Indeed, none of the exporters utilising the EIS
and only one of those using the 0S0 exported more than one-third of
its offshore-related turnover in the year for which data was
collected.
As might be expected, the external sources of information were most
heavily criticised by those exporters (especially the U.S.
subsidiaries) which had their own extensive internal information systems.
Apart from being the intelligence source most utilised by the exporters
33
surveyed, the internal information system was considered by many
to be the best and most important source of export marketing intelligence
- indeed, seven exporters depended entirely upon internally-generated
export intelligence. Five of these exporters were firms with extensive
overseas sales and service networks which doubled as information
collection systems. For example, one U.S. exporter stated that 99.9%
of its export marketing intelligence was fed in from its overseas
sales subsidiaries, which completely covered the Eastern Hemisphere.
Other exporters reliant on their internal information systems tended
to draw information from a number of sources, including their sales
offices, salesmen, agents and other contacts in the industry. For
example, several exporters commented on the ability of agents to
provide information about a project at an early date, as one pointed
out :
"Everything is done underhand in, for example, India,
and our agent will have an enquiry the day before it
is out."
However, the internal system was also considered the most important
information source by several exporters with far less extensive sales
34
organisations, which considered that their more limited number of
points of contact with the market place were nevertheless sufficient
given the small number of important customers for their product(s).
Undoubtedly, the main advantage of the marketing intelligence provided
by internal information systems was that it was up-to-date and
therefore more useful than that reported in the trade press and provided
by external organisations such as the 0S0 and the BOTB. For example,
33. See Table 10.6 (above).
34. For example, two exporters were entirely dependent upon their
relatively small team of salesmen for export marketing intelligence.
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one exporter commented that compared with the information received
from the BOTB "information from the guys in the field is_ news,
and it's better". Moreover, evidence suggested that up-to-date
export marketing intelligence (as provided by the internal
information system but seemingly not by other sources) might indeed
be a key factor in successful export marketing, in that the seven
exporters content to rely entirely on their internal information
systems included five of the seven firms which had exported more than
one-third of their offshore-related turnover, while none of the
exporters which failed to mention the use of internally-generated
information had exported more than one-third of their offshore-related
turnover^ (or had achieved exports of offshore-related equipment
worth more than £250,000 in the year for which data was collected).
The exporters which had no internal information system consisted of
four companies which relied entirely on published and/or external
sources of information and two companies which did not receive any
export marketing intelligence from any source whatsoever. All but
one of these exporters were small firms with no prior offshore-
related experience, which had had neither the time nor the resources
to establish their own overseas communication networks.
10.4 Export Services
A number of organisations - including several government departments,
banks, trade associations and chambers of commerce - provide a range
of services aimed at assisting exporters to overcome some of the
problems associated with exporting. Nevertheless, some exporters
argued that the support given to exporters by the U.K. government was
36
inadequate. This section provides a discussion of the findings
with respect to the utilisation of the export services provided by
the government and other organisations by the exporters of offshore-
related equipment surveyed.
Firstly, almost half of the exporters utilised the services provided
37
by the 0S0. In all but one case this was primarily for the receipt
35. The association between the nature of the information sources
utilised and exporting success is shown in Appendix 10.6.
36. See p. 195.
37. See Table 10.7. The OSO's export intelligence service was
discussed in section 10.3.5, pp. 235-236.
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of export marketing intelligence on a regular basis, the exception
being a Scottish exporter which contacted the OSO only from time
to time whenever it needed more general advice. Analysis revealed
that only 2 out of 8 small exporters utilised the OSO, compared with
10 out of 17 larger companies. Indeed, one small company was of
the opinion that the OSO was absolutely no use whatsoever to the
small to medium-sized business :
"They are only interested in orders of £100,000 or more.
They push the large companies all the time. I've told
the assistant director-general myself that they're not
worth the money we are paying for them in tax."
TABLE 10.7
Export Services Utilised
Export Services Utilised Number of
Exporters
BOTB, of which 13
- Trade fairs & exhibitions (38)
- EIS ( 7)





Chambers of Commerce 2
None 5
SOURCE : Interview data
Part of the explanation for the greater usage of this service by the
larger firms could lie in the fact that the OSO has, due to financial
constraints, only undertaken to provide information concerning major
38
offshore developments overseas.
Similarly, although relatively few exporters used the export services
provided by their trade associations and banks, those that did were
38. Leaving the EIS to handle the flow of information concerning
smaller contracts - see p. 109.
primarily interested in the export marketing intelligence these
organisations could provide, although banks were also used to check
the credit-worthiness of potential customers and to arrange meetings
with key customers in export markets. The exporters using the
services provided by their chambers of commerce were both U.S.
subsidiaries, one of which arranged representation on its chamber's
stand at exhibitions while the other contacted its chamber of
commerce whenever it encountered problems with respect to, for
example, export documentation.
Altogether, just over half the exporters used at least one of the
39
BOTB's export services. In addition to those exporters utilising
40
the information service (EIS) and taking advantage of the
41
assistance provided for overseas trade fairs and exhibitions, a
few used other services, including the translation service provided
42
by Technical Help to Exporters and the overseas publicity service
provided by the BOTB's publicity unit.
Further analysis revealed that only 3 of the 8 small exporters used
any of the BOTB's range of export services, compared with 10 of the
17 larger companies. For example, only 2 of the 8 exporters taking
advantage of the BOTB's support for trade missions and exhibitions
were small firms, and it was interesting that a third small exporter
which had planned to participate in a trade mission to Pakistan
had withdrawn because it was still too expensive, even with the
government subsidy. Similarly, of the 7 exporters using the EIS
only 2 were small firms. If it is accepted that export services
are likely to be utilised by those firms which expect to benefit most
from them, then this evidence conflicts with the hypothesis that
the export services provided by the BOTB are most useful to small
43
companies. Nor was there any evidence to suggest that the BOTB's
export services were particularly useful for new exporters, nor
that they tended to be more utilised by those firms less heavily
involved in offshore-related exporting.
39. See Table 10.7 (above).
40. See Section 10.3.5.
41. For further details, see section 10.3.3.
42. A department of the British Standards Institution sponsored by
the BOTB.
43. See p. 96.
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Nearly half the exporters had taken advantage of at least one of
44
the export services provided by the ECGD. Firstly, the ECGD
had provided several of the exporters with guarantees for credit
financing (that is, had furnished unconditional guarantees of 100%
repayment to banks, allowing them to provide finance to exporters at
favourable interest rates). However, this service was heavily
criticised, with even one of its regular users providing a list of
complaints, as follows :
"It takes time to get them interested but at the tender
stage we haven't got time. Also they want to wait for
proof of what the competition are doing so they can match
it, but it's difficult to get proof. Also, the period of
loans we get is shorter - our competitors get 8, 10 or 12
years for smaller values than we can obtain. Finally, the
ECGD only cover 80% of U.K. content, if more than 20% is
non-U.K. it won't cover it. But if you want to get into
some markets you must have domestic content, it may be 40%
but you can't get that covered."
In fact, as has already been pointed out, some firms regarded
their inability to provide their customers with competitive credit
45
financing as a problem influencing export performance, a fact
illustrated by the following remark :
"If I want financing over 15 years they'll offer 7 years
and say 'but if your competitors are getting more, we'll
match it'. Therefore you're always coming up from
behind. We're never in front as far as financing is
concerned."
The ECGD had also insured several exporters against the risk of non¬
payment by overseas customers. While one exporter described the
ECGD insurance as essential, another remarked that it was "first
class ... there's no way we would export without it." On the other
hand, it was also argued that since the U.K. had joined the E.E.C.
its usefulness had declined, while one user declared that "some
countries in which we'd like to think we could get risk cover are
no longer covered". Furthermore, the ECGD export insurance scheme
was also criticised for being aimed at large exporting contracts, with
one exporter remarking that "the ECGD is only concerned with business
of more than £2 million or two years' duration". The claims that
the ECGD is primarily interested in large, long-term contracts and is
44. See Table 10.7 (above)
45. See p. 195.
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therefore large company orientated were supported by the fact that
only one of the small exporters took advantage of either of the
ECGD services.
Thus, all the export services provided by the 0S0, BOTB, ECGD and
other organisations received a significant amount of criticism and
even the most popular among them were taken advantage of by less
than 50% of the exporters surveyed. Although the fact that all the
export services were found to be less utilised by small firms than
by large and medium-sized firms was itself of note, this finding
was particularly interesting with respect to the services offered by
46
the BOTB, an organisation which, it has previously been suggested,
concentrates on supporting the efforts of small and medium-sized
firms and new exporters.
10.5 Export Organisation
This section presents an examination of the way in which the offshore-
related exporters surveyed organised their exporting activities.
Firstly, five of the exporters were found to accommodate exporting
within their existing domestic marketing department. Although one
of these exporters did undertake personal selling in export markets
on a regular basis, the remainder were those firms which were
exporting only indirectly (through either agents or the Aberdeen
subsidiaries of multinational supply companies) and which treated
exports as being the same as domestic business. For example, none
of these firms employed a single person with specialist export training.
For each of these exporters, exports of offshore-related equipment
represented only a relatively small proportion - 3-25% - of total
offshore-related sales, a result which is consistent with the proposition
that when export business accounts for only a small proportion of
total sales exporting is likely to be accommodated within the existing
marketing department.
Surprisingly, only one exporter had an export department in addition
to a sales department for the domestic market. Although several
other exporters had formerly been organised on an export/domestic
46. See p. 96.
basis they had been re-organised, and indeed, the remaining 19
exporters all claimed to be organised on a global basis and to display
what one exporter described as a "worldwide attitude to sales". The
low incidence of the existence of an export sales department appeared
to be the result of three main factors: the technical nature of the
activities associated with marketing offshore-related equipment; a
low regard for specialist exporting training and expertise; and the
international nature of the oil industry. For example, one Scottish
exporter explained that the reason it had a "marketing department"
consisting not of export sales representatives but of "professional
sales engineers" (who spent roughly one-quarter of their time overseas
but had no export training) was that ...
"it's a technical business therefore we need qualified
sales engineers, they must know every single detail about
the product".
Typical of the remarks discrediting the importance of specialist
exporting expertise was the following comment made by a U.S. exporter
"The most staff have to do is to handle the financial
or shipping documents and they have sufficient expertise
for that. Other than that they don't need any special
export expertise. All you need to know is the right
people."
It was noticeable that the one export department which had been
established appeared to be inadequate in that it consisted of just
five employees, only one of whom undertook overseas sales trips.
However, there was also evidence that some of the exporters which
claimed to be organised on a "global basis" and to display a "world¬
wide attitude to sales" tended to be less willing to commit resources
to the development of overseas markets than to the domestic market,
in that in some firms there was clearly an imbalance between the
strength of the sales forces assigned to export markets compared
with those allocated to the domestic market. For example, the
marketing director of one exporter which had a total sales force of
a dozen covering Europe admitted that having six of these designated
to the U.K. market was five too many, while a U.S. exporter confessed
that it did not receive small export orders because it had ...
"
... fewer men overseas than over here. The men
overseas only have time to deal with our large
customers. They're not selling down to the same/
/level of customers because there are not so many of
them over there covering the territory."
Thus, the exporters which integrated exports into their domestic
marketing operations were involved in offshore-related exporting
only on a minor scale. Of the other exporters, only one had an
export department as such, the rest generally stressing the
international nature of the oil business and the necessity therefore
of being organised on an international basis and of adopting a global
attitude, rather than discriminating between export and domestic
sales. Furthermore, several exporters argued that the importance
of specialist export training was reduced by the close-knit nature
of the oil community which resulted in the salesman's technical
knowledge and his contacts in the oil industry being of -prime
importance. The only exporting expertise generally considered
relevant appeared to be the knowledge of shipping and financial
documentation held by the clerical staff located in Scotland. Finally,
despite the fact that a large majority of the exporters surveyed
claimed to have adopted a 'global attitude' to sales, there was
nevertheless evidence that some of these firms did discriminate
against exports in that they failed to commit resources to the
development of overseas markets to the same extent that they did the
domestic market.
10.6 CONCLUSION
The analysis (presented in section 10.3) of the data concerning
the export marketing methods utilised by the 25 offshore-related
exporters revealed that there was an association between the export
marketing programme implemented and offshore-related export performance
In particular, although there was no clear evidence that the choice
of pricing or product adaptation policy influenced exporting success,
there was substantial evidence of an association between the export
marketing research, promotion and distribution methods utilised and
export performance.^
As far as methods of promotion are concerned, although most exporters
47. The influence exerted on export performance by the nature of the
product was clearly identified in sections 9.2 - 9.6.
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regarded personal selling as the first essential, to a certain extent
the various methods of promotion were seen as performing different
functions, with the result that most exporters utilised several methods
of export promotion. Moreover, a strong association was found
between the number of methods of export promotion used and export
performance (as shown in Figure lO.l).
FIGURE 1Q.1














Commitment of Resources to Export Promotion
Methods of Export Promotion Utilised
\ f
Export Performance
If the number of methods of export promotion utilised is taken as
a rough measure of the resources committed to export promotion by
the surveyed exporters, this result can be interpreted as indicatina
an association between export performance and the level of
promotional activity undertaken. In addition, there was substantial
evidence that small firms simply did not have the necessary resources
to utilise a wide range of methods of export promotion and, in
particular, could not afford to undertake personal selling activity
48
on an effective level. There was also some evidence to suggest
48. Firm characteristics have already been shown to be closely inter¬
related and hence it was not surprising that relationships were
also found to exist between the number of methods of exoort promotion
utilised and firm nationality and Drevious offshore-related
experience.
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that there might be an association between managerial attitude to
exporting and the amount of export promotion carried out, in that
those firms which had adopted a passive attitude to exporting had
failed to commit any resources whatsoever to the promotion of
export sales.^
As discussed in section 10.3.4, evidence was also found of an
association between export performance and the method(s) of export
distribution utilised, with those firms which exported direct to
overseas customers (particularly those which had established their
own sales and service subsidiaries overseas) generally being more
successful in offshore-related export markets than those firms which
exported through intermediaries and carried out no direct selling
overseas. The distribution methods involving direct contact with
export markets do, of course, require considerable investment in export¬
ing, and there was clear evidence that some small firms simply did
not have the resources to employ even a single export sales represent¬
ative, far less be able to afford to establish permanent bases
overseas. Moreover, even a large company newlv-established in the
offshore supplies business will require a substantial period of time
to develop its own sales and service network appropriately located
to serve its oil industry customers. Hence, the U.S. subsidiaries,
which are part of large organisations with lengthy offshore-related
experience, might be expected to have more highly developed
distribution networks than newly-established British firms of any
size. However, part of the observed difference in distribution methods
utilised by exporters of different nationality could not be attributed
to differences in either the size or experience of the respective
organisations, in that in certain large, established British companies
the development of overseas distribution networks appeared to have
been influenced by an unwillingness to risk resources in export
markets. In addition, it was noticeable that the exporters which
had adopted a passive attitude to exporting had both chosen to avoid
committing resources to export distribution, having decided instead
to export through middlemen. Thus, although the commitment of
resources to export distribution (and hence the methods of export
distribution used) was influenced by the nationality, size and offshore-
49. As only two exporters had adopted a passive attitude to exporting,
this finding must be regarded as being tentative, and hence is
shown in Figure 10.1 as a broken line.
related experience of the exporter, there was some evidence that it
might also be affected by managerial attitude to exporting.
FIGURE 10.2
Factors Influencing the Methods of Export Distribution
Utilised and Export Performance
Finally, export performance was found to be associated with the
nature of the sources of export marketing intelligence utilised,
with those firms with an established internal information system
(providing up-to-date export marketing intelligence)' generally being
more successful in overseas markets than those exporters reliant
on external or published information sources. These internal
information systems were, of course, built upon these exporters'
export distribution networks, with their overseas offices acting
as the main collection points for up-to-date marketing intelligence
gleaned from salesmen, agents and other contacts in overseas markets.
Hence, only those exporters which had committed resources to the
development of export markets were rewarded with the up-to-date
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marketing information regarded as a key input for successful export
marketing, and once again, it was the small, inexperienced (mainly
Scottish) offshore-related exporters which were at the greatest
disadvantage, having had neither the time nor the resources to
establish their own overseas communication networks. Thus, the
investment- of resources in the establishment of internal communication
networks (and hence the sources of export marketing intelligence
utilised) was found to be influenced by the nature of the firm. It
should also be noted that, having chosen to export through middlemen,
the exporters whose managements had adopted a passive attitude to
exporting had no direct contact with overseas markets through which
to collect export marketing intelligence.
FIGURE 10.3
Factors Influencing the Sources of Export Marketing Intelligence
Utilised and Export Performance
Thus, Figure 10.4, which summarises the relationships presented in
Figures 10.1 - 10.3, shows that offshore-related export performance
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will depend upon the nature of the export marketing programme
implemented. However, the kind of exporting programme which has
been shown in this chapter to be associated with offshore-related
exporting success requires substantial investment in exporting.
For example, an association was found between export performance
and the level of promotional activity undertaken, while those
exporters which had invested in the establishment of their own sales
and service networks (and internal information systems) were generally
more successful than exporters which had not undertaken investment
of this nature. Whether the investment necessary for successful
exporting was committed was found to be determined by two main groups
of factors. First, there was some evidence that those firms which
had adopted a passive attitude to exporting were less willing to commit
the resources required for successful export promotion and distribution.
Second, it was found that small firms often simply could not afford
FIGURE 10.4
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to undertake a wide range of methods of export promotion or employ
salesmen to sell direct to overseas customers, while the establishment
of an appropriately located overseas sales and service network
presented even larger companies newly-established in the offshore
supplies industry with a problem which they could only solve with
substantial investment over a considerable period of time.That
is, firm characteristics (particularly size) helped determine whether
the resources necessary for successful exportincr were made available.
It was argued in Chapter 5 that small firms might be able to partly
compensate for their lack of resources by takina advantage of the
export services provided by a number of external organisations.
However, as pointed out in section 10.4, the services provided by
the BOTB, ECGD, 0S0 and other organisations were, in fact, found to
be less utilised by small firms than they were by the large and
medium-sized exporters. Hence it appeared that these export
services did not provide a solution to the real problem of inadeauate
51
resources faced by small exporters.
50. The evidence, presented in section 10.2, that small firms tended
to be involved in a smaller number of markets than were laraer
firms provided a further indication that the export-related
activities of small firms may be restricted by a lack of resources.
51. Since no clear association emerged between export performance and




WORLD OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS : 1980-85
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters presented an examination of the major
factors influencing the export performance of the Scottish manufacturing
sector of the offshore supplies industry. These results were based
on an analysis of data collected during the course of in-depth,
qualitative interviews in 40 firms located in Scotland manufacturing
offshore-related equipment.
A second round of in-depth interviews was later undertaken in the
same group of firms in order to identify possible future trends in the
offshore-related exporting activity of these manufacturers in the
period 1980-85. It was stressed in Chapter 9 that in some of the
surveyed firms managerial attitude to exporting was found to be influenced
by management's perception of future market trends (and the resulting
level of capacity utilisation)."'" For this reason it was considered
necessary to develop a reasonable hypothetical scenario of the global
offshore market for the period 1980-85, upon which the respondents could
base their replies concerning their expected strategy during this
period.
While the following chapter provides an analysis of the expected strategic
response of the sample to the scenario presented to them, this chapter
is devoted to a discussion of the scenario itself. The scenario was
based upon published data supplemented, where appropriate, by interview
data resulting from a survey of expert opinion. However, it was, of
course, impossible to predict what would happen to world offshore oil
and gas activity in the period 1980-85, as the future is uncertain.
Hence this scenario - an internally consistent, plausible account of a
future market situation - represents no more than one view of what
could happen in the offshore market during fais period, given certain
2
assumptions. Moreover, it should be noted that although the
scenario presented in this chapter was prepared in January 1980, no
1. This was consistent with the findings of previous exporting studies,
such as Cooper et al (1970) and Majaro (1977) .
2. An attempt has been made to clearly identify the assumptions which
underlie the scenario.
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attempt has been made to update it as the final phase of interviewing
was undertaken on the basis of the global market situation as detailed
in the original scenario. The full scenario presented in this chapter
was, however, too long and detailed for presentation to the
respondents, who were instead supplied with a summary of its most
relevant points.^
This chapter commences with a brief discussion of the world energy
situation which concludes that the demand for oil will increase
slightly over the period to 1985. In Section 11.3 the reasons for the
gradual movement towards offshore oil and gas activity (and the
corresponding increase in expenditure on offshore oil and gas operations)
are outlined. Finally, Sections 11.4 and 11.5 provide a review of
the major areas of offshore activity.
11.2 WORLD ENERGY 1980-85
The political upheavals in Iran and their impact on the supply and
price of oil provided a reminder that the timing and nature of such
shocks to the world economy are unforseeable. Consequently,
projections of energy supply and demand have undergone considerable
revision in recent years. For example, in 1973 Exxon projected that
4
demand in the 'free world', which at that time was equivalent to
86 million barrels per day of oil (b/doe), would rise to around
165 million b/doe by 1985 (Dafter, 1979d). However, the rate of
growth in total energy demand fell dramatically from 5.5% p.a. in
1965-73 to 1.7% p.a. in 1973-78 (Lascelles, 1979a). As a result,
a recent forecast by Shell suggested that energy demand in 1985 will be
no higher than 108 million b/d (S.B.S., 1979a).
Recent economic growth forecasts have been gloomy. For example,
the E.E.C.'s Annual Economic Review 1979-80 anticipated that the average
rate of growth in 1980 in the E.E.C. as a whole would.be 2%, the
lowest since 1975 (Dafter, 1979b) . A major factor contributing to
this bleak outlook is the assumed continuation of OPEC control over
the supply of oil, thereby eliminating the possibility of a significant
3. A copy of this summary is provided as Appendix 7.8.
4. That is, excluding the USSR, Eastern Europe and China.
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reduction in its price in real terms.
In the past economic growth and energy growth have proceeded roughly
in unison. However, during the period 1973-78 energy consumption
per unit of GDP for the OECD fell by 7% (S.B.S., 1979c). Furthermore,
several studies have concluded that conservation measures are competitive
with both present energy prices and the costs of future supply
alternatives, and have suggested that reductions in energy consumption
per unit of GDP in the region of 25-40% are feasible, although
substantial savings will take a number of years to materialise given the
slow turnover of energy using equipment (S.B.S., 1979c; Fraser, 1978;
Dafter 1979f). However, several countries (including the U.K.) have
decided against the introduction of compulsory conservation measures
at this stage. This evidence seems to support the argument put
forward by Odell & Vallenilla (1978, p.83) that there are "serious
political barriers" to be overcome before substantial conservation
gains can be made, as effective conservation does eventually mean
changing people's habits, and "few governments, anxious about the results
of the next election seem willing to go so far out on a limb." Given
that the easiest and most acceptable conservation measures will be
implemented first it seems likely that in the period 1980-85 energy
savings will continue to be significant but will fall short of the
25-40% reductions considered feasible over a period of around 20 years.
Table 11.1 shows clearly that little change in the relative contributions
of the various energy sources is anticipated by Shell in the 1978-85
period, with oil continuing to meet the greater part of the world's
energy needs. The continuing dependence on oil can be clearly
explained. First, on the demand side, almost all non-Communist
countries have created systems, both technical and societal, which
run on oil (and natural gas). These energy sources can only be
replaced very gradually because of the immense costs involved and also
the societal distress and resistance that would result from their
replacement by alternatives incapable of sustaining the complete range
of activities to which western societies have become accustomed
(Odell, 1979a). On the supply side there are considerable constraints
inhibiting the speedy development of other energy forms. For example,
in most countries it would take at least 10 years to plan, gain approval
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for and complete major energy projects such as nuclear power
stations and large coal mines.
TABLE 11.1









Oil 49 53.8 56 51.9
Gas 15 16.5 17 15.7
Coal 17 18.7 21 19 .4




7 7.7 8 7.4
TOTAL 91 loo.o 108 100.0
SOURCE : This table is based on Shell Briefing Service (1979a),
Figure 1, p.3.
11.2.1 Nuclear Energy
The modest increase in nuclear power shown in Table 11.1 above will
result from the commissioning of plants already at or beyond the
planning stage. Nevertheless, this expansion is by no means assured
as nuclear programmes worldwide have consistently failed to meet
targets. In addition, concern over radioactivity and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons appears to be mounting in a number of western
countries as a result of the failure to find a satisfactory solution
to the problems associated with the large-scale disposal and/or
conversion of nuclear waste products, while the safety of the reactors
themselves has been questioned following leaks at reactors in several
countries. Furthermore, while some authorities, such as the C.E.G.B.
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and Shell (1979a), stress that nuclear power is a fully commercial
proposition, others such as Odell & Vallenilla (1978) disagree, and some
opponents even claim that true costs are being systematically hidden
and denied (Counter Information Service, 1978).
11.2.2 Coal
As coal is less clean and convenient than oil, gas and electricity,
over a period of time in competition with cheap oil coal's share of
world energy supplies fell significantly. However, coal is now a
relatively cheap (and abundant) energy source and consequently the
downward trend should be reversed in the period 1978-85 (S.B.S. 1979a).
However, expansion can only be very gradual given the long lead times
associated with developments in new areas and the neglection of the
technology of coal production and consumption which has occurred as
a result of the industry's decline over the last 25 years (Odell,
1979b). There is also strong environmental opposition to coal
because of the landscape damage resulting from its extraction and the
pollution arising from its combustion, while working conditions
underground are becoming increasingly socially unacceptable. Finally,
considerable investment by energy users would be required to convert
existing oil and gas facilities to coal, and although liquefaction and/
or gasification of coal may eventually solve this problem they will not
have a significant effect in the period to 1985.
11.2.3 'Alternative Energies'
Hydroelectricity, which currently contributes around 6 million b/doe
has already been introduced at most sites which are suitable in the
industrialised countries. Development in the LDC's, where potential
still exists, is likely to be a slow process (S.B.S. 1979a). Alternatives
such as solar, wind, goethermal, tidal and wave energy are currently
uncompetitive except under particularly favourable conditions (such as
the use of solar energy for small power plants serving consumers in
cloudless areas remote from power networks). Also they are usually
highly localised and often need storage systems to ensure continuity
of supply. The exploitation of tar sands does now produce oil at
competitive prices and is therefore likely to be expanded, but studies
have shown that production of other 'synthetic' fuels (such as alcohol
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from sugar cane) is likely to remain uncompetitive with fossil
fuels in the foreseeable future (Fishlock, 1979; S.B.S. 1978b).
Thus, in general, 'alternative' energies require considerable develop¬
ment and their contribution in the period to 1985 will be minimal.
11.2.4 Natural Gas
It can be seen from Table 11.2 (below) that total world proven natural
5
gas reserves at the end of 1979 were estimated at 72,865 billion cubic
3 6
metres (m ), equivalent to approximately 450 billion barrels of oil
and over 50 years supply at the current rate of consumption of 1325
3
billion m per annum (S.B.S. 1979e).
TABLE 11.2
World Natural Gas
Reserves (1979) Consumption (1978)
Billion m"^ % Billion m"^ %
North America 7914 10.9 580 44
Western Europe 3833 5.3 205 15
Japan/Australia/
Far East 3630 5.0 35 3
Middle East 20964 28.8
Africa 5956 8.2 >• 80 6
Latin America 4092 5.6
U.S.S.R. 25485 35.0 '] 425 32
China/Eastern Europe 991 1.4 J
TOTAL 72865 100.0 1325 loo
SOURCES : (1) Reserves - Oil & Gas Journal, 31.12.79, pp 70-71
(See Appendix 11.1).
(2) Consumption - S.B.S. (1979e), pp. 6-7.
5. These are recoverable reserves, that is, that proportion of the
physical volume of gas present in the rock which can be extracted
under given technological and economic conditions.
6. 1 billion m^ = 17,000 barrels of oil per day (Shell, 1978a, p.64).
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Although there is no resource constraint on the supply of natural
gas, it should be noted that 35% of the world's natural gas reserves
are situated in the U.S.S.R. while a further 35-40% are controlled
by members of OPEC. Thus much depends upon the policies these
countries adopt with respect to the balance between exports, local
consumption and resource conservation.
The imbalance between resource base and consumption identified in
Table 11.2 (above) also highlights the significance of the difficulties
experienced in the transportation of natural gas. Most of the gas
currently used is transported by pipeline and consumed in or near the
country of origin and the transportation of gas from remote areas to the
main consuming markets continues to present problems of a technical
and financial nature. Liquefaction of the gas at very low temperatures
is currently the only economic and proven method of reducing natural
gas volumes sufficiently for bulk transport by ship, in special LNG
carriers. Although this system involves considerable investment,
3
LNG trade is expected to increase from 27.9 billion m (or 475,000 b/doe)
in 1977 to 100 billion m"^ (1.7 million b/doe) in 1985 (S.B.S., 1979a).
LNG shipments are currently made from Algeria to the U.S.A., from Algeria
and Libya to Western Europe and from Alaska, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia
and Brunei to Japan. However, continuing energy price rises should
increase the economic radius for new gas supplies and by 1985 there
should be additional services from Algeria and Nigeria to Western
Europe and the U.S.A., while further services from the Middle East and
Far East to Japan, the U.S.A. and Europe are among those currently
under consideration.
Thus, to summarise, natural gas consumption in the 'free world' is
expected to grow at approximately 1.5% per annum to reach lOOO billion
3
m (or 17 million b/doe) by 1985. As many indigenous gas fields
in the U.S.A. and Western Europe have reached or are approaching peak
production, this growth projection assumes not only that LNG import
projects will be developed where politically and economically feasible
but also that exploration for and development of new gas deposits
^specially in areas accessible for pipeline supply to the major
consuming markets) will be stimulated.
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11.2.5 Oil
In 1979 world proven oil reserves totalled around 540 billion barrels,
equivalent to around 30 years supply at the 1979 rate of production
of 52.6 billion b/d (of which 48.4 million b/d came from non-Communist
7
countries).
OPEC holds the key to future oil supplies and prices. Apart from
OPEC's control (in 1979) over almost 70% of the world's oil
8 9
reserves and approximately 50% of total world production, OPEC's
power stems from the dependence of the industrialised world's
technologies and lifestyles on an uninterrupted supply of oil and the
absence of a cheap alternative energy supply that can be substituted
10
for oil. The absence of a suitable alternative results in the
demand for oil being 'price inelastic', that is, an increase in prices
brought about by collective action does not produce an equivalent
reduction in the quantity purchased, causing the income of OPEC
producers to rise.
During the 1970s OPEC members appeared to undertake a major reappraisal
of what they believed to be in their own interests and it is
anticipated that they will want to maintain pressure on the supply and
demand balance by trimming production as necessary (compensating
themselves with higher prices). In this way they will be able to
continue to exert political pressure, force up prices even higher and
spin out their reserves over a longer period.
In the two decades prior to 1973 demand for oil increased at more
than 7% per annum. However, the 5-fold increase in the price of
crude oil which occurred in the period 1973-75 in the context of a
major world recession caused the rate of growth of demand for oil in the
free world to fall to around 1% per annum post 1973 (Odell, 1979a) .
Given the existing conditions of real rising energy prices, economic
recession and encouragement of energy conservation, the outlook for
demand seems unlikely to change to any significant extent, at least in
the next 2-3 years. Certainly the 2% per annum growth assumed
by Shell for the period 1978-85"^ appears optimistic.
7. See Appendix 11.2.
8. Almost 80% of the 'free world's' oil reserves.
9. 60-65% of 'free world' oil production.
10. As discussed in the previous subsections of 11.2.
11. As shown in Table 11.1 above.
Thus, the researcher's 'best estimate' of the 1985 energy pattern,
shown in Table 11.3 (below), assumes an overall 1% per annum growth in
the demand for oil and 2% per annum growth in energy demand in general
over the period 1978-85. However, it is very unlikely that oil
demand will grow at a steady rate throughout the period, but rather
that the considerable 1979 price increases will result in a fall in oil
demand in 1980, with the rate of growth in oil demand then accelerating
to around 3% per annum.by 1985.
TABLE 11.3









Oil 49 53 .8 53 50.5
Gas 15 16.5 17 16.2
Coal 17 18.7 21 20.0
Nuclear 3 3.3 6 5.7
Hydro-electricity
/other 7 7.7 8 7.6
TOTAL
*
91 100.0 105 100.0
—
SOURCE : Researcher's own estimate based on published information
and interview data.
11.3 WORLD OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACTIVITY 1980-85
In the past oil exploration and production has been highly concentrated
geographically in the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East.
Indeed, approximately 80% of all exploration has been undertaken in the
U.S.A., and this figure rises to over 90% with the inclusion of the
U.S.S.R. and the Middle East (Odell, 1979b). This situation has
arisen partly from the attempts of the major oil companies to maximise
production from politically stable regions of the world and partly
from the ready availability of low-cost resources in the Middle East.
However, Odell (1979a) argues that the politico-economic conditions
that produced this profile have disappeared, so that a geographically
dispersed pattern of production could now be developed. The basic
element in the new situation is the higher price of oil, which has
now been pushed well above the long-term supply price of the quantities
which seem likely to be demanded - that is, the price of oil is now
much higher than that necessary to bring new supplies on to the market.
Thus, non-OPEC nations which have experienced considerable economic
difficulties arising from large increases in their oil import bill and
fear for the future security of supplies are likely to attempt to make
themselves more independent of the oil policies implemented by OPEC
by increasing the rate of development of their indigenous oil and gas
resources. The drive to develop sources of non-OPEC energy is
reflected in the large slice of Euro-market activity taken up by energy-
related lending in syndicated loans (Evans, 1979) . In addition, the
search for new energy resources in Third World countries is receiving
high priority among a number of international organisations, including
the World Bank which will double its lending for oil and gas development
in the Third World from approximately £220 million in 1979/80 to £440
million per annum by 1983 (Dafter, 1979b) . Third World countries
may, in fact, encourage oil activities not only as a long term source
of oil (and revenue) but also as a short-term source of foreign capital
for licence fees etc. which are not insignificant even when no finds
are made (Gaffney, 1976) .
However, even assuming oil is discovered,.there is normally a
considerable time-lag (of perhaps four years) before the first oil
production is achieved. Indeed, Shell anticipate that in the period
1979-90 up to 80% of the world's oil will come from existing fields.
New production will also come from so-called 'low cost' locations, such
as the Middle East, Mexico and the rest of Latin America. Nevertheless,
most countries of the world will be stimulated to increase their efforts
to develop indigenous supplies of oil and gas, while the world's
continental shelves represent . an area which has been largely neglected
in the past from the point of view of oil exploration and development.
Therefore, it appears logical to anticipate a gradual shift in oil
and gas activity to offshore areas, especially given the continual
advancement of offshore-related technology.
Indeed, a gradual movement towards offshore activity is already in
evidence. In 1973 offshore production totalled only about 8.3
million b/d, around 15% of total world oil production, but by 1976 had
increased to around 12 million b/d, approximately 20% of total oil
production (Shell, 1978). As shown in Table 11.4 (below), by
1979 offshore oil production had expanded to 13.8 million b/d,
equivalent to 22% of total world oil production, while it has been
12
estimated that by the late 1980s offshore supplies will account for
30-35% of world oil production (Done, 1978) . The proportion of
natural gas production coming from offshore areas has also increased,
from around 10% in 1973 to about 17% in 1979 (Dafter, 1979a). Thus,
by 1985 approximately 25% of world oil production and 20-25% of
world gas production may be coming from offshore fields.
TABLE 11.4





North America 1.73 12 .5
Central America & West Indies 0.43 3 .1
Western Europe 1.90 13 .8
South America 1.93 14 .0
Africa 1.19 8 .6
Middle East 4.67 33 .8
Far East & Australasia 1.56 11 3
Communist Nations 0.40 2 9
TOTAL 13.82 100 0
SOURCE : Various - See Appendix 11.3.
12. By Dr. J. Birks, Managing Director of British Petroleum.
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At this point it is worth noting several other developing trends.
Firstly, future oil discoveries are likely to be much smaller than
the 'super giant' fields, 30 of which account for 50% of the world's
reserves (Dafter, 1979c) . Secondly, although oil demand may grow
at a slower rate in the future, capital needs will grow exponentially.
13
For example, it has been estimated that more than £50 billion
per annum could be spent on the development of oil production in non-
Communist countries by the year 2000, compared to the £8 billion to be
14
spent in 1980 (Dafter, 1979e). This is principally because most of
the 'easy' and 'cheap' oil reserves have almost certainly been found and
production from many such oil fields will be kept below the technically
possible limits. Thus the industry is being forced to attempt to
increase the amount of oil that can be recovered from existing fields"^
and to find and exploit more difficult and expensive resources. Finally,
developing more inaccessible oil means that projects will take far
longer to bring to fruition.
These trends are reflected in the increase in expenditure on offshore
oil and gas activities from approximately £1.2 billion in 1972 to more
than £4 billion in 1977 and around £6 billion in 1979. Looking ahead,
Dr. Birks of B.P. has estimated that offshore expenditure over the
period 1978-90 could total around £200 billion (Done, 1978). Thus,
the evidence suggests that offshore expenditure will increase to
around £10 billion per annum by 1985.^
Having identified the general trends contributing to an expanding
offshore market, the sections below provide a 'broad brush' review of
the major areas of offshore activity. As the majority of expenditure
on offshore-related equipment is associated with new offshore
developments the review will concentrate on those areas in which major
offshore developments are expected to take place over the period 1980-85.
This is nevertheless a complex exercise as development activity is a
difficult variable to predict, particularly beyond 1983. Indeed,
the difficulties inherent in such an exercise are underlined by the
list of factors which should be taken into consideration, including
past and present production and consumption patternsactivity
13." By Mr. Dirk de Bruyne, President of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company.
14. Constant 1979 prices.
15. Enhanced recovery techniques cannot, however, be expected to add
significantly to production in the period to 1985, principally because
of the high cost of oil recovered using these techniques - relative
to current oil prices (S.B,S., 1979c).
16. Constant January 1980 prices.
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planned and announced by oil companies and governments; published
evaluations of the geology of the areas; the general tendency to
maximise production near major consuming areas (especially with regard
to gas); the attraction of areas where finds are expected to consist
of low sulphur, light crudes; and the attraction of politically
stable regions. Moreover, as was shown above,^ expenditure on oil
equipment and services in general will depend not only on the number
and scale of offshore developments undertaken, but also on an area's
physical environment - the weather conditions, water depth, distance
to shore and so on - and the available technology and its cost given
the quality of the oil-bearing province and its physical environment.
11.4 THE U.K. CONTINENTAL SHELF
Treasury estimates indicate that capital expenditure on oil and gas
production - excluding exploration drilling - should decline rapidly
from approximately £2 billion per annum in 1979-80 to around £1 billion
per annum by 1985 (Economic Progress Report No. 112, p.3). In view
of the December 1979 oil price rises this view seems unduly pessimistic.
On the other hand, the forecast made in December 1979 by Wood Mackenzie
& Co., the Edinburgh stockbrokers, that up to 19 platforms will be
ordered in 1980-81, appears somewhat optimistic. They envisage
three platform orders being placed in 1980 for the Brae, N. Beryl and
Hutton fields, and contracts for up to 16 structures being placed in
1981 for the Alwyn, Andrew, SE Auk, Indefatigable, S. Montrose, Morecambe
(five or six platforms), Rough (three platforms), 'T-Block' and 30/17b
fields.
The author's research suggests that as at January 1980 the most likely
pattern of field developments (and platform orders) is as shown in
Table 11.5 below. It should, however, be emphasised that the projection
of field developments even 12 months in advance is extremely difficult.
Hence Table 11.5 is no more than a 'best estimate' made on the basis
of the limited information available and is therefore likely to be
subject to a substantial margin of error.
17. See section 2.2.
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TABLE 11.5






1980 N. Beryl - Mobil 500 250-300 million barrels
recoverable oil; steel plat¬
form order expected Spring




700 250-300m barrels recoverable
reserves; steel platform
order expected Summer 1980.
Hutton - Conoco 600 250m barrels recoverable
reserves; TLP order expected
Winter 1980/81; production
early 1984.
1981 S.E. Auk - Shell 100 50m barrels recoverable




100 Small steel platform possible
to boost production rates.
Rough - BGC 150 Three small steel platforms
may be ordered.




30/17b - BNOC 250 100-125m barrels recoverable
reserves; steel platform
expected; being developed
with all possible haste.
1982 Alwyn (North)
- Total
250 100-150m barrels recoverable
reserves; further appraisal
necessary before order for
fixed platform is placed.






















250 First phase calls for five
small steel platforms and two
pipelines; orders must be
placed in 1981 to meet
production target of 1983,
but schedule probably too
tight.
14/20 - Texaco 250
(approx.)




3/7 - Chevron 50 Small, inexpensive development;
possible tie-in to Ninian;
appraisal in 1980; next
Chevron deve1opment.




on gas gathering system.
Eider (211/16)
- Shell
250 100-200m barrels;possible tie-











400 Further development of T-block
requiring perhaps two further
platforms.








to north of current project.






Year Field/Operator Development Cost Remarks
(Em; 1979 prices)
1984 S. Beryl - Conoco Further development; probably
relatively inexpensive.
C. Cormorant - Approx. 100m barrels;
- Shell possible subsea tie-in to
S. Cormorant.
Lomond - Amoco - Previously uncommercial gas
condensate field; may be
developed once gas gathering
system in operation.
Tern - Shell - Possible future development
of previously marginal oil
field.
206/8 - B.P. - Extremely complex, difficult
development; waxy oil in
shallow but wide reservoirs
not deep below the surface;
deep water.
Crawford - Possible future development;
- Hamilton heavy oil and low porosity
will make any development
complicated.
SOURCE : Researcher's own estimate based on published information
and interview data.
The field development pattern shown in Table 11.5 is based on the
following reasoning
(1) The minimum period between the discovery of a significant
find and government approval of a development plan is currently
in the region of three years, the intervening period being
required for appraisal drilling and the preparation, submission
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and consideration of the development plan. For example, although
BNOC's 30/17b find, discovered in 1978, is being developed with
all possible haste, a decision to go ahead is unlikely before
the end of 1980 as a 30 month programme of appraisal drilling
is required. Thus, any platform orders placed before 1983 will
be associated with the development of finds already made.
(2) In recent years there has been a slump in the number of significant
finds made in the U.K. sector of the NOrth Sea. This slump is
18
a combination of a reduction in the level of exploration drilling
and a fall in the success rate - in 1978-79 on average only 10%
of exploration wells were successful, compared to a 40% success
rate in the early 1970s. Moreover, the quantity of oil found
per successful well fell from an average of 50 million barrels
in the mid-1970s to nearer 25 million barrels in 1978 (Dafter,
1979a). This reduction in the number and size of finds made
in the late 1970's has resulted in a dearth of large fields
awaiting development in the early 1980s.
(3) However, the massive increases in the price of crude oil which
occurred in 1979 ensured that some of the 50 or so already
identified, so-called 'marginal' fields in the U.K. sector will
be developed.
(4) Although developments such as the TLP may, in time, significantly
reduce the cost of offshore development, they are unlikely to
have a major impact on development costs in general in the period
to 1985. The Hutton TLP development, for example, will cost
at least £600 million, while any North Sea field of around 250
million barrels is likely to require a large structure and develop¬
ment expenditure of not less than £500 million. However, in
particular cases technological advance may result in the
exploitation of a previously uncommercial discovery, or at least
bring the development of a field forward in time. For example,
the Magnus field became viable - having previously been considered
marginal - due to the use of subsea completions on seven satellite
wells surrounding the central platform. Indeed, the 1980s should
see considerable use of underwater completions, both of the
18. See Appendix 3.3.
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individual well type and those arranged in clusters from an
underwater manifold. In addition, various kinds of floating
structures (including tanker^ are currently being considered
as production facilities in relatively cheap development projects
for small fields with short lifespans - for example, a converted
drilling rig is being utilised in the Buchan field. Thus, as a
result of certain technological developments and, more especially,
rising oil prices, several fields (such as Alwyn and Andrew) which
were previously considered marginal will be developed during the
period to 1985. (As it is impossible to forecast the level of
North Sea oil and gas taxation which the government will deem
appropriate during the period to 1985, it has been assumed that
such changes as may be made to the tax regime will not radically
alter the economics of field development).
(5) Similarly, the decision to increase the price of gas has improved
the economics of developing gas fields and development of the
Rough, S.E. Indefatigable and Morecambe Bay fields is expected
in 1981-82. With the installation of a gas gathering system
other fields, such as Bruce, may also become economical.
(6) In estimating the year in which these oil and gas developments
may go ahead and platform orders be placed, the following factors
have been taken into considerations -
a. The oil companies prefer an ordered pattern of development,
moving steadily from one development project to the next,
in this way providing continuity of employment for their
experienced development team(s). Thus B.P., for example,
can be expected to turn their full attention to the development
of one of their marginal fields, probably Andrew, around the
time that their Magnus development nears completion in 1982-83.
b. The time-schedules incorporated in operators' field
development plans often prove over-optimistic. Slippage may
occur not only with respect to the construction, installation
and commissioning of production facilities, but also earlier
at the appraisal and planning stages. For example, there
is some doubt whether the British Gas Corporation can meet
an extremely tight schedule which calls for orders for several
(probably five) steel jackets to be placed in 1981 in order
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to achieve production in late 1983.
c. The government's depletion policy is, as yet, undecided.
Production from current North Sea developments is expected
to peak around 1985 and fall below the self-sufficiency level
of approximately two million b/d around 1988-89 (Brown, 1979).
The government's ability to influence the production levels
of these fields is extremely limited given the 'Varley
assurances' already granted to the oil companies and the danger
that cutting production might harm oil reservoirs. An attempt
could nevertheless be made to control the flow of oil from
new developments either by regulating the pace of offshore
exploration through the timing, content and scale of future
rounds of exploration licences, or by influencing the timing
of development activity through the procedure for granting
consent for development proposals submitted by the oil
companies. Undue delay of development programmes would,
however, be particularly unpopular with oil companies, while
any such obvious action aimed at restricting production would
also raise objections from our E.E.C. and O.E.C.D. partners,
particularly at a time when uncertainties over the continuing
supply of Middle East oil have increased. As the present
government seems opposed to intervention in the affairs of
private industry such action is, in fact, very unlikely,
especially since any development currently under consideration
would probably not achieve peak production until after 1985.
Indeed, several of the 1980-83 developments are 'marginal'
fields, development of which the government appears more likely
to encourage than impede.
(7) It is, of course, even more difficult to predict the pattern of
developments which may take place from 1983 onwards. Development
projects receiving government approval during this period could
include several significant finds already made, such as N. Brae,
S. Beryl, C. Cormorant, 206/8 etc. Significant finds made during
1980-82, if exploited vigorously, might also receive development
approval (and result in platform orders) by 1985. As explained
above, the number of significant finds made during the period 1980-82
will depend upon the level of exploration drilling activity
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and its success rate. Both of these factors depend to some
extent on the scale and content of future licensing rounds.
As discussed above, some attempt may be made to control depletion
by regulation of offshore licensing and current evidence
suggests that the seventh round of licensing could offer a
relatively small number of blocks - certainly fewer than the
oil industry would like - although nothing is known about the
quality of the blocks to be offered. Nevertheless, exploration
activity started to pick up in 1979 and this trend is expected
to continue in the period to 1980-82. However, there seems little
reason to expect that the success rate will radically improve or
the amount of oil found per successful well significantly increase
during the 1980-82 period. Certainly the general consensus in
the oil industry is that the best and most easily identifiable
reservoirs have already been discovered and that there is little
chance of another Brent of Forties being found. Similarly, the
Department of Energy is of the opinion that well over half the
total recoverable reserves on the U.K. Continental Shelf have
already been discovered. Official estimates put total reserves
in the range 2400 - 4400 million tonnes (17500 - 32100 million
barrels), of which 1500- 2600 million tonnes (11000 - 19000 million
barrels) have already been discovered (Department of Energy, 1979) .
In Table 11.6 below, which summarises the information provided
in Table 11.5, it has therefore been assumed that in 1984 and 1985
new developments will continue to be approved, although the
combined budgeted expenditure of the developments going ahead
in each of these years - £1 billion - will be lower than that of
previous years.
Although equipment orders tend to be concentrated at the start of
the development phase - for example, the platform is usually ordered
soon after development consent has been granted - capital expenditure
is incurred over a number of years. Analysis of the spending profiles
of previous field developments in the U.K. sector of the North Sea
reveals that :-
(a) Expenditure is usually incurred over a period of 5 - 12 years
depending, for example, on the size of the field - capital expenditure
on large fields is generally spread over a longer period.
TABLE 11.6
Summary of U.K. Field Development Activity,
1980 - 85
Year Summary of Activity (1979 prices)
1980 Three major platforms (including a TLP) to be ordered
for three developments costing in total £1.8 billion.
1981 Seven platforms (five of them small) to be ordered
for five developments costing in total £1 billion.
1982 Nine or ten platforms (seven of them small) to be
ordered for six developments costing £1.15 billion.
1983 Five or six platforms (two or three of them small)
to be ordered for five developments costing
£1.05 billion.
1984 Developments costing £1 billion.
1985 Developments costing £1 billion.
SOURCE : Table 11.5.
(b) Capital expenditure tends to peak in the third or fourth year
of a field's development.
(c) The overall spending profile of the U.K. fields upon which
development had commenced by December 1979 is shown in Table 11.7.
TABLE 11.7
Spending Profile of Fields upon which Development Commenced 1971-79
Year of Development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-12
Percentage of Total
Capital Expenditure
5 12 22 21 14 10 7 4 5
SOURCE : Interview data.
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However, the developments which will get under way in the period 1980-
85 will tend to be smaller, 'marginal' developments or field
extensions. For this reason the historical spending profile
presented in Table 11.7, although a useful guideline, is inappropriate
and the spending profile shown in Table 11.8 probably a better estimate.
TABLE 11.8
Spending Profile of Fields upon which Development will Commence 1980-85
Year of Development 1 2 3 4 5 6
Percentage of Capital
Expenditure
10 20 25 25 15 5
SOURCE : Researcher ' s own 'best estimate'
When the field development expenditure detailed in Table 11.6 is
allocated according to the estimated spending profile shown in Table 11.8
and combined with the capital expenditure outstanding on field develop¬
ments already under way as at December 1979, the estimated capital
expenditure on U.K. field developments over the period 1980-85 is as
shown in Table 11.9 below.
TABLE 11.9
Estimated Capital Expenditure on U.K. Field Developments, 1980-85
(Em : 1979 prices)
Capital Expenditure 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Current Field
Developments 1820 1620 1140 590 255 150
New Field
Developments 180 460 765 1035 1115 1080
TOTAL 2000 2080 1905 1625 1370 1230
SOURCES : Estimated capital expenditure on current field developments
based on data provided by Wood Mackenzie & Co.; estimated
capital expenditure on new field developments based on
rasssrchfir's own 'hast estimate'.
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In addition to field development activity, North Sea gas collection
schemes are currently the subject of studies in both the U.K. and
Norway and there appears to be little doubt that such a system will
be installed during the period 1980-85. The restriction placed on
the output of the Brent field is, for example, an indication of the
government's intention to minimise wastage of associated gas. <
Possible projects range from a straightforward link between St. Fergus
and the Beryl field (which appears to have almost enough gas and
natural gas liquids to justify a narrow line) to more complex schemes
linking unconnected Norwegian fields to the Scottish coast. However,
the most likely pipeline project in the U.K. sector is a major pipeline
system running parallel to the median line with Norway, collecting
gas from as far north as block 211 (NE of Shetland) to blocks 15 and
16 (where the 'T-block' and Brae fields are situated) before coming
ashore at the St. Fergus terminal. This project is likely to be
completed in several stages costing in total £2 - 3.5 billion, depending
upon its scope.
Summary
The evidence presented suggests that several (somewhat smaller)
developments will commence annually throughout the period to 1985,
providing a steady string of platform orders. Total capital expenditure
on field developments will continue at around £2 billion per annum until
1982, but will thereafter fall quite sharply before stabilising at around
£1.25 billion per annum for several years from 1985 onwards.
Although operating expenditures will undoubtedly increase over the
period 1980-85 as the number of platforms installed in the U.K. sector
builds up, most of the demand created will fall on service companies
rather than the manufacturers which supply the equipment required at
the development phase of activity.
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11.5 GLOBAL OFFSHORE MARKETS
11.5.1 Western Europe
TABLE 11.10
Offshore Oil Production in Western Europe (1979)







SOURCE : Unless otherwise stated the statistics shown in
Tables 11.10 - 11.15 are based on the country
by country survey of world oil fields provided
in Oil & Gas Journal, 31.12.79, pp. 79-122.
Norway
The main centres of production are currently the Ekofisk oil and gas
complex - which includes the W. Ekofisk, Cod, Tor, Albuskjell, Eldfisk
and Edda fields - operated by Phillips, and the Frigg gas field,
operated by Petronord. Both complexes are served by established pipe¬
line systems.
Development of the gianfcStatfjord oil field (operated by Mobil) has
suffered considerably from design and construction delays and cost
escalation. The final cost of the 'A' platform, now virtually
completed, should be in the region of £700 million. The second massive
concrete platform, which should be installed in the summer of 1981,
will cost in excess of £1 billion. Alternatives for the £1 billion
'C' platform are being considered. All oil production will be
transported by tankers loading at single-point mooring buoys, but
the transportation of the associated natural gas is still under evaluation.
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Production from the Valhall field, which is also currently being
developed, will be via the Ekofisk complex.
Although the Norwegian government is likely to continue to support a
programme of steady offshore development (to ensure stability in the
Norwegian economy) there are a number of projects that could go ahead
before 1985. The major development is likely to be the construction
of a gas pipeline system costing anything from £2.5 - 7 billion,
depending on the scale of the scheme selected. It seems likely that
a major north-south line running to Europe will eventually be
constructed but, in the meantime, an additional line to the U.K. may
be built. The government feel that the discoveries made during the
summer of 1979 have increased reserves above the level needed to make
such a gas collection system viable. The principal discovery made was
that by Norske Shell on Block 31/2, which the Petroleum Directorate has
suggested could prove to be the world's largest offshore gas field.
Although the Norskfe Shell discovery may not be developed before 1985,
the small NE Frigg and Odin gas fields probably will be tied into the
Frigg complex during this period, while there are other gas discoveries,
such as Esso's SJeipner field, also awaiting development. In addition,
Statoil, the state oil company, expects either the "Golden block"
(34/10) or the "Silver block" (30/6) to be declared commercial in 1980.
The Golden block is known to contain a lot of oil and gas held in
complicated structures requiring costly development - probably in excess
of £1 billion - and is likely to go ahead with all possible speed as it
would be the first to be operated by Statoil. While other possible
oil developments include Esso's Balder field and further extensions
of the Ekofisk complex, B.P. has already submitted plans for the
development of the Ula field, a small oil discovery in block 7/12.
As at June 1979 about £5 billion had been invested in exploration
(£0.6 billion) and development (£4.4 billion) on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf, and in 1978 alone new contracts worth £0.85 billion
were placed for the Norwegian sector. Given the list of possible
developments detailed above and the policy of the Norwegian government,
it seems likely that this level of activity will be maintained in real
terms during the period 1980-85, with several small developments
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'bridging the gap' between the Statfjord 'B' and Valhall developments
(most of the work upon which will be completed by the end of 1981) and
the Statfjord 'C', Golden block, 31/2 and other major developments
likely to go ahead later in the 1980-85 period.
Norwegian companies were quick to spot the opportunity presented by
the offshore market to capitalize on their country's traditional expertise
in marine engineering. The initial response by Norwegian industry was
characterised by concentration on the supply of a few products and
services - including important items such as mobile drilling rigs,
concrete production platforms and supply ships - in which they achieved
substantial export success. However, strongly supported by the
Norwegian government, Norwegian industry has gradually broadened its
offshore capability, capturing 60% of the new contracts placed for the
Norwegian sector in 1978.
Denmark
Offshore exploration and development is in the hands of the Danske
Undergrunds Consortium (D.U.C.), which has made a series of relatively
modest - by U.K. and Norwegian standards - offshore oil and gas
discoveries, including the Dan field which has been producing small
quantities of oil since 1972.
In May 1979 the Danish parliament gave permission for the development
of the T.yra and Roar gas fields. The platforms will be small steel
structures but in total the development will cost somewhere in the
region of £250 - 680 million. The ElOO - 120 million development of
the Gorm field is also under way. Despite these developments, it is
unlikely that Denmark will become a major market for offshore-related
equipment given the nature of the oil and gas reservoirs so far
discovered.
Eire
In the 1970s around 55 wells were drilled in Irish waters with no
better results than non-commercial indications of oil, although one
small gas field has been discovered and brought into production at
Kinsale Head, off the Cork coast. Attention is currently concentrated
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on the Porcupine Trough (off the west coast) where Phillips made the
first significant (but non-commercial) oil strike in Irish waters
in October 1978 and BP discovered hydrocarbons in 1979. However, eight
other wells in this area have produced only traces of oil. Furthermore,
the water depths in the Porcupine Trough - 1200-1500 feet - could be
a serious deterrent to the development of any discoveries, unless
they have very large reserves. Thus, although drilling should
continue for several years no development activity is foreseen at the
present time.
Licensing terms state that licencees should use Irish goods and
services as much as competitively possible. Irish involvement in
exploration contracts increased from 16% in 1976 to 26% in 1977, at a
time when the Irish government estimated that the maximum share which
Irish industry could be expected to win was 29%. Around £60-70
million was spent on exploration in 1978.
Rest of Western Europe
Although many small offshore fields have been identified in Holland1s
sector of the North Sea, no major discoveries have been made in
recent years and while some small offshore gas developments are likely
during the 1980s, Holland will not develop into a major offshore market.
Holland has, in any case, a well-developed offshore supplies industry
with approximately 50 companies specialising in oil industry supplies.
Small oil and gas fields have been discovered off the coast of Greece
(in the North Aegean Sea) and Greece should be an oil producer on a
modest scale by early 1981. The South Kayala gas field is also
being developed. Off the coast of Italy a series of hydrocarbon
finds was made in 1979 by the ENI group in the Northern Adriatic Basin,
already the main source of Italian gas production. Gas has also been
discovered further south in the Ionian Sea. Italy has a well-developed
engineering industry and U.K. companies are unlikely to make much
headway in this small market. Spain discovered oil in 1979 in the
Gulf of Cadiz (on the Atlantic Shelf) and in the Mediterranean, where




Offshore Oil Production in North America - (1979)




* Estimated at 20% of total oil production (Dafter, 1978b)
Canada
Substantial reserves of oil and gas are believed to exist in the
Beaufort Sea and the offshore regions of the Arctic Islands and
Eastern Canada. To date, however, offshore activity has been
constrained by the costs and technological barriers imposed by
an extremely hostile environment. In addition, most of the oil and
gas deposits lie a considerable distance from the centres of
consumption, necessitating difficult and costly transportation.
Dome Petroleum made a series of oil and gas finds in the Beaufort
Sea in 1977-79 and hope that the area could be producing oil at
around 200,000 b/d by 1985, an achievement which would require
investment in production and transportation systems of around $6 billion.
The tremendous pressure created by the formation of pack ice (which
can be 7 feet thick in this area) necessitates the construction of
some form of artificial drilling island, as a steel platform of the
North Sea type would be crushed.
Panarctic Oils has been exploring in the Arctic Islands since 1968
although their first offshore well wasn't sunk until 1974. In 1979
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Panarctic discovered a gas field in the Whitefish Straits which should
3 3
add a further 5 trillion ft to the existing 14 - 15 trillion ft of
proven and probable gas reserves (principally on the Melville and
King Christian Islands), taking them close to the threshold of
3
20 - 25 trillion ft thought necessary to make a pipeline to southern
markets viable. However, considerable appraisal drilling must be
undertaken before the complex and expensive development of these reserves
can commence (probably towards 1985) .
Finally, off the east coast of Canada the main problems are presented
by icebergs and the wind and general sea state, which are at least as
demanding as those in the North Sea. This area saw intense
exploration in 1979 with 11 wells being drilled (in the Grand Banks
off Newfoundland, the Labrador Shelf and in the Davis Strait) at a cost
of around $250 million. Commercial quantities of both oil and gas have
been found in the area and development activity could commence before
1985.
Thus, major developments appear likely to get under way from around
1983 onwards. U.S. manufacturers appear well placed to provide
specialised equipment beyond the capability of indigenous industry.
U.S.A.
The U.S. Continental Shelf offers considerable potential as an oil-
bearing province. In 1978 the American Petroleum Institute estimated
that only 5% of the U.S. Continental Shelf had been explored, although
offshore areas accounted for around 18 - 20% of U.S. domestic oil
supply (Dafter, 1978b).
The majority of offshore activity has been focussed on the shallower
areas of the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana and Eastern Texas - only
12 out of more than 800 structures in the Gulf of Mexico are in depths
of more than 100 metres and the majority are in close proximity to
shore (Baker et al, 1978). Although production has been declining,
the area is still one of the world's largest oil and gas producers
and the deeper waters do show considerable promise. There are,
however, also two main areas of offshore production on the Pacific
Coast of the U.S.A. - the Los Angeles Basin and the Santa Barbara
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Channel - and a third in the Cook Inlet, off the south coast of
Alaska, where drilling in the mid-1960s identified several major
fields which were subsequently rapidly developed.
In December 1979 licenses were awarded for areas in the Beaufort Sea,
off the north coast of Alaska. Despite the extremely difficult
offshore conditions, very short drilling season and distance from
market, these licenses are thought to contain some of the best acreage
in the U.S.A. However, even if exploration is successful it could
be several years before large-scale development takes place.
Off the east coast exploration in the deep-water zone known as the
Baltimore Canyon started in the spring of 1978. The area aroused,
intense interest due to its proximity to the high energy consuming
areas of the east coast and in the summer of 1978 a significant natural
gas and condensate find was made, confirming the presence of hydro¬
carbons in the area. However, by February 1979 more than a dozen other
wells had failed to produce another significant find and the extent
to which hopes for the area had receded was shown by the paltry bidding
for the second round of licenses for the Baltimore Canyon auctioned that
month.
The decline in domestic oil and gas reserves in recent years and the
decision to allow gas and oil prices to rise to the market rates
should provide sufficient incentives for oil companies to step up
their exploration and production activities, both on and offshore.
The U.S. market for offshore oil and gas equipment will, however, be
extremely difficult to penetrate given the considerable experience
and expertise of indigenous U.S. manufacturers.
11.5.3 Central America and the West Indies
Offshore conditions in this area are generally favourable, apart
from seasonal hurricanes. Most countries in this zone will be
largely dependent on imported oil-related technology although the majority
traditionally import most of their engineering requirements from the
U.S.A. and employ U.S. standards.
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TABLE 11.12
Offshore Oil Production in Central America & the West Indies
(1979)






* As at January 1980.
Mexico
Mexico has been motivated by its vast reserves of low-cost oil, its
proximity to the U.S. market and its desire to use oil as a 'motor'
to increase the speed of economic development to exploit its hydro¬
carbon resources as quickly as possible. Oil production rose dramatically
during the 1970s and the 1980 target of 2.25 million b/d should be
achieved. Moreover by 1985 Mexico should be capable of producing
4 million b/d, although production will probably be restricted to
around 2.5 million b/d in order to prevent the economy from overheating.
Natural gas production is expected to rise from its 1978 level of 2.56
3 3
billion cubic feet per day (ft /d) to 3.3 billion ft /d in 1979, and
natural gas production capacity should be around 5 billion ft^/d by
1982.
Until recently offshore development had been limited to extensions of
existing onshore production areas in relatively shallow water in the
Gulf of Mexico, together producing only about 40,000 b/d. However,
the Cantarell complex of fields in the Gulf of Campeche (in the Gulf
of Mexico), which promises to be one of the most prolific offshore
provinces in the world, has been rapidly developed since its discovery
in 1975, with production rising from 20,000 b/d in June 1979 to 225,000
b/d in January 1980. By December 1980 production should reach
500,000 b/d, the limit of the existing 36" pipeline. A second phase
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of development, involving the exploitation of at least 3 more fields
in the Cantarell complex currently being delineated, could boost
offshore production to at least 1 million b/d by the early 1980s.
Offshore areas will, in fact, account for most of the increase in >>
production over the period to 1985 as Mexico's offshore oil is easier
and more economical to produce than her onshore oil, while it is currently
logical to increase offshore oil production and use the onshore fields
for gas production as this minimises gas flaring.
Fiercely nationalistic, Pemex (the State oil company) has been slowly
developing its technology since 1938 when the oil industry was
nationalised. However, the movement offshore has provided a stiff
technological challenge (despite the fact that the fields so far
developed are located 40-50 miles offshore in only 115-250 feet
of water) and Pemex is being forced to look for outside experience.
In addition, Mexico's manufacturing industry can't cope with the level
of demand from the oil sector. Last year Pemex bought around $2 billion
worth of equipment of which well over half was imported. Moreover,
this situation is unlikely to change significantly until at least
1983, despite high tariff barriers and Pemex's policy of giving a 15%
advantage to national or joint-venture companies when it puts out to
tender.
At the moment most imports are from the U.S.A. However, Pemex is
trying to diversify its purchases away from the U.S.A. and a foothold
has been gained in the market place by several Dutch, Norwegian
and French companies, usually through some form of joint-venture as Mexican
law limits foreign investment to 49% ownership. Despite showing a
great deal of interest, U.K. companies have in general been slow to
form joint-ventures, nor have orders been placed directly with U.K.
companies to any great extent. Apart from an inability to offer
competitive terms, it may be that British firms have still to gain the
thorough knowledge of the intricate workings of the Mexican system
which appears to be necessary to penetrate this market.
Rest of Central America & and the West Indies
Trinidad & Tobago has rapidly developed its sizeable offshore oil
and gas resources. Elsewhere prospects are good in the Bahamas, which
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lie in close proximity to the large oil fields in the eastern sector
of the Gulf of Mexico; on the Gulf coast of Guatemala, near the large
oil finds of southern Mexico; and in Barbados, just north of
Trinidad & Tobago. Interest is also being shown in the Continental
shelves of Jamaica and Cuba. A new platform fabrication and ship¬
building yard was established in 1979 on the Caribbean island of Aruba
in the expectation of securing orders for the Gulf of Mexico and South
America.
11.5.4 South America
Offshore conditions, particularly on the Atlantic coast, are generally
favourable. The only exception is the southern tip of the continent,
where conditions are stormy and inhospitable.
The countries in this area are largely dependent upon imported oil
technology. However, a large proportion of manufactured imports comes
from theU.S.A., although some Western European countries (such as
West Germany) have been fairly successful in the area. Unfortunately,
U.K. companies have been relatively unsuccessful in their attempts
to break into South American markets in recent years.
TABLE 11.13
Offshore Oil Production in South America (1979)






* Estimate : Oil production from Lake Maracaibo (treated as




Offshore exploration was limited during the years the State oil
company, YPF, held monopoly power. However, with increasing demand
and declining offshore production the Government has accepted its
dependence on foreign expertise and investment and revised its
licensing arrangements to encourage private companies (including
Shell) to undertake exploration.
The continental shelf off Southern Argentina is considered promising,
particularly the area between Tierra del Fuego and the Falkland
Islands where environmental conditions are very similar to those in
the North Sea. As yet results have been disappointing but should
developments be eventually undertaken U.K. equipment suppliers should
be well-placed given the similarity in offshore conditions, Argentina's
dependence on foreign technology, the active participation of U.K. oil
companies - including BP - in risk contracts in the area and the absence
of import duties on equipment required for offshore activities.
Brazil
While demand is rising at around 8% per annum, oil production has
fallen steadily as onshore production has declined faster than the
growth in production from new offshore areas. Although this situation
should be reversed shortly as production builds up from the Enchova
and Garoupa fields in the Campos Basin (which are the first of 8-10
prospects in the area to come on stream), Brazil will fall well short
of the production target of 425,000 b/d of oil set in the current
five year plan. Foreign oil companies have been awarded exploration
blocks in the Santos basin (where BP and Exxon are operating) and the
Amazon Delta (Shell and a Franco-Italian group). However, until
September 1979 when Exxon found oil in the Santos Basin the oil
companies had only minor oil traces to show for two years of risk contract
drilling. Nor is major development activity anticipated in Brazil's
inshore area, where a number of shallow water fields scattered along
the coast from north of the Campos Basin as far as the Rio Grande do
Norte (which lies at the turn of the coastline) currently produce
roughly half of Brazil's offshore oil.
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Brazil has a very competitive shipbuilding industry and local
construction yards are also being set up with a view to building
platforms not only for the Campos Basin but also for other offshore
areas in South America. Although Petrobras (the state oil company)
had previously strongly defended local manufacturers, restrictions
on imported equipment for offshore oil production have supposedly
been lifted.
Venezuela
Conventional oil production (about 80% of which comes from Lake
Maracaibo) has fallen steadily during the 1970s but has still exceeded
the rate at which new discoveries have been made. Thus, one of the
first tasks of Petroven (the state oil monopoly) following
nationalisation of the oil industry in 1976 was to reactivate explor¬
ation (which foreign companies had virtually halted because of the
impending state takeover). Consequently Petroven are to spend around
$25 billion on hydrocarbon development over the next 10 - 12 years,
with around $5.1 billion of this being spent on exploration, $11 billion
on conventional production, $2 billion on the exploitation of the
heavy oil in the onshore Orinoco region and the remainder on refining,
transportation and storage (International Petroleum Times, 7.7.79).
The most promising offshore area is the Gulf of Venezuela (adjacent
to Lake Maracaibo) which has unfortunately been ruled out of bounds
to oil exploration due to a border dispute with Columbia. Nevertheless,
since a $175 million, two-year offshore drilling programme was
commenced in October 1978, 3 out of 16 wells have struck hydrocarbons.
In June 1979 natural gas was discovered north of the Paria Peninsula
when a well was drilled into the same giant gas field which begins
off Barbados and extends past Trinidad & Tobago into Venezuelan waters.
Indeed, although two small oil finds have also been made Petroven believe
that offshore discoveries are more likely to be of gas than oil.
The active exploration programme currently being undertaken will
probably result in development activity from around 1982 onwards.
Preference will, however, be given to domestic manufacturers.
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Rest of South America
Chile has found oil and gas in the extremely hostile environment of
the Straits of Magellan and offshore oil production began in 1979.
Peru also produces offshore oil in small quantitites while Ecuador
has discovered natural gas offshore.
11.5.5 Africa
The main area of activity is along the west coast, where environmental
conditions are generally favourable. Most of the countries in this
zone are ex-U.K. or French colonies heavily dependent upon imported
technology and expertise. No one market is particularly large but
together they comprise an important target for British offshore
suppliers.
TABLE 11.14
Offshore Oil Production in Africa (1979}










The Egyptian government is attempting to increase oil and gas
production as rapidly as possible and new offshore licenses were
signed in 1979 in an attempt to boost the already busy offshore
programme. Although most of Egypt's oil comes from fields in the
shallow Gulf of Suez, the Abu Qir field in the Mediterranean became
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Egypt's first producing offshore gas field in January 1979 (with a
second gas find being made nearby later in the year)- The limited
exploration carried out in the Red Sea has so far failed to produce
a significant find.
Nigeria
Each year more oil is being found in Nigeria than is being extracted.
There are also substantial fields of non-associated gas which have
been located and sealed until the Bonny LNG plant is ready. Onshore
fields provide the majority of Nigeria's reserves and production but
a series of sizeable fields do lie offshore in the Gulf of Guinea
and the new offshore acreage which has recently been offered for
exploration is expected to produce new finds.
Rest of Africa
On the Atlantic coast Gabon, Cameroon, Zaire and Cabinda/Angola
are all producing oil from offshore fields, while gas has been
discovered off the coasts of Ghana, Gabon, Cameroon and Namibia/South
Africa. Exploration is also being undertaken off the east coast
of Africa, while in the Mediterranean Tunisia has made small offshore
oil and gas discoveries and is producing oil from the Gulf of Gabes.
Texaco are to develop three fields off the coast of Angola and
Agip and Elf are developing three fields offshore the Congo Republic.
11.5.6 Middle East
All the offshore fields discussed in this section lie in the Persian
Gulf where conditions are very favourable to offshore development.
Water depths tend to be less than 50 metres and nowhere exceeds 200
metres, while offshore structures are unlikely to be faced with
waves of more than 10 metres in height (compared with the freak waves
of 40 metres which are possible in the North Sea). The technological
demands are thus less harrowing than those in the North Sea and the
offshore structures in use are relatively small and simple in design.
There are already fabrication yards at Dubai and elsewhere in the region
that can look after most of the required construction, although in
other sectors the Persian Gulf states are still relatively under¬
developed in terms of providing an indigenous supply of equipment
and services.
TABLE 11.15
Offshore Oil Production in the Middle East
(1979)







Saudi Arabia (& Bahrain) 2,828,000
Sharjah 12,082
TOTAL 4 ,667,607
* including the Israeli-occupied portion of
the Gulf of Suez.
Abu Dhabi
Although the government is limiting oil production to a level which
will prolong the life of the major fields and maximise the recovery
of all hydrocarbons (including the country's vast quantities of
natural gas) it is nevertheless investing heavily in building up
its basic production capacity. By far the most important development
is the exploitation of the giant Upper Zakum oilfield - for which
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) are project managers - which
was started in 1977 and will cost around $4 billion. Oil production
is expected to commence in 1981 with full capacity of 500,000 b/d
being reached in 1986, although a later stage of development could
increase capacity to 800,000 b/d. A number of smaller offshore
290
developments are also underway, costing in total over $1 million.
The results of recent exploration suggest that there are rich
reserves still to be discovered. For example, a recently discovered
offshore gas field could ultimately prove to be one of the world's
largest discoveries. However, given the heavy investment already
being undertaken in.the oil sector early development of this field
is unlikely.
Although it has taken over all the top-level policy-making matters,
Abu Dhabi still relies heavily on Western (particularly French) oil
companies and contractors for most aspects of day-to-day operations.
Consequently, although there are opportunities for U.K. manufacturers
in this area the presence of French operators and project managers
appears to have largely benefitted French suppliers.
Qatar
Offshore fields already account for the majority of Qatar's oil
production and other 'marginal' offshore oil fields are known to
exist. In addition, while a project designed to collect and transmit
associated gas from the offshore oil fields to the mainland is
currently being undertaken, Qatar also possesses considerable reserves
of non-associated gas, including the recently discovered (and
apparently extremely large) North-west Dome offshore gas field. U.K.
firms are well-established in this market.
Iran
The Iranian sector of the Persian Gulf is generally considered to
be one of the world's most promising offshore areas, but the
revolution drastically reduced the number of foreign technicians
in the Iranian oil and gas industry and this has been reflected not only
in falling production levels (both on and offshore) but also in
reduced exploration and development.
Saudi Arabia
More than a dozen offshore discoveries are managed by Aramco (the
291
state-controlled oil company) and new offshore fields continue
to be discovered. However, Saudi Arabia's currently installed
production capacity exceeds its target production level and consequently
there is no desire to rapidly develop offshore discoveries. Aramco
arranges some of its purchases through branch offices in the Hague
and Houston, but most of its buying is handled through its purchasing
headquarters in Dhahran. *
Rest of the Middle East
Although further exploration is being carried out in Dubai, it is some
time since any new oil finds were made and it is thought that the
most likely sources have already been covered. Bahrain's only
offshore production comes from the Abu Safah oil field which it shares
with Saudi Arabia and although much of its offshore area has been
leased no other oil and gas finds have been made and prospects of
future discoveries are slight.
11.5.7 South-East Asia
In South-East Asia the waters are generally shallow and except in
the monsoon season no extreme conditions are met.
Singapore is a well-established port and the centre for offshore
activities in South-East Asia. Five yards have been established
to build drilling rigs and local shipbuilding companies are able to
build and repair supply boats. Japan is also well placed to become
increasingly involved in the offshore equipment market.
Japan
Intensive exploration both on and offshore has so far met with
very limited success. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has
drawn up a five-year offshore development programme (commencing in
1980) which involves an average of 15 exploration wells per year.
Moreover, Japanese companies are involved in a number of joint
exploration and development ventures in many overseas areas,
including the Gulf of Bohai, China; Palawan Island, Phillipines; the
Gulf of Alaska; and offshore Abu Dhabi.
TABLE 11.16
Offshore Oil Production in South-East Asia (1979)










* As at December 1979.
Australia
Australia's offshore production currently comes from four fields in
the Gippsland Basin in the wide, shallow Bass Straits, where the
Tuna oil and gas field is currently being developed and the Snapper
gas field should be developed in the early 1980s (at a cost of around
£100 million). This area also contains the Marlin, Sunfish and
Flouder finds (which should now be developed following the rise in
oil prices) and the more recently discovered Bream, Golden Beach
and Turrum finds (which are currently being assessed).
Australia's other main offshore area is the North-West Shelf. The
Canning Basin, which is estimated to have reserves of around 18
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, contains the North Rankin, Goodwyn
and Angel fields. Development of these reserves, which lie about
80 miles offshore in around 415 feet of water, should take place over
the period 1980-84 and will involve expenditure of around £1.4 -
1.7 billion on production platforms, pipelines, treatment plants and
LNG carriers.
The Exmouth Plateau is regarded by many as Australia's last hope
for a major oil discovery. This region lies in deep water (of
around 300-3000 metres) 15-18 miles offshore, close to the NW shelf
natural gas discoveries. To be commercial any find would need to
be of oil and of considerable size as the oil companies are operating
at the extremes of drilling technology and beyond known oil
production technology. However, the first four (very expensive)
wells drilled on the Exmouth Plateau showed only gas traces.
Nevertheless, Australia should continue to develop into a major
offshore market although it will, no doubt, be heavily protected
against imported manufactured goods.
Indonesia
Three main groups of offshore oil fields lie off the coasts of East
Kalimantan (formerly Borneo), Sumatra and Java. Exploration and
development was held up for a time as the government attempted to
renegotiate contracts given to the oil companies operating in the area.
However, there appears to have been a 'softening' in political
attitudes and exploration expenditure is expected to reach a record
level of over $600 million in 1980. Although the oil industry expects
most of the oil fields still to be discovered to be relatively small,
significant development activity (especially in relation to offshore
gas) is anticipated in the period 1980-85.
Rest of South-East Asia
Malaysia's oil production comes from two groups of oilfields, one off
the north-west coasts of Sarawak and Sabah, where Shell are continuing
to undertake considerable development work, and the other off the
east coast of the Malaysian peninsula, where Exxon are also undertaking
further development. The Phillipines became an oil producer for
the first time in 1979 when the South Nido field (off Palawan Island)
came on stream. The government is increasing its exploration effort
and 30 wells should be drilled in 1980. Unfortunately prospects
for U.K. companies are poor due to the entrenched position of
U.S. companies in this area. Brunei is already producing oil and
gas from offshore fields, and another find - the Fulmar Field - was
made in 1979 in this small but productive area. Oil has been
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discovered in significant quantities off the coast of Portuguese Timor
where the prospects for further discoveries are considered extremely
promising. Several oil and gas discoveries have also been made in
the Gulf of Papua. Bangladesh has discovered nine offshore gas
fields but it is yet to find oil. An $800 million LNG project is
currently under consideration and U.K. companies are well-placed to
win a major share of equipment orders. Off the coast of Thailand
a pipeline is to be build to serve two commercial gas finds made in
the Gulf of Thailand but British Gas has so far failed in its
attempts to get involved in the area. Drilling is now under way
on the continental shelf between South Korea and Japan where oil-
bearing stata are known to exist, while offshore exploration has
also been revived off the coast of Vietnam, following the conclusion
of contracts with Bow Valley (Canada), Agip (Italy) and Deminex
(West Germany). Off the west coast of India development work is
continuing on the Bombay High and North Bassein fields, while the
Ratnagiri oilfield is also to be developed.
11.5.8 U.S.S.R.
Although the U.S.S.R. has vast reserves of oil and gas, traditional
fields in the accessible Urals/Volga region are being exhausted and
additional reserves will have to be sought and developed further east
in Siberia and in offshore areas. The rate of growth of the U.S.S.R.'s
oil output has also been declining and it is unlikely that the oil
production target of 12.4 million b/d in 1980 set in the current five-
year plan will be achieved.
In 1979 offshore production, mainly from very shallow water in the
Caspian Sea, was around 200,000 b/d (compared to total oil production
of 11.7 million b/d). However, offshore exploration is expected to
be an important feature of the next five-year plan, with deeper drilling
in the Caspian Sea dominating the picture. Further activity is also
likely off Sakhalin Island, especially off its north-eastern coast
in the Okhotsk Sea, which Soviet geologists regard as being comparable
in hydrocarbon potential with the Gulf of Mexico. A Soviet-Japanese
consortium has already had some success in this area, with three out of
five wells sunk in 1977-78 striking oil and gas deposits. Further
exploration will also be carried out in the Black and Baltic Seas,
although previous exploration in these areas met with disappointing
results. Finally, the first exploration to be carried out in the
U.S.S.R.'s Arctic waters will probably commence in the early 1980s.
Offshore oil and gas technology in the U.S.S.F. lags markedly
behind that available in the West and existing Soviet technology
cannot cope with surveying and extracting oil and gas from deep water.
The U.S.S.R. will therefore require a wide variety of Western
technology to support its offshore programme - in fact, one report
has stated that the Comecon market for offshore equipment could
be worth $24 billion over the period 1975-85, with approximately
37% (or $8.8 billion) being spent on imports (Research Associates,
1978). The technology required will include large diameter
pipeline and associated equipment, drilling tackle and drillpipe,
subsea engineering equipment and production and extraction equipment.
Some U.K. companies have been pursuing these opportunities for some
time. However, there is strong competition for business in the
U.S.S.R. and considerable sales effort has been expended by Dutch,
French, German, Norwegian, Japanese and U.S. companies.
11.5.9 China
Offshore production is currently restricted to the Gulf of Bohai (in
N.E. China) in shallow water of up to approximately 50 metres in
depth. This area has been in production for some years, and
although development work has been largely confined to the north
of the Gulf there are thought to be up to 12 clusters of small steel
platforms in existence up to 100 miles offshore.
China has designated offshore oil exploration a priority sector and
current policy seems to rest on the premise that the large-scale
development of offshore oil production cannot be rapidly achieved
without much greater use of foreign technical expertise. Thus a
series of eight contracts have been signed with major oil companies
to participate in seismic tests for offshore oil. BP and Elf
Acquitaine have signed contracts for the Yellow Sea while in the
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blocks in the South China Sea near the Pearl River the agreements are
with Exxon, Mobil, Caltex and Phillips. Atlantic Richfield is
operating to the south and Amoco to the west of Hainan Island. These
companies are expected to hand over the seismic data and their
interpretation of the findings (free of charge) during 1980 and the
oil companies believe exploratory drilling might begin by early 1981.
However, the possibility of long delays is highlighted by the
Japanese experience in the Gulf of Bohai. Having reached an initial
agreement with the Chinese to appraise and develop a shallow-water
area in the south of the Gulf believed to hold a 3 billion barrel oilfield,
further negotiations ran into deadlock. Initial worries about the
contract - which involves Japan giving China a £1 billion credit to
be repaid in oil - were apparently related to Japan's ability to provide
a total contracting package given her limited offshore experience,
but the main disagreements arose over the financing of the venture
and the interest rates on Japanese loans. (Indeed, the financing
of offshore-related contracts placed overseas is liable to be of major
importance to the Chinese given their limited foreign exchange).
Between October 1976 and December 1978 the Chinese spent about $550
million on imported oil technology to develop their oil and gas
reserves, including at least three survey vessels, six jack-up drilling
rigs, six helicopters and six supply vessels. (These purchases
have been mainly from Norway, Japan, U.S.A., Singapore and France).
The Chinese are also reportedly keen to develop joint-ventures and
other forms of co-operation with foreign firms. Despite this,
continued maximum use of local industrial resources will be a major
policy objective.
Currently China is interested in shallow-water technology. However
by 1985 the development of hydrocarbon reserves lying in deeper water
may be under way and it is here that U.K. companies may well come
into their own, especially since the Chinese authorities are known
to have been impressed by the scale and speed of North Sea developments.
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11.6 CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the demand
for oil will grow at approximately 1% per annum 1980-85. During
this period the proportion of oil and gas produced from offshore
areas will also gradually increase. As a result of this increased
level of offshore activity and the development of more difficult
and expensive fields, offshore expenditure worldwide will increase
19
from around £6 billion in 1979 to at least £10 billion in 1985.
Although offshore development activity will take place in many parts
of the world, the main areas of offshore development in the period
1980-85 will be Norway, North America, Mexico, West Africa, South-
East Asia and Australia.
Although a number of smaller fields in the U.K. sector of the North
Sea will continue to be developed, it is anticipated that capital
expenditure on field developments will fall in real terms by around
25% over the period to 1985. As most expenditure on offshore-
related equipment is associated with new offshore developments, this
decline in development activity will result in a fall in the domestic
demand for many items of offshore-related equipment.
Thus, while the U.K. market for offshore-related equipment will decline
1980-85, the global offshore market will expand.
19. At constant 1979 prices.
CHAPTER TWELVE
EXPECTED FUTURE TRENDS IN THE SCOTTISH MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF THE
OFFSHORE SUPPLIES INDUSTRY
12.1 INTRODUCTION
The main objective of the final phase of the fieldwork was to
investigate future trends in the Scottish manufacturing sector of the
offshore supplies industry by determining the expected response of
the sample to a given scenario (developed by the researcher) of the
global offshore marketing situation in the period 1980-85. It is
evident from the previous chapter that the scenario presented to
these firms highlighted the fact that while the U.K. market for
offshore-related equipment in general would decline quite sharply over
the period 1982-85, the global offshore market was expected to expand
steadily throughout the period to 1985. It was argued in Chapter 5
that given this market situation the most appropriate strategy would
appear to be the development of offshore markets overseas. For this
reason, during the second round of interviews attention was focussed
on the strategy of market development. Thus, section 12.3 presents
an analysis of the expected strategic response of the sample"*" to the
hypothetical, but reasonable, scenario that there will be a decline
in the domestic market for offshore-related equipment in general over
the period to 1985, during which time the global market will continue
to expand.
Reference will also be made - in section 12.3.1 - to evidence concerning
these firms' original projections of the trend in their offshore-related
2
exporting activities over the period to 1985, based on their own
view of the likely demand for their offshore-related equipment in both
the domestic and export markets. It will be shown that the majority
of the sample agreed that while the absolute size of the global market
for offshore-related equipment would continue to grow (1980-85) the
capital expenditure on U.K. field developments would fall over the
same period, and that many of these accepted that this would lead to
1. At the time when the final round of interviewing was undertaken one
of the firms surveyed, unit C, was in the process of being taken
over by another company. As a result, this section is based
on the information collected during the course of interviews in only
39 firms.
2. This evidence results from the statistical questionnaire completed
during the first phase of interviewing.
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a fall in demand for their products in the domestic market. However,
some firms (including, for example, certain down-hole tool manufacturers)
argued quite correctly that the demand for their products was not
closely associated with the number and size of field developments,
and that therefore the domestic demand for their products might be
maintained in the period to 1985 irrespective of the decline in
development expenditure in the U.K. sector.
In Chapter 4 it was suggested that there might be a close association
between a firm's investment in exporting activity and its export
performance. However, it was further argued that this investment
may not be undertaken unless the firm's management adopts a positive
attitude to exporting, planning the exporting campaign and budgeting
for the necessary investment, rather than simply filling any export
orders which happen to be received. That is, a firm is likely to
be more effective in export markets if its management prepares a plan
outlining the export marketing policy to be utilised in the development
of overseas markets and budgeting for the investment likely to be
required for the successful implementation of this approach. In this
respect it is interesting to consider the planning activities of the
firms surveyed, information concerning which was collected during the
final phase of the fieldwork.
Long-range corporate plans (which typically cover a period of 5 or
more years) are of a strategic nature, that is, they are primarily
designed to determine corporate objectives and identify appropriate
courses of action which may be adopted in order to achieve these
objectives. These plans are normally, therefore, of a fairly general
nature, simply indicating the form of the product or market development
(or other strategy) to be undertaken, although In some cases these
plans may be more detailed with planned turnover, profits, investment
etc. being expressed in financial terms. In addition, these long-
term plans may provide the basis for shorter-term, operational plans
which are usually prepared in some detail (for a 12-18 month period)
with precise levels being set for raw material, labour and capital
requirements and targets established for sales (against which
performance can in due course be measured). Formal planning ensures
that decisions are made explicit and also - since it forces firms to
take some view of the future - increases the likelihood that threats
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and opportunities arising out of change in the market-place are
identified (Bates & Parkinson, 1969; Dale, 1973; Argenti, 1968).
Thus, a company should plan for the future. However, any form of
planning involves making some assumptions about the economic outlook.
Bates & Parkinson argue that reluctance to forecast often stems from
the belief that economic events are unpredictable and that therefore
forecasting is pointless as forecasts are bound to be wrong. However,
the importance of forecasting stems from its ability, if successful,
to reduce the area of uncertainty surrounding management decision¬
making. If, on average, formal forecasts prove to be more accurate
than hunches or guesses then forecasting will provide better information
on which to base management decisions and will therefore result in
improved decision-making (Bates & Parkinson, 1969; Drucker, 1968;
Spencer, 1968) .
Although a number of factors (such as the technical complexity and
diversity of a finn's products) will influence the need for planning,
Bates & Parkinson argue that a key variable influencing the extent
and nature of planning and forecasting activity will be the size of
the firm :
"In a small company planning can be carried on without
any great apparatus. In a one-man business there is no
great need to commit much information to paper. But for
the larger business a formal plan is indispensable."
(Bates & Parkinson, p.266).
Thus, in the case of a small firm, strategic plans may consist of
no more than a few ideas in the owner-manager's head, based on a
subconscious forecast of the future market situation. However, the
limited extent of formal planning being undertaken in a small firm
may also be the result of essential strategic decision-making being
obscured by a myriad of operational problems which act as immediate
demands on manager time and effort. In this way, Ansoff (1968)
argues, unless specific provision is made for concern with strategy,
effort may continue to be directed at improving operating efficiency
at a time when attention to strategic opportunities may produce a
more radical improvement in the firm's performance. For example,
unless small, offshore-related manufacturers find time to formalise
their planning activities they may continue to be so weighed down by
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day-to-day problems that they fail to recognise the opportunities
available to them in overseas markets through the strategy of market
development and, as a result, may continue to reinvest in activities
in the domestic market earning a lower return than those available in
the export market. Moreover, as mentioned above, even if the
opportunities presented by market development are recognised and the
firm intends to export, its success in this activity may heavily
depend upon the commitment of adequate resources, something which
might not take place unless the export marketing programme has been
planned and an appropriate budget set. Thus, the data collected in
the final phase of the fieldwork will now be analysed in order to
discover whether there was any evidence of an association between the
formalisation of planning, the commitment of resources to exporting
and export performance.
12.2 THE PREVALENCE AND IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING AND PLANNING ACTIVITY
Altogether 29 of the 39 firms surveyed claimed to have formulated a
definite policy with respect to their offshore-related manufacturing
business. In four cases this strategy was based on an annual plan,
3
and in two cases on a plan with a 3-year time-horizon used in
association with an annual plan upon which operating budgets were set.
However, by far the most common planning structure (used by 23 firms)
was a 5-year corporate plan used in tandem with an annual operating
plan or budget statement.
Nevertheless, there were considerable differences in the nature of
these 5-year corporate plans with, in general, the long-term plans
developed by the U.S. multinationals (at their headquarters in the
U.S.A.) being rather more comprehensive documents than those used by
British companies. Some idea of the detailed nature of the long-
range plans devised by the U.S. multinationals was provided by the
following statement by the general manager of a U.S. down-hole tool
manufacturer :
3. This being the time-span considered by these firms to be necessary
for the evaluation of investment decisions.
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"Our 5-year, long-range plan used for corporate strategy
forecasts all the ratios, exchange-rate ratios etc. and
has a complete profit and loss and balance sheet from
year to year for 5 years with increases in inflation
rates, price increases and exchange rate developments and
so on."
This company's corporate plans and forecasts were based on computer
analysis and economic modelling of the factors influencing world
4
demand for its products. This particular U.S. multinational had
also devised a very long-range plan of the organisation to the turn
of the century.
Some of the respondents from companies utilising planning and
forecasting systems were, however, far from convinced of their
usefulness. For example, even though he was very heavily involved
in the development of corporate plans, the managing director of one
British shipyard remarked :
"Although it at least concentrates the mind, the effort
expended is disproportionate to the benefits. We're
lucky if anything more than the next 18 months ahead
has any hard basis at all. After that we just take a
national mix of the type of ship we're capable of
building."
Moreover, there was evidence that individuals not involved in the
planning process were even less assured of the relevance of corporate
planning. The marketing manager of the offshore-related division
of one large U.K. company was particularly scathing in his comments
concerning the usefulness of the plans devised by head office staff :
"We have marvellous young lads who paint rosy stories.
They are always optimistic, I think they talk to the
wrong people."
Nevertheless, although several respondents criticised either the cost-
effectiveness or accuracy of corporate plans, the majority argued that
although forecasting and planning was difficult it was, however,
very important, a typical comment being the following :
"Forecasting is essential. If we don't plan ahead we're
neglecting our responsibility to manage the business.
It's just too easy to say, 'it's too difficult'."
4. As were the corporate planning and forecasting systems of several
other U.S. multinationals.
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Although a few firms commented on the importance of forecasts and
long-term plans in relation to the setting of budgets and determination
of the costing structure, the major function of forecasting and
corporate planning was generally considered to be the provision of
suitable information to allow the identification and assessment of
major changes in the market-place (and the threats and opportunities
thus created), the selection of appropriate strategic alternatives
and the timely appraisal of the resulting investment decisions.
Altogether ten firms undertook no formal planning whatsoever. Typical
of the comments passed were "I can't prepare a plan of what we're
going to do from day-to-day" and "I don't know what we'll be doing
next week at the moment," these remarks coming from the managing
directors of two small, Scottish companies. Indeed, 7 of the 16
Scottish firms undertook no formal planning, compared with only 3
of the other 23 firms, indicating that native Scottish companies were
less inclined to undertake formal planning than were other firms.^
However, it has already been shown that the majority of the Scottish
companies were small and hence it was possible that planning behaviour
was more strongly associated with size than nationality of firm.
Preliminary analysis revelaed that although 6 of the 10 non-planning
organisations were small, the relationship between size of unit and
formal planning activity was not very strong. However, this is
perhaps hardly surprising given that (as was pointed out above) all
the U.S. and U.K. organisations have formal corporate plans^
irrespective of the size of their Scottish subsidiaries. That is,
as far as an analysis of planning activity is concerned, the size of
the entire group would appear to be a more relevant variable than the
size of the Scottish unit. Further analysis revealed that all the
foreign and joint-venture units, all but one of the U.K. subsidiaries
and 9 of the 16 Scottish units were either medium or large units
themselves or were part of larger groups, and that only 4 of these
31 organisations did not undertake formal planning, compared with 6
5. It should be noted that the remaining 'non-planners' consisted of
two joint-ventures and a subsidiary of a European company, and that
therefore all the wholly-owned subsidiaries of the U.S. and U.K.
companies were governed by formal plans.
6. Devised by staff located at the groups' headquarters.
304
of the remaining small independent companies (as shown in Table 12.1).
TABLE 12.1
Forecasting and Planning Activity by Size of Organisation
Does the Organisation Undertake
Formal Corporate Planning?
Size of Organisation Total
Small Medium/Large^




TOTAL • 8 31 39
SOURCE : Interview data
Hence there was a clear association between size of organisation and
the prevalence of formal planning activity.
Although there was no relationship in general between the nature of the
product and planning activity, there was some evidence that several of
the fabricators in particular were finding it impossible to plan ahead
simply because the sudden collapse of the fabrication market had
necessitated that they turn their full attention to the problem of
survival, a typical comment being :
"The thing of prime importance is the next week, at the
moment, it's a case of 'let's get what's going'."
The management of another newly-established (but more successful)
Scottish fabricator had been too heavily immersed in solving the problems
associated with rapid growth to develop a formal strategy :
"This is especially difficult for us ... it's grown so fast.
I think the company is more concerned with ironing out its
problems of fast growth. We haven't looked as far ahead as
we should have done, at the moment we're not looking for
more than 2-3 months ahead."
7. Where the unit surveyed was an independent company this is the
'organisation' referred to, otherwise this term relates to the
larger organisation of which the unit surveyed was merely part.
8. Over 150 employees.
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Thus, there was evidence to suggest that in some firms strategic
planning was considered to be less important (or, at least, less
essential) than solving more pressing day-to-day problems, with the
result that it was often ignored by management.
Comments such as "our management is new to the game, we've done well
but we're basically planning from month to month" suggested that there
might be a relationship between experience in the offshore market and
the nature of planning activity undertaken, in that inexperienced
firms might find it harder to forecast developments and hence encounter
difficulty in preparing formal, long-term plans. However, although
firms without any prior offshore-related experience (whether at the
unit or group level) tended to be less likely to undertake formal
planning, in general the association was not strong. Moreover, the
firms commenting on the particular difficulties of forecasting and
planning in what was generally regarded as being an especially volatile
market included both experienced and inexperienced firms. For example,
it was for this reason that a joint-venture (involving a partner with
many years of offshore-related experience) had decided to abandon long-
term planning :
"We used to plan in the early 1970's. We no longer plan,
we simply sound out the market. We look ahead 18 months
in the North Sea, that's as long as you can reasonably
forecast with some certainty."
Finally, in general there was no association between the degree to
which a firm was involved in the offshore-related market and the nature
9
of the planning activity undertaken, although the following comment
by a firm dependent upon the offshore market for less than one-third
of its total turnover was interesting :
"Forward planning hasn't been considered because we've
always known there's a demand for our products onshore."
Thus, the key variable influencing the nature of the planning activity
undertaken was found to be size of organisation,*0 with small firms
in general being less likely to prepare formal forecasts and plans than
9. It may be that there is an association between the nature of the
planning process and the offshore-related involvement of the group
as a whole but data permitting this analysis was not collected.
10. As defined in Table 12.1 above.
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larger organisations. Small firms were less likely to be able to
afford specialist staff to undertake the planning function, with the
result that planning became just one of the several tasks carried
out by the chief executive(s). Consequently some of these individuals
were so involved in solving operational problems that they found it
difficult to allocate time to the consideration of strategic issues.
It was suggested above that the necessary investment in exporting
might only be undertaken if this commitment was embodied in a formal
plan. That is, it was necessary to investigate whether firms which
had not formalised their planning had failed to commit sufficient
resources to exporting and, as a result, achieved only a poor level
of export performance. In fact, it was found that firms which undertook
formal planning were more likely to export offshore-related equipment
than firms which did not - 21 out of 29 'planners' had exported such
equipment compared with only 3 out of 10 'non-planners'. Also, it
was interesting to note that the 'non-planners' which had exported
offshore-related equipment had done so only on a very limited scale
(each exporting equipment worth between £40,000 and £150,000 in the
year for which data was provided), with exports remaining a fairly
small proportion (between 3 and 25%) of their total offshore-related
turnover. Furthermore, these 'non-planners' were, in fact, the three
firms which had only achieved offshore-related exports indirectly
through multinational offshore supply companies located in Aberdeen^
and included two of only three exporters which had undertaken no export
promotion activity whatsoever. Thus, this evidence suggests that
there was an association between the formalisation of planning, the
commitment of resources to exporting and export performance.
12.3 CORPORATE STRATEGY 1980-85
12.3.1 Introduction
This section provides an analysis of the expected strategic response
of the firms surveyed to a scenario suggesting that over the period
11. This being the method of export distribution which minimised the
requirement for marketing skills, knowledge of overseas markets
and resource commitment by these offshore-related manufacturers
as, under this arrangement, it was the multinational offshore
supply companies which provided the market knowledge and undertook
all the exporting activities.
307
1980-85 there would be a general increase in global offshore
expenditure but a decline in field development expenditure in the
U.K. sector of the North Sea. It has previously been argued that
this decline in field development expenditure could be expected to
result in a fall in demand for offshore-related equipment in general.
However, it should be noted at this point that this is a somewhat
simplified picture. Indeed, although there is a fairly close link
between the level of field development expenditure and the demand for
platforms, fabrications and platform equipment.tsuch as process and
power plant, communications and wellhead equipment), several of the
companies surveyed were manufacturing items of equipment for which the
demand is fairly unrelated to the level of field development expenditure.
For example, as will be explained in more detail below, down-hole tools
and certain items of subsea electronic equipment (such as the camera
equipment used for underwater inspection) are required at the
production phase of activity and hence the domestic demand for these
products may be maintained for some considerable time. Similarly,
the demand for ball valves, pipe and pipe-coating facilities is
closely associated with the installation of new pipelines, and thus
these sectors are likely to be given a boost by the development of the
U.K. offshore gas gathering system. For this reason, during the second
round of interviews with the group of firms for which the decline in
field development expenditure was not particularly relevant, it was
hypothesised that the domestic demand for these companies' products
would be roughly maintained over the period to 1985, while the global
market would continue to expand.
Hence it is not surprising that some of the firms surveyed did not
expect the domestic market for their offshore-related equipment to
decline. The trend in the volume of domestic demand (over the period
to 1985) anticipated by the sample at the time of the first survey
(that is, summer 1979) is summarised in Table 12.2 (below). Only four
firms expected the domestic market for their equipment to improve in
the period to 1985, namely the three platform fabricators and. a
shipbuilder. It should, however, be noted that these opinions were
expressed at a time when there had been a considerable lull in orders
for platforms and supply vessels, and that therefore the prevailing
12
attitude was one of 'things can only get better'. Apart from these
12. Moreover, by the time the second round of interviewing was undertaken
(February-April 1980) one of the platform yards had altered its




Trend in Domestic Demand Projected by Sample
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SOURCE : Interview data
cases, there was a considerable degree of agreement between the sample's
views concerning likely future market trends and the scenario presented
by the researcher- For example, of the 20 fabricators, process, power
and wellhead equipment manufacturers identified above as producers of
equipment for which the demand was likely to be closely associated with
the level of field development expenditure, 11 stated that the domestic
market for their products would decline while the rest hoped that it
would be maintained - none expected the domestic market to expand.
Similarly, of the 14 manufacturers of electronic and oilfield equipment,
ball valves, pipe and pipe-coatings - the demand for which is less
closely linked to the volume of field development activity - 11 estimated
that domestic demand would remain roughly stable (while the others
anticipated a fall in demand).
The change in the proportion of offshore-related turnover exported
which the surveyed firms anticipated, given their own views of future
market trends for their products, is summarised in Table 12.3 below.
Altogether 16 firms expected to improve their offshore-related export
performance over the period to 1985, while only one firm expected its
export involvement to fall (to hothing, following a conscious decision
to withdraw from exporting). Table 12.4 (below) summarises the change
13. In real terms.
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TABLE 12.3
Trend in Offshore-belated Exporting Performance Projected by Sample
Anticipated Change in Proportion









SOURCE : Interview data
TABLE 12.4
Trend in Offshore-related Exporting Performance
Anticipated in Response to Scenario
Anticipated Change in Proportion









SOURCE : Interview data
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in offshore-related export performance that the sample would
anticipate if the market situation outlined in the scenario were to
14
occur. Given the degree of consensus between the scenario and the
sample's own view of future market trends it is perhaps not surprising
to find that only five firms altered their estimates of the trend of
their offshore-related export performance in the period to 1985.
Moreover, in only one of these cases was the alteration in the estimated
export performance due to the consideration of a scenario significantly
different to the company's own view of market trends, as in the other
cases the companies' expectations had, in the period between the two
rounds of interviewing, moved more into line with the author's own
scenario.
Thus, of the 39 firms surveyed, 17 expected their offshore-related
export performance to improve while only 2 anticipated a decline in
the proportion of their offshore-related turnover that would result
from exports.
In sections 12.3.2 - 12.3.6 the expected strategic response of the
sample to the global market scenario is analysed by sector, and in the
conclusion (section 12.3.7) an attempt is made to estimate the real
growth in total sales and exports of offshore-related equipment which
will result from the implementation of these strategies over the period
to 1985. Given that several of the surveyed firms did not even fore¬
cast turnover 12 months in advance, some of the estimates of these
variables in 1985 must be expected to contain a considerable margin of
error.
12.3.2 Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering; Concrete & Steel Platforms;
Steel, Pipe & Pipe-coating.
Although the larger of the shipyards had previously built an offshore-
related vessel for an overseas customer, neither shipyard had completed
an offshore-related export contract in the period for which data was
collected, primarily due to their failure to meet international price"
competition from yards in, for example, Brazil, Singapore, Japan and
Norway.
14. As discussed during the final phase of the fieldwork.
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The smaller yard was continuing to tender for export contracts (and
was, in particular, carefully watching offshore developments in
the Arctic Circle where the high design content of the required vessels
would perhaps give the U.K. yard a chance to compete) but was not at
all optimistic about its chances. The scope for offshore-related
product development at this yard also appeared extremely limited :
"Modules are not in our league, we would have to
bulldoze the yard and start again. The experience
of Burntisland Engineers is not a happy one - to
convert a shipyard is a mistake, you should start
from scratch."
Thus, very little offshore work had been incorporated into this yard's
original corporate plan. Unfortunately, this plan had been heavily
dependent upon public expenditure - naval vessels, sludge disposal
ships, etc - and the decline in this sector had resulted in the corporate
plan being reconsidered and a decision being taken (almost in desperation)
to try to increase its share of orders for the U.K. offshore market,
although its managing director admitted :
"Bearing in mind the complete blank in orders over the
last 3-4 years we can't be optimistic."
Nevertheless, full capacity was being forecast although it was conceded
that "whether we can achieve this is another thing entirely."
The larger yard was no more optimistic about the chances of its
continuing attempts to win export contracts being successful, and was
concentrating instead on the development of "specialised equipment"
for the U.K. Continental Shelf, "where there can be some pressure by
government on the operator to build in the U.K.". In addition to
multi-purpose support vessels (of which the yard already had construction
experience), this 'specialised equipment' included the pontoons and
columns for tension-leg platforms and steelwork for new designs of
semi-submersible and steel gravity platforms. In contrast to the
smaller yard's policy, it was also interested in the fabrication of
integrated decks and accommodation modules, although it was conceded
that it would not be competitive in this area of fabrication. It
was hoped that these product developments aimed at the North Sea would
help to sustain the yard at full capacity until 1985, with offshore
orders contributing approximately 30% of turnover during this period.
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The manufacturer of casing and other tubular oilfield products was
in a very similar position to the shipyards in that it was
uncompetitive in a market which was very price sensitive due to the
excess capacity in the industry worldwide. Moreover, it was reluctant
to consider widening the sphere of its exporting activities for fear
of reprisals :
"We don't touch the Far East, it's the Japanese market.
If we interfere with them they might come over here and
swamp us so we keep off each other's patch."
Consequently, exports of offshore-related equipment over the next 5
years were expected to decline and relief was expressed that at least
the domestic market was safe due to the "preferential treatment"
afforded this firm by the Gas Council and other customers operating
in the U.K. sector of the North Sea.
The pipe-coating yard's turnover is primarily determined by the level
of pipeline installation being undertaken. While the U.K. market
was considered to be very promising (with the single most significant
development being the approval of the gas gathering system), the
yard had also, since the first interview, become an exporter (to Gabon
and the Middle East) and further exports were anticipated to markets
such as India, Italy, Spain and Greece. As a result, the proportion
of offshore-related turnover represented by exports was expected to
increase beyond its then current level of 10%. Norway and (to a
lesser extent) Denmark were expected to develop into major offshore
markets, but success in these areas was expected to be dependent upon
direct investment to establish local pipe-coating yards. Expansion
of the Scottish yard will only be undertaken if it is warranted by
contracts secured in advance - for example, if a large share of the
gas gathering system is won existing capacity will have to be doubled.
None of the platform fabricators surveyed had exported in the past,
nor did any expect to become involved in exporting in the period to
1985. The concrete platform builder had completely closed its west
coast yard and, although it was still tendering for U.K. contracts,
the platform designs being offered were concrete/steel hybrids which,
if ordered, would be constructed at a new east coast site. While
one of the steel platform yards was taking steps to extend its
capability beyond jackets and decks (and, having already established
a pipe-rolling mill, was in the process of developing a module unit),
the other was pinning its hopes on the continuation of orders for
platforms, which it expected to become larger, heavier structures
with the development of fields in deeper water Both, however,
expected to be fully employed throughout the period fo 1985.
Thus, while both the shipyards and two of the platform yards were
optimistically forecasting full capacity for the period to 1985, all
five yards admitted that it was unlikely that they would become
exporters of offshore-related hardware. Moreover, while the pipe-
coating yard expected a gradual increase in offshore-related exports,
the much larger tubular steel product manufacturer anticipated a
real fall in the volume of offshore-related exports, with the net
effect of these changes for the sector as a whole being a reduction
in both total sales and exports of offshore-related equipment, as
shown in Table 12.5 below.
12.3.3 Modules; Fabrications; Sub-contractingMetal Goods ;
Underwater Engineering.
It has already been pointed out that of the two module fabricators
which had previously exported offshore-related equipment, one had
decided to stop pushing exports and concentrate instead on the develop
ment of the domestic market while the other had withdrawn from
exporting altogether. These decisions were unaffected by the scenario
of impending decline in the domestic market, with both companies
indicating their intention to react by extending their range of
containerised units for the U.K. sector. Nor did either of the other
module fabricators plan to export. While one intended no action in
response to the declining domestic market, accepting that this would
mean that eventually the yard would either be placed on a 'care and
maintenance' basis or closed down altogether, the other argued that
its facilities were such that it could (and would) respond by under¬
taking other forms of offshore-related fabrication and also, more
significantly, by diversifying into general and heavy engineering for
onshore markets. Thus, none of the module fabricators planned a
serious export drive"^ although one yard may continue to have some
15. The possible trend towards the replacement of large structures
by subsea completions and 'floating' platforms was not mentioned.
16. Three of the module yards mentioned the significance of transport
ation costs in reaching their decision to ignore the option of
exporting modules.
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limited success in exporting containerised units and another was
considering the possibility of exploiting its expertise through the
establishment of joint-ventures overseas.
Neither of the non-exporting fabricators expected to become involved
in exporting because, as one explained :
"Indigenous industry is quite capable of producing the
quite basic, unsophisticated technology we produce."
In any case, this firm described itself as "profit-orientated ... less
inclined to go for turnover for turnover's sake," and therefore planned
to react to the shrinking domestic market firstly by reducing overheads
and increasing efficiency and secondly by developing "downstream
activities that make use of our existing facilities and labour force and
skills", including the onshore maintenance and repair of tanks and
vessels and the manufacture of mud silos and more sophisticated
pressure vessels such as diving chambers. This firm did not, however,
intend to undertake offshore maintenance :
"We're definitely not going to get involved in offshore
maintenance because there are problems of mix with
onshore labour which is jealous of the rates offered.
So you rotate offshore duty, but this leads to problems
as some men are not suitable to work offshore, some need
close supervision."
The other non-exporter was the largest fabricator surveyed, employing
a 'base capability' of 500 local people and contract labour as required
up to a peak of 1700. Anticipating the decline in the domestic
market and recognising the extremely limited export potential of its
expertise in basic fabrication (except through management contracting,
for which a separate company had been formed), this firm had already
started to upgrade its facilities to enable it to diversify into general
engineering, including the manufacture of heavy pressure vessels and
tubular steel products. Although the fabrication of other offshore-
related items previously not undertaken (including small jackets
and modules) was also being considered, diversification into onshore
engineering was seen as essential. However, even allowing for some
success in this area, this firm was ...
"pretty pessimistic about the future. In 1985 the yard












































































































































































In contrast, the highly-diversified fabricator was forecasting a
major expansion in exports over the next 5 years, particularly to
deep-water zones such as Eastern U.S.A., Canada and North-west
Australia. However, not content with its deep-water concentration,
this company was investing heavily in the development of oilfield
products with more universal appeal. As a result of these two
strategies turnover was expected to grow in real terms at 20% per
19
annum over the period to 1985. The diving chamber manufacturer
also expected a rapid expansion in exports (following the renegotiation
of a licensing agreement restricting exports). Finally, although
the last fabricator had achieved a modicum of exporting success,
disappointment with its export performance had led to a change in
strategic emphasis towards a search for new products which could be
sold throughout the year as ...
"every year October-February is a low production phase
when we are cutting our prices to keep the factory open."
As a result, a manufacturing and marketing licence had already been
obtained for a new form of scaffolding system, with the intention being
to establish the product in the U.K. offshore market before eventually
exporting it to the other sectors of the North Sea and also marketing
it to the onshore U.K. civil engineering industry.
Both sub-contractors surveyed had foreseen the decline in offshore
construction in the U.K. sector. Indeed, the smaller firm had already
concluded that "there's too many oil-related specialists chasing too
little work" and therefore had stopped pursuing offshore business in
favour of general engineering repair and maintenance. The larger firm,
on the other hand, had elected to develop expertise in offshore
maintenance and repair :
"There's an awareness that we've got to spread away from
construction although our construction has always been
miscellaneous construction, we're not specialised in any
area. Maintenance is becoming more important and we've
established a team and a track record."
Finally, although the studbolt manufacturer planned to extend its
product range, the substantial increase in turnover forecasted was
19. None of this growth was attributable to market penetration,
that is, the winning of orders at the expense of competitors,
which was described as "all very well but very difficult".
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largely due to a major export drive, commencing in Norway, Holland
and Spain and followed by the development of export markets in Mexico,
Eastern Europe and, eventually, the Middle East.
Thus, of the seven firms in this sector which had not previously
exported offshore-related equipment only one, the studbolt manufacturer,
planned to do so by 1985. Of the remaining non-exporters, one planned
a major movement into offshore maintenance and repair, three had
selected diversification into general engineering for onshore markets
as their principal strategy for survival, one had accepted limited
growth as a fact and was concentrating instead on reducing costs as a
means of increasing profitability and, finally, one was taking no
action whatsoever, having accepted that this might mean that it would
not be in existence in 1985. In addition, three of the five firms
which had previously exported had decided to concentrate on product
development for the U.K. sector rather than export market development
(although two of these were likely to continue to export on a limited
scale). Interestingly the two fabricators which had selected market
development as their major strategy were the manufacturers of the
more sophisticated fabrications such as diving bells and helicopter
refuelling systems. Hence, although five of the twelve firms in this
sector are likely to be exporting offshore-related equipment in 1985,
for only three of these - the studbolt manufacturer and the two fabric¬
ators of the more sophisticated products - will overseas market develop¬
ment be the major strategy implemented. Not surprisingly, these three
firms are largely responsible for the increase in this sector's exports
of offshore-related equipment shown in Table 12.5 above. The
projected increase in the total sales of offshore-related equipment
by these firms will not, however, compensate for the considerable fall
in the offshore-related manufactured output of the large fabricator
(even assuming it manages to keep its 'base capability' fully employed).
12.3.4 Wellhead & Oilfield Equipment
Although the wellhead equipment supplied to the first North Sea oilfields
is already starting to be returned to its original manufacturers for
repair and overhaul, the majority of the wellhead manufacturers' turnover
in the period to 1985 will be associated with new field developments
and, in particular, will depend upon the number of production wells
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requiring completion equipment.
Recognising that the ever-increasing repair and overhaul business would
not compensate for the decline in new wellhead business in the U.K.
sector, one wellhead manufacturer had set its sights firmly on the
development of export markets, particularly those in Africa. Indeed,
the ejqpansion in exports was expected to be largely responsible for the
growth in this plant's turnover - 10% per annum to 1982 and 5% per
annum thereafter - forecasted for the period to 1985,^° although some
contribution was also anticipated from efforts directed at increasing
the firm's share of existing markets. In fact, each of the three well¬
head manufacturers surveyed stated that it was aiming to increase its
share of the North Sea market. The company most likely to succeed in
this objective would appear to be the subsea wellhead manufacturer,
which should benefit from the anticipated trend towards subsea completions,
and indeed, this firm was expecting "exceptional growth, mainly on the
subsea completion side." However, as the North Sea is currently acting
as the major test-bed for subsea equipment, exports were not expected
21
to increase their share of total turnover. To ensure that its
technological lead was maintained a 'Special Projects Group' had been
established and the importance of continual new product development
had been emphasised. The final wellhead manufacturer had been trying
hard (but unsuccessfully) to win "that elusive first order" for the
subsea completion equipment it had developed for use in the North Sea,
but was putting even more emphasis on exporting its standard equipment
22
to South and Central America and especially the Middle East. This
strategy (together with some increase in market penetration) was
expected to result in 20% per annum real growth in the turnover of
this firm's Scottish plant.
20. This was despite the fact that direct investment in manufacturing
facilities was also being undertaken in Austria (for the Eastern
European market), Venezuela and Norway, and consideration was
being given to the replacement of warehousing facilities in
France by a further manufacturing plant.
21. Nevertheless, this company had identified Norway, West Africa,
Australia, Mexico and Brazil as major growth areas, and while
direct investment was already being undertaken in Brazil, a
partnership in Norway was also under consideration.
22. Where it was hoped that the Scottish plant would become the second
supplier to the group's U.S. plant which normally supplied these
markets.
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As the growth in turnover forecasted by each of these firms was
in part based upon increasing market penetration at the expense of
competitors, and given that there was already excess production in
the U.K. wellhead manufacturing industry, it appears that the growth
rates forecasted by one or more of the wellhead manufacturers will
prove somewhat optimistic. If accurate, both total sales and exports
of offshore-related equipment by these firms would virtually double
in real terms by 1985.
The majority of the turnover of the firms in the oilfield equipment
sector consisted of down-hole tool sales, which are not directly
linked to the volume of field development expenditure. Indeed, one of
the large U.S. down-hole tool manufacturers was anticipating a boom
in the U.K. sector from 1984 onwards as well-workover activity gets
underway. For example, sand problems occuring in the Brent and Statfjord
fields will necessitate the replacement of down-hole tools while the
utilisation of secondary recovery processes on fields where production
levels are falling will also involve changing down-hole tools. Thus,
even if development expenditure in the U.K. sector does decline, demand
for down-hole tools will be maintained.
The two large U.S. down-hole tool manufacturers surveyed were already
supplying virtually every market in the eastern hemisphere. Moreover,
at their Scottish plants these manufacturers tended to develop new
tools only in response to specific customer problems - since they were
already operating at virtually full capacity they were not looking for
growth through new product development. For these reasons each was
interested primarily in increasing its share of its existing export
markets, although neither was forecasting more than 5% per annum real
growth in the turnover of its Scottish plant, to be achieved through
increased efficiency and very minor increases in capacity. In contrast,
the third, smaller U.S. down-hole tool manufacturer surveyed was
anticipating a considerable expansion in turnover. While a large part
of this would be due to the expected re-allocation of the Middle East
markets from the U.S. plant to the Scottish operation, considered even
more important was the growth in sales expected to result from the
planned expansion of the product line to include the down-hole tools
23
used at the production phase of activity. The two small, Scottish
23. This plant currently specialises in the production of stabilising
equipment used during the exploration phase.
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down-hole tool manufacturers were adopting completely different
strategies. While one intended to concentrate on developing its
exports of down-hole tools, the other planned to diversify into general
maintenance and repair, particularly for traditional onshore markets.
Finally, the traditional U.K. engineering company which had previously
failed in its efforts to break into the market for subsea equipment
was in the process of making a 'make or break' attempt to become
involved right at the start of 'floating' platform developments as a
manufacturer of riser tensioning equipment. If successful in winning
the first contract (for the Hutton TLP) further orders were expected,
both for the North Sea and, eventually, for TLP developments overseas.
Compared with the growth projected by the wellhead manufacturers
the real increase expected in both total sales and exports of offshore-
related equipment by the oilfield equipment manufacturers was modest.
This was principally due to the fact that the two largest companies in
this sector had no plans for a major expansion of production capacity
in Scotland and were already supplying virtually every offshore market
in the world, although it should also be noted that only one of the
other firms had selected export market development as its main expansion
strategy.
12.3.5 Process Plant
The British manufacturers of pressure vessels and heat exchangers were
both far from optimistic about the prospects for their offshore-related
business. While one admitted that due to the extent to which overseas
markets were protected it could only hope to maintain its current level
of offshore-related exports and replace business lost in the North Sea
by similar work for the onshore petrochemical industries, the other had
decided that there were already too many engineering companies involved
in this sector given the size of the market and that therefore it would
not make another major effort to break into this market, being content
instead simply to pick up sub-contracted steelwork. The latter had
also made a conscious decision not to become involved in offshore
inspection, maintenance and repair, for the following reasons :
"We would have to give the men platform allowances and so on
and once they'd been paid a high salary it would be difficult
to get them back to the old environment. It would cause untold
industrial disputes and trouble with the wage structure for /
/the sake of 10% of the business. This would lead
to an escalation of salaries all round and cause the
loss of 90% of our business."
Although also aware of the importance of continuing product
development, the Scottish pump manufacturer's main strategy with
respect to its offshore-related products was the gradual development
of exports, primarily to South America and the Far East (especially
Indonesia).
The turnover of the U.S. ball valve manufacturers is fairly closely
linked to gas pipeline developments. As far as the U.K. sector is
concerned, British Gas appear to have adopted a policy of sharing
business between these firms (and a third valve manufacturer situated
in England). Both companies expected full capacity to be maintained
in the period to 1985, both pointing out that their domestic business
represented only a fairly small proportion of their total turnover and
that therefore any shortfall resulting from a fall in demand in the
24
U.K. sector of the North Sea could be made good by increasing exports,
particularly to the Middle East (although one also identified Mexico,
West Africa and Canada as other markets offering considerable potential)
Thus, little change is anticipated in the marketing position of the
U.S. valve companies, already heavily involved in the export market,
while the only change in the offshore-related turnover of the British
process plant manufacturers is likely to be a reduction in sales to
the U.K. offshore market. The only company likely to significantly
expand its offshore-related exports is the Scottish pump manufacturer
which has designed a carefully-planned campaign for the gradual
exploitation of certain offshore-related export markets in South
America and the Far East. As far as the sector as a whole is concerned,
despite a small increase in offshore-related exports, total sales of
offshore-related process plant are expected to fall over the period
to 1985.26
24. In any case, should demand either exceed or under-utilise the
Scottish plant's capacity, business would be transferred between
these companies' various plants as required.
25. Although in the case of Canada it was thought likely that direct
investment would be necessary.
26. See Table 12.5.
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12.3.6 Power, Electrical & Electronic Equipment
Three of the four electronics companies surveyed had not exported
equipment to offshore markets overseas in the period for which data
27
was collected. The largest of the non^exporters had found that
there was very little effective demand for the products it had
developed and had therefore decided to move instead into the maintenance
of electronic (particularly communications) equipment. On the other
hand, the two small Scottish electronics companies did expect to be
exporting offshore-related equipment by 1985, although the strategies
they intended to employ were somewhat different. One company was
largely concentrating on the continuing development of its micro-processor
based systems for the U.K. sector and was only planning to export this
equipment once it had successfully completed a lengthy proving period
in the North Sea and a solution had been found to the problems associated
with international marketing - although it had been approached by a
larger company willing to market its systems worldwide it was not sure
whether this was the correct method of exploiting export markets :
"On a high-technology product I'm not sure if an ordinary
company can market it that well. It's not standard, there's
got to be so much liaison between the customer and us, even
if only 20% of the system has to be changed specifically for
the customer."
Despite acknowledging the need to undertake continual product development,
the other small company felt, however, that it was rapidly approaching
the stage when it could reap the rewards of previous product development
by exploiting export markets through agents established overseas. This
firm was, in turn, a stage behind the final electronics company which,
apart from being heavily committed to further product development, was
just commencing a major export drive (through both agents and the
worldwide sales and service network of its parent organisation). As
the latter remarked :
"For example, we recently developed a new product, a colour
video sonar recorder. We're the first with the product,
we've got a fantastic lead and we're selling it like mad.
It's the classic pattern of North Sea expertise leading
to the exploitation of overseas markets."
This company was also planning to exploit the indigenous market for the
military, mining and other applications of its subsea electronic equipment.
27. This firm had, however, previously exported offshore-related equipment.
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Both power plant manufacturers were planning to increase their exports
of offshore-related equipment, but for different motives. One company-
stated that it was already exporting a high proportion of its turnover
and was therefore not too bothered about the decline in the U.K.
sector, particularly as it was already planning to actively develop
offshore markets in South America and the Far East (including Singapore,
Malaysia, Indonesia and perhaps also Australia). The other company
was also concentrating on developing offshore markets overseas (including
Brazil, Canada and the Persian Gulf), but this was primarily because
demand from its other onshore markets was expected to decline even
28
faster than that from the U.K. sector of the North Sea.
Thus, while two of the three non-exporters in this sector expected
to be exporting offshore-related equipment by 1985, the three existing
exporters were planning to significantly expand their offshore-related
exporting activity. As a result, the volume of offshore-related
electrical/electronic equipment exported is expected to increase in real
29
terms over 500% in the period to 1985. With little overall expansion
in sales of equipment to the U.K. sector, this substantial growth in
offshore-related electrical/electronic equipment exports accounts for the
vast majority of the increase in this sector's total offshore-related
manufactured turnover.
12.3.7 Conclusion
Thus,the firms surveyed proposed to react in a variety of different
ways to the scenario, developed and presented by the researcher, of the
global offshore market situation in the period 1980-85.
First, it can be seen from Table 12.6 (below), which summarises these
reactions, that one firm intended to withdraw from offshore-related
manufacturing activity prior to the contraction that would eventually
be enforced by the decline in the domestic market. This firm, a
platform fabricator, had decided that there was no future for its
facilities in Scotland and consequently was closing its yard and selling
off its equipment. A further four firms admitted that as there were
28. Direct investment aimed at the offshore market had already been
undertaken in the USA and further projects in Mexico, Brazil,
Nigeria and the Far East were being considered.
29. As shown in Table 12.5 above.
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TABLE 12.6
Expected Strategic Responses of the Sample to the Global
Market Scenario, 1980-85
Strategic response
No. of firms for which this
course of action would form
part of the strategic response
1980-85
No. of firms for which this
course of action would be




Product development 27 11
Diversification 5 5
Increased efficiency 5 1




No action 4 4
SOURCE : Interview data
very few options open to them they were not planning to take any
major action with respect to their offshore-related manufacturing
activity. Three of these firms conceded that this policy would result
in their offshore-related manufacturing output falling in real terms,
but the fourth remained hopeful that turnover and employment would be
maintained. Diversification into onshore engineering was expected to
form the major strategic response of five firms. However, none of these
firms claimed that in moving into onshore markets they would be utilising
30
expertise developed for the offshore market. Finally, while one firm
which was more interested in profits than sales turnover intended to
react by increasing efficiency, cutting costs and hence hopefully
improving the profit on an at best constant sales volume, another was
planning to take steps to increase its share of the domestic offshore
market in an attempt to maintain or even increase its offshore-related
sales volume. However, even the managing director of the latter company
30. Two firms did state that they were planning to launch, in indigenous
onshore markets, products which they had originally developed for
the offshore market, but in neither case was this the main element
of corporate strategy.
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conceded that there was considerable doubt whether this strategy
would ultimately prove successful. Thus, the firms employing one
of these five strategies - namely disinvestment, diversification,
increased efficiency, market penetration and 'no action' - were
very unlikely to increase their offshore-related turnover in real
terms in the period to 1985.
Interestingly, only 2 of the 12 firms selecting one of these strategies
had any form of offshore-related experience prior to the development
of North Sea oilfields (compared with 15 of the 27 firms selecting one
of the other strategies) and only 3 of the 12 had exported
offshore-related equipment (compared with 21 of the other 27 firms).
Although more firms stated that they would react to the given scenario
by undertaking product development than in any other way, for most of
these firms product development would not be the major strategy employed.
Indeed of the 27 firms which intended to develop new products and/or
services for sale to the North Sea market (and, in some cases, eventually
also to offshore markets overseas), only 11 expected product development
to be their main strategic response in the period to 1985.
It was shown (in Chapter 9) that the nature of the product exerted a
strong influence on export performance and export potential. The
evidence presented in this chapter suggests that this fact was not only
understood by most of the sample but also taken into consideration in
the determination of corporate strategy, in that the 16 firms which
regarded market development as the main strategy to be implemented with
respect to their offshore-related manufacturing business included only
4 of the 19 shipbuilders and fabricators, compared with 12 of the 20
manufacturers of process plant, electrical/electronic and specialised
oilfield equipment. That is, considerably fewer firms from the product
sectors which have been identified as possessing least export potential
- namely shipbuilding and all forms of fabrication - considered that the
development of offshore markets overseas should be their major strategy
over the next five years than did firms in the other sectors. Furthermore,
the firms which had decided to concentrate on the development of the overseas
markets for their offshore-related equipment tended to be those which had
considerable offshore-related experience, in that the 16 firms opting
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for market development included 11 of the 17 firms which had some
form of offshore-related experience (either at unit or group level)
prior to the exploitation of the North Sea, but only 5 of the 22 firms
without any prior offshore-related experience. Finally, 13 of the
16 firms which intended to emphasise the development of offshore
markets overseas during the period to 1985 were already exporting
offshore-related equipment."^ Conversely this means that only
three of the firms stressing overseas market development had not
already exported offshore-related equipment, although a fourth firm -
an electronics firm which had assigned overall priority to product
development - also expected to become an exporter of offshore-related
equipment for the first time in the period to 1985. Hence, the firms
which stated that their main strategic response to the given scenario
would be market development were largely experienced offshore-related
manufacturers already exporting relatively sophisticated items of
offshore equipment.
TABLE 12.7







Market development 13 3 16
Other strategy 11 12 23
TOTAL 24 15 39
SOURCE : Interview data.
31. See Table 12.7.
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Although 24 firms had previously exported offshore-related equipment
only 21 of these had done so in the period for which data was
collected, and only one of the other three exporters appeared to
have any more than a very slight chance of exporting offshore-
related equipment again. Moreover, even one of the current exporters
had decided to withdraw completely from exporting offshore-related
equipment. Given that only four of the surveyed firms expected
to export offshore-related equipment for the first time in the time-
period covered by the scenario, it seems unlikely that any more than
25 of these 39 firms will be exporting offshore-related equipment
in 1985.
The total volume of offshore-related equipment exported by the sample
is expected to increase in real terms by 45% over the period to 1985,
32
when it is expected to total almost £70 million. Approximately
half of this increase in export volume should be accounted for by
the wellhead and oilfield equipment sector, although in percentage
terms the fastest growth in offshore-related exporting is expected
to occur in the electrical/electronic equipment sector. The
excellent export potential which this sector is considered to possess
is reflected in the fact that it is anticipated that in 1985 over
60% of the offshore-related turnover of the electrical/electronic
33
equipment manufacturers will be accounted for by exports, whereas
even in the oilfield equipment and process plant sectors (where most
firms surveyed had considerable experience of offshore-related
exporting) only 40-50% of offshore-related turnover is expected to
34
be exported. With the expansion of exporting activity in the
electronics sector at least 17 and perhaps 18 of the firms in the
32. See Table 12.8. However, it should be remembered that several
firms did not undertake formal forecasting and planning and
therefore some of the projections of total sales and exports of
offshore-related equipment in 1985 were only rough estimates.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the firms responsible
for the vast majority of offshore-related turnover and exports
did undertake formal forecasting and planning and that therefore
even a considerable margin of error with respect to the small,
non-forecasting firms will have little effect on the overall totals.
33. See Table 12.5 above.
34. Although, as Table 12.8 shows, even in 1985 wellhead and oilfield
equipment will continue to account for over 50% of the sample's
total exports of offshore-related equipment.
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TABLE 12.8













Engineering. 1.9 4.0 7.7 11.3
Wellhead & Oilfield
Equipment 25.9 54.9 36.8 53.9
Process Plant 5.2 11.0 6.1 8.9
Power, Electrical &
Electronic Equipment 1.1 2.3 6.9 10.1
TOTAL 47.2 lOO.O 68.3 lOO.O
SOURCE : Interview data
process plant, oilfield and electrical/electronic equipment sectors
are expected to be exporting offshore-related equipment by 1985,
compared with only 7 of the 19 firms involved in shipbuilding and
all forms of fabrication - further evidence of the influence exerted
on export potential by the nature of the product.
As far as total sales of offshore-related equipment are concerned,
Table 12.5 indicates that the increase (in real terms) in turnover
in the wellhead and oilfield equipment sector (and, to a lesser extent,
the electrical/electronic equipment sector) should almost exactly
compensate for the real reduction anticipated in the offshore-related
turnover of the shipbuilders and fabricators. However it should be
35. Constant prices.
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noted that some firms in sectors where demand should follow fairly
closely the decline in field development expenditure were nevertheless
forecasting that they would be able to maintain full capacity. Also,
in the wellhead equipment sector, for example, each of the companies
surveyed was expecting to increase sales at the expense of its
competitors. For these reasons, the estimate of total sales of
offshore-related equipment in 1985 may prove somewhat optimistic.
Moroever, since several firms commented that they were hoping to
increase efficiency, with the result that an increase in turnover
may not be accompanied by a proportionate increase in employment, it
is anticipated that there will be an overall reduction in employment
in offshore-related manufacturing, with the steepest reductions
occurring in the shipbuilding and fabrication sectors (which are also,
coincidentally, the most labour intensive sectors). On the other
hand, it should be remembered that several companies were intending
to enter the offshore maintenance and repair business, while others
stated that they would be attempting to diversify into onshore
36
markets in order to maintain full employment. For these reasons,
although offshore-related manufacturing employment will probably fall,
total employment and even total offshore-related employment in the
surveyed firms may nevertheless be maintained.
36. In some cases, this meant simply reverting to, or expanding,





In the previous chapters the background, methodology and findings of
this study of the export performance of the Scottish manufacturing
sector of the offshore supplies industry have been discussed in some
detail. The purpose of this final chapter is to draw together the
main themes to emerge from the study.
It will be remembered that the main objectives of the thesis were as
follows :
(a) to identify and examine the major factors influencing the
export performance of the Scottish manufacturing sector of
the offshore supplies industry
(b) to investigate the likely future development strategies of these
companies, and hence probable future trends in the offshore-
related exporting activity of this sector of Scottish industry
in the period to 1985.
The research methods employed in the achievement of these objectives
will be reviewed in the following section. The major findings concerning
the factors influencing the export performance of the sample will be
examined in Section 13.3, with the implications of these findings for
the future of the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies
industry being discussed in section 13.4. The following two sections
will then propose suggestions for policy measures and suggest areas
for further research. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a
brief summary of the contribution to knowledge made by this thesis.
13.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The offshore supplies industry proved a difficult area of study. This
was not only because it is, on the whole, a relatively new 'industry',
concerning which there is a marked absence of data, but also reflected the
fact that it is not co-terminous with existing industrial classifications.
The first main phase of fieldwork consisted of an examination of the
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factors influencing the export performance of the Scottish
manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry. This
was achieved by means of a series of in-depth, qualitative interviews
undertaken with the senior local executives responsible for
determining export strategy in 40 manufacturers of offshore-related
equipment located in Scotland. Information concerning the
identity of the firms constituting the sample population was provided
by the O.S.O., S.E.P.D., S.D.A. and Manpower Services Commission.
This was supplemented by details of firms drawn from offshore journals
(such as Ocean Industry) and offshore registers (such as that produced
by the Highlands and Islands Development Board).
The major topics requiring detailed examination in the interview
situation were identified during the course of a synthesis of previous
research on the determinants of exporting at the level of the firm-
This list of topics represented the main areas of discussion covered
in each interview, around which a certain degree of flexibility was
allowed when advantageous. Whenever possible the topics were allowed
to arise naturally in the course of the discussion and no formal questions
to be asked in a particular manner at a particular time were devised.
The objective of this approach was to remain flexible but stay in
control of the interview in order to maximise the collection of relevant
data.
The major advantages which this qualitative approach provided over a
rigid, quantitative technique involving the use of a structured
questionnaire were as follows :-
(i) Unconstrained by a structured questionnaire, the interview was
allowed to follow natural thought channels rather than rigid,
predetermined lines. The respondent was free to raise and
develop lines of thought which he believed to be relevant. In
addition, the interviewer was able to ask supplementary questions
where appropriate in order to clarify or probe responses. The
ability to probe responses and to approach subjects indirectly
provided the researcher with a better opportunity to examine the
true motives of behaviour, rather than simple, surface rational-
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isations. For example, a reply that 'exporting is not
worthwhile' implies that at least this option had received
consideration. However, probing could reveal perhaps that in
this firm there was no intention to export because its performance
in the domestic market was satisfactory (and hence there was no
need to export) and that in fact virtually nothing was known about
the export markets for its products.
(ii) When a structured questionnaire is used responses are categorised
into predetermined 'slots' designed by the researcher prior to
the fieldwork. Since these 'slots' will be based on the
researcher's experience, they may not reflect the real range
of categorisations held in the market place. Eventually, the
researcher will have to impose his own categorisations in order
to analyse the interview data. However, this will not occur
until the researcher has, in the course of the fieldwork, gained
experience of the subject area and of the true motivations
influencing the respondents - that is, categorisation is expost
rather than exante.
For these reasons, the qualitative approach resulted in greater depth
of information and a better understanding of the real motives for
behaviour than would have been possible using a structured interviewing
technique. Given that the objective of the study was to examine the
motives for behaviour with respect to exporting rather than simply
identifying the number of firms which behaved in a particular way,
qualitative research was undoubtedly the best method of approach for this
study.
However, it is important to bear in mind the implications of the use of a
qualitative approach for the results. Firstly, as is normally the
case with qualitative research, this study involved the survey of a
small number of respondent firms selected on a non-random basis. As
a result, the sample was only roughly representative of the various
categories of firms within the sample frame. Secondly, a standard
interviewing technique was not utilised. Consequently the interview
data is not amenable to statistical analysis. Thus, this qualitative
study should be regarded as producing 'soft' information and results
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which are tentative or indicative in nature.
As regards methodological design two unexpected problems were
encountered. Firstly, it was intended to examine the influence
which previous exporting experience exerted on managerial attitude to
exporting. It was expected that evidence relating to this
relationship would emerge from the general discussion of the practice
of exporting undertaken in the interviews. However, this did not
prove to be the case and hence the nature of this relationship should
have been a topic in itself to be raised by means of a direct question
where necessary. Secondly, because of the intention to limit
the scope of the study to offshore-related manufacturers in Scotland,
the size variable used in the thesis was that of the establishment(s)
located in Scotland. However, many of the surveyed firms owned
facilities outside Scotland and, of course, even if a Scottish
subsidiary is small it will have the parent company's resources to fall
back on. Therefore, in some cases - for example, as a proxy measure
of resources - the size of the enterprise as a whole is the relevant
size variable. Nevertheless, although the absence of any data
concerning the size of the enterprise did restrict the statistical
analysis of the relationship between size and export performance, it
did not seriously impair the analysis of the main body of qualitative
data.
13.3 MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF EXPORTING SUCCESS
The purpose of this section is to review the main findings concerning
the factors influencing the export performance of the surveyed firms.
The intention is not to try to summarise all the results but rather
to draw together the major themes to emerge from the analysis of both
the qualitative and quantitative data collected during the first main
phase of the fieldwork.
(i) Nature of the product
The first indication of the relevance of the nature of the product
to export performance resulted from the statistical data. This
showed clearly that while exports accounted for 23% of the
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offshore-related manufactured turnover of the sample as a
whole, the firms in the wellhead and oilfield equipment sector
exported nearly 55% and the fabricators less than 5% of
their offshore-related manufactured sales.
This finding was supported by an abundance of qualitative
evidence which also revealed that, in general, a positive
relationship existed between product sophistication and export
performance and potential. First, it was clear that some of
the fabricators had adopted a passive attitude to exporting
because they had recognised that it would be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to export the type of basic products they had
the capability to produce. In addition, it was noticeable
that none of the fabricators claimed a competitive advantage
with respect to their fabricated products and, indeed, that it was
firms from the fabrication sector which accounted for most of
the respondents to admit that they held no comparative advantages
over their international competitors. In contrast, all the
electrical/electronic equipment manufacturers claimed a product
advantage. Finally, in the examination of the exporting
problems experienced by the sample, the fabricators and process
plant manufacturers commented upon the unsophisticated nature
and relative cost of transporting their products and the problems
presented by visible trade barriers, while to the manufacturers of
electronic and specialised oilfield equipment tariff barriers and
transportation costs were relatively unimportant.
Thus, both the quantitative and qualitative evidence indicated
that the nature of a firm's products exerted a strong influence on
export performance and potential. This evidence is entirely
consistent with the findings of Cooper et al (1970) and Tookey
(1964) that there is a positive relationship between product
sophistication and export potential, and also with the basic
supposition underlying the classical theory of international
trade that for a firm to be successful in export markets it must
possess a comparative advantage over its competitors in those
markets.
335
(ii) Export marketing methods
Analysis of the data relating to the export marketing methods
utilised by the 25 offshore-related exporters revealed that
there was an association between the export marketing programme
implemented and export performance. This result supports the
findings of Tookey's (1964) study of export performance in
the hosiery and knitwear industry. As regards individual
elements of the export marketing mix the following results
were obtained :
(a) Promotion : Most exporters regarded personal selling as
the most important method of promoting exports. The
features influencing this preference for personal selling
were the small number of geographically-concentrated customers
in most sectors of the offshore supplies market and the
high-value of offshore contracts. However, most exporters
used several methods of export promotion, primarily
because these were, to a certain extent, seen as performing
different functions. For example, while the main sales
effort was through personal selling, advertising was used
to create and maintain an awareness of the exporter and its
capability in customer organisations.
(b) Distribution : The most effective method of distributing
offshore-related equipment overseas was found to be direct
to the customer, particularly by means of the establishment
of wholly-owned sales and service subsidiaries overseas.
Similar findings were made by Tookey (1964).
(c) Research: Those exporters with an established internal
information system were found to be generally more
successful in overseas markets than those exporters reliant
on external or published information sources. The internal
information systems were regarded as providing up-to-date
marketing intelligence which external sources could not
supply. This underlines the importance of up-to-date
export marketing intelligence stressed by Duguid & Jaques
(1971) and IMR (1978). It should, however, be noted that
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these internal information systems were based upon the
exporters' export distribution networks, with overseas
offices acting as the main collection points for marketing
intelligence from salesmen, agents and other contacts in
overseas markets. The results regarding the relevance
of exporting intelligence are therefore not independent
of those concerning export distribution.
(d) Product adaptation : Despite being of an industrial
nature, most items of offshore-related equipment exported by
the sample were either 'one-offs' or products requiring
some degree of modification in order to meet the needs of
overseas customers. Nevertheless, product adaptation
was not generally regarded as a problem. As the survey
covered a relatively small number of manufacturers in
several product sectors, most of which undertook product
modification for export markets, it was not possible to
reach general conclusions regarding the significance of
product adaptation. In particular, no evidence was found
to support the arguments put forward by Keegan (1970),
Tookey (1964) and Alexandrides & Moschis (1977) that those
firms which adapt their marketing mix for export markets
will be more successful exporters.
(iii) Commitment of resources
Considerable evidence was found to support the findings of IMR
(1978) and Tookey (1964) that the commitment of adequate resources
to exporting is essential. In particular, the kind of export
marketing programme identified above as being associated with
exporting success requires substantial investment in exporting.
For example, a strong association was found between the number of
methods of export promotion utilised and exporting success. If
the number of methods of export promotion used is taken as a
proxy measure of the level of resources committed to export
promotion, this result can be interpreted as suggesting an
association between the level of export promotion undertaken and
export performance. In addition, personal selling - the key
export promotional tool - is itself a very expensive activity.
For example, several small Scottish firms did not have the means
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to employ even one export sales representative. Far more
companies were unable to afford the £100,000 currently regarded
as the minimum cost of keeping a sales executive and his
secretary in an office in, for example, Abu Dhabi. Similarly,
distribution methods involving direct contact with overseas
markets also require substantial investment (particularly
when the establishment of overseas sales and service subsidiaries
is involved). Finally, it was only those exporters which had
committed the resources to establish a network of permanent
sales and service bases overseas which were able to benefit from
the utilisation of these networks as channels of communication
for the up-to-date marketing intelligence regarded as essential
for successful exporting.
(iv) Size of firm
The statistical evidence suggesting that small firms were less
successful in export markets was not conclusive. However,
substantial qualitative evidence was found to suggest that small
firms were at a disadvantage in export markets in that they did
not have the necessary resources to undertake successful exporting
- this is consistent with the findings of Cooper et al (1970),
Kotler (1972), Tookey (1964), P.E.P. (1965), Hirsch (1971),
Glejser et al (1980) and Rapp (1976)."'" For example, as explained
above, it was found that some small firms could not afford to employ
salesmen to undertake direct selling overseas, far less establish
a network of sales and service bases overseas. In addition, it
should be noted that several firms described their small size as a
problem adversely affecting their export performance. Finally,
the fact that small firms tended to be involved in a smaller number
of export markets than were larger firms provided a further
indication that the export-related activities of small firms may
be restricted by a lack of resources.
Tookey (1975) argued that firms which do not possess the resources
necessary for large-scale exporting may nevertheless achieve
1. Throughout this study size has been taken as being indicative of the
availability of resources. In fact, it is extremely difficult to
interpret the significance of size since it may represent a proxy
for many possible advantages such as technology and marketing skills,
excess managerial capacity, cheap capital, etc.
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some exporting success by utilising the export services
provided by organisations such as the B.O.T.B. However, the
findings of this study suggest that these services were less
2
utilised by small firms than by large and medium-sized firms.
Since one would naturally expect small firms (which are least
likely to have the resources to, for example, generate in-house
information on overseas markets), to make most use of outside
sources of information, this implies that the difference in the
export performance of the various sizes of firms may have been the
result of more than simply resource availability. On the
other hand, it may be that the services provided by the B.O.T.B.
are still too costly in resource terms for small firms. For example,
one manufacturer commented that participation in a B.O.T.B. trade
3
mission was too expensive, even with the government subsidy.
Alternatively, small firms can concentrate their limited resources
on the effective development of a smaller number of export markets
than larger firms (Tookey, 1975, Yarker, 1966, Thomas, 1977). As
mentioned above, small firms were indeed found to export to fewer
markets than larger firms. Moreover, it was discovered that even
some of the larger firms surveyed did not have the resources to
market their products throughout the world and that new products
were normally launched in a small number of selected markets rather
than on a global basis.
(v) Prior offshore-related experience
The quantitative data indicated that there was a clear association
between the extent of a firm's offshore-related experience and its
export performance. For example, all the firms exporting more
than one-third of their offshore-related turnover had offshore-
related experience prior to the development of North Sea oil fields.
In addition, a strong association was found to exist between prior
offshore-related experience and the scope of offshore-related
exporting activity, in that none of the firms without any form of
prior offshore-related experience was exporting to more than a
. 2. This supports the conclusions of I.M.R. (1978), see p.96.
3. See p. 241.
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dozen overseas markets.
The importance of offshore-related experience was underlined
by qualitative evidence. Firstly, the major competitive
advantage claimed by the sample as a whole was reputation/track
record, while several also claimed to hold an advantage in terms
of established contacts or market knowledge. In contrast,
several inexperienced firms admitted that breaking down purchasing
inertia in overseas markets would be a major problem. In
addition, it is clear that it is only those firms which have been
involved in the offshore business for a substantial period of time
that could be expected to have established an appropriately
located network of permanent bases overseas, as the development
of such a network is a considerable undertaking which is only
possible on a very gradual basis even for a large firm. These
bases perform three vital functions. Firstly, they provide a
local sales presence in a market in which direct selling is
undoubtedly the key method of sales promotion. Second, they
offer the fast, reliable, back-up and maintenance services
considered so essential by the oil industry. Finally, they act
as the main collection points for up-to-date marketing intelligence.
Hence, indigenous manufacturers newly-established in the offshore
supplies business and without an appropriately located sales and
service network are at a serious disadvantage.
(vi) Managerial attitude to exporting
The devotion of adequate resources to exporting does not simply
depend upon resource availability but also upon management's
attitude to exporting. Strong evidence was found of an association
between managerial attitude to exporting and export performance.
Several firms had adopted a passive attitude to exporting because
they had accepted that their basic products had very little export
potential. However, there was evidence in some firms with
products of proven export potential of an unwillingness to risk
resources in export markets. For example, certain sizeable
British companies which had been involved in exporting a sufficient
length of time to have established agents in virtually every




Consideration was given in Chapter 12 to the proposition that
resources may not be committed to exporting unless a firm
prepares a plan outlining the export marketing programme and budget¬
ing for the investment likely to be required for the successful
implementation of this policy. The key variable influencing
the nature of the planning activity undertaken was found to be
size of organisation, with small firms in general being less likely
to prepare formal plans and forecasts due to their inability to
afford specialist staff to undertake the planning function and
the inability of their chief executives to free themselves of
day-to-day operational problems for sufficient time to consider
strategic issues. Further analysis revealed that these
'non-planners' were less successful exporters and that for the
sample as a whole there was indeed an association between the
formalisation of planning, the commitment of resources to
exporting and export performance.
(viii) The dominance of U.S. multinationals
It was evident from the statistical data that the U.S.
subsidiaries surveyed tended to export a higher proportion of
their total offshore-related turnover than did the rest of the
sample. Indeed, 6 of the 7 firms most heavily involved in
offshore-related exporting activity were U.S. subsidiaries.
Examination of the qualitative data revealed that all the U.S.
subsidiaries had adopted a positive attitude to exporting and
that the majority of the firms which stated that they were exporting
for the sole reason that they wished to take advantage of global
opportunities were U.S. subsidiaries. This evidence, would seem
to suggest that the superior exporting performance of the U.S.
subsidiaries could perhaps to a significant extent, be
attributed to the more aggressive approach which these firms had
adopted with respect to export business. However, it should be
noted that a number of factors did, in fact, contribute to the
exporting success of the U.S. subsidiaries, many of which had
nothing to do with nationality per se.
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In fact, the difference in the export performance of U.S. and
indigenous firms can larc^ly be attributed to three factors
which have already been discussed - product-mix, offshore-related
experience and size of firm. First, the U.S. multinationals
which have established subsidiaries in Scotland have tended to
be manufacturers of specialised oilfield equipment, which
itself accounted for a large proportion of total offshore-
related equipment exports. Second, the U.S. multinationals have
considerable offshore-related experience. During their lengthy
period of involvement in the offshore market U.S. oil equipment
manufacturers have not only established their credibility with
the oil companies but have also set up a network of sales and
service bases overseas. Finally, the U.S. subsidiaries are part
of large organisations which are in a good position to afford
the substantial investment required for successful exporting.
Thus, to a considerable extent, the superior performance of
U.S. subsidiaries in export markets can be explained by the fact
that they are part of large organisations with substantial
offshore-related experience manufacturing specialised oilfield
equipment. It should also be noted that the best export
performance by indigenous firms was achieved by large companies
which had been supplying the oil industry (with general
mechanical and electrical equipment for use either on or offshore)
for many years. Nevertheless, it was also in this sector - where
firms had the advantages of size, experience and an exportable
product - that evidence was found of indigenous companies failing
to make the most of the export opportunities available to them.
For example, many experienced oil industry suppliers were still
not affording the U.S.A. the attention it deserved in terms of
sales effort, given its position as the main centre of purchasing
authority for oil-related equipment. Thus, there was evidence
that part of the relative lack of exporting success by some
British firms may have been attributable to the failure of
British business enterprise.
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13.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SCOTTISH MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF THE
OFFSHORE SUPPLIES INDUSTRY
Of the 60,000-70,000 people in oil-related employment in Scotland
in mid-1978, around 20,000 were employed by companies manufacturing
equipment for the .North Sea and other oil markets. A large
proportion of this manufacturing employment was provided by the firms
producing the platforms, fabrications and wellhead, power and process
equipment required for the development of oil and gas fields in the
U.K. sector of the North Sea. However, the oil scenario developed
4
during the course of the second stage of the fieldwork. revealed
the U.K. sector of the North Sea to be a gradually maturing oil
province in which the number and size of new field developments will
decline over time. As a consequence, development expenditure (and
hence demand for the items of equipment mentioned above) will fall in
real terms over the period to 1985. The anticipated impact of this
decline in the U.K. market (together with the expansion in the
global offshore market) on the expected corporate strategy of the
surveyed firms was examined in the final phase of the fieldwork, for
which a qualitative approach was once again adopted. The implications
of the results of this and the earlier phases of fieldwork for the
future of the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies
industry will be discussed in this section.
The Scottish shipyards surveyed both conceded that they were unlikely
to win export orders. In an industry experiencing considerable
excess capacity worldwide, these yards were unable to meet international
competition with respect to either price or delivery due to low
productivity and the subsidies provided to rival shipbuilding industries.
Although these yards stand a good chance of winning their share of
orders for offshore-related vessels for the U.K. sector of the North
Sea, their view of this market was such that both were looking else¬
where for business in order to achieve the full capacity that they
were both optimistically forecasting for the period to 1985. Given
that the larger yard has to date failed in its attempts to diversify
into various forms of offshore-related fabrication, it appears that
4. This was based on a survey of expert opinion, see pp. 144-148 for
further details.
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offshore-related output for the U.X. sector of the North Sea may decline,
while the export of offshore-related vessels is extremely unlikely.^
With certain notable exceptions fabrications, including platforms,
are unsophisticated, labour-intensive items and are therefore exactly
the type of equipment which overseas governments will ensure are produced
locally. They are also expensive and difficult to transport relative
to their value. None of the platform fabricators surveyed had exported
in the past, nor did they expect to become involved in exporting in
the period to 1985. Moreover, although the outlook for the U.K.
platform market is not encouraging, attempts to diversify into other
areas of fabrication (such as modules) will simply increase pressure
in that sector. The sub-contractors and the fabricators of modules
and basic steel items have also accepted the extremely limited export
potential of their products and none currently has plans to export.
Given the decline in domestic demand anticipated the outlook for this
sector is bleak, even allowing for the plans of some fabricators to
diversify into either offshore repair and maintenance or general
engineering for onshore markets. Although the studbolt manufacturer
has planned an export drive, the really notable exceptions in this
sector were the two manufacturers of the more sophisticated fabrications
such as diving bells and helicopter refuelling systems. These firms
have selected the development of export markets as their major strategy
for the period to 1985, and this should result in an increase in the
exports of this sector as a whole. However, this will not compensate for
the considerable fall in the offshore-related manufactured output of those
fabricators dependent upon the declining U.K. market.
The indigenous firms manufacturing general mechanical engineering
equipment (such as tubular steel products, pressure vessels, heat
exchangers and pumps) and electrical equipment (such as motors, generators
and switchgear) have already achieved some success in export markets.
5. The drilling rig yard was not surveyed during the final phase of
interviewing. At the time of the first round of interviewing
this yard was owned by a U.S. multinational with facilities in
other parts of the world, compared with which the Scottish yard
was high-cost. As such, the Scottish yard was normally last
in line to win a contract awarded to the U.S. multinational (unless
there was a U.K. element to the order) and consequently had ex¬
perienced considerable difficulty securing orders. However, this
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However, these companies are under extreme competition from their
U.S., Japanese and European rivals which are also suffering from
excess capacity, while in most overseas markets with domestic
suppliers these companies face high tariff barriers. Nevertheless,
the power plant and pump manufacturers plan to increase exports of
offshore-related equipment through the development of selected overseas
markets which they feel offer potential for their products. In
contrast, the process plant and tubular steel product manufacturers were
far less optimistic about their prospects of being able to increase
exports to replace declining domestic business. Overall, the
anticipated increase in the exports of pumps and electrical equipment
is unlikely to be sufficient to offset the reduction in this sector's
domestic sales in the period to 1985.
The manufacture in Scotland of specialised oilfield equipment (including
wellhead equipment, pipeline ball valves and down-hole tools) is
dominated by the subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals already heavily
involved in exporting. Despite the fact that U.K. demand was expected
to fall in line with the decline in the number of new production wells
requiring completion equipment, the U.S. wellhead manufacturers were all
forecasting rapid growth in the period to 1985, largely as a result of
the expansion of exports (mainly to new markets). However, some of
this growth was expected to be at the expense of competitors and hence,
although some increase in turnover through exporting is probable, the
forecasted growth rates are likely to prove somewhat optimistic. Although
the future U.K. demand for pipeline ball valves remains uncertain,
domestic business represents a relatively small proportion of the total
turnover of the U.S. ball valve manufacturers. Moreover, these
companies were confident that any shortfall in demand from the U.K.
sector could be made good by increasing exports. In contrast, a boom
can be expected in the U.K. demand for down-hole tools from 1984 onwards.
Given that the major U.S. multinationals in this sector were already
exporting to virtually every offshore market in the world, growth to
1985 will primarily be based on the U.K. market. Thus, overall, in
the period to 1985 a significant increase in both the export and domestic
sales of this sector can be expected.
yard was purchased in April 1980 by U.I.E., which has. already success¬
fully tendered for 3 drilling rig orders (one of which is for export)
as well as fabrication work.
6. This is supported by Department of Energy forecasts of expenditure on
well-workovers, see p.26.
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However,this specialised oil technology is_ controlled by U.S.
companies and despite the optimism of the U.K. plant managers
(particularly those of the wellhead manufacturers) it should be
remembered that the scope of the exporting activities undertaken by
the U.S. -subsidiaries is generally limited in accordance with corporate
strategy determined by their parent companies.^ In many cases the
Scottish subsidiary was the first major manufacturing plant of its
type to be located outside the U.S.A. and normally it was allocated
the Eastern Hemisphere as its sales territory. However, already
several of these companies have established a plant in Singapore and it
appears that in time some will set up further manufacturing facilities
0
overseas rather than expand their existing Scottish plant. Should
this direct investment result in increasingly restrictive market
allocation policies the growth of the Scottish plants could be
seriously constrained. However, although the size of the territory
allocated to the Scottish subsidiary may decline, this does not
necessarily mean that the size of the market in terms of sales volume
will fall. Moreover, geographical market restriction could, for example,
be accompanied by new product development or an expansion of the product
line manufactured in Scotland. Nevertheless, given the anticipated
trend towards increasing restrictions on the scope of the exporting
activities of their Scottish subsidiaries, it is somewhat reassuring
that most of these multinationals have in the past shown themselves
to be willing to transfer contracts to a plant operating seriously
below full capacity.
Despite the notable success of certain fabricators of sophisticated
items of equipment, the main evidence of the indigenous development of
specialised oil-related technology came from the electronics sector.
In addition to their product advantage, these Scottish firms have also
established a 'track record' with the oil industry through their
involvement in the North Sea. That is, North Sea experience has
7. Stuer et al (1973) and Hood & Young (1976) also found considerable
evidence of the marketing of US subsidiaries located in Scotland
being geographically restricted by their parent companies.
8. For example, the two largest oilfield equipment manufacturers had no
plans for a major expansion of production capacity in Scotland in
the period to 1985.
provided them with the opportunity to join the 'oil club' which
operates worldwide. However, most of these firms still have to prove
that they can market their products effectively in export markets.
The following quote from the managing director of one small, Scottish
electronics firm which has developed an advanced,micro-processor based
safety monitoring system indicates that some of these firms may well
prove to be inept marketers, lacking the aggression to effectively
sell themselves :
"The Scottish Development Agency has projected great
expansion plans for us. We're more conservative.
We don't know if we want expansion. Providing we can
make sufficient profit to support future development
we don't have to expand. More people just mean more
headaches."
Furthermore, several of these companies are small firms and therefore
have to overcome all the exporting problems this creates with respect
to overseas sales, distribution and support. .
Thus, the total value of offshore-related equipment exported by the
sample may increase by up to 40-50% in real terms in the period to
1985. Approximately half of this increase is likely to be accounted
for by the U.S. subsidiaries manufacturing specialised oilfield
equipment, with the remainder coming from indigenous manufacturers
of pumps, power plant, sophisticated fabrications and electronic
equipment. However, U.K. demand for platforms, fabrications and
process equipment is likely to decline while the export potential of
these sectors is also fairly limited. Indeed, as far as total sales
offshore-related equipment are concerned, it is anticipated that the
real reduction in the offshore-related turnover of the shipbuilders
and fabricators will be slightly greater than the increase in output
expected from the oilfield and electronic equipment manufacturers.
Consequently, it is anticipated that offshore-related manufacturing
employment in the surveyed firms may decline by up to 10% in the
period to 1985, with the steepest reductions occurring in the ship¬
building and fabrication sectors.
13.5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Having drawn together the main themes to emerge from the study and
outlined the major implications of these findings for the future of
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the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies industry,
this section is devoted to the discussion of the policy implications
of this study.
(i) Expanded role for the Export Section of the Offshore Supplies
Office
The Department of Energy's Offshore Supplies Office (O.S.O.)
has devoted only a small proportion of its resources to the
identification of overseas opportunities. As a result, the
Export Section of the O.S.O. has only attempted to provide
information concerning major offshore developments overseas,
leaving the Export Intelligence Service (E.I.S.) of the British
Overseas Trade Board to handle the flow of information
concerning smaller contracts. It was therefore surprising to
find that the O.S.O. was more heavily utilised by the sample
as a source of export marketing intelligence than the E.I.S.
In addition, the O.S.O. was less heavily criticised than the
E.I.S., over which it holds an important advantage in terms of
its detailed knowledge in this specialised industry. Given
this evidence, the anticipated decline in the domestic market
for many items of offshore-related equipment (together with
the expanding global offshore market) and the established
importance of up-to-date export marketing intelligence, it
would appear that there may be a strong case for an expansion
in the O.S.O.'s role as the best supplier of information
concerning opportunities for offshore-related manufacturers in
overseas markets.
Resources devoted to this end will, howevep always be limited.
The O.S.O. should therefore consider concentrating on the supply
of marketing intelligence to small to medium sized firms,
as large firms possessing their own internal communication systems
were found to consider the O.S.O.'s intelligence service less
useful than did other firms. Indeed, there may be a case for
concentrating resources on the identification of opportunities
in certain overseas markets and, in particular, certain product
sectors where U.K. firms stand their best chance of success.
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(ii) Consistency of government policy with respect to North Sea oil
The oil companies involved in the development of North Sea oil
fields are undertaking extremely heavy, long-term investment
in high risk projects. However, the oil industry feels that
the treatment which successive governments have afforded North
Sea oil development in recent years has created unnecessary
additional uncertainty. Although the oil industry has
expressed concern about the government's attitude to the award
of new acreage and its powers to delay new projects and cut
back production from existing fields, the key question appears
to relate to taxation. Tax rates were increased twice in 1980
and again in 1981 - in all eight tax changes have taken place
since Petroleum Revenue Tax was introduced in 1975. The industry
claims that these changes have seriously affected confidence in
the ability of the U.K. government to create the stable investment
climate necessary for them to commit the substantial sums
required for the development of North Sea oil fields. As
evidence the oil companies point to the considerable fluctuations
in the level of development activity in the U.K. sector of the
North Sea while, more recently, several companies appear to have
shelved new developments until a more favourable investment
climate is secured. Indeed, the last new development sanctioned
by the Department of Energy - the Hutton Field - was in August
1980.
To the extent that these arguments are valid, they will be
reflected in uncertainty in the domestic market for offshore-
related equipment. In the past the fluctuations in the level
of development activity have held a particularly severe impact
on the platform builders and fabricators, which are heavily
reliant on the domestic market. Moreover, uncertainty in
the domestic market may also have damaged the export performance
of indigenous offshore-related manufacturers. Cooper et al
(1970) found that some exporters were unwilling to enter untried
markets at a time when an adverse situation existed in the
9
domestic market. While the arguments put forward in the oil
9. See p. 80.
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scenario suggested that a long-term decline in the domestic
demand for platforms and their equipment was inevitable, to the
extent that government policy with respect to oil may have
created additional uncertainty in the domestic market this may
have had a detrimental affect on offshore-related export
performance. Encouragement of a consistent level of develop¬
ment effort is therefore a factor which should be considered
whenever policy measures relating to North Sea oil development
are being considered.
(iii) The attraction and integration of foreign multinationals into
the U.K. economy
This study has shown that encouraging foreign firms in specialised
or high-technology fields to establish subsidiaries in this
country can provide long-term employment in areas (such as oilfield
equipment) where it would have been very difficult for indigenous
firms to break into a market which would otherwise have been served
by imports from the U.S.A. and elsewhere. It was shown in
Chapter 12 that several of the U.S. subsidiaries have plans for
growth in the period to 1985. However, it was also pointed out
that the two largest U.S. oilfield equipment manufacturers were not
planning to export (having reached the appropriate size to meet
the demand emanating from the markets - product and geographical
- allocated to them), while several may suffer in the future
from increasing restrictions on the scope of their exporting
activities. Thus, this evidence suggests that future growth in
the employment created by this sector may have to come from
the attraction of new subsidiaries rather than through the
expansion of existing ones. As Hood & Young (1980) point out,
it is therefore vitally important to counteract any adverse
perceptions which might exist in the U.S.A. regarding, for
example, labour relations in this country. One possible
method of achieving this objective is the use in adverts
directed at the U.S.A. of the names of well known U.S. companies
(such as Baker Oil Tools and Cameron Ironworks) which have
established subsidiaries in this country. Alternatively, a list
of successful U.S. subsidiaries could be prepared for use as
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a promotional tool on sales trips to the U.S.A. (by, for
example, S.D.A. personnel), in much the same way as offshore
suppliers produce lists of successfully completed offshore-
related contracts to vouch for their 'track record' in the
industry. Thus the researcher would agree with Hood and
Young's (1980) conclusion that it is extremely important to
promote new investment from overseas. It is therefore
encouraging that the Locate in Scotland organisation has been
set up jointly by the S.E.P.D. and S.D.A. to attract inward
investment by quality firms in the high technology area.
Having attracted these firms, it is important to ensure that they
are permitted to prosper in the long-term. For example,
wherever possible joint-venture agreements should not contain
clauses prohibiting sales outside the U.K. market. Moreover,
it is important that these subsidiaries are encouraged to
integrate themselves as much as possible into the local economy
in order that the maximum benefit is derived from their presence.
A key objective in this area is the relocation of research
activity in the U.K. Hood & Young (1976) argue that low
R&D intensity is to be expected in new U.S. subsidiaries and
that as production facilities grow in maturity in-house R&D
is likely to become increasingly necessary. This is supported
by the present study which found that very few of the (relatively
newly-established) subsidiaries surveyed were undertaking R&D
activity in Scotland. Even the development of new products
and techniques stimulated by North Sea operations has largely
been undertaken in the U.S.A.^° However, there may be a
case for inducing key multinationals to relocate some of their
R&D activity in the U.K."'"''" While technology resulting
from research activity relocated in this country would remain
under the control of the multinationals, the very fact that the
research activity was being undertaken in the U.K. and that U.K.
nationals were being employed to carry out this research would
10. Both Lewis et al (1978a) and Baker et al (1978) found that the oil
industry tended to depend on established companies for the next
generation of equipment - see p. 38.
11. Although how best to encourage the expansion of R & D activity
in the Scottish subsidiaries of these firms is a difficult question
worthy of detailed research.
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facilitate the transfer of technology to indigenous firms.
A further consequence of the fairly recent origin of most of
the U.S. multinationals surveyed was the fairly narrow range
of products generally manufactured at Scottish plants, with the
more specialised items of equipment still normally being
imported from the U.S.A. Consequently, these firms should
be encouraged to extend the range of activities undertaken
in this country in order to help safeguard the future of their
Scottish plants. Finally, linkages between these subsidiaries
and local suppliers should be maximised as increasing contact
with these U.S. multinationals may improve the performance of
indigenous firms through the transfer of technology, where this
is defined in the wider sense to include marketing techniques,
production methods, management skills etc. In this respect
the O.S.O. in particular may be fulfilling an important role.
13.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The present study has consisted of a qualitative survey of the export¬
ing policies and practices of a relatively small number of selected firms
at a particular point in time. As such, there are two main areas in
which further research on the same general theme as the current study
would be particularly useful.
(i) The present study has identified the existence of associations
between certain variables - such as the methods of export
distribution utilised - and exporting success. However, as
Tookey (1964) and Hirsch (1971) have pointed out, it is not
strictly possible from the results of a one-off study to
establish whether a firm exported more because, for example,
it had established a network of sales and service subsidiaries
overseas, or whether this network of overseas bases was simply
justified at a certain stage of exporting. The direction of
this relationship could, however, be discovered were the
exporting activities of this firm to be studied on an on-going
basis. An on-going study of the exporting activities of the
sample could thus yield valuable results. This would be
particularly the case for those firms which have products which
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appear to possess significant export potential but are as yet at
a very early stage in their exporting activities. On a more
basic level, it would also, of course, be extremely interesting
simply to return to the surveyed firms in 1985 in order to
compare actual performance with that planned several years
earlier.
(ii) The limitations of the qualitative approach adopted in this study
were discussed in section 13.2 above. In particular it was
pointed out that while certain associations were found to exist
for the sample as a whole, it is not possible to generalise from
these results using statistical analysis. However, given the
detailed information concerning the factors influencing the
export performance of this sector of industry which has resulted
from the present study, it would now be possible to develop a
structured postal questionnaire which could be distributed to
the entire population of Scottish offshore-related manufacturers.
In this way associations indicated by the qualitative analysis could
be tested for the population as a whole. Thus, while the
postal questionnaire could not provide the same depth of information
concerning the practice of exporting in these firms, it would
nevertheless produce extremely useful information, particularly
when these quantitative findings were viewed in association with
the qualitative findings of the present study.
13.7 CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was to undertake a thorough study of the practice
of exporting in the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore
supplies industry. In particular, the main objectives were twofold :
(i) to identify and examine the major factors influencing the export
performance of this sector of Scottish industry
(ii) to investigate likely future trends in the offshore-related
exporting activity of these firms in the period to 1985.
These objectives were achieved by means of a series of in-depth,
qualitative interviews with the senior executives responsible for
determining exporting strategy in forty offshore-related manufacturers.
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There are, of course, many topics which have been afforded only the most
superficial of treatments. Clearly, little else could be expected
from a work of the present proportions. However, this study has
made significant contributions in two main areas :
(i) Prior to this study very little was known about the nature
and scale of the exporting being undertaken by offshore-related
manufacturers located in Scotland, and virtually nothing about the
factors which influence their aims and attainment with respect
to exporting. While a certain amount of original statistical
evidence concerning the export performance of these firms has
been presented, the major contribution of this thesis has been its
provision of the first detailed study of the major factors
influencing the export performance of this sector of Scottish
industry. Moreover, further research was undertaken to
investigate the implications of these findings for the future of
the Scottish manufacturing sector of the offshore supplies
industry in the period to 1985.
(ii) The qualitative research methodology utilised throughout this
study has provided this thesis with an additional element of
originality. Studies of export performance in other industries
have tended to use structured questionnaires, whether postal
or interviewer-administered. This is a very rigid approach
which results in interviews following predetermined lines and
responses being 'slotted' into preconceived categorisations.
Having discovered in the course of his desk research that the
attitude of senior management to exporting could be a significant
element influencing export performance, the researcher decided
that the nature of the research problem required a more
flexible approach than those offered by the structured question¬
naire. The qualitative technique adopted allowed greater freedom
to probe responses and consequently resulted in greater depth of
information and better understanding of the real motives for
behaviour than would have been possible utilising a more
structured approach. Thus, the use of this novel research
methodology provided valuable insights into management thinking
with respect to exporting in the surveyed firms.
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APPENDIX 2.1
GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS USED BY THE OIL INDUSTRY
BIT : The cutting part of the drilling string. The bit can be of
several types depending on the rock formations encountered (see
drilling string).
BLOW-OUT PREVENTER : A high-pressure valve, usually hydraulically
operated, which can be closed by remote control in the event of a
build-up of pressure, thereby completely sealing the well.
BUMPER SUB : Telescoping section of drill-pipe (included as part of
the drilling string) which compensates for any vertical motion of a
floating rig during drilling operations.
CHRISTMAS TREE : An assembly of valves and fittings which is located
at the head of the well to control the flow of the oil/gas.
DRILL COLLAR : Length of extra heavy pipe placed above the drilling
bit in order to concentrate weight at the bottom of the drilling strincr
(see drilling string).
DRILLING FLUID/MUD : Fluid, often a highly complex mixture of water,
clay, chemicals and other additives, used in drilling wells. Fluid is
forced by the slush pumps from mud storage tanks via the rotary hose
into the hollow 'kelly' and down the centre of the drilling string to
the bottom of the well. The fluid is returned via the marine riser
to the rig, whereupon the rock-cuttings will be removed (by, for example,
passing the mud through a vibrating fine mesh screen) before it is
re-circulated.
DRILLING STRING : The drilling string has four main components. At
the bottom of the drilling string is the drilling bit. In order to
concentrate weight near the bit and prevent the upper part of the
drilling string buckling, several lengths of extra-heavy pipe, called
drill collars, are placed directly above the bit. Above the drill
collars are a number of lengths of drill-pipe which are in turn screwed
onto the lower end of the 'kelly'. The 'kelly' is a hollow, 40-foot
355
long pipe of hexagonal cross-section able to slide through a similarly
shaped hole in the rotary table, which is rotated by the main power
unit. The kelly transmits the twisting movement from the rotating
machinery to the drill-string and thus to the bit. (Rotational drive
only is provided to the drill-string as its own weight is sufficient
to keep the bit in contact with the rock). As the hole increases in
depth, the kelly is gradually lowered until only a short length of it
remains above the rotary table, at which time another section of drill-
pipe is added to the drilling string just below the kelly once the
string has been clamped in the hole.
DRILL PIPE : Steel pipe forming a major element of the drilling
string (see drilling string).
DYNAMIC POSITIONING : Method by which drilling vessels can be kept
in an exact and stable position over a well involving the use of a
complex system of computer-controlled thruster motors which automatically
respond to changes in the wind, waves and current.
FISHING TOOLS : Tools lowered into the well on the end of a wireline
in order to remove a section of the drilling string which has broken
or become stuck.
'KELLY' : Square or hexagonal pipe used to transmit the twisting
movement from the rotating machinery to the bit (see drilling string).
MARINE RISER : Tube,- running from the blow-out preventer (situated
on the seabed) to the rig (on the surface), which excludes the sea
from drilling operations and enables drilling fluid to be returned to
the rig. The riser has telescopic joints to absorb the heave of the
rig and a tensioning system - of tensioners and guidelines - to
maintain rigidity for drilling.
ROTARY TABLE : Apparatus rotated by power unit, through which the
kelly slides (see drilling string).
SEISMIC SURVEY : Exploration method used to generate marine seismic
work profiles, which are basically maps showing the configuration of
subsurface rock strata, obtained by recording the speed and arrival
time of shock waves (produced by an air gun) reflected from boundaries
between two strata of different density. This system usually
requires two vessels - a firing ship and a recording ship - which,
with the aid of sophisticated navigational systems, maintain position
on set traverse lines along which shooting must take place.
SLUSH PUMPS : Pump used in the circulation of the drilling fluid
(see drilling fluid/mud).




COST BREAKDOWN FOR A HYPOTHETICAL 10,000 FT. WELL,






Preparation Mobilisation/Demobilisation 147 3.9
Site Preparation 25 0.7
Transport Rig Move 84 0.9
Drilling Contract Payments 2000 53.1
Installation Drilling Materials 11 0.3
Running Fuel 85 2.3
Costs Salaries 30 0.8
Maintenance 23 0.6
Drilling Mud 154 4.1
Materials Bits and Coreheads 48 1.3
Casing 245 6.5
Cementing 41 1.1
Evaluation Logging 135 3.6
Intermediate Testing 15 O. 4
Miscellaneous Evaluation 30 0.8




SOURCE : Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME, Paper No. SPE 5266,
"Drilling Costs", by JENKINS, P.B. & CRAWFORD, A.L., 1975. Reproduced
in MANSVELT BECK, F.W. & WIIG, K.M., The Economics of Offshore and
Gas Supplies, 1977, p.36.
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Site preparation : survey 16 0.7
interpretation 67 2.9
Rig charter : (60 days) 1200 52.4
Rig mobilisation : moving onto station 51 2.2
Consumables : casing, mud, etc. 457 20.0
Specialised services : divers, mud engineers
etc. 149 6.5
External services : helicopters, tugs, supply
boats, etc. 286 12.5
Abandonment 10 0.4
Sub-Total 2236 97.6
Additional expenses : if oil or gas found 53 2.3
TOTAL 2290 lOO.O
For each extra day of bad weather 31 1.3
SOURCE : LOVEGROVE, M., Our Island's Oil, 1975, p.29. (Values
converted to sterling at an exchange rate of $1.75 = £1, and reproduced
in LEWIS, T.M. & McNICOLL, I.H., North Sea Oil and Scotland's Economic
Prospects, 1978, as Appendix 1, p.133).
APPENDIX 2.4














Mechanical and electrical hook-up 16.5
N.G.L. installation 0.5
Storage and handling 0.5
TOTAL loo.o
SOURCE : MANSVELT BECK, F.W. & WIIG, K.M., 1977, p.
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Material for Deck Modules 395,000
Living Quarters and Helicopter Deck 800,000
Gas/Oil Separators and Gas Scrubbers 180,000
Pumps 245,000
Air Compressors, Receivers and Driers 13,500
Boilers and Accessories 12,400
Burner Equipment 6,500
Water and Sewage Treatment Plants 130,000
Tanks 8 ,000
Mixing Equipment 375





Hydraulic Pipe Clamps 18,OOO
Bolting Material 4,100
Gaskets 1,500
Power Generation Units and Electrical Equipment 1 328,000
Power and Control Cable 48,000
Instruments, Meters and Gauges 95,OOO
Heating and Ventilating Equipment 13,900
Hoisting and Lifting Equipment 137,000
Communication Equipment 4,750
Fire Fighting and Safety Equipment 214,000
Navigational Aids 8,000
Wellhead Equipment (for 10 wells) 165,000
Hydraulic Shut-down Unit 30,000
TOTAL 20 ,142,875

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ANALYSIS OF ORDERS PLACED BY OFFSHORE OPERATING COMPANIES 1974-76
1974 1975 1976
Total UK Share Total UK Share Total UK Share




- concrete 161.0 60.0 37 59.0 29.4 50 25 .0 22.0 88
2 Production platforms
- steel 87.0 56.0 64 75.0 71.0 95 57.0 40.0 70
3 Modules & other
fabrications 187.0 94.0 50 171.0 103.0 60 116.0 62 .0 53
Production Plant:
4 Power generation
equipment 22.4 18.5 83 27.0 19.2 71 10.0 8.5 85
5 Pumps 5.8 5.1 88 10.8 8.6 80 5.0 5.0 100
6 Compressors 8.5 3.5 41 3.6 1.5 42 5.0 3.0 60
7 Process plant &
equipment 11.9 9.5 80 31.7 28.8 91 18.0 16.0 89
Pipe & Fittings:
8 Pipe 85 .0 6.1 7 58.0 3.0 5 15.0 5.0 33
9 Pipe coating 25.8 23.3 90 1.4 1.4 100 17 .0 17.0 100
10 Pipe fittings (Valves
& accessories) 18.5 9.0 49 15.4 9.4 61 10.0 7.0 70
11 Casing 26.7 11.7 44 45.0 31.0 69 54.0 46.0 85
Miscellaneous:
12 Communications
equipment 8.0 6.8 85 13.4 11.1 83 12 .0 10.0 83
13 Wellhead & completion
equipment 8.7 5.3 61 9.5 8.4 88 9.0 5.0 56
14 Safety equipment 3.8 3.6 95 8.2 8.0 98 6.0 5.5 92
15 TOTAL FOR CAPITAL





16 Rig hire & production
drilling 146.0 37.0 25 159.0 53.0 33 105 .O 27.0 26
- rig hire
(exploration) 97.0 14.0 15 90.0 19.0 21
- production drilling 62.0 39.0 62 15.0 8.0 55
17 Surveys 14.0 11.0 79 19.7 12 .3 62 14.0 9 .0 64
18 Drilling tools &
equipment 13.3 6.3 47 13.0 6.8 52 13.0 7 .0 54
General Services:
19 Pipe laying 127.0 22.7 18 76 .0 8.2 11 100.0 27.0 27
20 Installations





Total UK Share Total UK Share Total UK Share
Em Em % Em Em % Em Em %
21 Diving 7.4 3.1 42 15.6 10.8 69 22 .0 13.5 61
22 Helicopter & air
services 13.4 8.0 60 23.3 13.8 59 20.0 12 .0 60
23 Marine transport 21.2 11.7 55 81.0 33.7 42 56.0 22.5 • 40
24 Mud logging & well
testing 9.7 6.0 62 12.6 3.9 31 8.5 3.5 41
25 Barytes & mud
chemicals 6.6 4.2 64 9.6 6.5 68 13.5 9.5 70
26 Cementing services 3.2 1.9 59 6.7 5.7 85 8 .0 4.0 50
27 Inspection, testing
& maintenance 6.7 4.6 69 14.4 10.0 69 12 .O 8.0 67
28 Other services 42.3 28.8 68 62 .0 55.0 89 92.0 80.0 87
29 TOTAL FOR
534.0 153.0 29 585.0 237.0 41 595.0 268.0 45
SERVICES
30 Design &
consultancy 85.0 51.0 60 71.0 42.3 60 87.0 71.0 82
31 GRAND TOTAL 1279.0 516.0 40 1185.0 613.0 52 1041.O 591.0 57










































































































































































































































































































































































































































SCOTTISH COMPANIES INVOLVED IN OFFSHORE-RELATED MANUFACTURING AS A
PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY
SHIPBUILDING & MARINE ENGINEERING
Ferguson Bros. (Port Glasgow) Ltd., Port Glasgow.
Scott Lithgow Ltd., Port Glasgow.
U-I.E. Shipbuilding (Scotland) Ltd., Clydebank.
CONCRETE & STEEL PLATFORMS
Ayrshire Marine Constructors Ltd., Hunterston
Highland Fabricators Ltd., Nigg Bay.
H.D.N. Offshore Structures, Loch Kishorn.
McAlpine Sea Tank Ltd., Ardyne Point.
McDermott Scotland Ltd., Ardersier.
Redpath de Groot Caledonian Ltd., Methil.
MODULES & OTHER STEEL FABRICATORS
(A) MODULES :
Burntisland Engineers & Fabricators Ltd., Burntisland.
Carronhall Engineering Ltd., Stonehaven.
R.B. Farquhar, Huntlv.
Ferguson Sea Cabs Ltd., Inverurie.
Richard Irvin Fabrications Ltd., Aberdeen.
Kestrel Marine Ltd., Dundee.
Motherwell Bridge Offshore, .Leith.
(B) MAJOR FABRICATORS :
A.I. Welders Ltd., Inverness.
A.L.I. Construction and Installation Ltd., Aberdeen.
Arbarthorpe Engineering Ltd., Aberdeen.
Bathos Developments Ltd., Stonehaven.
Buchan Express Services Ltd., Aberdeen.
Crombie Fabrications Services (Aberdeen) Ltd., Aberdeen.
Elbar Engineering Ltd., Elgin.
Grampian Containers Ltd., Aberdeen.
Highland Universal Fabrications Ltd., Inverness.
Hunting Oilfield Services (U.K.) Ltd., Aberdeen.
Interweld Ltd., Aberdeen.
Lewis Offshore Ltd., Stornaway.
W. H. Mackay & Sons Ltd., Wick.
New-Mar Oil Services Ltd., Aberdeen.
Oilfield Manufacturing & Services Ltd., Aberdeen.
Peterhead Engineering Co. Ltd., Aberdeen & Dundee.
Robertson & Ferguson Ltd., Fife.
Seawelding (Montrose) Ltd., Montrose
Speyside Engineering Co. Ltd., Elgin.
Standgate Weld-All Ltd., Aberdeen.
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(C) GENERAL SUB-CONTRACTORS :
Aberdeen Jig & Tool Co. Ltd., Aberdeen.
Aberdeen Service Co. (North Sea) Ltd., Aberdeen, Peterhead & Dundee.
A-I Bit and Tool Company (U.K.)' Ltd., Aberdeen.
Angus Precision Tools Ltd., Arbroath.
A-Z International Oil Tools Ltd., Aberdeen.
Belmar Engineering Co. Ltd., Aberdeen.
Container Care Ltd., Aberdeen.
Cromarty Firth Engineering Co. Ltd., Evanton.
D.B.C. Offshore Ltd., Aberdeen.
E.M.S. Euroweld Ltd., Dundee.
Forth Tool & Guage Ltd., Glenrothes.
Fraser & Ironside Ltd., Muir of Ord, Ross & Cromarty.
Hydril U.K. Ltd., Aberdeen.
Kamac Engineering Ltd., Arbroath.
Mainwork (Maintenance Contracting) Ltd., Aberdeen.
MacKay & MacLeod Engineering Ltd., Evanton.
Midlands Shotblasting (Scotland) Ltd., Perth.
Montrose Offshore Services Ltd., Montrose.
Mulco (Engineering) Ltd., Aberdeen.
Nimmo Offshore Services Ltd., Aberdeen.
Offshore Contractors (Peterhead) Ltd., Peterhead.
Precision Products (Dundee) Ltd., Dundee.
Servoil Ltd. (Engineering & Supplies Division), Aberdeen.
South Bay Engineering (Peterhead) Ltd., Peterhead.
Walker Welding Ltd., Aberdeen.
Wilmar Engineering Services (Aberdeen) Ltd., Aberdeen.
John Wood Group Engineering Ltd., Aberdeen.
METAL GOODS (not elsewhere specified)
Baldt (U.K.) Ltd., Aberdeen.
Bruce Anchor Ltd., Edinburgh.
Channel-Aire Systems Ltd., East Kilbride.
Fraser & Borthwick Engineering Services Ltd., Irvine.
Haden Offshore Ltd., Aberdeen.
Irvent (Metal Products) Ltd., Irvine.
Norbrit Engineering Ltd., Wishaw.
Prosper Engineering Ltd., Kilmarnock.
Rollstud Ltd., Aberdeen.
Seaward International Inc., Aberdeen.
Turners of Shettleston Ltd., Glasgow.
STEEL, PIPE & PIPE-COATING
British Pipecoaters Ltd., Leith.
B.S.C. (Tubes Division), Lanarkshire.
M.K. Shand Ltd., Invergordon.
OIL TOOLS & WELLHEAD EQUIPMENT
(A) WELLHEAD EQUIPMENT :
F.M.C. Corporation Ltd., Dunfermline.
Gray Tool Co. (Europe) Ltd., Douglas.
C.E. Vetco Offshore Ltd., Aberdeen.
(B) OILFIELD EQUIPMENT :
Axwell Engineering Ltd., Broxburn.
Baker Oil Tools (U.K.) Ltd., Aberdeen.
Black Gold Oil Tools Ltd., Aberdeen.
Brown Bros. & Co. Ltd., Edinburgh.
Drexel Engineering Services Ltd., Montrose.
Escol Drilling Equipment Ltd., Dunfermline.
Halliburton Manufacturing & Services Ltd., Arbroath.
Intairdril Offshore Services Ltd., Aberdeen.
Lenmor Production Services Ltd., Aberdeen.
Leutert (North Sea) Ltd., Aberdeen.
L.O.R. Oilfield Services Ltd., Aberdeen.
N.L. Control Systems Ltd., Aberdeen.
R.G.R. Engineering Products, Aberdeen.
Sea Oil Services Ltd., Montrose.
Tri-State Oil Tool (U.K.) Ltd., Aberdeen.
PROCESS PLANT, PUMPS, VALVES & COMPRESSORS
Babcock & Wilcox (Operations) Ltd., Renfrew.
Henry Balfour & Co. Ltd., Leven.
Cameron Iron Works, (Ball Valve Division) Ltd., Livingstone.
Cannon Valves Ltd., Leven.
A.F. Craig & Co. Ltd., Paisley.
Largo Lintec Ltd., Buckhaven.
Motherwell Bridge Engineering Ltd., Motherwell.
T.K. Valves Ltd., Dunfermline.
Weir-Pacific Valves Ltd., Glasgow.
Weir Pumps Ltd., Glasgow.
POWER PLANT
Anderson Strathclyde Ltd., Glasgow.
Bauteil & Baylor Ltd., Glasgow.
Parsons Peebles (Motor & Generators) Ltd., Edinburgh.
COMMUNICATIONS, INSTRUMENTATION & OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
Aeranamics Electronics Ltd., Peterhead.
Banchory Instruments Ltd., Banchory,
Daniel Industries (U.K.) Ltd., Larbert.
East Anglian Electronics Ltd., Aberdeen.
Ferranti Ltd., Edinburgh.
Glen Instruments (Scotland) Ltd., Alva.
Moray Electronics Ltd., Elgin.
Osprey Electronics Ltd., Wick.
V.U. Data Ltd., Inverness.
U.D.I. Operations Ltd., Aberdeen.
OTHER MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Aberglen Seamarks Ltd., Aberdeen.
Angus Sewn-Up Ltd., Forfar.
Carlyle Wishart & Co. Ltd., Edinburgh.
Delcoats Ltd., Glasgow.
Field Gear Ltd., Aberdeen.
Halket & Adam Ltd., Dundee.
John Kelly and Son (Kitchen Engineers) Ltd., Aberdeen.
Lassalle Manufacturing (U.K.) Ltd., Aberdeen.
Multifabs Ltd., Peterhead.
Offshore Interiors Ltd., Edinburgh.
Oilfield Safety Products Ltd., Aberdeen.
P.P.S. Glassfibre Ltd., Inverurie.
Stratoflex (U.K.) Ltd., Glasgow.
Webco Industrial Rubber Ltd., Aberdeen
UNDERWATER ENGINEERING
Seaforth Maritime Ltd., Aberdeen.




The British Overseas Trade Board (BOTB) is the wing of the Department
of Trade charged with promoting U.K. exports, to which end it was
allocated a budget of just over £70 million in the financial year
1978/79. The use of these resources in support of the existing
efforts of U.K. firms is analysed in the table below
Use of Resources in Export Promotion - 1978/79
£m
Collection & Dissemination of Market Intelligence 16.9
Trade Promotions, of which 21.9
overseas trade fairs 16.6
outward missions 2.8
other 2.5
Help to Individual Exporters, of which 12.0
assistance to capital goods export projects 3.3
assistance to U.K. businessmen visiting
overseas and help to exporters in overseas
representation 4.5
market entry guarantee scheme 0.8
export marketing research & advice 0.9
other 2.5
Information & Publicity, & Support for Inward
Missions, of which 12.3
overseas information service 8.2
inward missions & individual business
visitors 2.3
other 2.8
Miscellaneous, including administration &
planning 8.3
Total Government Expenditure (including staff costs)
in support of the Marketing Operations of Exporters 71.9
SOURCE : British Overseas Trade Board (1979a), p.9.
The strength of the BOTB's operations might be said to lie in the
extensive network of contacts that have been established since its
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formation in 1972 with a large number of government and commercial
bodies both in the U.K. and overseas, particularly its relationship
with the U.K.'s diplomatic posts abroad. These provide sales
intelligence on overseas markets and act as the main point of contact
between local businessmen and visiting U.K. executives. In total
there are around 750 full-time commercial counsellors attached to the
U.K.'s consulates overseas (BOTB, 1978; Gray, 1979a).
The main government-supported services available to exporters of
industrial products will now be discussed in more detail.
Export Intelligence Service (EIS)
The EIS provides subscribing firms with details of specific opportunities
abroad and other items of market and economic intelligence important
to exporters. The information provided includes :
(a) enquiries for the purchase of goods or services
(b) enquiries from potential agents and other firms looking
for U.K. partners in joint-venture or licensing
agreements
(c) changes in overseas tariffs and import regulations
(d) calls for tender
(e) market reports
(f) early warnings of major overseas projects.
This information, which is received from 220 Foreign Office posts in
160 countries, is classified and coded
(a) according to its type in one or more of 17 categories
(b) by commodity within 7000 commodity headings
(c) by country and geographical area.
The incoming intelligence is then compared with the profiles of
subscribers' interests (which have been coded within the same categories
and put on the computer record) to determine the selection of notices
to be sent to subscribers (BOTB, 1978).
Trade Fairs and Exhibitions
In 1978 the BOTB supported 303 overseas trade fairs and exhibitions
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(Gray, 1979a). The BOTB provides stand space and services at
favourable charges to U.K. exporters wishing to assess and develop
overseas markets by participating in suitable international trade
fairs. Participants at such events outside Western Europe have
in the past also been able to claim the cost of the air fares for
two representatives manning the stand, as well as assistance with
freight charges for equipment exhibited but unsold at the trade
fair. However, these fringe benefits will be withdrawn by 1981,
except for companies exhibiting overseas for the first time.
Assistance is awarded under three schemes :
(a) the Joint Venture Scheme : exhibitors taking part
under the sponsorship of an approved non-profit-making
body (such as a trade association or chamber of commerce)
in group displays at suitable international specialised
trade fairs (or the relevant section of some general
fairs) may be provided with 15 square metres of stand
space (Wainwright, 1971) .
(b) British Pavillions : These may be organised to encourage
the involvement of U.K. companies at general trade fairs
overseas where participation is organised on a national
rather than an industry basis.
(c) British Industrial Exhibitions : These are special all-
British trade exhibitions organised in selected markets
where no suitable international trade fairs exist (BOTB,
1978). For example, 350 companies were represented on
125 stands at the lO-day British Energy Exhbitions
sponsored by the BOTB in Peking in June 1979. In addition
to the hundreds of meetings which took place on the stands,
more than 800 meetings between the U.K. manufacturers and
local trading corporations and ministries were arranged,
while more than 60 technical lectures were also delivered.
Outward Missions
The objective of the outward missions scheme is to allow U.K. companies
to improve communication with overseas markets and assess the prospects
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for exports, and also to reinforce other marketing efforts. For
approved outward missions, which should be sponsored by a non-profit-
making organisation, the BOTB will contribute financial assistance
equal to the cost of sending one representative from each company
participating plus a mission secretary or co-ordinator. Usually
6-20 members of a mission will be assisted (Export, June 1979; BOTB,
1978).
In addition, under the Group Export Educational Visits Scheme for
Small Firms, the BOTB will provide financial support to approved groups
of firms (which have not exported to the country(s) to be visited)
towards visits to countries in Western Europe for the purpose of gaining
first-hand experience of market conditions.
Capital Goods Projects
The Overseas Project Group of the BOTB co-ordinates government assistance
to firms pursuing large overseas contracts. Firms pursuing such
contracts may qualify for financial assistance with pre-contractual
expenses from the Overseas Project Fund, althotigh these contributions
are repayable if a contract is secured.
In 1979 the BOTB published the Smaller Project Management Directory
(available free of charge) which is intended to assist small to medium
sized companies competing abroad for contracts of under £10 million.
The directory gives details of project management companies and
consultants which are experienced in negotiating with overseas clients
and co-ordinating the activities of sub-contractors and are willing to
manage smaller projects. This publication will allow U.K. subcontractors
holding information about overseas projects in which they wish to
participate to identify and approach a potential project manager who
may be interested in leading the bid (Export, July/August, 1979).
Agency Finding Service
This scheme is run by the BOTB with the help of the Commercial Officers
based at Foreign Office posts throughout the world and is available to
all U.K. companies at a nominal fee. The client is asked to complete
a questionnaire which involves description of the company, its operations,
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the products and services on offer and the proposed selling
arrangements. On the basis of this information the Commercial Officer(s)
overseas identify and contact possible agents who meet the firm's
criteria and send back a report (containing an analysis of the market
prospects for the client firm, together with the names, capabilities
and general commercial standing of suitable and interested agents)
to the exporter.
Market Entry Guarantee Scheme (MEGS)
MEGS is designed to help small manufacturers deal with the problems
and financial risks associated with the penetration and development of
a new market. The basis of this scheme is an agreement that the
BOTB will contribute 50% of the eligible costs of the market venture
in return for a levy on sales receipts in the overseas markets (which
is intended to recover the contributions along with a commercial rate
of return on the scheme's investment). If sales do not materialise
as expected, payment of the levy stops at the end of an agreed period.
Eligible costs are defined as those overheads incurred overseas which
would otherwise be written off and could only be recouped by the
manufacturer through the profit margin on sales, such as office
accommodation and warehousing and staff costs (Gray, 1979a; BOTB, 1978).
Export Marketing Research
The BOTB's Marketing Research Section provides free advice on how
marketing research can help solve exporting problems; the best methods
of conducting research in export markets; suitable consultants/
agencies and their costs; and how to set up an in-house marketing
research department. Also financial support can be provided towards
the cost of marketing research projects, whether carried out by
consultants or in-house research staff. Individual companies can claim
up to one third of the cost of the research in approved cases, trade
associations up to two thirds, and groups of 2 or more firms 50%.
Where research is undertaken by in-house staff, allowable costs include
overseas travel and subsistence. Priority is, however, given to firms
with little or no experience of export market research (BOTB, 1978;
Export, September 1979) .
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Overseas Information Service
The BOTB's Publicity Unit provides advice on the publicity of new
products and/or services in export markets and exporters may even
be given free publicity if they can offer newsworthy items about
their export activities. This material will be passed on to
diplomatic posts overseas (BOTB, 1978; Lewando, 1977).
Inward Missions
The BOTB can offer financial assistance to groups of companies wishing
to receive in the U.K. a deputation of overseas buyers or influential
visitors. The interests of the mission members must be broadly
similar and a joint-programme of visits must be undertaken by them.
To qualify for assistance the mission must be sponsored by a trade
association, chamber of commerce, etc. which must meet some of the cost.
The BOTB will, however, provide organisational assistance and generally
pay 50% of the price of a direct economy class airfare for mission
members from W. Europe (75% of those from elsewhere) as well as 50%
of internal travel, hotel accommodation and essential interpretation
costs (Export, June 1979; BOTB, 1978).
The Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD)
ECGD assists exporters in two main ways :-
(a) it insures them against the risk of not being paid
(b) it furnishes unconditional guarantees of 100% repayment to banks,
thereby allowing them to provide finance to exporters at
favourable interest rates (ECGD, 1977; BOTB, 1978; Deschampsneufs,
1967; Wainwright, 1971).
(a) Insurance for Supplier Credit
The ECGD1s insurance business is operated on a commercial basis involving
no cost to the taxpayer. ECGD classifies exports into two broad
categories. Firstly, cover for trade of a repetitive type is provided
on a 'comprehensive' basis, that is, the exporter must cover all (or,
in certain circumstances, most) of his export business for a year in all
markets. Cover is restricted to 90% of loss from buyer risk (customer
default) and 95% of loss from political risks (such as cancellation
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of a valid import licence, war, etc.).
The Comprehensive Short Term Guarantee covers sales on credit terms
not exceeding six months. However, exporting general engineering
equipment frequently requires credit to be extended to the buyer for
more than six months. For this reason holders of a Comprehensive
Short Term Guarantee policy can cover specific contracts where credit
terms of between six months and five years are offered under a
separate policy, the Supplemental Extended Terms Guarantee. The
standard Comprehensive Short Term Guarantee covers sales from stock
held overseas for immediate delivery. In addition, holders of this
policy can get ECGD cover for goods while they are in stock prior to
sale (against loss arising from war, confiscation etc) through a
Supplementary Stocks Guarantee.
The second category of trade consists of projects and large capital goods
business of a non-repetitive nature, usually of high value and involving
lengthy credit terms. Such business is not suited to comprehensive
treatment and specific policies are negotiated for each contract. Under
a Specific Guarantee, cover (which is restricted to 90% of the loss)
is provided for transactions on credit up to five years. The financing
of export transactions covered by specific policies may be facilitated
by guarantees given direct to the exporter's bank, as discussed in
Section (b) below.
Other insurance cover offered by the ECGD includes :
(1) the Construction Works Guarantee: for U.K. contractors being
employed on a specific construction project overseas.
(2) the Services Guarantee: providing cover (broadly along the
lines of ECGD insurance for sales of goods) for earnings from
technical and professional services for overseas clients.
(3) the Cost Escalation Scheme: providing partial protection against
certain U.K. cost increases for U.K. firms with capital goods
contracts worth at least £2 million with a manufacturing period
of at least 2 years.
(4) the Foreign Currency Endorsement: under which policy-holders
who invoice in foreign currencies can be protected against extra
losses through participation in the forward exchange market or
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foreign borrowing (undertaken to protect themselves against
adverse changes in the exchange rate).
(5) the Joint and Several Facility: under which the main contractor
in multi-discipline contracts (worth a minimum of £50 million
and of exceptional national interest) is indemnified against
unavoidable cost over-runs incurred for reasons outside the
insured contractor's control in connection with insured sub¬
contractors.
(6) A performance bond is an assurance to the buyer from an undoubted
third party (usually a merchant bank) that he will be compensated
if the supplier fails to perform the contract. ECGD provides
insurance cover against the unfair calling of performance bonds
by overseas clients (and also provides support for the issue
of performance bonds by supplying an indemnity to a bank willing
to issue a bond).
(b) Guarantees for Credit Financing
In the case of 'supplier credit' the manufacturer sells on deferred
payment terms, borrowing from a U.K. bank to finance the period from
shipment of the goods until payment is received. Apart from insuring
the exporter, the ECGD often also gives, for a small additional premium,
a direct guarantee to the bank providing export finance (providing the
buyer gives a promissory note or accepts a bill of exchange). The
bank can then lend to the exporter against the security of this guarantee
at special interest rates: at h% over the base rate for business on
upto two years' credit from shipment and at special fixed rates of
interest for longer term credit.
The ECGD also guarantees repayment of loans made by U.K. banks direct
to an overseas buyer for the purchase of U.K. capital equipment. Finance
is provided to the buyer at fixed preferential interest rates for up
to 85% of the value of the contract. With 'buyer credit' the exporter
receives prompt payment (or perhaps even progress payments prior to
delivery) from the U.K. bank which has provided the loan to the overseas
buyer who in turn will repay the loan in accordance with the terms of
the loan agreement with the bank.
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The ECGD now accounts for approximately one-third of all U.K.
export insurance, in the year to March 1978 insuring exports
worth £12.9 billion (Brown, 1979). Unfortunately, with the
exception of a few plant contractors, U.K. companies don't seem
to get the best out of the ECGD services (Hughes, 1979a). Tookey
(1964) discovered that unfavourable comments about the ECGD's services
appeared to stem from difficulty in understanding the complicated
regulations associated with the ECGD's policies. More recent
complaints have been associated with delays in the processing of the
credit applications which exporters must submit before they can pursue
an export order if they want ECGD cover. However, Hughes (1979a)' argues
that faults lie on both sides. The ECGD has failed to market itself
properly, to make companies aware of the ways.1 inwhich they can offer
support. For their part, exporters tend to think about financing
when negotiations are well advanced or even complete, whereas close












































































































































































































































































































































































































































KEY TO APPENDIX 7.1
1. In some cases the unit surveyed was not the entire firm but a division
or subsidiary in which the offshore-related activity of the company
was concentrated.
2. All the units surveyed were located in Scotland . The nationality
listed indicates the location of ultimate control, that is, where
the firm's headquarters is situated. The coding used is as follows:
S - Scottish company
UK - Corporate headquarters located in England or Wales
F - Corporate headquarters located overseas
JV - A joint-venture between British company(s) and foreign
company(s).
3. The North Sea experience of, for example, the platform yards has
shown that often new subsidiaries must prove their capability to the
offshore oil industry even though their parent companies may already
be established in the business. Therefore the length of offshore
involvement indicated in Appendix 7.1 refers to the period of time
for which the Scottish unit surveyed (not its parent company) has
provided products/services to the offshore oil industry. (Although
many of the purchasing and engineering functions and personnel in
oil companies/contractors will be common to both' on and offshore
oil/gas, this study concentrated on the offshore oil industry since
(a) the technology and operations associated with on and offshore
oil activities are not identical and therefore some of the
expertise derived from North Sea experience is specifically
offshore-related, and
(b) this approach narrowed the scope of the study, which was
important from the point of view of managability.)
Coding: N - New unit established in Scotland during the 1970s
and therefore having no prior experience of offshore
markets elsewhere in the world.
EN - A unit established in Scotland prior to 1970 which
had no experience of supplying offshore markets prior
to the development of the northern North Sea from
1970 onwards.
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EP - An established unit which had supplied equipment
to offshore markets prior to 1970.
4. A few companies were unwilling to disclose accurate turnover data
(broken down on an offshore/onshore and domestic/export basis), while
some firms did not organise their accounting in such a way as to be
able to provide accurate data of this type. Hence, these figures
were sometimes rough estimates. For this reason employment was
used as an indicator of size. The size referred to in Appendix 7.1
is that of the Scottish-based operation rather than the group as a
whole.
Coding: S - Not more than 150 employees
M - 151 - 1000 employees
L - Over 1000 employees.
5. Offshore-related involvement refers to the percentage of the Scottish-
based unit's turnover which, in the previous 12-month accounting
period, was accounted for by offshore-related manufacturing, where
this includes related repair work such as machining and welding under¬
taken at the manufacturer's plant but does not include the manufacture
of equipment for onshore terminals, platform yards etc. For those units
also involved in the provision of offshore-related services, the figures
in brackets refer to the proportion of turnover represented by total
offshore oil and gas activities.
6. Export performance was measured in terms of the proportion of the
Scottish-based unit's turnover exported, where exports are defined
as goods/services exported directly by manufacturers or known to be
destined for export through merchants or shipping houses. The pro¬
portion of turnover exported was chosen as the measure of export
performance because the researcher was primarily interested in whether
exports could be increased, although from the firm's point of view
profitability would probably be the obvious measure of export perform¬
ance. In any case, it is difficult to assess the profitability of
exports as some firms do not employ costing methods permitting
comparisons of the profitability of export and domestic orders to be
made, while others are likely to be reluctant to provide details of
costs and profits. Moreover, it is not possible to assess the
relationship between export performance and overall profitability as
too many factors - such as product mix and the percentage of sales
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exported - influence profitability to allow any association that •
might exist to clearly emerge. For example, if only 5% of total
sales are exported, domestic sales will exert the major influence
on profitability.
7. Offshore-related export performance is the proportion of the
Scottish-based unit's offshore-related turnover which is exported. In
only 3 cases - units N, W and M2 - did offshore-related exports
include a (relatively small) service element. Thus, with these
exceptions this listing represents the percentage of total offshore-
related turnover accounted for by exports of offshore-related
equipment.
8. These figures relate to the number of national markets outside the
U.K. to which, in the previous accounting year, these units had
exported.
9. This column lists the number of national markets outside the U.K.
to which, in the previous accounting year, these units had exported
offshore-related equipment.
10. When operational - the yard was closed at the time the fieldwork was
undertaken.



























































































































































APPENDIX 7.3 : CONTACT LETTER
389
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
Department of Business Studies
WILLIAM ROBERTSON BUILDING, 50 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JY.
031-667 1011 ext 6652
Dear
I am undertaking a study of the export potential of the Offshore Supplies
Industry, as part of a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Edinburgh funded
by the Social Science Research COuncil. A copy of a letter from Professor
Norman Hunt, Head of Department, is enclosed vouchsafing the integrity of
the study.
Your business has been selected for inclusion in a sample of Scottish
manufacturers supplying equipment to the offshore oil industry for consult¬
ation on information essential to the study. Your cooperation would be
much appreciated as without it the value of the work may be reduced.
I would desire to visit your company and interview those personnel involved
in developing and implementing export strategy, in particular the individual
who has prime day-to-day responsibility for export sales management. The
discussion topics would include current export performance, your company's
export policy and exporting methods utilised. In the event that your company
does not export at the present time an interview would nevertheless be
appreciated. I would also like to return to your company at some future
date to discuss the reaction of company employees to a forecast of future
market trends for your product group (which will be developed as a result
of consultation with industrialists, academics, government officials etc.).
I must stress that information provided will be treated in the strictest
confidence, and the identity of your firm will be protected by anonymity and,
where it is deemed necessary, by sufficient aggregation of data. However,
subject to these restrictions, and in return for your cooperation, on the
completion of the research I will make available to you a report detailing
my findings - including the aforementioned forecast - should you wish it.
I will telephone you in a few days' time, hopefully to arrange a meeting
with you, when I will be only too willing to answer any questions which you
may want to raise concerning the study.
Thanking you in anticipation of any help you may be able to offer me.
Yours,
Paul D. Gregory, B.Com.




WILLIAM ROBERTSON BUILDING, 50 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JT
from Professor Norman C. Hunt 031-667 1011 ext 6377
This is to introduce MR. PAUL GREGORY, who is a postgraduate
research student in this Department.
He is pursuing research on the export performance of Scottish
manufacturers involved in North Sea oil as a principal activity.
The University would be very grateful for your cooperation in
this important project and commends Mr. Gregory to you as a
wholly responsible person.
19th April, 1979.




TOPICS LIST (Phase 1)
A. CLASSIFICATION
1. Name and job title of respondent
2. Experience of respondent
3. Name of firm
4. Principal activity of firm
5. Degree of involvement in the offshore oil industry
6. New firm (set up specifically for the North Sea market) or
established firm
7. Scottish-based firm or Scottish subsidiary of a UK/foreign
firm
8. Equipment currently supplied by the firm to the North Sea
market; and to overseas markets
9. Length of involvement in offshore markets overseas - pre-
North Sea
10. Typical size of export orders of oil-related equipment compared
with that of home orders for oil-related equipment?
B. MANAGERIAL ATTITUDE TO EXPORTING (OIL-RELATED EQUIPMENT)/EXPORT
POLICY IMPLEMENTED
1. EXPORT POLICY :
If exporting oil-related equipment; How would you describe
your policy towards exports?
If not exporting oil-related equipment;
(a) Have you tried to export in the past?
(b) Are you considering exporting in the future? If not,
why not?
2. EXPORT AIMS :
(a) What percentage of offshore output is exported?
(b) Would you prefer a different proportionate division of
sales between export and home markets?
If yes, what division would you prefer? Why? and what action
are you taking to try to change your current position?
If no, why do you prefer the current home market/export market
mix?
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3. REASONS FOR EXPORTING :
(a) What are they?
(b) Does the firm have any special competitive advantages?
4. BENEFITS OF EXPORTING :
What are they?
5. PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO EXPORTING :
(a) What problems have you experienced with respect to trying
to export your products to offshore markets overseas?
(b) If exporting; What factors are likely to prevent an
increase in exports in the future?
If more than one oil-related product is exported; Do the
problems you have mentioned vary for different products?
If not trying to export; What problems would you expect to
experience with respect to exporting?
(c) Could your firm export more if it could produce more?
(d) If orders were increasing faster than production, how would
priority between home and export orders be determined?
6. ACTUAL AND EXPECTED PROFITABILITY OF EXPORTS :
(a) How would you describe the profitability of exports as
compared with home sales? Why is this the case?
(b) Are export prices, ex-factory, identical to home prices?
If no; What determines export prices?
(c) How essential are exports for long-term survival?
C. EXPORT STRATEGY IMPLEMENTED
(Answered only by firms with exporting experience)
1. EXPORT MARKET SELECTION :
Do you consciously select export markets?
If no; Why not?
If yes; How do you select export markets?
e.g.
(a) What factors are taken into consideration?
(b) Do you concentrate on one market or try to enter as many
as possible immediately?
WILLINGNESS TO ADAPT MARKETING MIX :
(a) Have you found it necessary in the past to adapt
your products (or other elements of your marketing mix)
to suit export markets?
How often, and in what circumstances?
(b) Is it important to adapt the product (and other
elements of the marketing mix) to suit export markets?
Why?
(c) Under what circumstances would you be prepared to
undertake changes in the product (and other elements
of the marketing mix) to suit export markets?
OVERSEAS SELLING METHODS USED :
(a) Through which channels are your products exported?
If more than one; Relative importance of each?
If agents are used; What are their rights, responsibilities
and remuneration, how are they selected?
(b) Do you use promotion or advertising of any kind in
overseas markets?
If yes; What form of sales promotion, and to what extent?
If no; Why not?
INFORMATION SERVICES UTILISED :
(a) Which export-related sources of information does the firm
use?
(b) Has the firm ever commissioned a professional consultant
to undertake market research in foreign countries?
How often, in what circumstances and why?
AWARENESS AND USE OF EXPORT SERVICES :
(a) Which export services does the firm use?
(b) Are there any other export services of which you are
aware?
Why are they not used?
ORGANISATION OF THE EXPORTING FUNCTION :
(a) How is the exporting function organised?
(b) How many employees are devoted to exporting (compared
to home sales)?
(c) Who has prime day-to-day responsibility for
export sales management?
To whom does this person report?
(d) What proportion of their time do export sales executives
and export management spend abroad?
(e) What training of export staff is undertaken?





1. Name of firm
2. Please state the year to which subsequent replies refer. Details




3. Size of firm :
(a) Number of employees
(b) Annual turnover
4. Involvement in offshore oil & gas :
(a) Offshore oil & gas related employment
i. manufacturing
ii. total offshore-related
(b) Offshore oil & gas related turnover
i. manufacturing
. ii. total offshore-related
5. Principal activity
6. What other activities, if any, does the firm undertake? What
percentage of turnover do these activities contribute?
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7.. What percentage of total turnover is exported?
8. What percentage of offshore oil & gas related turnover is
exported?
9. What equipment does the firm supply?
i. to the U.K. sector of the North Sea













10. To how many countries are you currently exporting?
(a) in total
(b) offshore oil & gas related equipment








12. Do you expect the percentage of offshore oil & gas related







13. How do you expect the geographical scope of your offshore oil
& gas related export activities to change over the next five
years?
APPENDIX 7.7
Organisations Constituting the Panel of Experts
Bank of Scotland (International Division), Edinburgh.
Department of Energy (Offshore Supplies Office), Glasgow.
Ivory & Sime, Edinburgh.
McNeill Pearson Ltd., Edinburgh.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, London.
Royal Bank of Scotland, Edinburgh and Aberdeen.
Scottish Development Agency, Aberdeen.
Scottish Economic Planning Department, Edinburgh.





(1) DEMAND FOR OIL WILL GROW AT APPROXIMATELY 1% p.a. 1980-85.
(Compared to 6% p.a. 1963-73 and 1% p.a. 1973-78).
FACTORS - lower economic growth
price mechanism eliminating energy waste
government policies to reduce energy waste
inability to change rapidly Western systems,
both technical and societal, which run on oil
and natural gas
inability to expand alternative energy resources
1980-85.
(2) THE PROPORTION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION FROM OFFSHORE AREAS
WILL GRADUALLY INCREASE 1980-85.
Oil : 15% in 1973; 20% in 1976; 22% in 1979; 25% in 1985
Gas : 10% in 1973; 17% in 1979; 23% in 1985.
FACTORS - higher oil prices make offshore oil viable
- desire in many countries to develop indigenous
energy resources
development of offshore-related technology.
(3) OFFSHORE EXPENDITURE WILL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS TO
£10 BILLION p.a. BY 1985 (from £1.2 billion in 1972; £4 billion
in 1977; £6 billion in 1979).
FACTORS - increased level of offshore activity
development of more difficult and more
expensive fields.
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2. THE U.K. CONTINENTAL SHELF
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES WILL FALL BY 25% IN
REAL TERMS 1980-85, FROM AROUND £2 BILLION IN 1979 TO ABOUT
£1.5 BILLION IN 1985.







1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
2080 1905 1625 1370 1230
150 700 950 650 300
2230 2605 2575 2020 1530
FACTORS - Capital expenditure is determined by the number and
scale of developments being undertaken. (Although
expenditure will usually peak in the third or fourth
year of a field's development).
(a) Development activity 1980-83 will be limited to the
exploitation of (mainly marginal) discoveries already
made
reduction in number and size of finds made in
the late 1970"s has resulted in shortage of large
fields awaiting development in the early 1980's.
rising oil and gas prices have made previously
marginal field developments economical.
Three major developments will get under way in 1980;
followed by a steady string of smaller, less
expensive developments commencing 1981-83.
(b) Development activity 1984-85 will consist of the
exploitation of
i. already discovered (mainly marginal) fields
ii. significant finds made 1980-82 - although
exploration activity will improve 1980-82,
success rate probably will not.
Therefore new development activity not expected to
exceed 1981-83 level.
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3. GLOBAL OFFSHORE MARKET
THE MAJORITY OF EXPENDITURE ON OFFSHORE-RELATED EQUIPMENT IS
LINKED TO NEW OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENTS. THE MAIN AREAS OF
OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT 1980-85 WILL BE :
(a) NORWAY : Current offshore expenditure of £0.85 billion
p.a. likely to be maintained in real terms. Several
significant new finds made in 1979. Protected market
but British suppliers of specialised equipment have been
successful.
(b) CANADA : Possible development 1983-85 of oil and gas
resources found in Beaufort Sea, Arctic Islands and east
coast. U.S. offshore supplies industry will probably
benefit most.
(c) U.S.A. : Large market, with activity off all coasts.
Indigenous industry can satisfy virtually all the oil
industry1s requirements.
(d) MEXICO : Major developments in Gulf of Campeche. In 1978
Pemex spent almost £1 billion on equipment, over 50% of
which was imported, mostly from the U.S.A. Current U.K.
performance in area poor, even compared to other
European countries.
(e) BRAZIL : Offshore development continuing in Campos Basin.
Reliance on foreign technology recognised and prospects good
for U.K. firms.
(f) VENEZUELA : Over £10 billion to be spend on on/offshore oil
development in the 1980's. Development of recent gas finds
1982 onwards, and prospects for U.K. firms are good.
(g) WEST AFRICA : Development continuing off the coasts of
Angola/Cabinda, Congo Republic, Nigeria and others.
(h) ABU DHABI : 1977-83 development of Upper Zakum fieldwill cost
around $4 billion, with further developments possible 1983
onwards, although French (CFP) influence benefitting French
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suppliers. Other smaller offshore developments costing
over $1 billion also under way.
(i) QATAR : Development of major offshore gas find probable,
and 'marginal' oilfields possible during 1980-85 period.
Offshore gas collection scheme under way.
(j) AUSTRALIA : Development likely 1980-84 of gas deposits in
Rankin Basin, costing £1.4 - 1.7 billion. Further
development of Bass Straits fields also likely.
(k) INDONESIA : Exploration expenditure in 1980 expected to
reach $600 billion. Significant development activity
(especially with respect to gas) anticipated 1980-85.
(1) SOUTH-EAST ASIA : Shell and Exxon continuing development
of Malaysia's offshore resources. Significant development
also off India, Philippines, Thailand and elsewhere.
(m) U.S.S.R. : Offshore development planned. Comecon market
for offshore equipment 1975-85 was estimated at around
£11 billion, of which £4 billion was to be imported. British
companies were pressing for entry. Whole situation changed
by U.S.S.R. presence in Afghanistan.
(n) CHINA : Major development work 1983 onwards. U.K.
companies well-placed as China will need to import deep-water
technology and is known to be impressed by North Sea
developments.
CONCLUSION :
U.K. MARKET FOR OFFSHORE-RELATED EQUIPMENT WILL DECLINE 1980-85, WHILE
THE GLOBAL OFFSHORE MARKET IN GENERAL EXPANDS.
APPENDIX 7.9 : LETTER OF EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING SCENARIO
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UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
Department of Business Studies
WILLIAM ROBERTSON BUILDING, 50 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JY.
031-667 1011 ext 6652
Dear
Following our conversation on the telephone I have enclosed for your
consideration a brief summary of the global oil scenario I have
prepared in order that you may have time to read it through prior to
our meeting.
I would like to stress that the prime objective of the meeting is not
to obtain your opinion of the content of the scenario, but rather to
discuss how your company would react to the market situation presented
in the scenario.
Looking forward to our meeting,
Yours sincerely,
Paul D. Gregory, B.Com.
APPENDIX 7.10
TOPICS LIST - (Phase 3)
(A) FILL IN ANY GAPS IN STAGE (1) INFORMATION.
(B) ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO GLOBAL OIL SCENARIO PRESENTED :-
(1) HAVE YOU, OR DO YOU INTEND TO, FORMULATE A DEFINITE STRATEGY
IN RELATION TO YOUR OFFSHORE-RELATED MANUFACTURING BUSINESS?
If no;
(a) Why not?
(b) Do you intend to take any action as far as your offshore
related manufacturing business is concerned? What
action and why?
(c) How do you expect your involvement in offshore markets
overseas to change?
If yes;
(a) What do you intend to do?
- Disinvest
- Increase efficiency - same profit on reduced sales
- Growth: Market penetration - what form will increased
marketing effort take?
- Growth: Product development - which product areas
will be developed?
- Growth: Diversification - into which new business
areas will the company move?
- Growth: Market development
(1) Which offshore markets will be developed?
Why these ones in particular?
(2) Which exploitation strategy will be utilised
(e.g. exporting; licensing or direct investment)
Why this method?
(b) Why was this course of action selected?
(2) WHAT EFFECT WILL THIS STRATEGY (OR LACK OF STRATEGY) HAVE ON
(a) Total employment and sales






Estimates of these variables in 1985?
EXPORT POTENTIAL OF OFFSHORE-RELATED EQUIPMENT
(1) DRILLING RIGS :-
POOR. Exportable product but high cost yard.
(2) DRILL SHIPS :-
VIRTUALLY NIL. Little demand and high cost yard.
(3) SUPPLY VESSELS :-
NIL - POOR. High cost yards with little chance of
exporting basic supply vessels but some prospect with
respect to sophisticated support vessels.
(4) PRODUCTION PLATFORMS (CONCRETE AND STEEL) :-
VIRTUALLY NIL.
(5) PRODUCT FABRICATIONS :-
MODERATE OVERALL. Ranging from poor in the case of
containerised units etc. to good as far as more sophisticated
products such as diving bells are concerned.
(6) BASIC STEEL FABRICATIONS (MODULES, HELIDECKS, FLARE BOOMS ETC)
POOR.
(7) GENERAL MECHANICAL ENGINEERING :-
CASING - MODERATE
PROCESS EQUIPMENT - MODERATE
OILFIELD PUMPS - GOOD
OILFIELD VALVES - GOOD.
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(8) OILFIELD EQUIPMENT
VERY GOOD. Companies involved are U.S. subsidiaries
which dominate this sector - which includes wellhead
equipment, down-hole tools and other oilfield equipment.
(9) ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING :-
NON OIL-SPECIFIC PRODUCTS :
MOTORS AND GENERATORS - GOOD
SWITCHGEAR - GOOD
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT - GOOD
TELEMETRY/TELECONTROL SYSTEMS - GOOD
SPECIALISED, UNDERWATER EQUIPMENT :




Managerial Attitude to Exporting by Size,






(A) Number of Employees:
Up to 150 8 6 14
151 - lOOO 13 2 15
Over lOOO 10 1 11
(B) Offshore-related Experience
Prior Experience 18 0 18
No Experience 13 9 22
(C) Nationality:
Scottish 8 8 16
Other 23 1 24
All Companies: 31 9 40
SOURCE : Interview data
APPENDIX 9.2
Reasons for Exporting
Reasons Number of Firms
Mentioning this reason
To expand sales, of which 27
- to grow (10)
- to survive/maintain employment (13)
- to increase profits (4)
To take advantage of global opportunities 8
To spread risk 8
Personal motivation, of which 6
- prestige (1)
- patriotic reasons (6)
To monitor global competition 3
Exporting is more profitable 3
To improve company's reputation 3
Exporting is easier 1
To achieve economies of scale 1
Accident 1






















































































































Comparative Advantages Allegedly Held by
Offshore-related Export Involvement
Comparative Advantages Offshore-related Export Involvement TOTAL
Exporters (25) Non-exporters (15) (40)
Track record/reputation 14 3 17
Product/expertise 12 4 16
Size of firm 6 4 10
Delivery 6 3 9
Industrial relations 6 2 8
Skilled labour force 5 2 7
Price 4 3 7
Market knowledge/contacts 7 O 7
Location 5 1 6
Credit/finance 1 2 3
Facilities 0 3 3
Marketing orientation 2 0 2
None 2 5 7
SOURCE : Interview data
APPENDIX 9.5
Number of Comparative Advantages by Offshore-related
Export Involvement
Export Involvement
Number of Comparative Advantages
TOTAL
NONE 1-2 3-7
Exporters 2 7 16 25
Non-exporters 5 7 3 15
TOTAL 7 14 19 40
SOURCE : Interview data
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APPENDIX 9.6
Comparative Advantages Allegedly Held by Proportion
of Offshore-related Turnover and Volume of
Offshore-related Equipment Exported
Number of Comparative Advantages
TOTAL
Nil 1-2 3-7
(A) Proportion of Offshore-related
Turnover Exported (%) :
Nil 6 7 5 18
1-33 0 6 9 15
34 - 100 1 1 5 7
(B) Volume of Offshore-related
Equipment Exported (£m):
Nil 6 7 5 18
Less than £1 million 1 5 8 14
£1 million and over 0 2 6 8
TOTAL 7 14 19 40






Additional costs & problems of overseas
marketing 23
Visible trade barriers 19
Inaccessibility of markets 17
Payment problems 17








Raw material & labour supply 7
Restricted export markets 7
Unsophisticated product 6
Delivery 6
Value of sterling 3
Insufficient government support 3
Credit provision 3
Lower profitability of exports 2
Location 2
None 3
SOURCE : Interview data
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Value of sterling 6
Insufficient government support 1
Visible trade barriers 1
National image 1
Raw material & labour supply- 1
Productivity 1
Restricted export markets 1
None 17
SOURCE : Interview data
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APPENDIX lO.l
The Association between the Export Market Selection Policy
Implemented and the Scope of Offshore-related Exporting Activity
Market Selection Policy
Number of Offshope-related Export.,
Markets
Total
1-6 7-12 Over 12
No selection of export
markets 3 1 1 5
Imposed restrictions on
export markets 4 2 4 10
Conscious selection of
export markets 3 3 1 7
TOTAL 10 6 6 22
SOURCE : Interview data.
APPENDIX 10.2
The Association between the Volume of Offshore-Related Exports






belated Exports 1-6 7-12 Over 12
Less than £1 million 8 5 1 14
£1 million and over 2 1 5 8
TOTAL 10 6 6 22
SOURCE : Interview data
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APPENDIX 10.3
Number of Methods of Promotion Utilised by
Offshore-related Export Performance
Proportion of Offshore-belated
Number of Methods of Turnover Exported (%) Total
Promotion Utilised
0-33 34-66 67-100
0-2 9 0 0 9
3-4 9 4 3 16
TOTAL IS 4 3 25
SOURCE : Interview data
APPENDIX 10.4
Number of Methods of Promotion Utilised by
Offshore-related Experience




No Experience Prior Experience
0 - 2 6 3 9
3-4 4 12 16
TOTAL 10 15 25
SOURCE : Interview data
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APPENDIX 10.5
Methods of Export Distribution by Offshore-related
Export Performance
Proportion of Offshore-related
Methods of Distribution Turnover Exported (%) Total
0-33 34-66 67-10O
Indirect 4 0 0 4
Salesmen 7 1 0 8
Salesmen & sales offices
overseas 6 1 1 8
Sales offices overseas 1 2 2 5
TOTAL 18 4 3 25
SOURCE : Interview data
APPENDIX 10.6




Turnover Exported (%) Total
Intelligence Sources 0-33 34-100
Internal information
system only 2 5 7
Internal information
system in association
with published or external
sources of information 10 2 12
No internal information
system 6 0 6
TOTAL 18 7 25
SOURCE : Interview data
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Neutral Zone* 141 0.2
Oman 57 0.1
Qatar * 1700 2.3

















CHINA & other Communist Nations: 991 1.4
TOTAL WORLD 72865 100.0
SOURCE : Based on OIL & GAS JOURNAL, December 31st, 1979, pp. 70-71.
1 cubic foot = 0.028317 cubic metres.















USA 26500 4.1 8650 13 .8
Canada 6800 1.1 1480 2.4
Total 33300 5.2 10130 16.2
LATIN AMERICA:
Argentina 2400 0.4 470 0.8
Barbados 1 neg. 1 neg.
Bolivia 150 neg. 30 neg.
Brasil 1220 0.2 165 0.3
Chile 400 0.1 18 neg.
Columbia 710 0.1 125 0.2
Ecuador* 1100 0.2 220 0.4
Guatemala 16 neg. 2 neg.
Mexico 31250 4.9 1490 2.4
Peru 655 0.1 195 0.3
Trinidad & Tobago 700 0.1 215 0.3
Venezuela* 17870 2.8 2330 3.7
Total 56472 8.8 5261 8.4
ASIA-PACIFIC:
Australia 2130 0.3 440 0.7
Burma 25 neg. 30 neg.
Brunei 1800 0.3 255 0.4
Republic of China
(Taiwan) 10 neg. 5 neg.
India 2600 0.4 240 0.4
Indonesia* 9600 1.5 1600 2.6
Japan 55 neg. 10 neg.
Malaysia 2800 0.4 270 0.4
New Zealand 110 neg. 16 neg.




Total 19355 3.0 2892 4.6
WESTERN EUROPE:
Austria 141 neg. 36 0.1
Denmark 375 0.1 12 neg.
France 56 neg. 20 neg.
Germany, West 480 0.1 95 0.2
Greece 150 neg. — -
Italy 645 0.1 33 0.1
Netherlands 60 neg. 25 neg.
Norway 5750 0.9 390 0.6
Spain 150 neg. 15 neg.
U.K. 15400 2.1 1570 2.5
Yugoslavia 275 neg. 70 0.1
Total 23776 3.7 2266 3.6
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Estimated Proven Reserves Production










Abu Dhabi* 28000 4 .4 1450 2.3
Bahrain 240 neg. 50 0.1
Dubai* 1400 0.2 360 0.6
Iran* 58000 9 .0 290O 4 .6
Iraq* 31000 4.8 3370 5.4
Israel 1 neg. 30 neg.
Kuwait* 65400 10.1 2210 3.5
Neutral Zone* 6260 1.0 560 0.9
Oman 2400 0.4 290 0.5
Qatar* 3760 0.6 480 0.8
Saudi Arabia* 163350 25.5 9250 14.8
Shar jah* 11 neg. 15 neg.
Syria 2000 0.3 165 0.3
Turkey 125 neg. 56 0.1
Total 361947 56.4 21186 33.8
AFRICA:
Algeria* 8440 1.3 1240 2.0
Angola-Cabinda 1220 0.2 143 0.2
Cameroon 140 neg. 32 0.1
Congo Republic 400 0.1 57 0.1
Egypt 3100 0.5 500 0.8
Gabon* 500 0.1 192 0.3
Ghana 7 neg. 3 neg.
Libya* 23500 3.7 2050 3.3
Morocco neg. neg. neg. neg.
Nigeria* 17400 2.7 2370 3 .8
Tunisia 2250 0.4 105 0.2
Zaire 135 neg. 21 neg.
Total 57072 8.9 6714 10.7
U.S.S.R.: 67000 10.4 11670 18.7
CHINA & other Communist
Nations: 23000 3.6 2470 3.9
TOTAL WORLD 641623 100.0 62588 100.0
SOURCE : Based on OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Dec. 31st 1979, pp. 70-71.
* Denotes OPEC member
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APPENDIX 11.3
Estimated World Offshore Oil Production (1979)
Barrels per day %
NORTH AMERICA:
USA 1,730,000 12.5
CENTRAL AMERICA & THE WEST INDIES:
Mexico 265,000 1.9
Trinidad & Tobago 168,358 1.2
Total 433,358 3.1
SOUTH AMERICA:


























Neutral Zone 413,000 3.0
Qatar 250,000 1.8




Barrels per day %














TOTAL WORLD: 13,815,747 100.0
SOURCE : Apart from the exceptions listed below, Appendix 11.3 is
based on the country by country survey of world oil fields in
the Oil & Gas Journal, 31.12.79, pp. 79-122, and shows
average production rates over the first 6 months of 1979.
U.S.A.: estimate - 20% (see Dafter 1978b) of total oil
production in 1979.
Mexico: offshore production as at January 1980.
Venezuela: estimate - oil production from Lake Maracaibo
(treated as offshore) accounts for roughly 80%
of total Venezuelan oil production.
Israel: includes Israeli-occupied portion of Gulf of Suez.
India & Philippines: As at December 1979 (Oil & Gas Journal,
31.12.79, p.73).
USSR & China: best estimate of total offshore oil production
:.r..\ in 1979 given available information.
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